



THE BALTIC SEA REGION

Cultures, Politics, Societies

Editor Witold Maciejewski



A Baltic University Publication



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SOCIETIES*

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Editor

Witold Maciejewski

Dept of Scandinavian and Baltic Studies, Adam Mickiewicz University
al. Niepodległości 4, 61-874 Poznań, Poland
witmacie@amu.edu.pl

Editorial Assistant

Dominika Skrzypek

Dept of Scandinavian and Baltic Studies, Adam Mickiewicz University
al. Niepodległości 4, 61-874 Poznań, Poland
dosk@amu.edu.pl

Project Leader

Lars Rydén

The Baltic University Programme, Uppsala University
Box 256, SE-751 05 Uppsala, Sweden
lars.ryden@balticuniv.uu.se

Proof reading: Douglas Harrison, Aberfoyle, Scotland
Drawings: Małgorzata Sheiki-Bińkowska or as indicated
Maps: Radosław Przebitkowski or as indicated
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Witold Maciejewski

The Baltic Sea Region – Culture, Societies, Politics is the first textbook on a European macroregion, as seen from the perspective of humanities. The authors give a holistic, cross-disciplinary view on the countries around the Baltic, their common history, cultural and social development, politics and economy.

The textbook conveys a general understanding of the societies in the region, emerging democracies, and forming new relations between new and old states. It constitutes the main reading for a university course offered by the Baltic University Programme, coordinated at Uppsala University.

The point of departure for this book was the revision of the series of booklets *Peoples of the Baltic* produced in the early 1990s. However, intensive and close discussions on the changing Baltic world provoked new questions concerning the new deal in our part of Europe and resulted in the new book. Fifty-five authors, active within the BUP-network, have contributed with articles and essays on subjects considered relevant for studies on the region.

The editor takes this opportunity to thank all the co-editors and authors, and especially Lars Rydén (Uppsala). His encouragement and competent suggestions have influenced both the contents and the final form of this book.

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ABBREVIATIONS

ABM	Anti-ballistic missile (missile defence against intercontinental ballistic missiles)	EVS	European Value Study
B7	Islands of the Baltic Sea	FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
BaltSeaNet	Baltic Sea Area Studies: Northern Dimension of Europe	GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
BCCA	Baltic Sea Chambers of Commerce Association	GDI	Gender Development Index
BEEGS	Baltic and East European Graduate School	GDP	Gross Domestic Product
BIP	Baltic Investment Programme	GEM	Gender Empowerment Measure
BOD	biochemical oxygen demand	GIWA	Global Initiative for Water Assessment
BSBS	Baltic Sea Business Summit	HDI	Human Development Index
BSR	Baltic Sea Region	HELCOM	The Baltic Marine Environment Protection Commission – the Helsinki Commission
BSSSC	Baltic Sea States Sub-regional Council	HELCOM-PITF	Project Implementation Task Force
BUP	Baltic University Programme	IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
BW	Biological weapons	ICBM	Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles
CBM	Confidence-building measures	IDA	International Development Association
CBSS	Council of the Baltic Sea States	IMF	The International Monetary Fund
CBW	Chemical and biological weapons	INF	Intermediate range Nuclear Forces
CCB	Coalition Clean Baltic	INGOs	International Non-Governmental Organizations
CEECs	Central and Eastern European countries	ISPA	Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession
CFE	conventional armed forces in Europe	KOR	Komitet Obrony Robotników, Committee for Defense of Workers
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy	M(B)FR	Mutual (and Balanced) Force Reductions
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States	MAD	Mutually assured destruction (deterrence based capacity of each super-power to destroy the other)
CPMR	Council of Peripheral Maritime Regions	MIC	military-industrial complex
CSBM	Confidence and Security Building Measures	MNE	multinational enterprise
CSCE	Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (Helsinki 1975)	NACC	North Atlantic Co-Operation Council
CTB(T)	Comprehensive Test Ban (Treaty); (nuclear weapons)	NAFTA	North American Free Trade Association
CW	Chemical weapons	NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development	NDF	Nordic Development Fund
EC	European Community	NEFCO	Nordic Environment Finance Corporation
EEC	European Economic Community	NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisations
EFTA	European Free Trade Association	NIB	Nordic Investment Bank
EIB	European Investment Bank	NKF	Nordic Arts Centre, Nordisk Kunstcentrum
ESPAD	The European School Survey Project on Alcohol and Other Drugs	NOMUS	Nordic Music Committee
EU	European Union	NOPEF	Nordic Project Export Fund
EÜE	the Estonian Students Building Troops		

NORDICOM	Nordic Council for Scientific Information and Research (Nordisk Dokumentationscentral for Masskommunikationsforskning)	SDI	Strategic Defence Initiative ('Star Wars' programme, USA, launched 1983)
		SLBM	Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile
		START	Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (US-USSR negotiations beginning in 1982; START I agreement signed 1991, START II between USA and Russia in 1993)
NORDOK	Nordic Council of Scientific and Technical Documentation		
NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty (nuclear weapons)	TACIS	Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States
NWFZ	Nuclear Weapons Free Zone R&D Research and Development	TBN	Trans-Baltic Network
OSCE	Organisation on Security and Co-operation in Europe	UBC	Union of the Baltic Cities
		UNCED	United Nations' Conference on Environment and Development
PES	Public Employment Services		
PPF	Partnership for Peace	UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
PHARE	Poland and Hungary Assistance to the Reconstruction of the Economy	UNEP	United Nations' Environmental Programme
PPP	Purchasing Power Parity	VASAB	Vision and Strategies Around the Baltic Sea 2010
SALT	Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (SALT I and II)	VAT	Value Added Tax
SAMNAM	Nordic Amateur Music Co-operation Council	WHO	World Health Organisation
		WTO	World Trade Organization
SAPARD	Special Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development	WVS	World Value Survey
		WW I	World War I
Sberbank	Russia's central bank	WW II	World War II
SCANDOC	Scandinavian Documentation Centre		

INTERNET LINKS

Baltic University Programme.

<http://www.balticuniv.uadm.uu.se/>

The Baltic Sea Area Studies: Northern Dimension of Europe.

<http://www2.rz.hu-berlin.de/BaltSeaNet>

The Baltic Sea Region Studies at University of Turku.

<http://www.utu.fi/hum/tdk/english/baltic/>



Introduction – how to study a region

Figure 1. Photo: Katarzyna Skalska

INTRODUCTION – HOW TO STUDY A REGION

The Baltic Sea Region and the relevance of regional approaches

Lars Rydén

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The Baltic Sea Region and the relevance of regional approaches

Lars Rydén

1. How the word “region” is used

This book is about a region, and how to study a region. A particular region, the Baltic Sea region, is in focus but there is also the general issue of how to understand the development in and of a region. How should such a study be done? Are there general tools for understanding regions that we want to apply? What constitutes a region, and the process of regional development?

The concept of region is used mainly in two ways. Firstly a region may be a part of a state, that is a county or perhaps a province. We then refer to an area where the inhabitants commute to work and study, and conduct more or less daily trips to buy goods or services, and where there is a considerable economic interaction. The concept of regional policy mostly refers to this and is below state but above city or municipality level.

The word region is also used to denote an area that consists of several states or parts of states. This concept of inter- or multinational regions is the one used below.

The traditional concept of regional geography is relevant here but far from sufficient. We will need to look at regions in many ways – their landscapes and environments, their societies and their histories, the people living there, the economies and so on. These pictures will together form a richer image of what a region is, why we talk about and think in terms of regions and how we prefer to constitute regions. Below, we will compare the Baltic Sea region with regions in other parts of the world, and thereby put our own region in perspective.

It should be mentioned here that not everyone accepts the concept of a Baltic Sea Region. The argument seems to be that it is too diverse, has too little internal contacts, that communality is lacking, and that therefore there are really no reasons to call this a region. It is certainly true that the present generation inhabiting the region do not know each other well at all and thus did not realise that they belonged to a Baltic Sea region as such. I will, however, argue here that this is not in itself an absolute criterion of presence or absence of regionality, and that there are many other ways to see the relevance of regions. Instead, we may in general point to the need to give the world some structure to understand it, a structure which tells us of which parts it consists.

How to define a region

Administrative *state borders* are an obvious way to structure the world. But there are many other demarcations than political ones to be used when structuring the world.

If we use the human dimension, *the people* living in the world, then language, culture, religion can all be used to define regions.

The *physical shape of the world*, the landscape or the waterscape, is another principle to make up regions. In the mixture of water and land, we see continents, islands, coasts, lakes, and rivers, we see mountains, deserts, forests, plains and so on. Regional geography deals with these features.

Yet another way to structure the world is *the biology*, the life forms living in the world. The biologists define life zones, each of which is inhabited by a characteristic collection of species of plants and animals. Biologists talk about bio-geographical zones, sometimes vegetation zones or – in American jargon – biomes. Examples of such zones are the arctic zone, the pine forest, also called the boreal zone or taiga, and the broad-leaved forest zone if we focus on northern Europe. Further south there are the tropical forests, deserts etc.

There are interesting interrelations between these different principles for the definition of regions. Sometimes these interrelationships are obvious. Thus deserts are defined geographical areas, but they also have very special biology and are inhabited by special peoples, often nomads. In short it is clear that the culture, economy and, in general, living conditions of a people depend on the physical conditions and the biology in the area in which they live. From this it follows that even if we define regions using one principle – often the geographical one forms the starting point – the definition is expected to be of significance for other ways to structure the world as well.

Table 1a. The definitions of the Baltic Sea Region in major co-operative projects

Project	Definition	Purpose of co-operation	Comment
The 1992 Convention for the Protection of the Baltic Sea Helsinki Commission, HELCOM	The Baltic Sea, including all sub-basins and Kattegat, with their drainage basins	Environmental protection of the common water; monitoring and reporting	The original 1974 convention referred to the same waters, but did not include the drainage basins
Council of the Baltic Sea States, CBSS, from 1992	9 coastal states + all Nordic states, i.e. Norway and Iceland are added	Intergovernmental co-operation in the region	The EU Commission takes part as observer
Vision and Strategies Around the Baltic Sea 2010, VASAB from 1992	Nine coastal states + Belarus; In Russia the drainage basin + Murmansk regions included	Co-operation of spatial planning between ministries of planning	
Baltic 21 cooperation	Same as in CBSS	Sustainable development in the region	From 2001 as a CBSS cooperation
Union of Baltic Cities from 1991	Drainage basin of the Baltic Sea, same as	HELCOM Cooperation between cities	

2. How water can define a region

What about the Baltic Sea region (BSR), what is it? It may be defined in several ways. One way is to look at the sea and the areas close to the beaches of the Baltic Sea itself. We will then end up in a region consisting mostly of the sea itself. This was the approach taken when the first international agreement on the BSR in “modern” times was written, in 1974, the Convention of the protection of the Baltic Sea. The organisation set up to work with it, which is hosted by Finland and situated in Helsinki, is known as the Helsinki Commission, Helcom. The focus of the Convention was on the sea itself, and activities like shipping were important. A considerable monitoring activity regarding the Baltic Sea was agreed on in the convention and thus Helcom became an unusually lively contact point for the countries around the Baltic Sea during the Cold War.


Geographically it makes more sense to include not only the coasts of the sea but also the inland connected to the sea through waterways and rivers. This land is called the drainage basin of the sea, or the catchment or watershed in American jargon. Geographically, a region was classically very often defined in this way – a drainage basin. There were several reasons. Conditions within the basin were often comparable. Historically, travels were most easily made on water and therefore interaction in the region often dominated over those with the world outside the drainage basin, in both peace and war.

In Europe there are six large sea basins. These are the areas draining to the Baltic Sea, the North Sea, the Mediterranean, the Black Sea, the Caspian Sea and finally the White Sea and Barents Sea basins. The classical Mediterranean region might be the best known of these. In the world as a whole it is possible to point to 60 such areas connected to a local sea or other larger water body. Well known are, for instance, the Great Lakes district in the USA, the Lake Victoria region in Eastern Africa and the Gulf of Thailand in Southeast Asia.

These basins are often international. The Baltic Sea region contains, in addition to the 9 coastal states, 5 inland states with larger or smaller areas draining to the Baltic Sea. The Great Lakes district in North America holds 12 US states and Canadian provinces, and Lake Victoria in Africa five states, in their respective basins.

The Baltic Sea

It should be noted that the definition of the Baltic Sea is not given a priori. The Sea may be delineated in several ways. The so-called Baltic proper is the water south of Åland and east of Denmark. This body of water is in constant exchange with waters around it in the north, south and east. These waters were included in the Baltic Sea convention in 1974. They are the Bothnian Bay, the Bothnian Sea, the Gulf of Finland, the Gulf of Riga and the Belt Sea. Kattegat, north of the Öresund, was also included, although Kattegat may easily be included in the North Sea. Kattegat is marine and salty, but it has much in common with the Baltic Sea when it comes to its environmental situation, since it is shallow and threatened by a large influx of polluted water from its drainage area which is mostly agricultural. In this way the area defined in the Convention includes seven interconnected water bodies. Delineating the Baltic Sea in this way is today in common use.



Map 1. See map The main sea regions of the world on p. I. Ill.:
Radosław Przebitkowski

Also, rivers with their catchment or drainage basins often define geographical regions. Classical river basins are the Amazonas, i.e. the Amazon river basin in South America, the Yellow river basin in China, the Nile basin in Africa, and the Rhine river basin in Europe. Also these larger rivers typically flow through several states.

It is typical that the common water body is important to all states in the region. We thus often see international agreements on shipping, fishing, coastal management etc.

International river commissions exist all over the world. These commissions often survive in times when all other contacts between the states in a drainage area are frozen or even broken. An example is the Mekong river commission in Southeast Asia that continued working during the Vietnam war. The task of the commission was to agree on water levels for the rice cultivation, but political issues were discussed secretly in the commission. We may, of course, remind ourselves that the Helsinki Commission on the Baltic Sea worked during the Cold War period.

As mentioned, up to recent times, rivers, and, in general, water was in fact a more important framework for communication than land – and it still is in many ways. This means that river basins or the basin of a Sea were areas of more communication within themselves than with the surrounding world. They were regions in this basic sense, areas of communication. From this it follows that they had much common history, common culture, and common economy. In the Baltic Sea Region the Viking period, and the Hanseatic League period, remind us of this basic fact. However, contact with the Baltic Sea was important politically much later and in fact is still important.

3. The Baltic Sea region

The Baltic Sea *drainage basin* includes wholly or partly the territory of 14 countries altogether with some 85 million inhabitants. In addition to the nine coastal states – Sweden, Finland, Russia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Germany and Denmark – we also find Belarus with almost half its area in the basin, and smaller parts from Ukraine, Czech and Slovak republics draining through Poland in the south, and very small parts of Norway draining through Sweden in the west.

Germany contributes to comparatively smaller land areas along river Odra and the coast itself. However, some of the areas that drain into the North Sea through the Elbe are often of concern in a Baltic context by tradition from Hanseatic times. In Denmark, about 50% drains to the Baltic Sea, if the Kattegat is included, which we will do here.

The whole drainage area covers 1,745,000-km². If the Baltic Sea is included in the area, it will be 2,250,000 km². This is about 15% of all Europe.

The border of the drainage basin is called the *water divide*. The Baltic water divide is easy to find where the basin is limited by high mountains. On the Scandinavian mountains in the

north and west, the water divide and the national border between Norway and Sweden almost coincide along the ridges. In the south, the Carpatian mountains form the water divide which again practically coincides with the national borders between Poland and its two southern neighbours. In the east, however, the divide is found in a much flatter landscape. In Belarus the sources of the rivers of Dvina/Daugava going to the Baltic Sea and Dniepr flowing to the Black Sea are close, and equally in Ukraine where sources of river Bug running to the Wisła and further to the Baltic and Dniestr running into the Black Sea are close. These are the areas where the Vikings crossed from the Baltic to the Black Sea basins one thousand years ago. Also, in Germany and Denmark the divide is found in a flat landscape.



Map 2. The Baltic Sea Region. The Baltic Basin, i.e. the drainage area of the Baltic Sea, including Kattegat, is marked by the bold line. In this region all water flows towards the Baltic Sea.

The nature of the Baltic basin is extremely diversified (see chapter 9). It may be described from many perspectives. In general, it is characterised by boreal forests in the north, agricultural areas in the south and an abundance of water. In the southernmost part of the area are the Tatra mountains and the mining areas of Czech and Slovak Republics which drain to the Baltic Sea via the Odra and Wisła rivers. Just north of these mountains, in the southern part of Poland, western Ukraine and Belarus, is a densely populated industrial and agricultural area. The arable land, 20% of the catchment, is concentrated here. Poland alone accounts for 41% of the arable land. In the south, the population density is also by far the highest. Poland accounts for almost half of the 85 million population in the basin with its 39.5 million inhabitants.

The eastern rim of the Baltic Sea with the Baltic States and Russia south of St-Petersburg is less populated, but in some parts of this area, there is a concentration of heavy industry. The largest rivers in the east are the Nemunas and Daugava.

The central part of the drainage area, with Sweden, Finland and north-western Russia has a large number of lakes, with 83,000 of them in Sweden alone. Here, we find Lakes Ladoga,

Onega, Peipus/Chudskoe, and Vänern, which are the largest in Europe. The water from Ladoga and Onega in Russia enters the Gulf of Finland via the important but short Neva river.

The forests dominate in the north, and here forestry is economically very important. Sweden, Finland and north-western Russia together have close to 80% of the forests of the basin. In the most northern and north-western parts of the basin, we find large and high mountains, the Swedish and Norwegian fjell. This region is only sparsely populated. A number of large rivers, several with impressive waterfalls, are found here, many of them with hydroelectric power stations and large upstream reservoirs.

The Baltic basin has a very long north-south extension, about 3,000 km. The climate is thus dramatically different in the north and south (see chapter 9.7). The mean annual temperature in the north is 0°C. At the southern end of the basin, mean annual temperature is 8-12°C. The Baltic Sea basin receives a comparatively large volume of precipitation each year. Evenly spread out over the basin, it amounts to 40 cm of water per year. The north has an abundance of water resources and at the same time a small population. In the south, on the contrary, precipitation is lower and evapotranspiration higher. Water availability is limiting agriculture in large areas of Poland.

The degree of urbanisation is largest in the western and central parts of the region, with a maximum of over 90% in the industrialised areas of Sweden and Denmark, and decreasing to below 70% in the east. St Petersburg is the largest city in the region with its 5 million inhabitants. There are a total of 29 cities with more than 250,000 inhabitants.



Figure 2. The landscape of northern Sweden. Photo: Andrzej Szmaj

From the point of view of the people, the Baltic region is very heterogeneous. In fact looking at the region it counts as one out of three European areas or large diversity, and one out of three important fault lines between different peoples, cultures, and political systems. The other two are the Caucasus where the Islamic/Arabic, Turkish and Slavic/Orthodox world meet, and the Balkans where the

Turkish, Slavic, Germanic and Italian cultures meet. In the Baltic, the interfaces are between the Nordic (west), West Germanic (south), Finno-Ugric (north) and Slavic (east) worlds.

We find diversity, however, not only in these three regions. International regions are typically diverse areas of intercultural communication. It holds for the classical Mediterranean world with its diversity of people from Greek and Roman as well as North African and Middle Eastern origin. It is equally possible to say a similar thing about e.g. the North Sea basin with its Scottish, English, French, Dutch, German and Scandinavian components. However the three mentioned areas of “cultural fault lines” had a special situation after the end of the Cold War and the aftermath of the “deconstruction” of the Soviet Union and the communist states.

Table 1b. Frameworks for regionalisation

Category of regionalisation	Purpose	Methods	Possible outcome
Political	Political co-ordination	Creating security Building common institutions	Formation of Unions, Federations
Economic	Economic co-operation, increasing markets	Free trade agreements	Common banking Formation of free trade areas
Planning	Planning co-operation, co-ordination of infrastructure		Common authorities
Environmental	Environmental protection	Setting common rules, surveillance	Common monitoring and reporting

The peoples of the Baltic, as well as in other regions, are thus diverse in their origins, cultures, languages and roots. However, the smaller, more homogenous areas do not necessarily lie within one state, but are rather more often intersected by national borders.

Within the European Union this has been recognised, and an interesting policy to support co-operation and development in small areas with common history, culture and often environment has been implemented. These smaller areas include e.g. the Archipelago region between Sweden and Finland, the Pomeranian region with Poland, Germany and Sweden, and the Green Lungs region between Poland, Lithuania and Belarus. In general, the European Union's approach has led to less emphasis on the national states, as these often trans-border cultural regions at one end and the multinational regions at the other get interest and support. It has also promoted pride of local cultures, as these get more recognition.

4. Three ways to study a region

How to study the development of a region? Here I will use three different conceptual frames: regional development as a *political process*, as an economic process (perhaps progress), and as a so-called spatial process. The three may be studied separately, but are connected, most interestingly through the paradigm of sustainable development.

Regional development as a political process focuses on *regional institution building*. Political co-operative structures, from loose alliances to federal states, exist all over the world. In northern Europe we may point to the Nordic countries as a relevant example. Here a long common history of political interaction in war and peace over almost a thousand years finally evolved into a situation where we find much co-operation in many fields, from politics and economy to culture, education, and environmental protection to mention but a few. The Baltic Sea region may also be studied from this aspect. It is certainly true that it has been more divided than united over the period of the Cold War, but the situation before and after has been much different.

Regional development and international institution building have several corollaries. The first is obviously the historical process of *state formation* – regions are made up of states – and the connected development of democracy, *democratisation* (see Section IV on democracy). Regional development may be seen as a maturing of the states and their democratic institutions, making them increasingly better working and more fair. Democracy serves the purpose of a non-violent tool to *solve conflicts*, but is also used as a huge machinery for redistribution of the resources of society to make it *more equal*. We may refer to the development of *human rights*, and *minority rights*. In political regions all over the world these rights are expected to be respected and “regional authorities” may intervene in the internal politics of member states to support democracy and human rights.

The political process of international institution building serves the important political purpose of managing of international conflicts. Thus political regions are, to a larger or smaller extent, also security regions, or, in slightly stronger wording, *security communities* (that is, they are not, or not only, defence alliances, see chapter 32). An example of a security community is the European Union, where there is a large family of institutions to resolve conflicts between member countries, in spite of the fact that fifty years ago the most devastating war ever was fought between these same countries. We may thus ask to what extent the Baltic Sea region is developing in the same direction.

Secondly, regional development may be seen as an *economic process* – or even progress – focusing on *trade* (see Section VIII on economy). Even if trade is as old as human society, its present enormous volume and extent has become a new phenomenon in the 20th century. Economic development has to do with production and the creation of markets to sell and trade the products. A basic pattern in the world as a whole is that trade flows are largest with neighbours, if artificial constraints do not interfere. The natural development of trade thus leads to the development of international regional co-operation and region formation. In the BSR trade has a long history from the Hanseatic League in the Medieval times and on to the present day (comp. on the Hansa in chapter 2).

Economic development also includes the increased capacity, diversity, and sophistication of the economic life of the members in the region. Region building will allow member states to specialise and rely on other members for that which they do not produce easily themselves. They may also rely on common institutions for investments and economic development. With a large common economy they also become dependent on each other for economic stability, labour market and currency politics.

Thirdly, regional development may be seen as a *spatial process* focussing on *resource use*. Obvious components here are communications infrastructure with the laying of roads, railroads, ferry lines etc, habitation infrastructure with urbanisation and city development of large and smaller cities. Spatial development also includes the use of *natural resources* – forest, agriculture, mines, energy, etc – and the *environmental impact* of resource use. Resource use also requires an infrastructure, consisting of hydropower dams, electric grids etc, but it is equally connected to the use of land, that is *regional planning*. This way of studying a region is close to the classical one in regional geography, where the natural resources and their use for economic development was a main concern.

The concept of *sustainable development*, finally, combines social, economic and environmental aspects. Here, social may, or perhaps should, be defined in such a way that it contains political and security aspects as have been discussed above. It certainly also includes the economic aspects and the use of natural resources. A weak point is that these different dimensions of sustainability are not related to each other in a well defined theory.

The three frames for regional studies can be defined more precisely and thus allows us to compare regions. It is thus possible to compare development of regions, e.g. regarding economy and democracy, and thus see if regions develop in similar ways. It is possible to do this in a more quantitative way using the notion of *indicators*. There are, however, hundreds of indicators in use and it is not easy to choose the most relevant ones or even to measure indicator values. However, a start to do that has been achieved in the study of sustainability of different regions. For the Baltic Sea region a first report from the Baltic 21 project in 2001 contains a series of indicator values for the region and their change over time.

Below we will look more closely at the Baltic Sea region from the various perspectives indicated above. We will use a historical approach to clearly describe development, but with the purpose to critically analyse the contemporary situation.

5. The origin of the Baltic Sea region – state formation and development of democracy

In the Baltic Sea region state formation can be seen from about 1000 AD. The first states were not strong and the central power did not control the entire area of the state. This was the situation during all the Middle Ages. The better organised states in southern and continental Europe had a considerable influence on the events in the BSR and some historians have called this the “europeanization” of the Baltic Sea region, referring to the period 1100 to 1400.

Strong centralised states developed in the Lutheran parts of the region around approximately 1600, after the Reformation. These states had the military, economic and juridical power. They collected taxes, customs etc to become the economically most powerful actors. The power was used to raise and equip armies and conduct war with large military force. The wars in the 17th century, the Thirty Years War and the following Polish-Swedish war, spread to involve all states in Europe, from Spain to Russia. They were indeed devastating. When in the 20th century this was again the case the warring states became equally centralised, equally strong and with equally disastrous results. The 1600s and the 1900s have many sad parallels, as the most violent centuries in our history.

The strong centralised state invariably used its monopoly of violence also against its own inhabitants. This violence took all kinds of forms of oppression. As a result, a dichotomy developed between the state and the rest of society, the so-called civil society. A strong central power, in the form of a king or otherwise, has in history been shown to have its limitations



Figure 3. Some Nordic countries have a long tradition of public involvement in national politics, here illustrated by the election of the medieval Swedish king Magnus (13th century). Ill.: Uppsala University Library

as a guiding principle for developing a society. The alternative principle is the *division of power*. This was common in the historical origins of the societies in the Baltic region. There were many power holders and the king just had his special role to fulfil as “head of state”. Originally a leader – a king – was appointed by *election*. It may be that few members of the society were allowed to vote. Well documented procedures for the election of kings exist from the middle ages, around the year 1000, in e.g. Iceland, Sweden and Poland. *Elected assemblies*, parliaments, are also very old. The first Icelandic parliament, the Allting met in 1000, the first Swedish Riksdag in 1334, and the first Polish Sejm in 964. Novgorod had a representative democracy well in place in the Middle Ages from its origin around 900. Likewise, the first *courts* are equally old. In Old Uppsala, which in Viking times was a political and religious centre in the Baltic Sea region, one may still visit the mound where court cases are said to be have been conducted every 11 years.

The three basic components of a democratic state – the executive power or the king, the representative power or the parliament, and the judging power or the court – thus featured as “social inventions” very early. These inventions were repressed in the strong states in the 1600s, but came back during the 1700s with the French revolution and the American constitution as spearheads.

The first modern constitution in the Baltic Sea region was written in Poland in 1793, just before its final eradication as a state, and in Sweden in 1809. However, it was much later that a modern process of general election, in which all groups were allowed to take part, was established. Finland was in fact the first country in the world to allow women to vote in 1906. This was the establishment of true *representative* democracies, where the inhabitants could express their preferences in elections, elections which were “*free and fair*”: all those who want to run for election should be given a fair chance to do so, and all those who want to express their opinion and criticise or argue for various candidates in an election should be free to do so.

Those who have been given the confidence of the people in election, rule the country for a defined period of time. However, in a fully matured democracy, the people do not sit back and watch between elections. They should have the possibility to intervene, take part and be active. This is *participatory* democracy. Just as representation may take many different shapes, so does participation. The *political parties* were central. But there are many other kinds of groups that may pursue political goals without running for parliament. These are the so-called *interest groups* or, in general, non-governmental organisations, NGOs. NGOs are important components of the civil society in mature democracies. Interest groups have always existed in societies but it was not until the end of the 19th century that modern political parties developed. NGOs, blossomed in the western democracies after the WW II. These groups are important in societal development, especially when the public authorities are weak.

In a democracy ideally a *majority decision* should also be fair enough to allow all groups not only to accept it, but in fact also work for it. This of course requires a considerable respect for the process, and the process requires a considerable degree of respect for the partners. Integrity should be a key word, which is related to the development of *human rights*, and *minority rights*. The respect for those who have a different view or ideology or even more so, religious belief, appeared in a formal sense from the 1600s at the end of the large wars with the treaty of Oliwa outside Gdansk in northern Poland in 1660, as an extension of the older Polish law from 1573. It has since developed in many ways (see chapters 30 and 31). A more recent invention is the *ombudsman* institution, a Swedish name for a person or authority that represent a weak group in society. Disrespect for others, especially ethnic groups, is still a major concern in many societies. It turned out to be devastating in the Balkans after the Cold

War. It is also a true challenge in the Baltic region as our societies become increasingly more mixed and multi-ethnic.

The description of regional development within the paradigm of the political process may be seen as the *maturation of democratic institutions*, making them increasingly better working and more fair. We may also refer to the net of social contacts. The trust between individuals and organisations that this represents is today more often referred to as *social capital*. There are many ways in which social capital can express itself and become meaningful (see chapter 12). One of these is in the relationship between the state and civil society. A proper working state needs both legitimacy and confidence. A state that does not have *legitimacy*, that does not in a very clear way represent the inhabitants, will be seen as separate from them. It is through the democratic system that the state acquires legitimacy. A legitimate system also has some *confidence*. As an example, people in general are willing to pay taxes since they know that the money goes to health care, streets, schools, and other common responsibilities, and trust they are used well.

It remains to be said that in the world as a whole, the process of state formation and democratisation has only begun. Large parts of Africa are now at the beginning of this process as colonisation has ended. In Latin America the wars have largely ended after the systems shift and the development of democracy is promising. Much of the development that many people desire, a peaceful world, a protected environment and a good economy, will have to wait until the strong absolutist state changes in a more democratic direction.

6. The present political scene – co-operation increases

The formation of political co-operative structures, from loose alliances to federal states, is a central part of regional development. Tighter structures, federal states, include in Europe with among others the United Kingdom, with England, Scotland (for two years with its own parliament), Wales and Northern Ireland (now with increasing autonomy), and the German Federal Republic. In the world as a whole, larger states are federal in some sense. This is the case for instance in North America with USA and Canada, in Brazil and in the Russian Federation. Groups of states with extensive co-operation but which are not federations include the Nordic countries and Benelux. The outstanding inter-state political structure in Europe is the European Union. It is an economic union but also a political one in which many common institutions have been created to allow the co-ordination of political measures as well as the co-ordination of legal initiatives and changes. There are today in the 15 countries of the EU, both those who want a tighter structure, so called federalists, and those who argue for a looser structure, the unionists.

Is the Baltic Sea region in some sense a political region? It is clear that a considerable move towards the creation of common institutions has marked the will to create political co-operation in the region. Foremost is the Council of Baltic Sea States, the CBSS, created in 1992, including the 9 coastal states, all the Nordic states (with Norway and Iceland included) and the European Commission. The inland states, e.g. Belarus, do not take part. The CBSS has since autumn 2000 an enlarged mandate and will be charged with all inter-governmental co-operation in the region. Its secretariat in Stockholm has a Polish Secretary General and personnel from several other countries in the region. The presidency in the CBSS rotates between the member states, which chair the council for one year at a time. In 2001-2002 the

presidency is held by Russia. The CBSS manages e.g. social issues such as crime prevention in the region, and works to combat drug traffic. Presently issues such as common security and economic integration are not treated in the Council and it is thus still a rather weak political body. As from the autumn of 2000 it includes, however, the work towards sustainable development in the BSR, the so-called Baltic 21, with its own secretariat in Stockholm. At present there are three common intergovernmental secretariats in the region, the Helcom Secretariat in Helsinki, the CBSS with the B21 Secretariat in Stockholm, and the VASAB Secretariat in Gdansk. To this should be added a co-operation at the parliamentary level, as the Nordic council regularly has invited the three Baltic States and Poland since the early 1990s to join their annual meetings.

Co-operations at a lower administrative level have also bloomed in the region after the systems shift. The Union of Baltic Cities, UBC, was formed as early as 1991 through an initiative by Kalmar in Sweden. It has developed to support a large number of so-called town twinnings, or friendship towns, and has its own extensive program. In 2002 it numbered 99 member cities. It may be compared to associations of cities on the national level, and the now long-working association of cities on European level as well as in other areas of the world. On the sub-state, that is county, level there is also a Baltic Sea region co-operation, called the BSSSC, Baltic Sea States Sub-regional Council, with its office in Copenhagen. In addition the CPMR, Council of Peripheral Maritime Regions, with its main office in France, has a Baltic Sea Region group, just as there have now been for a long time similar groups in e.g. the Mediterranean and elsewhere.

In all these developments of new institutions since the systems shift the region referred to is the Baltic Sea basin. The Baltic Sea region is thus developing politically as a region of co-operation. It is true that some parts of the region, such as the arctic area, are less tightly involved in all these new activities, but they are nevertheless invited. For political reasons Belarus has not been invited to join most of these institutions. For geographical reasons Ukraine, Slovakia and the Czech republic are also normally not involved although they share small pieces of the drainage basin. However Norway, although its share is equally small, is invited in its capacity as a Nordic country.

7. The Baltic Sea region as a security region

Baltic Sea region politics have been a key element in foreign politics in Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Norway since 1990, while Germany has focused on the unification of the two German states. Since the early 1990s the Swedish government investments have been several tens of millions Euro yearly summarising over the state budget as a whole. If one adds the values of initiatives from counties, municipalities, various associations, down to the individuals, the sum is certainly much larger. Why these considerable efforts?

At least when reading official documents, the answer is clear and not entirely altruistic: Security politics. The goal for the Swedish Baltic Sea politics is to develop regional security to avoid further East-West confrontation, a backlash of the Cold War. Instead of a costly confrontation and military threat on the other side of the Baltic Sea we would like to see co-operation and market possibilities.

This is the “Realpolitik” dimension. One can be perfectly sure that there is as well a very real human dimension to the Swedish interest, as well as of that in other countries, in co-

operation and investing in the region. Countless individuals are motivated by a concern for fellow human beings in neighbouring countries which suffered greatly over many years. This concern is of course additionally powered by all those who have a refugee background in some way, and sometimes also have family in the former communist countries.

The security dimension of regional co-operation has been addressed as the issue of security community (see Section VI on security). A security community is a region in which disputes are not expected to escalate to armed conflict but are settled through various peaceful means, for instance, through negotiations in common institutions. Making a survey of such 'security regions' in the world highlights that they are characterised by democratic institutions, economic integration, and well-developed broad co-operation.

Seen from this perspective, the politics in the Baltic Sea region in the 1990's and later is not very different from what happened on continental Europe in the aftermath of the Second World War, with its economic support, especially the Marshall plan, to the new German Bundesrepublik, and the efforts to increase co-operation between two of the main warring parties, France and Germany, and the support of democracy and creation of common international institutions. These efforts led to the coal and steel agreement, and later to the European Union. One might have divided opinions on many aspects of the development of the European Union. I do not think, however, that anybody would expect a conflict between member states to end up in an armed confrontation. The Union is in fact a security community. Other examples are the Nordic Countries, and the countries in North America.

Will the Baltic region ever be united? What are the arguments for and against? On the positive side, we have the development of a number of common institutions, such as the Council of Baltic Sea States, and the incorporation – or co-operation – of the “new democracies” into existing structures such as the Nordic Council (see chapter 37). The further development will lead to the enlargement of the European Union and NATO to cover part of the region. One might question if this is good, considering that not all of the region will be part of these institutions. We do not want a new iron curtain, not even further away. The recent events in the autumn of 2001, where a common fight against terrorism entered a top position on the political agenda, have led to an unforeseen co-operation between the USA and the Russian Federation, which may ease these concerns for the situation in the Baltic Sea region.

We may also analyse the development in a broader context. Traditionally, security was considered to depend on military might. The assumption was that an aggressor could be “fended off” at “the fence”, the border, and the defence capacity was proportional to military strength. This is obviously no longer a viable option. No country will be able to defend itself in this way in a situation where nuclear weapons can be used on both sides. Also, conventional war in modern societies will lead to extensive destruction on both sides. Security can thus not be created through one-sided national politics, but rather requires agreement and co-operation.

The background to such a possibility in the Baltic Sea region should not be forgotten. In the Baltic Sea region, the Cold War ended in 1989-91 with very little military action. The former Soviet forces left the territories of the three Baltic States and the former allies in 1994, even if some military personnel remained in Latvia up to 1999. The situation of Russian-speaking minorities in the three Baltic States, a constant source of aggressive behaviour from the Russian authorities, has improved considerably over the ten years after the systems change. A comparison can be made to the two other regions which are interfaces between East and West, the Balkan region, or between East and South, the Caucasus region. Wars broke out here. It is not so easy to explain why this did not happen in the Baltic Sea region. We should be grateful that it did not happen. Thus, even if much remains to be done,

the security situation in the region is improving continuously. The inhabitants in the region will hopefully be able to trust that they are living in a corner of the world where war is not an option. This requires continued international co-operation and friendship with neighbouring countries.

We might conclude by citing one representative of the American Embassy in Stockholm when invited to give a speech on the American view of the Baltic Sea region. He formulated the American hope for the future: “we hope that in some years from now in the area around the Baltic Sea we will continue to see a community of States that constructively co-operate to address common problems”. This is certainly what we have today – a community of states that create common institutions to address common problems in a co-ordinated way.

8. Economic regional development

As everywhere else the economy in the Baltic Sea basin developed from the available natural resources, firstly within agriculture, hunting and fishing. Even if self-sufficiency was dominating, some trade was possible. During the Hanseatic times, the Baltic region was a net exporter of skin and fur with Novgorod as a trading centre. During the period of about 1200-1400, the small town of Skanör on the southern tip of present Sweden, arranged an extraordinarily rich two-month long market for herring each year. Salt, to conserve the fish, was imported from salt mines in Lüneburg in Germany, and Kraków in southern Poland. Mining was also part of the early economy. The mountains in the north and the south of the basin have been mined since historical times. The earliest mining enterprises were, however, in mid-Sweden where the copper mine at Falun 300 km north of Stockholm was the largest in the world and very important for the Swedish economy during the 15th, 16th and 17th centuries. Likewise, iron mining in this region of the country was important. During the Middle Ages and up to the beginning of the 19th century, Sweden was an important producer of iron, mostly for the war industry in Europe. In southern Poland and in the Slovakian mountains mining began very early, and became very important in the 18th and 19th century when coal mining increased.

It is not clear how much people could be supported in this economy, but it is assumed that the population rose only slowly during the Middle Ages and reached an estimated 10% of its present size around 1600. In the 18th century improved agricultural methods, including the introduction of the potato, and improved health care started an early modernisation of the societies in the west. Family size increased, and the population began to increase steeply. Several millions emigrated to the Americas, and in this way eased the pressure on resources. The eastern part of the Baltic region also went through a phase of mass emigration in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, also mainly to the United States. The reason was mostly repression, especially of the large Jewish population.

Up to 1800, only some 2-3% of the population in the region lived in cities, and more than 80% worked in agriculture. During the later part of the 1800s *industrialisation* developed in the region and requirements for the centralisation of resources, including workers, led to the expansion of cities. The technology, such as cars and railways, and energy production – oil and electricity – developed by the industry itself allowed the building of a new transport infrastructure. This increased efficiency and boosted industrialisation. As railways and roads expanded, direct connection to Baltic Sea shipping, still large, was not mandatory and cities developed far away from water courses. The most important industrial branches in the

Baltic region include food, pulp and paper and forest industry, mines and steel works. Other important industrial branches are manufacturing and the metallurgic and galvanic industry. Some were big polluters. Important industrial cities and centres became mid-Sweden, north Sweden, the St-Petersburg region, the Baltic States with a concentration on Riga, northern and eastern Germany and southern Poland. At the beginning of the 20th century cities were in general still small, but in the coming years the cities grew further as the expanding industries swallowed most of the population increase.

In western countries, manufacturing industry had its peak around 1970 when close to 70% of the work force was still in industry. Today this figure is below 20% in the Nordic countries. The difference is the result of the collapse of several branches such as ship building and part of the steel industry, and a steadily increased productivity through introduction by, in particular, automation. In central and eastern Europe, industrial production since the systems change is in a process of changing the old technology, largely from the 1950's, to a modern technology which allows competition on a larger market, requires less resource use and is more acceptable for the environment. This requirement for change has resulted in a crisis for many industries after the systems change (see also Section VIII on economy).

In the period after WW II the resource use per capita has increased about four times in the west of the region. The GDP increased equally. In the west the *affluent society* was created. It can be measured in many ways e.g. through energy use per capita. It is today about four times larger than around 1950 and about 10 times larger than in the agricultural society the century before.

Since the end of the 20th century, population increase has abated and in fact ceased in almost all of Europe. The birth rate has decreased and the balance between fertility and mortality has established itself on a much lower level. The political problem is now an inverse population pyramid, with too few young persons having to support too many elderly. The crucial question now is not population increase but how much resources each individual uses.

The time of industrialisation and urbanisation is often referred to as modernisation. This phase has today changed into something new, a *post-modern society*. This new society has an economy that is increasingly based on the service sector. Less than 20% of the population is – working in industry, and less than 5% in agriculture. Manufacturing industry is dominated by high tech branches such as information technology and biotechnology. The ratio between GDP and resource use, increasing in the western world since about 1970, is an early sign of a *future dematerialization* of the societies.

The steps – agriculture, industrialisation, urbanisation, affluence, population stabilisation – seem to be typical steps that many regions in the world are passing. The Baltic Sea Region is at the forefront of this scheme. A large part of the world has not yet entered into industrialisation and does not have access to e.g. electricity. Large parts of the world have not stabilised their populations.

9. Economic regions

European post Second World War trade history is well known. In the west, trade barriers were systematically removed to create a common free trade zone, which eventually led to the European Union. Its predecessors, such as the Coal and Steel Union from the 1950's and its follower the EC, and the EFTA, European Free Trade Association, from the 1970's were steps on the way to the union. Today, in addition to the 15 states in the European Union,

several states have special agreements with the Union to facilitate trade, including e.g. Norway, Switzerland and Greenland (which is the only country that was, for a period, part of the Union but decided to leave).

In the east, economic co-operation within the Soviet Union and its allies in Central Europe was even tighter. This was a natural consequence of the planned economic system. The two systems, west and east, were largely isolated from each other. Exceptions included, for example, the trade between the USSR and Finland as a consequence of the peace agreement after WW II.

More or less tight trade unions have developed in many areas of the world. In North America NAFTA, the North American Free Trade Association, includes Canada, the USA and Mexico. In Latin America, Mercosur includes five states, and in Asia ASEAN, organises most of East and South East Asia, from Japan to Australia. After the systems shift do we find tendencies to develop trade relationships in the area around the Baltic Sea? Definitely. In the political documents regarding BSR from the EU Commission and the individual countries in the region, it is clear that their policy towards the eastern part of the BSR aims at fostering an economic development, new markets and the development of economic life. Considerable sums of money are invested for these purposes. From the western perspective, the “new countries in transition” are potential future markets for their productions. From the eastern perspective, the richer western countries are invited to invest, and foreign investments are seen as a tool for economic development, and the development of a new economic culture and competence (see chapters 45-48).

The results are noticeable. Even if these “new markets” are still small they are rapidly increasing. For instance Estonia’s three largest trading partners are today Finland, Germany and Sweden. The Russian Federation, which of course formally before was the only trading partner, is now further down the list. Increasing numbers of companies from the western part of the region are establishing themselves in the new countries. In Poland by far the largest trading partner is Germany, with Sweden in the second position with a value of about 35 billion Euros in 2000. Russia is in third place due to its major role in Poland’s gas and oil economy. Factors that are obstacles in this process are e.g. the still unclear legal situations, especially in Russia and the three Baltic States, and weak banking development, factors that are rapidly changing. The economic development is impressive during the 1990’s. After a painful economic decline in the early years after the systems shift, the increase has been rapid and during part of the time world record economic growth rates, up to 11%, were noted for Estonia and Poland. Several of the countries in the region are candidates for the European Union and the first countries are expected to join in 2004.

In addition to formal trade agreements to constitute regions, economists also focus on special so-called “growth” regions. In Western Europe, “the yellow banana” – referring to its curved appearance on the map – stretching from London over eastern France and Montpellier to Barcelona in Spain – is one such much discussed area. Another one is the Öresund region, which includes the cities of Malmö and Helsingborg in Southern Sweden, Helsingör and Copenhagen in Denmark, and which may extend to Northern Germany with Hamburg. Is there such a region in the Baltic Sea Region? Apart from the Öresund region, the line from St Petersburg, over Helsinki and Tallinn to Stockholm and perhaps down to Öresund, has been pointed out to have the capacity for extraordinary economic co-operation and growth. It is sometimes referred to as the “blue banana”.

It is clear that the Baltic Sea region is a region of increasing economic co-operation. After the expected expansion of the European Union, the formal economic co-operation will include the entire region with the important exceptions of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine. However,

work to develop agreements between the EU and the near regions of NW Russia, especially the Kaliningrad Oblast, is already ongoing, and may make the border less sharp.

10. Regional development as spatial planning and sustainability

The development of a region may also be seen in the context of planning, both regional and local. Comprehensive planning, local plans etc are all part of the larger scheme called *spatial planning*. This concept, though difficult to describe, addresses all kinds of changes in society. Obvious is infrastructure development, building of residential areas, industry etc but also culture, and social development are included. The background to these efforts to develop a holistic concept was the 1980's.

In the mid 1980's the development of the world as a whole was seen as a series of failures. The third world continued to be poor and in conflict despite all developmental aid. The industrialised part of the world had entered a route of immense resource consumption and environmental destruction. Obviously this would, if it continued – lead to disaster. The United Nations were at the time calling a commission to deal with the dilemma, the so-called World Commission for Environment and Development. In 1987 the Commission published its report asking for a new kind of development, called *sustainable development*. It was described as a development that “would allow us to meet our own needs without endangering the possibilities for future generations to meet their needs”.


The concept of sustainable development was both political, technical or scientific and ethical. In fact, it was the value dimension of the concept that was stressed most often, not least by the chairman of the commission, the former Prime Minister of Norway, Ms Gro Harlem Brundtland, when she presented the work. Sustainability, it was stressed, could not rely on environmental concerns alone, the so-called ecological dimension of sustainability. It was crucial to take into account also the economic and social dimensions. There were enough examples of how these three dimensions were interconnected to convince people that a good development needed to be comprehensive and include all sides of society. In 1992, the United Nations arranged a conference on Environment and Development, UNCED, in Rio de Janeiro, the Earth summit, where leaders from 178 states and numerous other organisations met to discuss development. So far it is the largest conference ever held. Five documents were signed. Of these, the 400 page Agenda 21, an agenda for the 21st century, is the most remarkable one in its unusual complexity, comprehensiveness and consequence. It details how to achieve sustainable development in a series of areas in 40 chapters.

On the European Union level, co-ordination of spatial planning has been a concern since the 1980's. It is clear that development of infrastructure requires co-ordination. Roads and railroads need to relate to each other. But much more is discussed in the context. A first concrete step to co-ordinate planning in the Baltic Sea region was the conference organised in the fall of 1992 on the initiative of the Swedish minister of physical planning Ms Görel Thurdin. Her proposal was to co-ordinate planning for a sustainable future as a co-operative project in the region in parallel with similar efforts within the European Union. The ministers agreed and created VASAB 2010, Visions and Strategies for the Baltic Sea Area, lagging two years behind the European project which was aiming at coordination by the year 2008. The secretariat of VASAB has its site in Gdansk, Poland. The area that VASAB is looking into is partly larger and partly smaller than the one covered by the Helcom Convention. It extended

further north, to Murmansk, and further South, into Germany. It was the area considered the most relevant for spatial planning.

Also, the following meeting on the level of Prime ministers of the region in Visby in May 1996, dealt with the developmental issues. The ministers then agreed on the creation of an Agenda 21 for the BSR, the Baltic 21 to support a sustainable development in the region along the principles laid out in the Agenda 21 Document from the Rio conference. The Baltic 21, it was agreed, should address seven sectors: industry, energy, transport, agriculture, forestry, fishing, and tourism. In addition, spatial planning with VASAB as the responsible actor was added. Later on, the new sector of education and so-called joint actions have been added to the Baltic 21 process, to make it a very comprehensive programme for addressing issues of sustainable development in the region.

It is clear that improvement of the environment is a very basic component in the Baltic 21 activities, as is proper resource management. But in the longer term, social and economic development will have an equal weight in the agenda. The Baltic 21 co-operation has the potential to become one of the most forceful tools in making the Baltic Sea Region a region of co-operation. It should be recognised that in this respect the BSR is rather unique in the world. No other international region has entered such a process. There are only formal agreements in some regions, e.g. in the western Mediterranean, but nothing as concrete as the Baltic 21.




Map 3. The project Visions and strategies around the Baltic Sea 2010 is a co-operation between the Ministries of Planning in all countries in the Baltic Region. It was created in 1992 through an initiative by the Swedish Minister of planning, Görel Thurdin, and has a secretariat in Gdańsk, Poland. A first report on infrastructure and spatial coherence deals with urbanization, communication, and energy supply. The strategies for developing the railroad and road networks are illustrated on the maps. (Source: Visions and Strategies around the Baltic Sea 2010, Karlskrona.) Ill.: Radosław Przebitkowski

11. The environment of the Baltic Sea region

Environmental protection is an important concern in planning. It is natural that regions defined by geographers are relevant to environmental protection. The common water – a river, a lake or a sea – receives pollutants from the entire drainage basin and if the inhabitants wish to protect their common water they have to co-operate. Even if you yourself do not pollute but your neighbours do, your water will still be polluted, or, as most often stated, pollutants do not recognise state borders. However, they are often stopped by borders between drainage basins.

Water is relevant for pollutants in many ways. Pollutants sooner or later end up in water, since either they are emitted with waste water, they leak from land to water, or they are washed out from the air with precipitation, rain or snow.

The common water, the Baltic Sea, was also a priority when, in the first moments of the systems shift in 1990, the Swedish and Polish Prime ministers invited all states around the Baltic Sea to a meeting to support and extend the co-operation in the region. One important result was a rapid improvement and extension of the Baltic Sea Convention. The new Convention, signed in Helsinki in 1992, included a much larger portion of the drainage area of the Baltic Sea. This is a major step forward for the protection of the environment. After all, at least 95% of the pollutants in the Sea come from land and to improve the water situation, it is necessary to come to grips with the root causes of the pollution, that is activities on land. A large program started to remove 132 identified “hot spots”, the worst polluters, in the region. The major banks in the region were engaged to finance the implementation of this programme, which was planned for 20 years, that is up to 2012, and to a cost of some 20 billions of Euro. In 2001 it is fairly well on the way and some 30% of the money has been invested and 20 of the hot spots removed.



Map 4. The main sources of environmental pollution in the BSR.
Ill.: Radosław Przebitkowski (see the map on p. III)

Concern for water

The concern for water is thus well motivated. Water, clean water, is very important to people in all kinds of life situations. Interviews with even poor inhabitants tell us that they are willing to pay quite a lot if they would be given better water. It is reflected by the fact that more than 90% of environmental investments of the newly independent states in the Baltic Sea region after the systems shift were used to improve water, either wastewater treatment or water provision.

Further initiatives for environmental protection in the Baltic Sea Region include the work within the UBC, Union of Baltic Cities, educational activities in the Baltic University Programme, the school project called BSP Baltic Sea Project and several projects run by non-governmental organisations co-ordinated by the so called Coalition Clean Baltic, CCB.

Co-operation for environmental protection in the BSR has a long history compared to other areas of the world. Another long term co-operation exists around the Great Lakes in North America. Later projects have been started in a series of regions around the world, in the drainage basins of seas or rivers. Too often they have been prompted by environmental disasters or, in general, deteriorating environmental situations. Thus the situation in the Black Sea, where such a co-operation started after the systems change, is environmentally in a very bad situation. An important reason is the invasion of foreign species. The Rhine river was the scene for a major outlet of toxic chemicals from a Swiss factory 20 years ago. This led to much improved co-operation between the five states along the river, which today has resulted in a considerably cleaner river. In general, we might observe that such pollution events which may be very destructive for those living downstream of the outlet, do not often lead to conflict or re-compensation claims. Typically, they instead lead to an increased co-operation, development of protection measures and improved environmental safety, e.g. through monitoring schemes and alarm routines.

On the global scene, the United Nations Environmental Programme, UNEP, has taken a lead to start activities all around the world. Thus a monitoring and evaluation project was started in 1999, addressing the 66 water areas. The authority working with the project, called Global Initiative for Water Assessment, GIWA, has its headquarters in Kalmar Sweden. GIWA started its assessment work with the Baltic Sea.

12. Resource use

How do we know if a society is sustainable, or how sustainable it is? A judgement on this topic should be done using measures, or *indicators of sustainability*. Such indicators have been developed for a series of sectors, but often they are not easy to interpret. In practice, questions of resource management dominate. It is clear that use of non-renewable resources is not consistent with sustainability. It is also clear that linear resource flows are not consistent with sustainability either. Thus fossil fuels, such as coal, oil and gas, need to be replaced by e.g. biomass and hydropower, and likewise linear flows of nitrogen and phosphorus in agriculture have to be replaced with recycling of such resources. Accumulation of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, which is a consequence of the combustion of fossil fuels, leads to global warming, and linear flows of nutrients in agriculture, lead to eutrophication of waters, e.g. the Baltic Sea itself. The environmental consequences are thus serious, and will, in the longer term, have economic and social consequences.

So how sustainable is the Baltic region, especially when compared to other regions in the world? The Baltic region is rather well provided with energy resources. Not all of them are, however, sustainable and renewable. Coal was used as mining developed in Polish, Czech and German areas in the south, while forests were the main energy resource in the north. Estonia has long since been independent energywise due to its oil shale mining. Around 1900, hydropower plants and adjoining large reservoirs were built in the northern part of the region. The rapid expansion of energy use occurred after World War II, with imported oil as a main resource. Norway later became the main provider of oil in the

west and Russia in the east of the region. The use of fossil fuel slowly changed character as coal was substituted by oil and oil by natural gas. In particular Sweden, but also Germany, Finland and the earlier Soviet Union, developed nuclear power to decrease their dependency on fossil fuel. In Norway, Sweden and Finland renewable resources account for some 50% of the energy budget, while in e.g. Poland it is close to nothing, while Denmark is improving due to increased use of wind power.

The first report from the Baltic 21 project was published in early 2001 with values for a series of indicators. On a world scale, Columbia University in New York compared 150 countries. Generally, by these measures the Baltic Sea region is doing well, with Finland, Norway and Sweden as No 1, 2 and 4 on the list. The Baltic states are in the first third of the list while Poland does not score well. The list is based on an average of 30 indicator values for each of the countries.

The work cited should be understood as a first effort to estimate the state of the world and its regions from a sustainable development point of view. Even if the results are thus approximate, it is clear that there is a long way to go. Globally it is estimated that resource use will have to decrease to half to achieve sustainability. In the industrialised countries, this factor will be much larger, a factor of ten has been mentioned, to be on a sustainable level if the world as a whole should have an equal resource flow. This is not at all the situation today. Regardless of this rather bleak picture of what is needed, it seems clear that the Baltic Sea region is doing very well compared to other regions in the world. A whole series of interesting projects in the region point to a considerable capacity to improve.

13. Epilogue – regionalisation as part of globalisation

Let us return to the question of how regions are formed? We may ask if regions are *naturally given* entities or if they are *constructed or invented* by those living in them. Geographers and biologist would say yes to the first, they are given by nature. But also those dealing with economy, culture, peoples, languages etc would see them as factual, given certain criteria. One obvious such criterion is *identity*. If identity is the criterion, then regions will be of very different size depending on which parameter is studied.

Social scientists may see regions as *areas of communication*, that is areas that have more communication within them than with the outside world. It is partly connected to the units of classical regional development which are smaller than the national state but larger than the local society. These regions are areas where people work, consume and find social contacts. Authorities think in terms of economic development, schools, social services and health care etc when it comes to such regions. They certainly have more communication within themselves than with the outside world. However, this may also be true on a much larger scale. It is so, for instance, for Europe and even more so the European Union. Such communication may be defined in economic terms more easily, trade, investments etc, but also in e.g. travel and tourism.

There is a third way to define a region. I will simply call these *common interests and responsibilities*. We have pointed out two such reasons, environmental protection, especially the shared water, and the shared security. Regions formed for these reasons exist in many places in the world, and several examples were already given above.

Where do we find the Baltic Sea region in this panorama of types of regions, and approaches to regional studies? As in most regions it is not only one dimension that we see. The com-

mon interests and common responsibilities clearly dominate in the BSR at present. Efforts for co-operation are mostly concerned with environmental protection, and creation of security. Economic co-operation is steadily increasing but is very far from the trade patterns in e.g. the European Union. In an historical perspective we see much common history, politics, and culture. But as the region has been divided a very long time these facts are more theoretical than alive. The very different historical and present experiences we have in the various places in the Baltic Sea region, of course mostly east and west, make us strangers to each other. From this point of view the region needs to be re-established.

The process of regionalisation is naturally discussed in the context of globalisation. Much has been written on the topic of globalisation, and it has been described as a process where common cultures, values and markets eventually encompass the entire world. Coca-Cola, pop music and the trans-national companies are seen as part of globalisation. There are definitely aspects of the globalisation process that fit in region building.

Firstly, globalisation is a long term process, which slowly includes continuously larger areas. It has been going on for at least two generations, or one may even count it from the beginning of industrialisation. Also, regionalisation has this character of enlargement of an originally smaller area. In globalisation, Europe and the USA took a lead. In the Baltic regional context, one may point to the Nordic countries as a core from which the larger area is established, although this is not uncontroversial.

Secondly, globalisation is driven by communication possibilities and market expansion. The same process is seen in the regional context.

Thirdly, globalisation is clearly seen to consist of several stages. Some of these were early such as the spreading of science and technology. Others were later such as the spreading of common media. Between them is the spreading of international economy, language, and cultures. We see similar aspects in regionalisation, e.g. on the economic scene with the establishment of international power companies or banks which are present in all countries in the region. We see less so far of the common language and culture, although it is clear that pop music, movies and other cultural phenomena are spreading regionally.

Fourthly, globalisation goes together with a strengthening of local cultures and a weakening of the national state. This process of stronger local cultures is interesting to observe in the European union expansion. It is also directly supported by the Commission.

As a *fifth point*, globalisation slowly approaches a system of global governance. This includes international conventions in a series of areas, global institutions such as United Nations, and the first signs of a global world order with the Peace Court and more recently the ICC, International Criminal Court. The building of such common institutions in the region has been a major aspect in the discussion above.

Regionalisation is in this way a local aspect of globalisation. The development of regional co-operation around the Baltic Sea is boosted by thousands, or even millions of individuals who conduct projects on scales from personal to governmental. The interest, will and enthusiasm for the common project “developing the Baltic Sea region” cannot be denied. This is in itself worth studying, getting involved in and enjoying as an important and meaningful part of the lives of those people in the area around the Baltic Sea.

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On the emergence of the Baltic Sea region and the reading of the book

Witold Maciejewski

1. Culture and territory or how do regions get to the world?

Our planet Tellus, as pictured in the logo of the Baltic University Programme, has been divided innumerable times by peoples claiming their right to territories. *Territory* is, besides language and religion, part of the collective, ethnic identity. “Our country”, *the fatherland* (*fosterlandet, ojczyzna, poguta, meän maa, Vaterland etc.*) is marked on the map and in our mind as a distinct part of the world we have a special relation to. Not only the peoples who are settled from time immemorial consider themselves to possess their territories; the nomadic tribes also have a notion of their own territory, however much these two can be different. Ethnic cultures include the primary notion of territory. States are considered generally by politologists to be the bearers of cultures, something which is, however necessary, a crude simplification. The third salient marker of identity – religion – is recognized by several authors as uniting cultures in larger structures, called civilisations. Civilisations constitute their own areas that include the territories in possession of ethnic cultures. That is why the world is considered by many to be divided into a few dominating civilisations: Western (i.e. Catholic and Protestant), Orthodox, Islamic, Hinduistic, Confucian, Buddhist and others.

However, religions are not the only factors uniting the peoples into larger communities (and, be sure, discriminating these communities from each other at the same time). Cultures and civilisations produce ideologies, myths, ideas and intellectual streams interpreting and organizing the world we live in. Some of these form frames of reference of more universal value. *Multiculturalism and pluralism, ecologism and globalism, democracy and subsidiarity, market economy and solidarity* definitely belong to the valid pattern of thinking, created certainly inside the Western civilisation. All of these are based upon internal criticism of European culture, proclaim the value of openness and tend to cross barriers shaped by the local ethnic cultures. Consequently, the ideologies, constructed upon these values, also need their own territories. This is the way regions are procreated on and that is also why the essence of regions consists of the fact that their boundaries are not kept within the frontiers of states, cultures nor civilisations.

Origin of the word region

The very word *region* belongs to the so-called internationalisms or all-European loans and appears in all languages of the BSR. It is derived from Latin *regionalis* and related with *regio* ‘direction, borderline’ and *regere* ‘to lead, direct, govern’. The notion includes then two relevant semantic items: a more primary, spatial item, and a metaphorical component, implicating a sense of power. Both aspects are relevant for the present description of the Baltic Sea Region.

Baltic Facts

BELARUS	
Area:	207,600 km ²
Inhabitants:	10.4 million (2001 est.)
Capital:	Minsk 1.7 million (1999)
Religion:	Orthodox
Language:	Byelorussian, Russian
Government type:	Republic
GDP per capita:	\$7,500 (2000 est.)
Currency:	Belarusian Ruble (BYR)

CZECH REPUBLIC	
Area:	78,864 km ²
Inhabitants:	10.3 million (2000)
Capital:	Prague 1.2 million (1999)
Religion:	Catholic, Protestant
Language:	Czech
Government type:	Republic
GDP per capita:	\$12,900 (2000 est.)
Currency:	1 Czech Koruna (CZK) = 100 halefu

DENMARK	
Area:	43,094 km ²
Inhabitants:	5.3 million (2000)
Capital:	Copenhagen 488,000 (1996), 1.8 million ¹ (1996)
Religion:	Protestant
Language:	Danish
Government type:	Monarchy
GDP per capita:	\$25,500 (2000 est.)
Currency:	1 Danish Krone (DKK) = 100 øre

ESTONIA	
Area:	45,200 km ²
Inhabitants:	1.4 million (2000)
Capital:	Tallinn 420,000 (1997)
Religion:	Protestant, Orthodox
Language:	Estonian ² , Russian
Government type:	Republic
GDP per capita:	\$10,000 (2000 est.)
Currency:	1 Estonian Kroon (EEK) = 100 sents

FINLAND	
Area:	337,000 km ²
Inhabitants:	5.2 million (2000)
Capital:	Helsinki (Helsingfors) 551,000 (2000), 870,000 ¹ (1994)
Religion:	Protestant, Orthodox
Language:	Finnish, Swedish
Government type:	Republic
GDP per capita:	\$22,900 (2000 est.)
Currency:	Euro

GERMANY	
Area:	356,900 km ²
Inhabitants:	82.8 million (2000)
Capital:	Berlin 3.5 million (1997)
Religion:	Lutheran, Catholic
Language:	German
Government type:	Republic
GDP per capita:	\$22,700 (2000 est.)
Currency:	Euro

LATVIA	
Area:	64,600 km ²
Inhabitants:	2.4 million (2000)
Capital:	Riga 816,000 (1997)
Religion:	Protestant, Catholic, Orthodox
Language:	Lettish ² , Lithuanian, Russian
Government type:	Republic
GDP per capita:	\$7,200 (2000 est.)
Currency:	1 Latvian Lat (LVL) = 100 santims

¹ metropolitan area
² official language

LITHUANIA	
Area:	65,200 km ²
Inhabitants:	3.6 million (2000 est.)
Capital:	Vilnius 578,000 (1999 est.)
Religion:	Catholic, Lutheran, Orthodox
Language:	Lithuanian ¹ , Polish, Russian
Government type:	Republic
GDP per capita:	\$7,300 (2000 est.)
Currency:	1 Lithuanian Litas (LTL) = 100 centas

NORWAY	
Area:	386,280 km ² (2)
Inhabitants:	4.5 million (2000)
Capital:	Oslo 500,000 (1998), 800,000 ¹ (1992)
Religion:	Protestant
Language:	Norwegian
Government type:	Monarchy
GDP per capita:	\$27,700 (2000 est.)
Currency:	1 Norwegian Krone (NOK) = 100 øre

POLAND	
Area:	312,685 km ²
Inhabitants:	38.6 million (2000)
Capital:	Warsaw 1.6 million (1997)
Religion:	Catholic
Language:	Polish
Government type:	Republic
GDP per capita:	\$8,600 (2000 est.)
Currency:	1 Zloty (PLN) = 100 groszy

RUSSIA ¹	
Area:	17,075,200 km ²
Inhabitants:	145.5 million (2000)
Capital:	Moscow 10.7 million (1995)
Religion:	Orthodox, Muslim and others
Language:	Russian and others
Government type:	Republic
GDP per capita:	\$7,700 (2000 est.)
Currency:	1 Russian Rouble (RUB) = 100 kopeks

SLOVAKIA	
Area:	49,036 km ²
Inhabitants:	5.4 million (2000)
Capital:	Bratislava 451,000 (1998)
Religion:	Catholic, Protestant
Language:	Slovak, Hungarian
Government type:	Republic
GDP per capita:	\$10,200 (2000 est.)
Currency:	1 Slovak Koruna (SKK) = 100 halierov

SWEDEN	
Area:	449,964 km ²
Inhabitants:	8.9 million (2000)
Capital:	Stockholm 736,000 (1998), 1.7 million ¹ (1998)
Religion:	Protestant
Language:	Swedish
Government type:	Monarchy
GDP per capita:	\$22,200 (2000 est.)
Currency:	1 Swedish Krona (SEK) = 100 öre

UKRAINE	
Area:	603,700 km ²
Inhabitants:	48.8 million (2000)
Capital:	Kiev (Kyjiv) 2.6 million (1998 est.)
Religion:	Orthodox, Uniate
Language:	Ukrainian, Russian, Romanian, Polish, Hungarian
Government type:	Republic
GDP per capita:	\$3,850 (2000 est.)
Currency:	1 Hryvna (UAH) = 100 kopyykas

¹ incl Jan Mayen 380 km² and Svalbard 62,000 km²
² incl Kaliningrad oblast, Capital: Kaliningrad 513,000 (1995)

Map 5. Baltic facts. Ill. Radosław Przebitkowski

Essentialists and constructivists

The debate on regions, as presented by the textbook, is inscribed in much broader, methodological controversy between essentialists and constructivists. According to the first standpoint, the territories – fatherlands, regions, and others – exist as physical facts, created by objective processes. The essentialists define their task as a description of an existing reality; regions are given by nature and history. Natural properties of regions determine the inhabitants, who live in a special relation to the territory in their possession. Nations are believed to be equipped with their specific mentalities. Roots of this attitude are to be found back in the Post-Romanticism and more specifically, in the French tradition of regional studies, established by the school of Pierre Vidal de la Blanche.

The opposite standpoint stresses that regions exist in double meaning: primarily, they exist in our mind, i.e. they are our mental constructs, which are projected on physical map. The constructivists ask then questions, concerning both the mental and physical realities, claiming that regions and territorial identities are inventions derived from culture. The constructivist attitude in regional studies is broadly represented among contemporary researchers; one of the most quoted theories in this spirit was introduced by the Finnish geographer Anssi Paasi in the 1980s. Both attitudes are represented in this textbook.

Theoretically, the areas, their extension and number of regions are unlimited. However, all creation needs justification in order to be saved from the Ockham razor, cutting off the unnecessary beings. Therefore the goal of the textbook presented is to deliver reasons for distinguishing one of the Europe's macro-regions.

2. Defining the Baltic Sea region (the BSR)

To the outsider looking in, the Baltic Sea region should be a distinct, sharply separated natural area, consisting of the water-filled space in its centre and adjacent lands around the Sea. The problem arises however when the second component is to be defined.

- In 1992 top *politicians* from several countries established an infrastructure, named the Council of Baltic Sea States, probably the most powerful body of the region. The Council is composed of Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Russia, Sweden and the European Commission. In addition France, Great Britain, Holland, Italy, Ukraine and USA received status as observers. This composition implies that the BSR was comprehended by the top representatives of the countries listed as an area linked to the neighbouring North Sea region and, possibly, to the White Sea region (the Barents region).
- In 1998 the Euroregion Baltic was established by the *littoral municipalities* of Denmark, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Russia (Kaliningrad) and Sweden. Links of cooperation are, not surprisingly, closest between the littoral cities.
- In 1974 the Convention for the protection of the Baltic Sea defined the BSR from the *ecological* perspective as the water drainage area of the Baltic Sea and this is the very point of departure for the Baltic University Programme since the first activities in 1990.

Apart from these, the BSR is often associated with the so-called *Balticum*, corresponding to the territory of the three “Baltic states” (Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia). In addition, there are more than 30 governmental and non-governmental organizations connected to the Baltic Sea and some of them have their own notions of the region.

The Baltic Sea Region has, then, been defined differently depending on the goals of its creators, historical associations, ideological, political or practical grounds. The result must look quite amorphous and any possible attempt at re-defining the Baltic area to provide it with sharp boundaries seems to be burdened with the weakness of arbitrariness. However, a necessary, more prudent proposal, related to the ecological way of thinking, distinguishes between a core region, composed of the countries situated in their entirety within the water drainage area or directly adjacent to the coastal line, and external surrounding countries (the hinterland) possessing more or less extended parts of this area.



Figure 4. Stockholm – one of the Baltic capitals. Photo: Katarzyna Skalska

The BSR as defined in this prudent way, must be seen as a diversified area:

- Politically, it belongs to nine “coastal states” and five “hinterland countries”,
- it is inhabited by almost 85 million people, which means that every tenth European lives in the BSR.
- These 1.34% of the total world population deliver about 10% of the global industrial production. Most of the Baltic people live in 60 metropolises, half of which have their own airports. About 130 thousand ships harbour in the Baltic ports every year.
- The BSR is also a meeting point of two “hard” security systems: NATO (Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Norway, Poland) and the security alliance created by Russian Federation and its partners. Apart from this, two states (Sweden and Finland) are neutral.
- The recent trends to integration have split the region into a western part, leaning towards integration with the European Union or already integrated, and the eastern group of states (Russia, Belarus and Ukraine), seeking their own way.

Although the all above-mentioned notions do not comprise any precise definition, all of them include common negative characteristics. Thus, the region builders plan to construct neither a military block, nor an economic or political union around the Baltic Sea. No outer demands or restrictions that would force anybody to build up any “hard” organization are available either. The Baltic Sea region is a “soft” invention which may be provided with qualities that agree with the best knowledge, experiences and wishes of the parties involved.

3. Diversity

DIVERSITY of peoples, religions and languages, considered as a specific feature of the Baltic region, is generally held to be an important, universal value. The Baltic region is a meeting point of four Christian faiths (Catholicism, Orthodoxy, Protestantism and Uniatism). The 14 countries around the Baltic Sea are in possession of two civilisations of global relevance: the Western Christian and the Orthodox. The Southeastern sub-

region is also a historical nest of Jewishness. Several minority religions, such as non-conformist Protestant confessions, Karaims, Islam, Armenian Orthodoxy and others are represented alongside the dominating churches. From the point of view of ethnology and linguistics, the historic peoples of the Baltic represent about at least 30 different ethnic groups (immigrants from outside the region not included).

Cultural diversity is a source of ideas, inventions, habits, rituals and arts. Peoples have a right to their views, beliefs and ways of life. These characteristics shall be treated equally; acceptance of cultural diversity is the corner-stone of human rights and democracy. Ethnic cultures enrich the universal human culture, providing it with variety of proposals about how to live and how to solve common problems. Linguists who follow the so-called Sapir-Whorf hypothesis argue that each human language reflects a separate, specific way of thinking, a separate universum. The opposite notions, cultural homogeneity, monoculturality and mono-ethnicity, imply the impoverishment of culture which, similarly to the impoverishment of biological species may lead to the degeneration of societies.

On the other hand, the peoples are also in competition and rivalry with each other. Diversity may then be a source of conflicts. The recent divisions of the BSR – the division between security systems, division between the European Union and the remaining states, between more and less successful market economies and democracies – seem to follow a thesis spread by politologists (Samuel Huntington and his followers), claiming that the superior divisions are in reality located between the dominating global civilisations. In the case of the BSR it affects the so-called West and Orthodoxy. If it can be held as true, constructing a region, situated exactly in-between two opposite systems of values, political and “hard” security structures, acquires a special importance for the parties involved. Junctions or crossroads are namely especially exposed to conflicts, and conflicts between civilisations are considered more serious than these within a civilisation.

Diversity then, is a serious matter; it can enrich the peoples of the Baltic or cause conflicts, even involving parties distant from the region, something which has already happened in history.

4. Rethinking the BSR in cross-disciplinary perspectives

The cross-disciplinary perspective, programmatic for works published by the Baltic University, appoints diverse theoretical patterns of description and analysis. The idea of interdisciplinary studies is to cover the subject as comprehensively as possible, to study and present it as seen from different points of view. Meanwhile, those different perspectives can be too distant from each other and, as a result, incompatible. Thus, some important conclusions need mutual confrontation and comments, especially in cases of inconsistency or contradiction. How, then, do the authors understand their task? Generally, assuming that *diversity* is the characteristics of the Baltic Sea Region, they have three ways to choose:

- If diversity were the only salient feature of the Baltic Sea Region, the analysis should be driven towards stressing country-, culture- or nation-specific characteristics. In this case the present book would give a survey of, for instance, country and people descriptions.
- Another, opposite way is to search for possible common traits in order to find a more universal, holistic characteristic of the region. A local, Baltic homogeneity is to be assumed and demonstrated.

- The region can also be analysed as a specific case, subordinated to some general rules, held relevant and non self-evident by humanities and social sciences.

The authors have followed these three methods and, moreover, some of them supplied the studies with proposals, projecting a desirable development of the Baltic community. When accepting the functional, ecological BSR as the point of departure, the authors of the text-book took the task of re-interpreting the region in terms of broad defined culture. This work completes the circular, intellectual process of region creation: ecologism and other, more or less practical or political reasons are parts of culture, probably ideologies, which are to be set up back in the frame of culture.

4.1. *History* has been given a re-validated role and changed apparatus during the last fifteen-twenty years. Post-modernism has questioned the very meaningfulness of notions comprehended as self-evident some years ago; such central concepts as “the historic process” and “objective development” have lost their previous explanative role. There are only texts which are relevant, history exists in stories and memories, according to the post-modern way of thinking. The changed methodological pattern allows one to see history liberated from national narratives, but it allows also the questioning of the very existence of facts.

The position taken by the author of the first section is a compromise between more traditional methodology and post-modernism. Kristian Gerner delivers a report on the region’s history, assuming that there are objective constraints behind the story telling. When attempting to define the “Baltic identity”, the author follows the second way listed above. Different ethnic histories and views on the same historical issues, treated from a necessary distance, are juxtaposed with each other. Due to this method several events, central to the national histories, appear to have quite opposite symbolic value (cf. interpretations of the Battle of Tannenberg/Grunwald, the treaty of Kiejdany, the Swedish “Deluge” and so on). This is one way of making the particular national narratives compatible. The comparative view also allows one to discover unexpected parallelisms between the particular histories (such as, for instance, the history of Sweden and Poland-Lithuania during the 18th century).

The regional history appears divided in two parts: the earlier, up to the first decades of 18th century, was dominated by quite salient actors: the Vikings, the Hansa and the Swedish empire. These have not been replaced by other, equally dominating powers for the last three hundred years. This thesis finds an extensive illustration in the study on arts by Andrzej Wozinski (in the section on culture).

However, as the collective Baltic history with no ethnic subject does not have its own symbols and values, it cannot be constructed in a similar way to the particular ethnic histories we are used to. The collective history can be referred to the space in between the narratives. This space has been filled by competition, antagonisms and rivalry, but also by trade (the Hansa), long periods of peaceful co-existence, the exchange of people and ideas. Links of co-operation and competition are grounds for networks, which desirably, in the time to integration, create the collective, ethnically composed subject of the Baltic’s own history.

Thus, when analysing the *macrohistory of the region*, we can see how our local, particular views become inadequate if we try only to understand the past as a common legacy. Ethnic myths behind our particular histories certainly unite us as groups of people but, on the other hand, our myths also deliver maligned images of other people. Revising our own images opens the way towards more freedom; creating a distance to our common history liberates us, or – at least – makes us less prone to being used as a means of ethnic hostilities. This is also the message of sections, dedicated to the multi-ethnic composition of the Baltic countries.

4.2. Our views on history and ethnicity are parts of our *culture*. Culture determines our mentality and our behaviour; we do not and cannot exist outside of culture. But, what was said about history is also true when speaking more generally on culture. Cultures both unite and divide us, but we are also becoming aware that culture is our human invention. This revelation may also protect us when, provided with moral and intellectual qualities, we find ourselves involved in clashes of cultures. These are experienced every now and again in our more integrated Europe.

Diversity of ethnic cultures in the region seems to confirm the thesis of division between the dominating civilisations, but the authors of sections on culture and language offer a more subtle analysis. Three or four different cultural zones (or sub-regions) are distinguishable with respect to social capital and values declared to be held by the Baltic societies, according to the study of Thorleif Pettersson. Linguistic, religious and political features discriminate the region in a parallel way, in part overlapping the distinctions based upon axiology. The result is that probably the most homogenous sub-region in all respects is Fenno-Scandia, with Finland being a kind of linguistic outsider. The Nordic countries have much in common with the other Germanic-Protestant countries, the Anglo-Saxon world and even Japan, while the societies of the previous Soviet empire are divided into two or three groups, each of them being part of a broader, cultural context, external to the BSR. Poland, which is the most populated country of the BSR, shows itself closer to be Portugal on the “spiritual” and social plane than to its eastern (“Orthodox”) physical neighbours. As seen from the global perspective, the BSR looks rather like a meeting point of extreme European cultural provinces than a part of Europe with its own, local identity. In addition to that, the Baltic network for cultural exchange seems to have quite extensive gaps, as is reported by Bernard Piotrowski. Thus, studies on social capital and traditional-conservative values offer results, which are generally contravene of the thesis on a culturally united Baltic Sea Region.

The study on *languages* contributes even more arguments to the statement that the BSR does not form any simple model of cultural unity. The underlying divisions are analysed from the point of view of historical linguistics and from the geographical perspective. The conclusion is that the main, historic communicative communities are sharply isolated from each other. The linguistic diversity of the Region, where more than forty historic languages are spoken, has been alleviated by the extension of English, used as a regional language to an ever increasing extent. The uniting role of this global language, foreign to everybody in the region and therefore relatively free from the function of an ethnic symbol, is matched by a process of diversification on the level of minority languages – both the historic languages in the region and the so-called “home languages”, used by recent immigrants. Special attention is paid to the endangered languages and language planning for the historic minority languages (Kashubian, Karaim, Meänkieli, Romani, Saami, Upper and Lower Sorbian, Yiddish), and support for the “home languages” (the register of these includes more than two hundred and fifty ethnolects). Generally, the status of the minority languages is improving, thanks to official protection.

On the other hand, however, the divisions built on self-expression seem not to correspond to conclusions of reports on democracy, social conditions and economy. In other words, the map of successful transformation of economy and political systems does not exactly overlap the map of divisions built on social capital and declared values. One presumable explanation of this inconsistency might be that the self-expressed awareness of the Baltic peoples does not follow the processes of rapid changes in politics and economy. Apart from that, as stated by some authors, the young generation declares beliefs of higher degrees of adequacy. Thus, the perspective of a culturally united region does not seem to be totally unrealistic, the more so as English is about to become a true *lingua franca* in the region.

4.3. Political systems with *democratic qualities* have been built (or reconstructed) in almost all countries around the Baltic Sea, more or less successfully. The democratic institutions in the Southeastern Baltic provinces have generally grown stronger. Current obstacles in building civil societies in the “new democracies” seem to be commented on rather in economical and social terms than in terms of the legacy of communism. Churches and religions have also sought their place in the new reality and developed towards defining themselves as parts of democratic systems.

Analysing deviations seems to be more important today than explaining the grounds of democracy, which is a compulsory subject in the region’s schools. That is why a considerable amount of space has been offered for the description of corruption and malfeasance, i.e. deviations, that erode the people’s confidence in the democratic system. Statistical reports from the BSR indicate a quite visible division between the honest North (with Finland, the “cleanest” country in the world) and the relatively corrupt Southeastern sub-region. Corruption seems to have a long tradition and possibly even forms a kind of negative social capital (the earliest record of corruption known to the author in the Baltic Sea region is *Das Marienburger Tresslerbuch der Jahre 1399-1409*, published in 1896 by Erick Joachim in Königsberg, reporting bribes paid by the Teutonic Knights during these years). The advanced form of this deviation, the *state capture*, described by Li Bennich-Björkman, appears when illegal or informal groups interfere in law formation processes in what is ostensibly a democratic country. Precedents of this most dangerous deviation may also be indicated in the history of the BSR – the failure of the Polish-Lithuanian Noble Republic (1569-1795) and the ensuing partitions of the country have been documented and analysed in terms of state capture by Polish historians, possibly without using the very notion.

4.4. The *ethnic diversifying* of the BSR countries is an ongoing process, caused by integration and migrations. The ethnic, linguistic, religious and social maps of the region have been extensively changed during the postwar period. Countries with generous immigration policies – for instance Sweden – have quite numerous groups of citizens of foreign origin. Some of the newly established Baltic democracies, especially Estonia and Latvia, have inherited their ethnic composition from the not lamented Soviet Union. Poland with its twenty historic minorities, each group being relatively few in number, only recognised in 1990 the very existence of Germans within its borders. Generally, during the years after the fall of the Soviet Union, no serious conflicts, based upon ethnic hostility, have taken room in the region – on the contrary, the Baltic peoples have probably started harmonising their ethnic relations. The legal preconditions for ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities have also been improved. Anti-Semitism has not developed as a factor of political significance either.

The section on *minority and majority cultures* by Harald Runblom and Hans Ingvar Roth reports on changing relations between majorities and minorities. Tolerance and acceptance, which are the central, traditional key concepts regulating desirable attitudes towards “the others”, seem insufficient today. The European institutions recommend an active protection and support for minorities, as ethnic diversity is being recognised as the richness of Europe. New ideas of multiculturalism, created and implemented originally outside the Baltic region, may change the traditional pattern of majority domination.

Multi-ethnicity is discussed in several chapters throughout the book against a background of other problems. Ethnic frictions in Estonia and Latvia are noted and commented upon in the sections on culture (Michał Buchowski), languages (note the *multilingual society* by Sven Gustavsson), democracy (Li Bennich-Björkman) and social conditions (Marina Thorborg).

A general conclusion may be that the BSR countries are about to re-define themselves, adopting the model of pluralism and multi-ethnicity instead of the traditional national-state identity. This process brings a newly evaluated view on ethnic histories, recognition of faults and, in several cases, crimes and murders committed during and after WWII. Although the spiritual reconciliation is an ongoing process, not all the nations are ready today to clear their own past.



Figure 5. September 11th, 2001 – Manhattan, the terrorist attack on the symbols of the United States. Photo: Błażej Buchowski

4.5. Preconditions for the Baltic *security community*, as projected by Karl Deutsch and the authors of the section on peace and security, have undergone remarkable changes during the last ten years. The development of the entire region has surprised its commentators once again. It has been determined by trends arranged in a predominantly “vertical” way, i.e. in parallel with the East-West axis. The Nordic dimension has been strengthened in respect to the three Baltic republics, especially Estonia. Integration waves have divided the region into new parts in respect to two main organisations:

- The European Union (1. the EU members: Denmark, Germany, Sweden, Finland, 2. the applicants: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and 3. the non-EU members: Belarus and Russia)
- The NATO pact (1. the NATO members: Denmark, Germany, Poland, 2. countries waiting to join: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 3. the neutral states: Finland and Sweden),

- Belarus and Russia, in union outside the main stream of European integration.

At the present time, developments have brought the improvement of relations between almost all the countries of the Baltic. However, humanities have a low power of predictability, if any at all. Humans are creative and therefore unpredictable; they still bring new inventions, both good and bad and terrible. The terrorist attack against the identity symbols of the United States on September 11th, 2001 changed presumptions of security patterns for the whole world. It would be unrealistic not to hypothesise on the possible consequences for the BSR, as the monitoring of radical fundamentalist movements, drug business, trading in arms and mafia activities is probably about to be much strengthened. Regions with diversified security systems are probably going to be forced to revise their politics in these fields, as neither the existing “hard” security systems nor the “soft” security patterns seem to be able to stop terrorism. The very meaning of the “Nordic Peace” may then also be perceived as inadequate, almost immediately after its emergence. Unfortunately, the superficial thesis on the clash of

civilisations is gaining territory, just because it creates an image of the enemy which is easy to understand, recognise and pick up by the mass media.

4.6. Sections on *social conditions and economy* are dedicated to problems of general and regional relevance, such as demographical structure, unemployment, education, inequality of the sexes and the integration of European economy. The perspective is concentrated mainly on the ex-communist states and most of the authors represent the Nordic point of view. Both the process of transition as such and the economic theories on it are analysed with a quite moderate deprecation of the dominating doctrine of liberalism.

Economics is a discipline using a language dealing with stochastic processes, and that is why it is overtly similar to sciences. But, on the other hand, its predictions are based upon interpretations of the behaviour of humans. That is why economy is also close to humanities and ideologies. Generally speaking, the economic predictions should be more adequate when referred to stable cultures – in the case of our region – to the Nordic countries, where the reactions are much more predictable than in the countries facing changes which previously had not been experienced at all. Thus, it must be true that receipts on successful transformation offered to the ex-communist countries in the 1990s were based merely on ideology than on experience and, as seen in retrospect, were defective.

According to the view presented by Hans Aage that run contradictory to broadly asserted opinions, communism did not so much collapse because of its own inefficiency, rather it was dismantled. Faith in liberalism and private activity, steering the transition, may have even resulted in the fact that about 30% of population in ex-communist countries lives below the poverty line.

The new *poverty and social segregation* in the Nordic countries, on the other hand, seem to have quite different origins. The phenomenon is mainly restricted to immigrants, as referred by statistical reports. From an anthropologist's point of view, unemployment is, at least in part, caused by a pattern of thinking, laying the ground for the social and cultural isolation of immigrants. According to this, individual peoples are primarily seen as representatives of foreign, monolithic cultures which are, in agreement with current political correctness, to be supported and preserved (for details see Michał Buchowski's chapter on culture).

This reasoning may probably be extrapolated and implemented in the discussion on barriers preventing *enlargement of the European Union*. Popular support for enlargement has declined gradually during recent years, both in the united Europe and in countries waiting to join, and this is reflected in the current political debate. As reported by Hans Aage, besides the economic and legal matters, one of the central fears concerns the future of the Union after enlargement. Social



Figure 6. A Swedish rapper in the multi-ethnic Stockholm. Photo: Katarzyna Skalska

and cultural discrepancies are comprehended as a potential source of conflicts that may – on the one hand – lead to an undesirable political strengthening of the Union, and or – on the other hand – show themselves too difficult to be handled on a civilised way. In both cases the ethnic cultures seem to be comprehended as monolithic and unchangeable, something which corresponds neither to European experiences, nor to the declared high valuation of ethnic diversity (cf. section on multi-ethnicity in this volume).

Culture-based presumptions are also reasons for economic *inequality between the sexes* and, according to Ingegard Muncio, also *judicial inequality*, incorporated in general constraints, defining citizenship. Extensive differences between the Nordic and the south-eastern sub-regions are to be observed regarding the economic, social and political position of women.

The *demographical development*, analysed by Marina Thorborg and Gaiane Safarova is generally characterised by increasing life expectancy and decreasing fertility rates, combined with falling infant mortality. Declines in natural changes are mitigated by immigration to some countries, although the general tendency of population decrease is becoming more and more visible as in 2000 this also included Poland which, besides Denmark, Finland and Sweden had had small positive rates of natural population increase for the previous years. Several regions of north-western Russia are reported to face an unprecedented process of depopulation.

The environment of the region is the object of main concern of several courses offered by the Baltic University Programme. The present volume includes a rather optimistic report by Hans Aage, stating improvement in this area.

The social and economic problems of the region are identified however, diagnosis and cures, suggested by the authors, seem to come apart in two directions: the first, stressing the role of the state and the social infrastructure, and the second, preferring individual, private activity. The contradiction reflects a more global, ideologically based controversy that is not to be solved in this volume (and, hopefully, not in others either).


5. Ground zero?

During its history the region has been divided innumerable times by peoples claiming their right to territories. All the countries have changed their territorial shapes, political and social systems, they have fought each other or collaborated, some of them disappeared, and some re-appeared again. The development became quite rapid after 1989. The fall of the Soviet empire, emancipation of former Soviet satellites, the rise of new states, reunification of Germany were events that transformed the Baltic world.

The status quo created during the last twelve years is generally treated as new and unprecedented. The pressure of topicality and concentration on political issues means however, that a retrospective look on the Baltic may bring some surprises. The movements of the Baltic peoples and their countries during the 20th century seem to be governed by a gradual drifting – unaware in part at least – “back” to the very old, prehistoric “homes”. Namely, the contemporary divisions cover approximately the map of main ethnic and linguistic divisions in 600, i.e. the status quo after the Great Migration (compare the status of years 600, 1914, 1937, 1945, 1991).

Today most of the main tribes are back in their old sites. Does the history of our presence at the Baltic Sea end as a territorial zero-sum game? Are we conveyed by our ethno-centrism in a much higher degree than we dare to admit? Is culture that we have invented a cover for something else? Is the presented idea of a free, peaceful and harmonious region, created

by good neighbours, a new Utopia? However utopias, if implemented, change reality. The answer may come in some ten years. A new textbook on the Peoples of the Baltic should be needed at that time.




Map 6. The linguistic divisions around 600 AD. Source: Tadeusz Milewski, *Atlas lingwistyczny języków świata*, Lublin – Kraków 1948. Ill. Radosław Przebitkowski

Part

A

**THE CULTURAL
LANDSCAPE**

*HISTORY, CULTURE
AND LANGUAGES*



Section I

HISTORY

Figure 7. Danzig, Polish Gdańsk, a wealthy Hanseatic city, several times has played a crucial role for the history of the Baltic region. Ill.: BUP archive

I

Section

HISTORY

Editor and author of chapters 1-7: *Kristian Gerner*

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INTRODUCTION

Kristian Gerner

The history of the Baltic Region is multidimensional. It is constructed from different points of departure. On the one hand, there are structures and processes in economy, politics and culture. On the other hand, there are a number of “national” narratives. Structures and processes are constructed from established facts, from events in the past that have formed spatial and temporal patterns, i.e., when these facts are put into interpretative frameworks, theories about correlations, causes and effects. National narratives, on the other hand, are about memory, collective memory, which locates the individual in a community with a shared identity and distinctive boundaries against other communities.

The ideology of the Baltic University Programme is to create a “Baltic” narrative as the basis for the construction of a Baltic identity. This means that past events, processes and structures must be interpreted and presented with a view to their relevance for those peoples who today inhabit what is defined as the Baltic Region. The boundary against what is not Baltic must be defined and upheld. In the present context this means that the Baltic Region must be kept apart from both the national and the European. What is exclusively national and what is universally European of course cannot be avoided or dismissed, but the focus must be on what is Baltic, what is a common past for the inhabitants in the territory “the Baltic Region”. To the degree that structures and processes are influenced by events on the national or European level, these have to be treated as inputs from distinct subparts within the Baltic Region on the one hand and from the external environment, on the other hand.

Once the idea of a Baltic Region is accepted as the basis for the construction of a narration, concepts such as communications, contacts and networks become crucial. This means that migration, trade and warfare come into the focus of attention. Politics and ideology, projection of political and ideological power, belong to the picture. To make the narrative general and comprehensive, collectives rather than individuals have to be treated as the principal actors. This means that commercial, ideological and political actors such as trade organisations, missionary organisations, social classes, cities and states are treated as agents of competition, cooperation and change. A conflict perspective becomes central and with it concepts denoting aggression and defence, respectively. It must be noted that adaptation in the face of external challenges is one kind of defence and that the action-reaction processes born from such confrontations are important aspects of historical changes.

If the Baltic Region is defined as a delimited territory, the history of which is characterised as competition and cooperation among collective actors, the Swedish state, which was formed around the year 1000, emerges as the only truly and exclusively “Baltic” collective actor. All other, be it medieval organisations such as those later known as the Vikings, or the Hanse and the Teutonic Order and national states such as Denmark, Russia, Poland, Germany and Holland in the early modern or modern period, had other territorial bearings as well, i.e., continental European or even Asian. “The Baltic Region in History” thus can be constructed with Sweden as the main focus and point of departure. This does not entail that Sweden is depicted as more “important” in a generic sense than other collective actors in the region. However, when it comes to creating long lines in history, it is obvious that the period from the raids of the Vikings in the last centuries of the first millennium to the creation of the modern Russian state under Peter I in the early eighteenth century can be viewed and told as the history of the

rise of Sweden. This means that other collective actors such as the Hanse, Denmark, Poland-Lithuania, Muscovy and the Dutch can be described as competitors to Sweden.

When it comes to the history of the last three centuries, it is much more difficult to treat the history of the Baltic Region as a coherent and self-contained whole. This is because of the fact that during this period, Russia and Prussia/Germany came to dominate military affairs and the economy to a much larger degree than earlier, at the same time as these powers had their main assets and political ambitions beyond the Baltic Region in the strict sense. During “the bloody twentieth century”, the history of the Baltic Region is circumscribed by factors and processes of global rather than of local significance, i.e., the definite establishment of a global economy, the mass migrations from all the states in the Baltic Region to the United States, the two world wars, and the Cold War. At the beginning of the twenty first century, the Baltic Region cannot at all be defined as a self-contained entity. Other identities such as gender and generation, citizen or revolutionary, all defined in global terms, are becoming central to the individuals.

Concerning the idea of social sustainability in the Baltic Region, history can contribute by fostering the image of a common fate in the sense that people in the region perceive that they have a common collective memory that should serve to create a feeling of unity rather than of enmity. In this perspective, the challenge is from Russia. Only future can show whether the political leadership of Russia will recognise the new political order in the Baltic Region which emerged in 1991 as an irrefutable result of history.

1 How to construct a Baltic history?

Kristian Gerner

In the Baltic drainage area, the three main currents of Christendom coexist and confront each other, i.e., Orthodoxy, Catholicism and Protestantism. Furthermore, in the south-eastern part there is the Uniate Church, also called the Greek Catholic Church. Before World War II there was also a strong Jewish presence in the region. In addition, for fifty years, the secular religion of Marxism-Leninism was dominant from Rügen to Viborg. In Russia it was the official ideology for an additional twenty years before that, i.e. from the Bolshevik takeover in 1917. With regard to views on the individual and society, the pattern may be simplified to comprise only two varieties, the individualist Western Christian, including the Uniates and the Jewish traditions on the one hand, and the collectivist Orthodox and Marxist-Leninist traditions, on the other hand. Historical structures have left traces both in the landscape and in language that are still visible.

There are different collective identities in the Baltic Region. For most individuals, national identity is more important than a Baltic identity when it comes to inter-state relations. However, politics in the contemporary Baltic area is influenced by ideas of a European community. The notion of a Baltic Region is included in the concept of the European Union. It is assumed by most politicians and many scholars that all societies in the Baltic region shall and will converge according to the West European example of representative democracy, market economy and rule by law (Fontana 1995). The practical conclusion is that the former communist states must conform to this Western “model”. The view of the future influences decision-makers and thus both politics and social developments in states such as Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.

1. Does history matter?

We are confronted by two different notions concerning both ontology, what is real, and epistemology, what we can know. A cultural approach implies that there are profound differences, rooted in history, between distinct societies. Traditions and habits are understood to be causal factors behind contemporary developments. Adherents of this view argue that history matters. A rationalistic approach implies that all human categories behave according to the same principles. In this context, not history per se, but perceptions and understanding of history “matter”. In the former case, it is assumed that history is important in its capacity as a causal matrix for contemporary behaviour. Concepts such as ‘path dependence’ and ‘Sonderweg’ (special track) are used in order to suggest that the past has a direct influence on the present and the future (see box on pg. 86). In the second case, it is assumed that the influence of

history does not come from history as past reality, but from the past only as interpreted by contemporary players. In their endeavours, which are principally rational, the actors can be informed or motivated by their view of history or use “historical” arguments.

History relates to collective memory and identity. Societies consist of people who are united by a shared identity, which separates them from other societies. The notions of “us” and “them” are fundamental in collective identity building. The sense of shared identity is created by collective memory, i.e., something that the individual acquires by upbringing or by choice. A basic carrier of collective memory is language, the mother tongue. Another basic carrier is ideology as a set of beliefs, attitudes and practices. Language and religion are fundamental identity markers. They are usually called ethnic markers, because the idea is that the individual has them from birth, in their blood. This is compatible with the concept of ‘culture’ as the basis for collective identity.

The third carrier of collective identity is territory, the landscape, both the natural environment of society and the existing neighbourhoods. When related to territory and not to ethnicity, collective identity has the connotation of civilisation, of civic society. If one declares that history is important, it is necessary to keep the distinctions in mind. Is it about the “roots” and “institutions” of a people and linked to the notion of factual history, or about shared memories and interpretations linked to a certain geographical space and historiography?

If we suppose that there is a Baltic Region, how shall we give it a history? By telling the stories of the different contemporary states existing there today or of the different nations, defined according to the criteria of language and customs? Does Sweden have a history? Do Swedes have a history? The same goes for Latvians, Danes and so on.

The ideology of the Baltic University Programme requires the construction of a Baltic history that “matters” today in the respect that it promotes social sustainability in the Baltic Region. However, the concept ‘Baltic history’ is not easy to define. If one writes the history of the Baltic Region, it is obvious that the point of departure must be territory. There is not any self-conscious ‘Baltic’ people.

During the last 450 years the shores of the North and the Baltic Seas have been inhabited by Protestants. Lithuania and Poland, both Catholic countries, were almost landlocked behind Protestant Germans until 1945. Although the Russian Empire acquired all territory from the Tornio river to the Nemunas river during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, both the Russian language and the Orthodox religion remained rather insignificant in the Baltic Region in the narrow sense. That is, until the Russification policies were introduced in the late nineteenth century. In spite of Russia’s rule over the Baltic provinces and Poland in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, it is only between 1945 and 1991 that one can speak of a culturally specific Russian presence in the region. St Petersburg, founded in 1703, certainly was Russian, but above all it represented European civilisation in general. Its culture was intimately related to that of the Netherlands, Germany, Poland, Finland and Sweden. Except for the language, there were not any specific ‘Russian’ characteristics in the Petrine state as such, although the society at large remained specifically Russian.

2. Defining the Baltic peoples

All this causes an intriguing ambiguity in our time when it comes to defining “Baltic” peoples. The Scandinavians, the Germans, the Finns, the Estonians and the Latvians are Baltic without question. This cannot be said unequivocally of Russians, Poles and Lithuanians and not at all

of Belarusians and Ukrainians. However, both because prominent individuals from the latter states clearly express the wish, on behalf of their nations, to be counted as belonging to the Baltic Region, and because of the ideological goals of the Baltic University Programme, these peoples are included in the project of creating a sustainable Baltic Region. To the extent that contemporary peoples are conscious that they share parts of their past with other peoples, the collective identification of Finns, Swedes, Danes, Norwegians, Icelanders, Faroese and Estonians, can be said to be Northern. Latvians, Germans, the Dutch and the British, but to a certain degree also Poles, Lithuanians and Russians, constitute a more ambiguous case.

Deciding on where the boundaries of the Baltic Region should run when the task is to create a sense of a shared past for the present inhabitants, it would be ridiculous to use physical landmarks such as mountains and rivers. To take the closest example, the watering area of the Baltic Sea is not a territory which is either united by a shared memory of a common past or strictly delimited against other political, cultural or economic communities. Writing a history of the Baltic Region must be a pragmatic exercise. The boundaries must be vague and historiography must proceed from the assumption that there is at least a core. The main challenge is how to reconcile the quite separate Western and Eastern Christian societies and create a sense of community in spite of the fact that historically, the two have been forged or constructed with one another as “the Other”.

3. How to construct a Baltic Region?

The concept of Northern Europe has a special content in the Scandinavian and Finnish words Norden and Pohjola, as Finnish sociologist Mikko Lagerspetz has noted in a contribution to the discussion of who belongs with whom in the Baltic Region:

The romantic ideology of Scandinavianism depicted the people living in regions then possessed by Denmark and Sweden-Norway as bearers of a common, ancient tradition. [—] Finland could also be counted as belonging to ‘the North’. [—] With the eventual accession of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to the EU, the chances are that even (at least some of) these new members might be willing to strengthen the voice of that bloc. (Lagerspetz 2001).

A shared history? What is of concern is thus whether the contemporary Baltic Region is perceived as a basically uniform entity with a shared history and culture and a ‘Nordic’ identification, or as an area of cultural clashes with different historical parameters (Huntington 1996). A very important aspect is whether Russia is excluded (the clash of civilisations thesis) or included (the shared memory thesis).

The Finnish geographer Anssi Paasi has analysed the concept of region in its political and territorial aspects and noted that it is a social construction. Paasi’s definition is relevant for a discussion of the question, whether there is a Baltic Region in a socially meaningful sense:

Regions are not ‘organisms’ that develop and have a life-span or evolution in the manner that some biological metaphors – so typical in Western political thought – would suggest. Rather [...] regions and localities are understood in this framework as being a complex synthesis or manifestation of objects, patterns, processes, social practices and inherent power relations that are derived from simultaneous interaction between different levels of social processes. – Through the institutionalisation process and the struggles inherent in it, the territorial units in question ‘receive’ their boundaries and their symbols, which distinguish them from other regions. (Paasi 1995).

The most important symbolic manifestation of a region is its proper name. It “recollects” and creates one whole out of historical developments and important events. The individuals concerned acquire a sense of a collective identity, which is linked to the region (Paasi 1995). The obvious question to pose is whether political actors can construct a new region and legitimise it by way of retroactively creating a history, which gives a sense of collective identity to the people inhabiting this region.

Competing labels and notions. The notion of a Baltic Region that would unite Russia, the Baltic States and Poland with the Scandinavian countries and Germany can be traced back to the Soviet political idea of creating a nuclear-free zone in northern Europe. However, the direct background lies in developments from the 1980s onwards. An early instance of thinking along the lines of creating a Baltic Region was the notion of the New Hanse, put forward before the East European revolutions in 1989 by the head of government of the German Land Schleswig-Holstein, Björn Engholm. Conferences were arranged in different cities, for example in Kotka on the Gulf of Finland in 1990. The choice of place revealed the ambiguity of the concept of the New Hanse. Kotka was not an original Hanseatic town, as it did not exist in the Middle Ages, but politicians, business people and intellectuals obviously interpreted the name Hanse in a symbolic way to mean co-operation and close relations in general.

Although the notion of the New Hansa faded away after the demise of Björn Engholm, after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, international co-operation has developed among the states facing the Baltic Sea. There is a Baltic Council and a lot of other institutions promoting contact and the exchange of goods, people and ideas. There is even a Baltic University, comprising far more than one hundred universities and with its administrative centre in Uppsala. In the Swedish official usage of the concept the Baltic Region, Russia has an ambiguous status, because quite arbitrarily the Kola peninsula, the Arkhangelsk oblast, the autonomous republic of Karelia and also the Leningrad and Kaliningrad oblasts are included, and sometimes also Novgorod and Pskov, but not Russia as such. Concerning Poland and Germany, it is assumed that it is not necessary to make a distinction between their Baltic littorals and the rest of the states. In any case, most of Poland and the eastern half of Germany belong to the Baltic drainage area. As for Belarus, it is taken for granted that this state is wholly ‘Baltic’. Ukraine’s status is also ambiguous. It seems that Lviv and Galicia are included, Kiev and Poltava (for reasons of Swedish history) also, but hardly Odessa and Charkiv or the Crimea.



Figure 8. The medieval fortress of Bohus in Sweden (constructed by Norwegians in 1308). Photo: Katarzyna Skalska

It is obvious that geographical traits are not a sufficient condition for the creation of political, economic and cultural co-operation envisaged by the idea of a Baltic Region. In addition, a common history, similarity of political culture, economic interdependence, linguistic affinity, and even personal relations between political leaders, social groups and individuals may be considered to be main factors in discussions with a bearing on the



Figure 9. Medieval castle of Ogródzieniec in Silesia, a border area between Poland, Czech and Germany. Photo: Paweł Miguła

creation of a regional identity among the parties in question. As in the case of the geographic definition, the historical and cultural definition leaves Russia as the most ambiguous part.

In addition to the people actually living around the shores of the Baltic Sea and on the islands, those living on the shores of the North Sea form part of the history of the region. On the one hand we have the Scandinavian peoples

of Norwegians, Icelanders and Faeroese and their descendants in the Shetland and Orkney islands, and on the other hand the English and the Scots, the Friesians, the Dutch and even the French. The Bohemian king Otakar II Premysl took part in the German crusades in the thirteenth century and is the reference for the historical name of the contemporary Russian city Kaliningrad, i.e., originally named *Castrum de Coningsberg* or *Königsberg* (Gornig 1995).

Whereas the Polish and Lithuanian names of the city are direct translations of the original German name, the Russian name was a transcription of the German name, *Kenigsberg*. When the city and the surrounding territory became Soviet in 1945, all Germans were expelled (most of them had fled at the close of the war). The German place names and geographical names were also removed and replaced by Soviet Russian names. Thus *Tilsit* became *Sovetsk* and *Königsberg* was named after the late Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, i.e., the figurehead of the state. He happened to be Mikhail Kalinin, notorious for continuing to perform his official duties until his death in 1946 regardless of the fact that his wife was purged on Stalin's orders and imprisoned in a labour camp. In the course of the 1990s, some of the inhabitants took an interest in the province's history. Students began to use the old German name, shortened to *Kenig* and referred to themselves as *European Russians* – apparently in contrast to their compatriots in Russia proper.

2 Networks, states and empires in the Baltic Region

Kristian Gerner

In terms of communications and multilateral, multidimensional relations between people, the historical region to which the northern peoples belong cannot be defined as the drainage area of the Baltic Sea. The North Sea must be included as well. In their recent contribution to the publisher Routledge's series "Seas in history", David Kirby and Merja-Liisa Hinkkanen also treat the two seas as a whole, arguing that "they have for centuries been linked by maritime trade in a manner so intricate that to tear it asunder would seriously violate the narrative as well as run the risk of losing sight of the whole" (Kirby 2000).

Until the nineteenth century, the sea was the main uniting link for the people inhabiting the whole area concerning contact between localities, cities, towns and ports at a rather considerable distance from one another. One may speak of contacts and communications according to the rules of comparative advantage as seen in long distance trade, the exchange of technology, experts, skilled labour and manual workers. In the process, the diffusion of culture and warfare between established and emerging states contributed to create a rather easily discernable "Mediterranean of the North" with the Baltic Region as the core.

Small communities in the very sparsely populated Baltic Region gathered to create organisations and alliances that grew into political and military centres, based upon control of land and stationary populations. Natural obstacles to communication such as steep mountains and dense forests became political dividing areas, frontiers. At the same time as there was a Baltic network of long distance contacts and communications, there also existed a number of politically distinct units, countries.

Competing labels

In the Scandinavian languages and in German the Baltic Sea is known as the East Sea (*Eystrasalt, Östersjön, Östersöen, die Ostsee*) whereas in Estonian the name is the West Sea (*Läänemeri*). It is historically significant that in Finnish the name is the East Sea (*Itämeri*). Although belonging to a different family of languages, the Finnish language is highly influenced by Swedish when it comes to concept building. Together with the Scandinavian peoples, the Finns define themselves as part of the West, whereas the Estonians of course do this as well but at the same time also look to the west. The English term is derived from Latin vocabulary, as are also the contemporary Russian and Polish words, i.e., from the name of a supposed island *Baltia* mentioned in the work of the elder Plinius. Hence also the expression *Mare Balticum*. In the Russian language those provinces that were conquered in the eighteenth century were originally called *Ostzejskie provintsy*, which of course was a loan from the German.

1. Emergence of states

When a Swedish state emerged, developing from a loose community of so-called landscapes in the ninth to eleventh centuries, it was both around inland waters, the great lakes of Mälaren (with Hjälmaren), Vättern and Vänern, and on the two sides of the Gulf of Bothnia. The early Swedish state included what is today Finland and thus from the beginning it was clearly a Baltic state. It was not an ethnically defined nation state but an alliance of clans with the same language and related legal traditions. As a state consciousness developed, it was related to territory and political boundaries. The latter were generally vaguely demarcated and seen as flexible and negotiable.

Norway took shape as a North Sea state, literally “the Northern way”, whereas the third early Scandinavian state, Denmark, was at the centre of the Northern Mediterranean, facing both the Baltic and the North Sea and in control of the waters connecting the two halves, the Straits of Öresund, the Belts and Kattegatt. Its name was given by the neighbours to the south, the Franks, and it means literally “the Danish frontier”.

The eastern, inland part of the early Swedish state was settled by non-Swedish speakers, i.e., the closely related Finns and Karelians. The latter became a frontier zone beyond which was the Russian state of Novgorod, to be followed in time by Muscovy and Russia. In the southeastern part of the Baltic Region, people speaking Slavic, Finnish and Baltic languages settled. Of these, those that spoke Polish and Lithuanian had managed to create internationally recognised states in the Middle Ages.

The easiest way to give an overview of political history is by way of mentioning wars, because they have usually started and ended at distinct dates. Moreover, wars have not been fought for amusement or entertainment, but over natural and human resources, including the control of markets and harbours, and also as motivated by religious and ideological beliefs and by idiosyncracies among decision makers. Wars were very frequent and viewed by most contemporaries as natural. To be a warrior was a profession, although many individuals did not have the freedom of choice but were conscripted or simply pressed into military service. For long periods, war was part of everyday life for many people in the Baltic area. Some wars were called crusades, whereas others were named either from objects of conflict or theatres of actual warfare, sometimes with a time period denoted as well. In the Baltic area, we observe the crusades of the Teutonic Order, of Swedes and Danes as well as the Livonian War, the Northern Seven Years War, the Kalmar War, the Thirty Years War, the Deluge and the Great Nordic War and a number of bilateral wars such as Swedish-Danish, Swedish-Polish and Swedish-Russian.

From the Middle Ages until the early nineteenth century the military history of the Baltic Sea was practically identical with the military history of Sweden (Hornborg 1945). Because ‘war’ is a concept that denotes contact with somebody else, the enemy, and maybe also with allies, this military history necessarily had to be Baltic history. The wars were a means of gaining control of the water routes and they became a defining trait of the history of the whole region. The political and social structures of the warring states adapted to and coped in different ways with the demands of warfare (Frost 2000). Sweden and Denmark competed from their formation as states in the late first millennium until the early eighteenth century with one another and with the Hanseatic cities, the Dutch and the English, for control of the main outlet from the Baltic Sea, the straits of Öresund.

2. Empire builders

As is rather natural, life styles in the Baltic Sea Region have been overwhelmingly maritime in character. At the end of the first century AD, the Roman historian Tacitus paid attention to the fact that the Sviones had big fleets of long ships with pointed stems, i.e., something similar to the ships of the Vikings. The ships were both merchant ships and men of war, used for trade and robbery, war, conquest and settlement.

Thus the first, very loose “empire” in the Baltic Sea Region was based upon control of the water routes. Apart from the people from Roslagen, Danes, Norwegians and Germans and later the Dutch and the English also based their power on maritime prowess and skills. It is significant that a German bishop in the newly conquered Livonia, Albrecht, founded the city of Riga in 1201, and that the Danish king Valdemar II the Conquerer elevated a small Estonian village on the coast of the Gulf of Finland to a Danish stronghold in 1219, which subsequently became known as ‘Danishtown’ or ‘Danishburg’, i.e., Tallinn. However, the new masters and their German and Swedish successors retained the local name of the area, Rävåla, and called the city Reval.

According to the Russian chronicle *Povest vremennykh let*, warriors and traders – “Vikings” – from east Sweden, an area known as Roslagen, were invited by the Kievan Slavs to bring order to the country. Their chieftain was a certain Rurik, and his people, who became the founders of the ruling dynasty, were called Rus. The grand dukes of Kiev and of Moscow and the first tsars, until the death of Ivan the Terrible’s son Fedor in 1598, stemmed from Rurik. Some Polish-Lithuanian noblemen also traced their aristocratic origins back to the legendary Rurik.

The expansion of the Scandinavians was followed by the expansion in the Baltic Region by peoples from the North Sea seaboard. From the German-speaking areas came both warriors and merchants, monks and nuns, craftsmen, clerks and peasants. It was a matter of both conquest and colonisation, christianisation and urbanisation. Beginning in the late twelfth century, the German crusaders and the merchants of the Hanseatic league, with its beginning in Lübeck in Schleswig-Holstein in the southwest corner of the Baltic Sea, spread over the whole area up to the Gulf of Finland.

They also made substantial inroads into the kingdoms of Denmark, Norway and Sweden and made an indelible imprint on the vocabulary of the Scandinavian languages. When it comes to maritime terms the Dutch presence in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries also left a lasting impact, to be followed by the influence of English with regard to industrialisation and the development of modern agriculture and, later, science, technology and commerce in the Baltic Region.

3. The cities

The Dutch influence in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries made water a prominent feature of townscapes. In whole or partly, the Danish capital Copenhagen, the new Swedish port of Gothenburg, the old Hanseatic city Danzig, Berlin with Potsdam and the new Russian capital St Petersburg were partly designed or re-designed according to the Dutch model of building defence walls and canals, making townspeople living literally on water, am Kanal, to mention a street name in Potsdam. Most of these cities changed considerably in the following centuries. However, when Gdańsk was rebuilt after the heavy destruction brought by German

Vikings

Harald Runblom


During the late Iron Age ship building in the Scandinavian area produced the keeled long boat carrying sails which could sail the open sea. It was also shallow enough to be useful for river traffic. This new ship made long distance voyages possible, providing the technological requirements for the Vikings, sea travelers from Denmark, Norway and Sweden. During the Viking period, from about 800 to 1050, a network of trade and communication was established in the Baltic region.

The most important routes of the Danish Vikings led to England and northern France, those of the Norwegians went west to Scotland and Iceland, even North America; the Swedish Vikings sailed the Baltic Sea and its rivers.

The western Viking voyages were sometimes conquering expeditions. The Vikings travelling to the east were mainly merchants who were first concerned with trade. Their travels built on trade connections that had been established during the iron age, especially by Gotlandic seafarers who went to the eastern shore of the Baltic which is the present day territory of the Baltic states. The trade routes carried them far east. Sailing the Vistula, Nemunas, and Daugava rivers continuing on the Pripjat, Dnepr and Dnestr they came to the Black Sea. Along the Volga they even reached the Caspian Sea. Among important trade settlements that developed were Hedeby (Denmark), Wolin and Truso (Poland), Birka (Sweden), Staraja Ladoga (Finno-Ugric area) and Novgorod and Kiev (Russia).

At the end of the Viking period, kingdoms were formed in Denmark, Norway and Sweden. Vikings played an important role in the establishment of the first Russian state in Kiev.

Map 7. Viking voyages. The travels of the Danish, Norwegian and Swedish Vikings. Ill.: Ulf Zander



The Hansa

Harald Runblom

In the 12th century merchants in North German cities organised themselves with the intention of controlling trade in the region. This organisation grew stronger and developed into a network of cities, the Hanseatic League. The League excluded others from profitable business by controlling ports and shiproutes. The northeastern part of the Baltic region provided furs, grain, timber, wax, flax and hops which was brought to the more densely populated areas on continental Europe. Among the return trade goods was salt from France and Germany, used for food conservation, not least of all Baltic Sea herring. During the 14th and 15th centuries when the Hanseatic League was at the height of its dominance, more than 100 cities and towns were part of this trade network. It extended from London in the west to Novgorod in the east. Strongholds were in the north German cities, in particular Lübeck. Visby on Gotland was an important free port in the early phase due to its old connections with the eastern part. Lübeck gained dominance because of its strategic position between the Baltic and the North Seas. The German influence of the Hanseatic League can still be seen in many of the languages in the region, in the design of the new cities they planned, in architecture, and the standardisation of merchant and sea law.

Map 8. The Hanseatic routes during the height of their power in the 14th and 15th centuries. Ill.: Ulf Zander






Figure 10. The Teutonic Knights' stronghold Marienburg (Malbork), incorporated into the Kingdom of Poland in 1466. Photo: Katarzyna Skalska

and Soviet troops at the end of the Second World War, its central market street in the Old Town was recreated according to the seventeenth century Dutch model. After German unification in 1990, reconstruction of central Potsdam, with its Dutch imprint, was also undertaken.

An important aspect of the use of the waterways in the Baltic Sea part of the region was bulk trade. After the long-distance trade of the Vikings had ceased, which brought fine goods such as glassware, pottery and silk to Scandinavia, export from the Baltic countries was dominated by goods for everyday use, such as cereals, butter, fish, furs, timber, iron, copper, wax, flax and hemp. Imported goods were mainly salt and cloth. Some of the salt came from south-western France, but much from Lüneburg in northern Germany. The cloth came mainly from the Lowlands (Rebas 1976). In the late fifteenth and in the sixteenth century, more than half of the ships that went through Öresund were Dutch, their total number being more than six hundred per year. They brought salt and money, weapons and textiles, and collected cereals, tar, timber, hides, hemp and wax, much as the Hanseatic

ships before them. In this perspective, the North and Baltic Seas emerge as an economically self-sufficient macro-region, defined by its network of water ways. For the interested parties, Sweden, Denmark and the Dutch, control of the Straits of Öresund was of crucial importance. Here it was possible to benefit from the trade by collecting customs.

In terms of international politics, the principle of the Baltic Sea as a *Mare Clausstrum*, which was sometimes a goal of Swedish politics, contradicted the principle of the open seas, which was promoted primarily by the Dutch and the English.

Reval and Riga acquired a German character with regard to both inhabitants and architecture. They emerged as simili of the other Hanseatic cities around the Baltic Sea, such as Lübeck, Wismar, Rostock, Stralsund, Stettin, Danzig, Elbing, Pillau and Memel. Many of the places had older local Slavic or Baltic names that were the basis for the German names, and under which they remained known in these languages, such as Szczecin, Gdańsk, Elbląg and Klaipeda. These cities were interfused with the fortresses of the twin German organisation, the Teutonic Order, primarily Marienburg, Thorn and Königsberg, known in Polish respectively as Malbork, Toruń and Królewiec. Königsberg was a Hanseatic city as well. Associated with the Hanseatic League and under heavy German political and cultural influence besides the economic and linguistic as well as in terms of architecture, were Bergen, Oslo and Tönsberg in Norway, Stockholm and Kalmar in Sweden, Novgorod and, of course, Visby in Gotland. As an early centre for north German merchants, Visby even anticipated the emergence of the Hansa. Towards the end of the Middle Ages, the Baltic Region was a German Region in terms of trade, urban culture and common language. As was the case with the Vikings, one cannot speak of an empire, but certainly of dominance and political hegemony. The Middle Ages saw a functional German empire in the Baltic Region.

3 The Swedish and the Polish-Lithuanian Empires and the formation of the Baltic Region

Kristian Gerner

The Hanseatic project did not develop into a proper empire in spite of the fact that it wove the Baltic area together commercially. Likewise, the German crusaders were ultimately unsuccessful in their state-building enterprise. In the fourteenth century they had become a lethal threat to the Lithuanian Grand Duchy and the Kingdom of Poland.

1. The simultaneous union formation

The Polish-Lithuanian personal union under Władysław Jagiełło, which was forged in 1385/86 when Rex Poloniae, (i.e., she held the throne; as a female she would otherwise have been called Regina) the young Jadwiga, daughter of king Louis of Anjou of Hungary, who was also of Piast ancestry, married the Grand Duke of Lithuania, was directed against the Teutonic Order. The latter's defeat at the hands of Władysław and his relative, the Grand Duke of Lithuania, Vytautas, in 1410 was the beginning of its demise.

In the northern part of the Baltic Region, parallel to developments on the Polish-German front, the Kalmar Union of Denmark, Norway and Sweden in 1397 was established with the aim of contesting the commercial hegemony of the Hansa. Thus at the end of the fourteenth century, international politics in the Baltic Region saw the emergence of a Central European empire in the southern part and a Scandinavian empire in the north. During the sixteenth century, Muscovy emerged as a serious challenger in the eastern part of the




Figure 11. Hedvig (Polish *Jadwiga*) Anjou (1371–99), Rex Poloniae from 1383, canonized in 1997 (*Polska kongars saga och skald*, ed. 1736). Ill.: Uppsala University Library

The fate of memorials



Figure 12. The Grunwald monument in Kraków.
Ill.: Małgorzata Sheiki-Binkowska

destroyed the Polish monument in Kraków. After the Second World War, a copy was made and placed on the original site. The remnants of the old one were brought to Grunwald, which had become Polish when German East Prussia was divided between Poland and the Soviet Union in 1945, and a new monument was erected on the medieval battlefield. The place where the High Master of the Teutonic Order fell was marked with a small stone.

The battle of Grunwald was to have considerable ideological influence in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It was one of the central pictures in the Polish artist Jan Matejko's series of illustrations of Polish glorious battles in history, painted at the time when Poland did not exist as a state in the late nineteenth century. The future Nobel Prize Laureate Henryk Sienkiewicz wrote his novel *The Crusaders* to commemorate the victory. In Kraków in Austrian Poland, a memorial was unveiled on the 500th anniversary of the battle in 1910. In 1914, the German army celebrated its victory over the Russians at Tannenberg, close to Grunwald, as a Teutonic revenge on the Slavs. In 1934, the remains of the victorious Field Marshal in 1914 and the President of the German Reich from 1927 to 1934, von Hindenburg, were buried at Tannenberg in a special mausoleum. In 1939, the Germans



Figure 13. A post-war poster, symbolizing the historical Polish narrative on Germans (Grünwald 1410 – Berlin 1945 by Tadeusz Trepkowski). Ill.: Uppsala University Library

Northern Mediterranean. To the west, the Dutch slowly became more and more visible. All this was directly connected with the simultaneous demise of the Hanseatic League and of the Teutonic Order. In 1525, the Order was secularised in Prussia and accepted the King of Poland as its overlord. Half a century later its Livonian branch passed away at the beginning of the great war that was to rage from 1558 to 1721. The main players in this struggle for political hegemony in the region were the states of Sweden and Denmark, the Commonwealth of the Two Nations (Poland-Lithuania), Muscovy and finally Brandenburg/Prussia, the successor state to the Teutonic Order. The Dutch navy was very influential as well in the contest, with the English following suit. Political and military power, control of trade and religious beliefs were involved in the struggle. To this came the issue of the right to the Swedish crown, which was contested by all three Polish Vasa kings. It was only in 1660 that king John Casimir had to renounce his claim to the Swedish crown. During the wars of succession in Muscovy in 1605-1613, the *Smutnoe Vremya*, The Time of Troubles, Sweden and Poland also competed with Russian princes for the Russian throne. Novgorod was occupied by Sweden in 1611-1617, and Charles Philip, the brother of Gustavus II Adolphus, was launched as a candidate for tsar. King Sigismund III Vasa alternatively launched his son or himself. Polish troops occupied Moscow in 1612 but were defeated and driven back by Russian troops under the merchant Minin and Prince Pozharskii. Later this event was remembered in Russia as a turning point in history which signaled the rise of Russia to the status as a great power. To celebrate the 200th anniversary, a monument was made, to be placed on the Red Square in Moscow in 1812. Napoléon's invasion of Russia and his occupation of Moscow forced the Russians to postpone the project for a while, but the ideological impact of the monument was strengthened when Napoléon too was forced to retreat and the French invasion was successfully overcome. In 1613, Michail Romanov, the son of the Russian patriarch, was elected tsar of Muscovy. The Romanov dynasty would hold power until 1917.

2. The Stockholm period

The seventeenth century has been called “the Stockholm period” in Baltic history. Sweden emerged as a great power in European politics, the peak being reached in 1648-1660. In 1630 Sweden entered the thirty years war, and at the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, Sweden acquired a number of commercially and strategically important cities and provinces in the southern Baltic area. In 1645 and 1658, after successful wars against Denmark, Sweden acquired the southern provinces of Halland, Scania and Blekinge as well as Gotland in the Baltic Sea and the Norwegian provinces of Bohuslän, Jämtland and Härjedalen. The new territories were to be successfully integrated with Sweden. The new boundaries were marked by water and mountains, which made most Swedes perceive them as “natural”. When Finland and the Åland islands were ceded to Russia in 1809, the Swedish state was given its definite territorial form.

Three major wars were fought between Sweden and Muscovy/Russia. In 1617, Sweden was victorious, the peace treaty of Stolbova barring Muscovy from direct access to the Baltic Sea. The war in 1656-1661, which ran parallel to both states' simultaneous struggle with Poland, ended in status quo. In 1721, the Great Nordic War ended with the Peace of Nystad. Russia retained the Baltic provinces of Estonia and Livonia which had been occupied in 1710 and also took Karelia with the city of Viborg.

3. The Swedish-Polish rivalry

The special Swedish-Polish relationship began in 1562, when John, the brother of king Erik XIV of Sweden and Duke of three counties in east Sweden (Finland), married Catherine Jagiello (Katarzyna Jagiellonka), sister of Sigismund II August, king of Poland. It took on deep significance in 1587-92, when John and Catherine's son Sigismund was elected king of Poland and inherited the Swedish crown, respectively. It ended after Sweden's defeat at Poltava in 1709, when Stanisław Leszczyński, who had been elected king of Poland in 1704 under Swedish pressure, was forced to give up his Polish throne to the returning August II.

For most of her history, Poland has been a continental state. However, after the union with Lithuania in 1385-6, in the fifteenth, sixteenth and seven-

teenth centuries, Poland aspired to become a leading sea power in the Baltic Region at the cost of the continuously weakening and finally dissolving Teutonic and Livonian Orders. The same period saw the ascendancy of Sweden to Baltic great power status. The two states had intimate and multifaceted contacts, both friendly and antagonistic. Especially memorable is the Swedish invasion of Poland and the widespread destruction brought by the Swedish troops in the war between 1655 and 1660.

In order to defend her conquests at the 'sea-side' (*sjökanten*), on the southern and eastern Baltic coast, Sweden had to control the hinterland with troops, and these had to be fed at the



Figure 15. The Swedish man-of-war 'Vasa', a draft by Björn Landström (*Vasa*, ed. By Mats Erling, Vasamuseet 1990). Ill.: Uppsala University Library



Figure 14. The first Catholic translation of the Bible into Polish was dedicated to Sigismund III Vasa. 1599, when the Bible was printed, was the last year of the union of Poland, Lithuania and Sweden. Photo: Witold Maciejewski

cost of the adversaries. At Altmark in 1629, a truce between Sweden and Poland left Livonia with Riga in Swedish hands. This was confirmed in a new truce in 1635. Apart from the economic and strategic issues, there was a certain confessional flavour to the conflict.

An example is a decoration on the Swedish man-of-war 'Vasa' from 1628. It sank immediately after it had left the shipyard in Stockholm. Thanks to this accident, the ship remained well preserved at the bottom of the sea. In the 1950s it was rescued and placed

in a special museum. On the ship, the contemporary viewer can see the wooden head of a grim Triton with a beret on his head, i.e., a typically Catholic priest's cap: 'It was certainly making fun of the Catholic enemy who, when Vasa was built, above all was Poland'. ("Skeppet Vasa – en färgglad reklampelare", *Universitetsläraren*, nr. 19, 1999, p. 15). This was at the time when the Swedish Lutheran State Church was increasingly becoming an instrument of state propaganda and patriotic indoctrination of the people. The King ordered the priests to hold especially anti-Papist and anti-Polish sermons.

In 1655, Sweden's new king Charles X Gustavus and the Council deemed it necessary to invade Poland-Lithuania with the double aim of securing Sweden's strongholds in East Prussia and keeping a new challenger in the east, Muscovy, at bay. Poland had lost part of its eastern territories to Muscovy as a result of Bohdan Khmielnicky's rebellion in 1648, which ended with the treaty of Perejaslav in 1654. Immediately after the treaty, Muscovy attacked Poland and occupied the eastern borderlands of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. They were later to be considered to be a specific historical region and were called the *Kresy wschodnie* in Polish, or just *Kresy*. In 1655, even Wilno was occupied by Russian troops. The local aristocracy in the Lithuanian part of the Commonwealth now had three options: to remain loyal to the Polish crown, to accept Muscovite sovereignty, or to conclude a new union, this time with the other attacking power, Sweden. It was also a choice between the three faiths of Catholicism, Orthodoxy and Protestantism. As a remnant from the impact of the Reformation on Poland in the sixteenth century, some families among the Lithuanian nobility were Calvinist, i.e., Protestant. And in spite of Polish attempts to bring all the Orthodox subjects in the east into the Catholic Church through the so-called Union of Brest in 1596 (hence "Uniates"), Orthodoxy had remained an important factor there.

4. Traitors, heroes and the intervention of the Holy Virgin

On 20th October, 1655, the Swedish general Magnus de la Gardie, son of James who had invaded Moscow and occupied Novgorod during the Time of Troubles and grandson of Pontus de la Gardie, who had secured the Swedish hold on Estonia back in 1561, agreed at a meeting in Kiejdany with the Lithuanian Great Hetman Janusz Radziwiłł and his brother Bogusław on a union between the Kingdom of Sweden and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania under a common ruler, the Swedish king. Lithuania's aristocracy would remain masters in their land, and the Catholic church would retain its strong position. In some Polish historiography, the Swedish-Lithuanian union became known as the Treason of Kiejdany. In contemporary Lithuania, the 340th anniversary of the union was celebrated in 1995 as a symbol of Swedish-Lithuanian historical bonds and friendship.

At the same time as Radziwiłł formed his union with Sweden, another camp within the Lithuanian aristocracy recognised as Grand Duke of Lithuania tsar Alexei Mikhailovich of Muscovy, who was at war with both Sweden and Poland. A third camp among the aristocracy and the gentry remained loyal to the Polish crown. In classical manner, these men formed a confederation. In the Polish interpretation, the significance of the religious dimension, which was to be given artistic expression by Sienkiewicz in his famous Trilogy about Poland's wars in the seventeenth century, was that there was a Protestant crusade by the Swedes at the same time as Poland was attacked by Orthodox Muscovites and Moslem Ottomans and Tartars. The significance of the political dimension was that a highly centralised state where the king had strong executive power, Sweden, attacked the Noble Republic with its Golden Freedoms.

The pivotal change of atmosphere, following immediately upon the so-called miracle at Częstochowa, has been described in the following way in Oscar Halecki's classical history of Poland:

It mattered little now that in the beginning of 1656 the Great Elector [Frederick William of Brandenburg], consummating his disloyalty, allied himself with the King of Sweden and declared himself his vassal in his capacity of Duke of Prussia. Some days later the Confederation of Tyszowce united the immense majority of the Polish nobility and gentry round John Casimir, who had returned from exile, and the whole country rose against the foreigner in a unanimous outburst of reviving patriotism. The chief traitors disappeared, struck by death that seemed a judgement of heaven, and courageous and disinterested leaders, Stephen Czarniecki in Poland, Paul Sapieha in Lithuania, placed themselves at the head of the movement of liberation (Halecki 1978).

A historian of a later generation, Adam Zamoyski, takes quite another view of the union of Kiejdany, noting that Charles X Gustavus and John Casimir were of the same Vasa dynasty:

Swedish troops appeared in every province, often accompanied by magnates or szlachta who supported Charles. Since there was little to choose between one Vasa king and another many accepted what seemed to be a fait accompli. The structure of the Commonwealth seemed to have fallen apart like a house of cards. [—] The majority of the population of the Commonwealth was quite prepared to accept Charles as king, but he was only interested in keeping Pomerania and Livonia, and treated the rest of Poland as occupied territory. He and his generals immediately began exporting everything they could lay their hands on – pictures, sculpture, furniture, entire libraries. The Protestant Swedes also took to burning down churches, having first emptied them of everything portable, and this sacrilege incensed the peasants, who were hardly concerned as to who sat on the throne. [—] A guerilla war developed, with bands of loyal szlachta and peasants making life very unpleasant for the Swedes (Zamoyski 1987).

According to Halecki, the resistance against the Swedes was caused by the Radziwillian treason of Kiejdany, but according to Zamoyski, it was caused by the Swedish deluge. Halecki's interpretation fits into the romanticist vein in Polish historiography, Zamoyski's into the positivist. The Marxist Jerzy Topolski's interpretation is compatible with that of Zamoyski but adds a further dimension:

The rapidity with which the Swedes managed to conquer Poland [—] was facilitated by the fact that some magnates and part of the gentry expected that Charles Gustavus would attack Russia, with which Poland was involved in a conflict over the Ukraine, and joined his ranks. In their eyes it was an ordinary change of ruler, actually within the same dynasty. It was only the ruthless pillaging of the country by the Swedes which brought about a change in public opinion and led to nationwide resistance (Topolski 1986).

The war ended with the peace of Oliwa in 1660. Sweden did not acquire any territory from Poland, but John Casimir renounced his claims to the Swedish throne. The Polish king also lost his suzerainty over Brandenburg-Prussia. In 1886, the future Nobel prize laureate in literature, the Polish writer Henryk Sienkiewicz published, as part of the Trilogy, his novel about the Swedish war, called *The Deluge*. Reading it and seeing movies based upon it, generations of Poles have been given a vivid picture of the horrors of the Swedish war. The war is also at the core of Polish national mythology in a positive sense, thanks to the legend of the Black Madonna in Częstochowa as the Protector and Saviour of Poland. The legend was born when, after the successful resistance against the Swedes, who had to lift their siege on Częstochowa at Christmas in 1655, king John Casimir proclaimed the Holy Virgin to be Queen of Poland.

5. Reconstruction of Sweden and destruction of Poland

After defeating the troops of the Russian tsar Peter I at Narva in the late autumn of 1700, King Charles XII of Sweden spent the following years waging war in Poland with the aim of dethroning August II as king of Poland, because in his capacity as king of Saxony August had declared war on Sweden in 1700, and have him replaced on the Polish throne by Stanisław Leszczyński. The Swedish troops caused a second deluge. In 1706, August agreed to denounce his rights to the Polish crown. This was the peace in Altranstädt.

Commenting on the effects of Charles XII's campaign in Poland, the Finnish writer Zacharias Topelius wrote with the benefit of hindsight in the mid-nineteenth century that it entailed 'The destruction of Poland, the defeat of Sweden and the loss of Finland'. Topelius was very popular in both Finland and Sweden in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, and his views certainly helped to create the impression that the fates of Sweden and Finland, and of Poland on the other hand, were closely linked in history. Actually, in the last quarter of the eighteenth century, Sweden was rather close to sharing the fate of Poland. However, the domestic policies of King Gustavus III (1771-92) and his constitutional reforms in 1772 and 1789, which strengthened the executive power and managed to rally the lower classes behind the King, led to the postponement of the partition of Sweden into a latter period of European history. This partition came only in 1809 when Russia, as a result of the agreement with France at Tilsit in 1807, was able to conquer the eastern part of Sweden and make it the Grand Duchy of Finland. The major part of Sweden remained a sovereign state. Moreover, as a result of the defeat, the Swedish king Gustavus IV Adolphus was forced to abdicate. He was succeeded as King by his uncle, Charles XIII. However, the real executive power was held by the crown prince, elected by the Swedish Diet in 1810, Jean Baptiste Bernadotte. To the Swedish crown the latter could add the Norwegian one as well: in Kiel in 1814, Denmark had to cede its Norwegian part to him. He adopted the Swedish name Karl Johan (Charles John). The main street in Norway's capital Oslo still bears his name.

It is instructive to compare the fate of Sweden in the early nineteenth century with that of Poland in the late eighteenth century. When, after the first partition in 1772, king Stanisław August Poniatowski and the Polish Long Diet in 1788-1792 attempted to rescue the Polish state by adopting the constitution of 3rd May, 1791, the action triggered internal opposition and external aggression, which led to the second partition. Renewed resistance under Tadeusz Kościuszko only sealed the fate with the third partition in 1795. By contrast, the Swedish constitutional reform in 1809 and the reconstruction of the state after the first partition turned out to be successful. One



Figure 16. Empress Catherine of Russia, Stanisław Augustus of Poland, Joseph II of Austria and Frederic the Great partitioning Poland (*La Situation de la Pologne en MDCCLXXIII*, after an engraving by Moreau). Ill.: Uppsala University Library

main cause was that the setting was different. In 1809 a major war was being waged in Europe, and the Swedish government had space for manoeuvring between the great powers.

Thus the ultimate result of the long conflict between Sweden and Poland was the reconstruction of Sweden as a middle power and the disappearance of Poland as a political actor in the Baltic Region. The struggle of Sweden and Poland in the seventeenth century was part of the overall competition for hegemony in the Baltic Region. One may argue that the idea of the Baltic Region as an entity crystallised in this epoch with the Swedish notion of *Mare nostrum*, our sea, as *Mare Clausstrum*, the closed sea. These developments can also be used for a demonstration of how concepts covered by names of states have changed content repeatedly with regard to both spatial configuration, political structure, and ethnic composition. Up to 1809 Finland was an integrated part of the Swedish kingdom. At the same time, that area bordered on Muscovy and her successor Russia. The city of Viborg in Karelia, at the eastern end of the Gulf of Finland, was an important Swedish military, administrative and commercial centre. To secure its hinterland, the Vasa kings set out on a policy of expansion with the aim of barring Muscovy from reaching the shores of the Baltic Sea. The Swedish acquisition of the cities of Narva and Reval and of the provinces of Estonia and Livonia should be seen in this perspective. The capture of the cities of Riga, Memel, Pillau and Elbing under Gustavus II Adolphus and of Vorpommern, Rügen, Stettin and Wismar at the end of the Thirty Years' war, was simply the logical consequence of this policy of expansion. It had its own momentum, bringing Sweden to conquer large parts of Denmark in 1645 and 1658 and to attack Poland in 1655.

Poland's successful resistance against Sweden in the 1655-1660 war meant not only that Sweden had to give up its ambition to add Lithuania to its provinces in the east. It is also a fact that the peace of Oliwa in 1660 came to mark the zenith of Swedish expansion and power in the Baltic Region. It was concluded in the same year as the peace of Copenhagen with Denmark, which also meant a territorial concession by Sweden concerning the island of Bornholm and one Norwegian province, Trondheim, which were given back to Denmark; they had been acquired in 1658.

During the following decades, the Swedish state grew "inwards" as an effect of economic policies designed to meet the demands of the permanent military mobilisation. Under Charles XI, foreign policy changed fundamentally to acquire a defensive character. The administrative and judicial systems were reformed and became more efficient, and the cadres of officers and state servants were increasingly recruited from the gentry and common people. The political power of the king was reinforced at the cost of the aristocracy. This had a double effect. The rise of a modern bourgeoisie was promoted, and the peasantry was not politically disenfranchised. The political influence of the aristocracy was broken once and for all, especially after the implementation of the decision at the Diets in 1680 and 1682 that their huge properties should be returned to the state. In Swedish history, this is known as the Reduction.

Charles XI (1672-97) and his son Charles XII (1697-1718) were absolutist rulers, but they prepared the way for the modern state by promoting the emergence of a servant class with a certain sense of patriotism and diligence. The fruits were harvested in the mid-eighteenth century during the epochs called the Era of Freedom and the Gustavian Era. Absolutism was abolished with the constitution of 1719, and the following decades saw the emergence of strong parliamentary influence on policy-making and legislation. Whereas Gustavus III, with his constitution of 1772 and his Act of security in 1789, managed to strengthen the role of the executive, this did not mean that parliamentary life and politics were brought to a standstill. The main result was that Russian and French direct influence over Swedish politics was curbed.

6. Modernisation of Sweden

While the eighteenth century saw the fruition of the modernisation of the Swedish political and economic fabric, the preceding seventeenth century was the century of the final Europeanisation of Sweden. Because of the importance of Sweden in the thirty years war and because of the opening of the country to massive technological and cultural influence from France and the Netherlands, Sweden ceased to be viewed as part of the wild and barbarian North and became a recognised member of European civilisation. Experts in law and the humanities, such as Hugo Grotius and Samuel Pufendorff were recruited to promote the political influence of Sweden in Europe. The French philosopher René Descartes visited Stockholm to lecture for Queen Christina. Uppsala university, which had been closed under the first three Vasa kings, was reopened under Duke Charles in the 1590s. In 1632 an Academy was founded in Dorpat (Tartu) in Livonia and in 1640 another in Åbo (Turku) in Finland. In 1668 a new university was founded in Lund, ten years after the conquest of the province of Scania. All this was a conscious attempt to strengthen the centralisation and homogenisation of the state by binding the newly-acquired territories as well as Finland closer to the government in Stockholm and instill a sense of Swedish patriotism in both the common people and the nobility.

Gothenburg, founded by King Charles IX in 1603 and really built under his son Gustavus II Adolphus after a fire in 1611, became an important port on Sweden's west coast. Its city plan and buildings were designed by Dutchmen, much as part of Danzig was redesigned in the same period. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, thousands of Dutch merchants, bankers, artisans and shipbuilders lived in Danzig, the inner city of which acquired that Dutch-Flemish architectural character which was to be restored after 1945. When the Swedish state furthered the development of mining and metal works, entrepreneurs and craftsmen from the Netherlands took a very active part in developments. Whereas Gothenburg was the earliest visible sign of the Dutch impact on Sweden, the most significant actor was the merchant and iron product specialist Louis de Geer (1587-1652) who moved from Amsterdam to Sweden in 1627. His contribution to the modernisation of Sweden was such that the Swedish historian Eli Heckscher argued that it was doubtful whether any other individual had exerted such an economic influence on Sweden as de Geer. He owned iron mines and works, brass foundries and ship yards and also engaged in large-scale farming. He is given the honour, by another Swedish historian, Jerker Rosén, of having given the Swedish working class its schooling in new technologies. It was easier to tell what he did not control than to enumerate all the enterprises under his control. He was the biggest creditor and financier of the Swedish Crown (Rosén 1962).

Dutch commercial, economic and cultural influence on the development of some leading cities in the Baltic Region as well as on whole states, functioned as an uniting link between Sweden, Poland, Brandenburg (Berlin, Potsdam) and Russia (St Petersburg) in the seventeenth century (see also case chapter 4).

The economic policy and social policies in Sweden followed the principles of cameralism. They differed from the mercantilism of the day by giving a greater role to the state and socialising the citizens to become loyal servants of the state. Lutheranism was put to ideological use in this endeavour. Moreover, as the Swedish historian Stellan Dahlgren has expressed it, 'the army was not only an instrument of warfare but also a tool for enforcing social discipline in the country'. (Dahlgren 1992).

For Sweden, the remaining legacy was status as a medium power. This position was lost with the defeat at Poltava in 1709. The legacy was one of the successful construction of a viable civic state. With the loss of the Baltic empire, Sweden also lost sight of Poland and her increasingly troublesome affairs.

7. Archaisation of Poland

During the first half of the seventeenth century, Poland-Lithuania reached its greatest territorial size ever. However, the second half of the seventeenth century saw the beginning of the demise of the state not only as a great power but also as such. Its capital Cracow had been one of the cultural centres of Europe from the high Middle Ages, with a university dating back to 1364 and reopened at the beginning of the Jagiellonian period. The other capital of the Commonwealth, Wilno, was a centre of both Polish and Jewish culture, also with international contacts. In 1579, the Jesuit college in Wilno was raised to the level of university. However, the reign of the three Vasa kings saw both the emergence of Warsaw as one of Europe's baroque cities, opera and all, and the decline of royal power as such. Whereas the Swedes ruined Warsaw, the old eastern capital, Wilno, was thoroughly ravaged by Muscovite troops in 1655.

The decline of Poland had its causes in the combination of a rather weak central royal power and the economic and demographic consequences of the many wars fought on the vast territories of Poland-Lithuania during the better part of the seventeenth century. The Swedish invasions were highly effective in reducing the prosperity of the Polish state, both by blockading exports and because of the devastation of both cities and the countryside during the deluge. The campaign of Charles XII was an additional blow both to political stability and to the economic fabric.

In contrast to Sweden in the seventeenth century, Polish society developed neither an efficient central administration nor cities and modern manufacture. Poland remained an agrarian country with *enserfed* peasants and an exporter of raw materials, ranging from foodstuffs to iron ore and charcoal. Hamburg and Amsterdam superseded Danzig, under Polish suzerainty, as the most important trading ports for Polish goods. From the 1620s to the 1650s, the Swedes intermittently sealed off Danzig so efficiently from trade in the Baltic Sea that the city itself and Polish exports never really recovered from the crisis. To make things worse, England and the Netherlands increasingly imported the traditional export products that had come from Poland from their overseas colonies at the same time as Muscovy re-entered the Baltic market, competing with the same raw materials as Poland. Contrary to Sweden, Poland did not have a strong central power that could step in and promote economic life with the help of mercantilist and cameralist methods.

The wars with Sweden and Russia in the 1650s brought almost total ruin to Poland. In this decade, the urban population declined by more than two thirds. A consequence was that the commercial and administrative cities such as Warsaw, Cracow, Poznań, Lublin and Wilno recovered slowly. Instead there was a certain growth of the private towns. However, these functioned as transmission belts for the exchange of goods used by the aristocracy, the owners of the towns. There was not much enterprise, investment and commodity production in these towns. The lifestyle of the ruling aristocracy was geared towards manners and the ideals of a fictitious past, expressed in the ideology of Sarmatism.

One may even argue that in contrast to Sweden, which underwent modernisation, Poland underwent archaisation, ending in the institutionalisation of the *liberum veto* and the manifestation of strife and anarchy surrounding the election of the king in 1696-7. The latter was called 'one of the most dismal episodes in Polish parliamentary history' by the historian Zamoyski (Zamoyski 1987). His Marxist counterpart Topolski caught the whole political development of the decentralisation and ultimate demise of state power, especially after the end of the rule of the Vasa dynasty in 1668, the kings of which were the last that could rely on a kind of historical or traditional legitimacy, with the phrase: 'That weakening was caused by the transformation of the fairly efficient system of the so-called democracy of the gentry into an oligarchy of the magnates' (Topolski 1986).

In his book on Polish-Scandinavian relations, the Polish historian Kazimierz Âlaski has described the mutual Swedish and Polish experience of one another during the seventeenth cen-

ture as a process of increasing alienation and enmity. Among Swedes, the impression of Poland as an anarchic society was reinforced. According to Ålaski, it was during this period that the Swedish language was enriched with the expression 'polsk riksdag' (Polish Diet) as a metaphor for political disorder and internal strife. On the other hand, the Polish popular dictionary was completed with expressions such as *zły jak Szwed* (evil as a Swede) and *brudny jak Szwed* (dirty as a Swede) (Ålaski 1977).

8. The outcome of the Swedish-Polish rivalry

By the early eighteenth century, Sweden and the Poland were on the wane, something that was accentuated in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century when first Poland and then Sweden were partitioned. Poland disappeared as a state and most certainly as a maritime power, if it had ever been one. Sweden under its new ruler, crown prince Bernadotte, compensated for the loss of its eastern part, which became the Grand Duchy of Finland under the Russian tsar, by forging a union with Norway which, through the treaty of Kiel in 1814, was disentangled from the Kingdom of Denmark. In 1864, the latter also lost the southern duchies of Schleswig, Holstein and Lauenburg to the German states of Prussia and Austria. All in all, by this time Germany and Russia emerged as great powers in the region, although the British remained hegemonic in the North Sea. The British navy remained an important military factor also in the Baltic Sea, as is evident from its crucial role in the Crimean war. The United Kingdom played an important role in the economy of both Sweden and Denmark.

In the course of the long war between 1558 and 1721, the smaller peoples on the eastern Baltic shore also suffered terrible losses. The countryside was almost bled to death repeatedly, and it is estimated that during the war activities in the 1620s and in the 1650s up to two thirds of the population died. Except from outright murders by the marauding troops, people died from starvation, which was caused by bad harvests and by pestilence. It must also be added, that among the soldiers, who suffered a very high death toll, the majority died from illness and malnutrition and not in battle. The human cost of the Swedish Baltic Empire was tremendous.

4 The Russian and German Empires

Kristian Gerner

Seventeenth century Sweden was actually a model for eighteenth century Russia. In his dissertation, the Swedish historian Claes Peterson showed that Peter I copied the Swedish administrative system and tried to organise the Russian administration accordingly (Peterson 1979). The Finnish historian Max Engman has given the label the “Stockholm period” to Baltic history in the seventeenth century. However, Engman adds significantly that viewed in a broader perspective the proper label would be the “Amsterdam period”. The Netherlands’ pre-eminence was reflected in the fact that Dutch supplanted Low German as the main commercial language (Engman 1995). After the establishment of the Russian Empire of Peter I in the Baltic area the “Stockholm period” was succeeded by the “St Petersburg period”. In the beginning this period too was characterised by Dutch influence. However, it has been argued that the crucial Dutch contribution to Swedish and Russian modernisation was part of a dialectical process where Muscovy played an important role.

In historiography, Russia has been cast in rather a passive role when it comes to modernisation and societal development in general. It is significant that the founding of St Petersburg has been seen as the inauguration of both the “westernisation” and “Europeanisation” of Russia. However, if the perspective is changed it might be argued that Muscovy’s challenge to Swedish supremacy in the Baltic spurred the military, administrative and economic modernisation of Sweden in the seventeenth century. Moreover, it has even been argued that Muscovy’s foreign and military policies contributed to the rise of Holland and thus triggered the whole modernisation process in the Baltic Region.

In all his writings, the Soviet Russian historian Boris Porshnev stressed that political, economic and cultural history cannot be understood if the analysis is confined to separate states. Instead, it is necessary to view Europe as a system of states. In 1948, Porshnev published a book devoted especially to Russia’s place and role in early modern European history. He described Muscovy’s struggle against the Teutonic Order and thereafter against the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation as a crucial factor for the victory of the bourgeois revolution in Western Europe. Porshnev argued that tsar Ivan IV certainly did not consciously act to help the Dutch revolution against the Habsburgs. On the contrary, Muscovy despised the Dutch rebels and fought them diplomatically. However, Muscovy’s pressure on Europe weakened the Habsburgs and thus made the Dutch revolution possible. The pattern was repeated during the Thirty Years War. Without Muscovy’s support to Sweden against the Catholic forces, the German Empire would not have been defeated. Muscovy thus contributed to the triumph of “the progressive forces”, i.e., the Protestant powers Sweden and Holland.

Parallel cities: Gothenburg and St Petersburg

Long after the actual Dutch flavour had evaporated, Gothenburg remained the most liberal and, as it were, progressive city in Sweden. It attracted, among others, especially Scots and Jews, the latter who were allowed to settle in Sweden in the late eighteenth century. It is appropriate to compare the role of St Petersburg in the economic and cultural development of Russia with the role of Gothenburg as a powerful external factor in Sweden's economic and cultural development, especially if the latter city is viewed as an emblem for the role of integrated and assimilated foreigners in general. The great literary scholar Yuri Lotman, originally from Leningrad but who spent most of his career in Tartu in Estonia, has written much on the topic of St Petersburg as a crucial factor in Russia's history. He has drawn attention to the importance of the fact that St Petersburg was situated at the geographical periphery of Russia. The city was a border zone between European culture in general and the specific Russian traditional culture (Lotman 1984).

1. Westernisation or the Third Rome

Gothenburg's geographical location and its original relation to Swedish culture was similar to the role of Peter's St Petersburg. However, the following history was different. Whereas Gothenburg did not become the capital and was fairly well integrated into Swedish society, St Petersburg became the capital of Russia. Yet, to a certain degree, the new city with its western design and name remained alien in the Russian cultural environment and in the symbolic universe of Russian thinking. According to Lotman's analysis, the city was viewed both as the victory of reason over the elements and as a break with the order of nature, both as a utopia and as a diabolical illusion. According to the contemporary secularised interpretation of the Bronze statue of Peter I from 1782, Falconet's famous *The Bronze Horseman*, the snake under the horse symbolised the hatred, the enmity and the hindrances that Peter had to overcome in order to accomplish his modernisation of Russia.

However, according to Russian religious tradition, the snake was Anti-Christ and in the actual context with the horse and the horseman it symbolised the end of the world. The interpretation said that the Devil had helped Peter build his city against the order of Nature and thus violated Russia. During the nineteenth century, St Petersburg was still perceived as the antidote to the Russian city Moscow. However, Lotman is keen to add, it acquired a dynamic role and really functioned as the modernising centre of Russia (Lotman 1984).

Peter's project really was the second Russian empire. The first emerged gradually as a successor to the Byzantine Empire. Kiev adopted Christianity from Constantinople in 988 and adopted the Orthodox religion. During the fifteenth century, Moscow, which had succeeded Kiev as the capital, distanced itself from the emperor and the Patriarch in Constantinople because the latter were viewed as renegades when they reached reconciliation with Rome in an attempt to create a common Christian alliance against the Ottoman threat. Thus, when Constantinople fell



Figure 17. The Bronze Horseman, Peter the Great, from his statue by Stephen Falconett at St Petersburg. Ill.: Uppsala University Library

to the Ottomans in 1453, it was easy for Muscovy to regard this as a just punishment. Within the Russian church a doctrine evolved which cast Moscow in the role as the third, true and final Rome. The grand duke adopted the title of Caesar, Tsar in Russian. In 1589, the metropolitan of Moscow was recognised as Patriarch by the Patriarch in Constantinople. Russia had become a recognised successor to the Byzantine empire. Catholicism in general and the catholic Polish-Lithuanian neighbouring state in particular emerged as the Other, cast in the role as arch enemy.

2. Peter I's Baltic Empire

Peter I – sometimes called the Great – changed competition with the West into another dimension. He retained the idea of a Russian empire, but his plan was to integrate it with Europe and introduce Western civilisation. This was in the Baroque era, when symbols were highly significant. They carried messages about the political ambitions and aims of the rulers and their states. Thus it was highly significant that Peter named the new capital of Russia St Petersburg and that he spelled according to Dutch rules. Saint Peter was the apostle who brought Christendom to Rome, the capital of the original empire. If Moscow had been regarded by Peter's predecessors as the Third Rome, the new tsar announced that Russia was linked to the origin directly. Not only the Dutch spelling but also the design of the new Russian capital, which reminded the visitor of Amsterdam and Venice, main centres of European trade, intelligence and banking, demonstrated that Peter's ambition was to make his new empire a modern state at the forefront of European civilisation. After having defeated and obliterated the Swedish Baltic empire (but not Sweden as a national state) Peter adopted the Roman title Emperor. This did not signify an ambition to conquer all of Europe but the demand that Russia must be regarded as an equal to the two successor states to Rome in Western and Central Europe, i.e., France, where Louis XIV had adopted the title *Augusto Augustior*, and the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation, usually ruled by members of the Habsburg family. Russia was established as a Baltic empire. The competition from Denmark and Sweden ceased to be a serious threat to Russia, in spite of the Swedish "revenge" wars against Russia in 1741-43 and 1788-90, but in the southern Baltic area a new challenge developed slowly in the form of Prussia. This had to do with developments in 1789-1871 among the successors of the Roman empire in the west, i.e., France and the German *länder*.

Building a Russian Empire entailed access to the sea and control of the lands to the east of Prussia and Austria, i.e., the lands between the Baltic and the Black Sea. Peter had tried to establish Russia on the shores of the Black Sea but had finally concentrated on the Baltic region. His plans were fulfilled by Catherine II – also called the Great – in the late eighteenth century at the cost of the then enfeebled Ottoman empire. Whereas Peter had built the new Russian capital on the Baltic coast in a territory inhabited by a truly Baltic people, the Finns, which had been under the jurisdiction of the main antagonist in the area, Sweden, Catherine built a new Russian port in a territory traditionally inhabited by a truly Mediterranean and Pontic people, the Greeks, which had been under the jurisdiction of the main antagonist in the area, the Ottomans. The new city was called Odessa.

Its construction was to be supervised by a French aristocrat in Russian service, de Richelieu. Its design and architecture were as West European as that of St Petersburg. However, approaching the Mediterranean from the east through the Black Sea, Catherine announced that Russia now challenged the Ottomans once again by laying claims to Constantinople. After

the conquest of Constantinople in 1453, the Ottomans regarded themselves as the inheritors of the empire in direct competition with Moscow. Now Catherine had her grandsons named Alexander and Constantine in order to signal the Russian claims on the heritage from Constantinople.

3. The French episode

The Russian Empire became the politically most powerful state in the Baltic Region as a consequence of the outcome of the Napoleonic wars. In 1809, Russia defeated Sweden and Finland became a Grand Duchy under the Russian tsar. Russia played a leading role at the peace congress in Vienna in 1815. Almost a century after Peter the Great's proclamation of the Russian empire, it was finally recognised by the Western great powers as their equal. Copying the model of Alexander the Great, the Russian tsars enlarged the Russian empire in the nineteenth century by conquering the lands of the Southern Caucasus and of Central Asia, finally reaching the Pacific Ocean, where Vladivostok, literally "the Sovereign of the East" was founded in 1861.

However, as Russia extended its empire in the east, it was gradually losing positions in the Baltic area. This was the result of some long-term consequences of the French revolution of 1789, i.e., the rise of Prussia to great power status and the creation of the German Empire in 1871.

The French revolution swiftly developed into a republican project for Europe. Interestingly, the symbols chosen to represent the new republic were taken from the Roman Res Publica. Official insignia, the names of political institutions and public art and architecture all recalled the original model, and ambitions to establish a new European empire emerged. The identification with the Roman republic was strong. In April 1792, even before the dethronement of Louis XVI, Robespierre argued against the declaration of a revolutionary war on Austria lest the war should produce "a new Caesar".

Actually, a new Caesar did enter the scene. In 1804, First Consul Napoléon Bonaparte crowned himself and was anointed by the Pope, adopting the title "Empereur de la République". Defeating Prussia, he also re-established Poland in the form of a Duchy, Księstwo Warszawskie. The Polish *szlachta* gladly joined La Grande Armée as Napoléon invaded Russia in 1812. This is the subject of the most famous of all Polish poems, Adam Mickiewicz's work *Pan Tadeusz*. It was to inspire generations of patriotic and romantic Poles in their struggle against tsarist Russia in 1830, 1863, 1905 and 1920. In 1999, the greatest Polish film director ever, Andrzej Wajda, crowned his more than fifty years long career with the movie *Pan Tadeusz*. The whole dialogue was Mickiewicz's original poem.

4. The anti-absolutists episodes and restoration of autocracy

But back to the early 19th century. Besides exerting dictatorial power, Napoléon made the empire hereditary. Although his legal reforms helped make France a modern state in the era of accelerating capitalist industrialisation and advancing political liberalism, his empire certainly was not a democratic state. However, as a result of direct confrontation with France, with modern French political philosophy and with the French legal system during and immediately after the Napoleonic wars, Russian officers began to nurture the idea of a revolution in

their own country and of a democratic constitution for Russia. The moment came when tsar Alexander I died in December 1825. This caused a minor dynastic crisis. Of Alexander's two brothers, the older, Constantine, was the heir apparent. However, he had been disqualified by Alexander because of hismorganatic marriage, and he refused to become tsar. The revolutionaries attempted to use the short interregnum before the Guards swore allegiance to Alexander's younger brother, Nicholas, to take power by force. The revolt was easily crushed by the troops of the new tsar, Nicholas I. Five of the leaders were sentenced to death by hanging. More than a hundred were exiled to Siberia or demoted to army service in the ranks. However, their ideas were taken over and developed further by a new category of critics of the state, which grew in Russia during the nineteenth century. The revolutionaries of 1825 themselves became known as the Dekabristy. The Bolsheviks, who took power in 1917, recognised the Dekabristy as their predecessors. Senate Square was renamed Dekabrist Square as an act of homage.

After the modernisation spurts under Peter I and Catherine II, respectively, which were consciously meant to make a truly European state of Russia, came the third impulse as a direct consequence of the confrontation of young Russian officers with contemporary West European civilisation. This time it was not a spurt directed from above. It was the start of a long march and mobilisation from below and within Russian society. It would end only with the breakdown of tsarist Russia in 1916-17 and the Bolsheviks' coming to power. Ideologically, the Russian intellectuals were profoundly influenced by the ideas of the Enlightenment and Romanticism. Among the intellectuals, who now became known as *intelligenty*, who formed the intelligentsia, different ideological stances developed. The most prominent among them were the Westerners, the Zapadniki, and the Slavophiles, the Slavjanofilii. The former were universalists and wanted to see – or believed that it would come as matter of historical development – Russia become a modern European state. The latter believed in certain peculiar qualities of the Russian people and believed in a special road to modernity for Russia. In terms of progressive radicalisation in the course of the century, many among the former became socialists and many among the latter populists. There was also a mixture of elements from both strains, first the Narodniks and then the Bolsheviks.

Tsar Alexander II (1855-1881) answered some of the demands in the wake of the shock following defeat against the United Kingdom and France in the Crimean War. Enserfment, which had been abolished in the Baltic provinces in the second decade of the 19th century, was abolished in 1861, and the administrative and judicial structures were changed according to Western models. However, the tsarist autocracy did not manage to promote political input from below but remained resistant to radical demands, especially after Alexander II had been murdered by a populist in 1881. Only after a new military defeat, in 1905, against Japan, did a new wave of reforms hit Russia as a direct consequence of revolutionary upheavals. A parliament, called the state дума, was established in 1906, agrarian reforms were implemented, and the press and literature in general could flourish. On the eve of the outbreak of the Great War in 1914, not only militarily and politically but also culturally, Russia was a leading Baltic power. Then came the war, and Russia was lost to European civilisation for seventy years.

5. Emergence of the modern German empire

The Roman German empire, which had been founded in 962, disappeared as a consequence of the Napoleonic wars. In 1804 the emperor Francis II realised that the end of the empire was imminent and contented himself with creating a new empire from his hereditary lands,

to become Emperor Francis I of Austria. Napoleon dissolved the old German empire formally in 1806. Then Napoleon was defeated. France went through a reconstitution of the monarchy and two minor revolutions in 1830 and 1848. A second republic was proclaimed in 1848. It was followed by a second empire in 1852, when First Consul Louis Napoléon arranged a referendum, after the outcome of which the Senate declared him emperor as Napoléon III.

In the mid-nineteenth century, the Russian empire was the only empire to border on the Baltic Sea. However, competition between the German and French halves of the old Roman empire were soon to touch the Baltic Region. Prussia, which had been consolidated and reformed as a consequence of the impact of and the reaction to the French revolution and Napoléon's devastating victory over Prussia in 1806, began to compete with Austria for the role as the leading German state. Prussia at the same time of course remained a Baltic power. In 1864 Prussia and Austria attacked Denmark in order to reclaim the duchies of Schleswig, Holstein and Lauenburg. They did so. Two years later, in 1866, Prussia defeated Austria in the battle of Königgrätz and forced the latter state to renounce all aspirations for hegemony over all German countries. The time was ripe for a second German empire.

In 1870, Prussia attacked France. Even before the capitulation of Paris, the German chancellor Otto von Bismarck had the King of Prussia, William, proclaimed German Emperor. The ceremony took place in the Hall of Mirrors in the palace of Versailles on 18 January 1871. This was a symbolic gesture with the message that the new German Empire was the inheritor of the whole imperial tradition, both the French and the German. The new empire was called the Second Empire. The word in German was Reich. The word is etymologically related to the Scandinavian words "rike" (Norwegian and Swedish) and "rige" (Danish). In the latter languages, the word has the connotation of "state". However, the German word Reich has the connotation of "empire". After the ascendancy to the throne of William's grandson William II in 1888 and his dismissal of von Bismarck in 1890, Germany began to claim recognition as an empire on an equal footing with both the British and Russian empires. In the political language of the 1890s, Germany aspired for "a place in the sun". Thus in the early twentieth century, the Baltic Region became the arena for competition between Germany and Russia. For the major part of the century, politics in the Baltic Region became profoundly affected by this. The story came to an end only in 1990-1991 with the unification of Germany and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Within the framework of the European Union, Germany emerged as the most powerful state in the region. Russia was still recognised as a military great power, but its ideological, political and economic influence diminished significantly when the Soviet empire was dissolved and Russia lost East Germany, Poland and the three Baltic states.

In the early twentieth century, the German Empire, whose capital Berlin must be considered to be a Baltic city, was at the forefront of industrial, technological, scientific and cultural developments in the world and certainly in the Baltic Region. However, it must not be forgotten that a second centre of the modernisation process was an outgrowth of west European civilisation across the Atlantic Ocean, i.e., the United States of America. It had a crucial influence in the Baltic Region from the mid-nineteenth century and during the whole twentieth century. Mass emigration to the United States eased social pressure on the states in the Baltic Region, and the resulting networks of contacts with the United States and the latter's influence in all spheres of society in the region were of profound importance for developments in the twentieth century.

Baltic Empires

The Danish Empire (1150-1220). As early as the Viking Age Danes gained dominance in the Baltic Region, controlling Norway, Denmark, Skåne and Estonia. Tallinn (which means “Danish fort”) was founded by the Danes in 1219. Denmark also controlled several of the large islands in the Baltic Sea. There was much Swedish-Danish dispute over Gotland, which was Danish during several periods until 1645.

The Teutonic Order (1226-1410). German knights advanced eastward in the early Middle Ages. Along the Baltic Sea coast the cities of Danzig (Gdańsk), Königsberg and Riga were founded. Prussia, originally inhabited by a west Baltic people, was conquered. The eastward expansion was halted by Polish-Lithuanian forces at the battle of Grunwald/Tannenberg in 1410.

The Kalmar Union (1397-1521). A union was formed by Denmark, Norway and Sweden in 1397, partially to counteract the Hanseatic League. Though weak, it became one of the largest alliances in the Baltic Region, mostly under Danish leadership. It survived several wars between Denmark and Sweden, but broke apart when Gustav Vasa was successful in separating Sweden from Denmark in 1521.


The Lithuanian-Polish Commonwealth (1386-1795). Lithuania was unified under Mindaugas in the 13th century. Through marriage, a personal union was established between Poland and Lithuania in 1386. This empire was very large, extending from the Baltic to the Black Sea, including major parts of present day Belarus and Ukraine. Poland and Lithuania entered into a real union in the 16th century. This state was partitioned by Russia, Prussia and Austria in 1772-1795.

The Swedish Empire (1560-1721). The Swedish realm expanded from the 1560s and on. Encircled by its neighbours, Sweden launched wars with Russia, Denmark, Poland, and the German Emperor and gained territories. The Swedish king Gustav II Adolf entered the Thirty Years War and conquered several German ports. Denmark lost Scania (Skåne) and other provinces to Sweden in 1658. This marked the maximal extent of the Swedish empire. The Baltic Sea almost became a Swedish inland water. The emergence of Sweden as a great power was made possible through administrative reforms, and the build-up of an iron and copper industry with the help of Dutch expertise and capital. Almost all areas east and south of the Baltic Sea were lost in the Great Northern War which ended with the treaty of Nystad in 1721.

Russia (1701-1917). The Russian expansion towards the Baltic Sea was led by Tsar Peter I, marked by his decision to build St Peterburg in 1703 as the capital of Russia. After the Great Northern War Russia obtained Estonia and Livonia from Sweden. After agreement with Prussia later in the 18th century, Poland was divided between Prussia, Russia and Austria. The Vienna Treaty after the Napoleonic wars confirmed Russian control over these areas.

Brandenburg-Prussia-Germany (1660-1918). With Brandenburg as the nucleus, Brandenburg-Prussia was established as an electorate in 1660. In the 18th century Prussia grew to an influential state. Centralisation of the administration (in Berlin), economic reforms, the creation of a professional army were the basis of Prussian power. Prussia took a lion's share in the divisions of Poland 1772-95. After Congress of Vienna of 1815, Prussia took a leading role in the German unification. The establishment of the Second German Reich in 1871 confirmed Prussia's hegemony over Austria as the leading German state.

Figure 18. The Baltic Empires – dominating powers in the Baltic Region. Ill.: Ulf Zander



5 From the First World War to the end of the Cold War: the bloody twentieth century

Kristian Gerner

The First World War was to a great degree caused by German ambitions to be a global power and master of the European continent. It ended in 1918 with both the German and the Russian empires in shambles and the establishment of the successor states of the so-called Weimar Republic in Germany and the Soviet Union in Russia. For fifteen years, for the first time in half a millennium, there was no strong local imperial power in the Baltic Region. Only in 1933, with Hitler coming to power, did German imperial ambitions start to inform foreign policy again, and at the same time, Stalin had crushed all kinds of imaginable political, social and ideological opposition at home and prepared for Russia's comeback as an imperial power in the Baltic Region and the world.

In 1916, the invading German armies caused tsarist Russia to break down. In the wake of the devastating military defeats at the front and after huge political anti-tsarist demonstrations in the capital Petrograd (which had been renamed at the outbreak of the war in 1914) in March 1917, the tsar was forced to abdicate. A so-called provisional or temporary government was formed by a coalition of liberal and reformist socialist parties from the State Duma, the parliament which had been established as a new institution in 1906, in the wake of the 1905 Russian revolution. The leaders of the new state identified with the French revolution of 1789 and with the Paris Commune of 1871. The latter was seen as a prototype of socialist society. However, the Bolsheviks soon also identified with Russia, and with pre-Petrine Russia at that. In Muscovy, the doctrine of the Third Rome was part of the general idea that the non-Orthodox world was evil and ultimately had to be liberated and salvaged by Muscovy. The Bolsheviks viewed the two socialist Internationals from 1864 and 1889 as failed attempts of revolution in a similar way as the Russian Orthodox Church once held that both Rome and Constantinople had failed as imperial projects. The Bolsheviks created a new and definite International which they baptised the Third International. Its centre was Moscow. The capital of the Soviet Union thus reclaimed the role and the ambitions of sixteenth century Muscovy. The Third International became known as the Communist International, Komintern. Its mission to spread the revolution was carried out by branches in the capitalist states, i.e., communist parties that were obliged to follow orders from Moscow and work on the overthrow of the regimes and the established state order in their own countries.

World War I (1914-1918)

At the Congress of Vienna in 1815 the European leaders adopted a security system based on balance among the great powers. The gradual breakdown of the system began at the end of the 19th century. Russia, Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman empire were weakened, which resulted in unrest in the outer fringes of Europe, especially the Balkans. Germany was unified into the Second German Reich in 1871, rapidly industrialised, and began to lead an aggressive foreign policy. A system of alliances, Germany and Austria-Hungary against Britain, France and Russia, made the conflict over Bosnia-Herzegovina between Serbia and Austria escalate into the Great War of 1914. The German plan was to strike effectively against the western powers and avoid war on two fronts. But the plan failed. Russia mobilised quickly, and the German-French war resulted in a deadlock in the trenches along the western front. The US participation in the war (from 1917) was decisive. Germany and its ally Austria-Hungary surrendered on November 11, 1918.

World War I marks the breakdown of three empires, Tsarist Russia, the Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy and the Second German Reich. Based on nationalist movements, eight independent states were recognised during the Paris conferences in 1919-1920. Five of these are in the Baltic Region: Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland.

In the interwar period and more outspokenly during the post-war era, a specific Nordic identity was built which included the populations of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. Although the Finnish language belongs to a quite different language group, the long tradition of the Swedish language in Finland and the presence in the country of a large Swedish population, intimate relations between the Nordic peoples have been considered as rather "natural". It is of some consequence in the present era, that Scandinavians have a tendency to believe that relations among the three "Baltic" peoples of Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians are equally intimate, which they certainly are not.

In the interwar period, Lithuania and Poland were enemy states. There was no direct official contact between the two. Travellers had to move between the two states by way of passing through Latvia. Estonia and Latvia were not accepted as Nordic states by their Scandinavian neighbours, although Estonia in particular developed close cultural and scholarly relations with Sweden and Finland. International events in 1939-1940 proved that the three Baltic states certainly, and to some degree also Poland and Finland, really were not regarded as legitimate states in the eyes of the leaders of Germany and the Soviet Union.

1. Emergence of new states

It is interesting to note that the Bolsheviks encouraged without hesitation and reinvigorated the Orthodox notion of the Poles as the arch-enemy of Russia, i.e. of Soviet Russia. At the time of the German defeat in November 1918, Józef Piłsudski, of Lithuanian szlachta origin and also a former socialist and organiser of Polish troops who fought against Russia on the side of the Central Powers in the war, proclaimed the reborn Polish state. Its new boundaries were not yet delimited when in 1920, during the final stage of the Civil War in Russia, Piłsudski engaged the new Polish state in a struggle for the Kresy.



Poland managed to occupy Kiev, but the Red Army succeeded in both defeating the white general Wrangel in southern Ukraine and pushing the Poles back to the Vistula at Warsaw. With some French assistance, Piłsudski managed to turn the tide once again. The Polish-Soviet war ended with a peace treaty in 1921, which gave Poland eastern Galicia with Lwów as well as Grodno and the western part of Belarus. In October 1920, Polish troops occupied the Wilno district, which was subsequently united with Poland. However, the new Lithuanian

Figure 19. Józef Piłsudski (1867-1935) originally a socialist and terrorist, military leader during World War I, conqueror of Bolsheviks in 1920, and finally dictator 1926-1935. In 1934, he suggested to the European super powers a preventive war against Hitler's Germany. Photo: Uppsala University Library

state had its own claims on the city, which they called Vilnius. The Polish conquest of Vilnius was not recognised by the Soviet side.

The Polish defeat of the Bolshevik Red Army on the Vistula in 1920 was greeted as a miracle by official Poland. In the history books, it was ranked side-by-side with the victory at Grunwald in 1410. For the Russian Bolsheviks, the defeat was a major setback. Their war aims had been to ignite the flame of revolution in Germany by establishing direct contact with the German proletarians, many of whom sympathised with Communism and with Soviet Russia. Now the Poles crushed the dream. They were to pay fatally for this in 1939 when the Soviet Union finally succeeded in establishing direct contact with Germany in the embrace of the two totalitarian regimes in the form of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact.

As a direct consequence of the defeat of Germany in the Great War and of the civil war in Russia, Finland became an independent state. After a civil war between whites and reds in 1918, which was also a war of liberation as the victory of the whites secured the new state from immediate Soviet aspirations on it, Finland became a Nordic democratic state similar to the three Scandinavian states (Iceland became a sovereign state only in 1944). Poland and Lithuania also became sovereign, but as separate “national” states. The Lithuanian government considered Vilnius to be the self-evident capital, but as mentioned above, Polish troops occupied the city in 1920. It was incorporated in Poland until 1939 and given to Lithuania by the Soviet Union after its conquest of eastern Poland in the same year. As the results of plebiscites, Silesia was divided between Poland and Germany and Schleswig between Denmark and Germany. After a decision by the League of Nations, the Åland Islands, inhabited by Swedes, became part of the Republic of Finland but with a certain political autonomy.



Map 9. New States. Estonia and Finland are recognized by Soviet Russia as independent states in the Treaty of Tartu (Dorpat), February 2; Lithuania is recognized in the Treaty of Moscow, July 12; Latvia is recognized in the Treaty of Riga, August 11 by Soviet Russia. Ill.: Radosław Przebitkowski

2. Communism and Nazism

In Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, which had been wholly or partly parts of the Russian Empire, the ruling circles and a majority of the electorate viewed the local communist parties with suspicion not only for purely ideological reasons but also because the communists were identified with Russia. In addition, communism was viewed as Jewish because, among the first generation of party leaders not only in the Soviet Union but also in Poland and Lithuania, a number of party leaders were Jews. Anti-Semitism reinforced anti-Communism and anti-Russianism. Of course historical memories informed fear in the western successor states of Soviet imperial designs for the territories lost by Russia in 1918-1920. There was also fear of similar German aspirations, especially as Germany never recognised its eastern boundaries as definite. In 1926, coups resulted in authoritarian regimes in Poland and Lithuania. In 1934, the same thing occurred in Estonia and Latvia. Only Finland remained a democracy. The immediate reasons were internal political conflicts and ambitions on the part of the political leaders from the time of the struggle for independence in 1918 to restrict the influence of both communists and of fascist movements. However, these developments were also a specific reaction against perceived threats from Germany and the Soviet Union. Belief in the strength of democracy, its legitimacy, was rather low.

In a way similar to the one that Soviet Communism was inspired by both ideology and history, so was its twin German Nazism. The main difference was that whereas the ideological basis of the Soviet dictatorship was the Marxist notion of social class, the ideological base for the German dictatorship was “race”. The main enemies of the Soviet regime were classified as capitalists, whereas the Jews were chosen as the main enemies of the German regime. Both regimes promoted belief in conspiracy theories. In the “Jewish capitalist” they had a shared enemy. In spite of the fact that anti-Semitism was not accepted by the early Soviet state, at the very time as the victory of the Soviet Union in the war against Germany looked certain in 1943-44, the Soviet regime adopted anti-Semitic policies and prepared to complete the Holocaust by extinguishing Jewish culture (and many Jewish people). The process came to a halt with the death of Stalin in 1953. However, Soviet Jews were to be harassed by the state authorities until the end of the Soviet State.

It is important to note that the obsession with “purity” was important in both the Nazi and the Communist case. The respective empires should be truly “Aryan” and “Proletarian”, respectively. Ideologically, both Soviet Marxism and German Nazism were peculiar mixtures of superstition and modernism. Both regimes sought to restrain thinking, encourage irrational beliefs and foster an emotional climate of struggle against enemies and subservience to leaders. Because of the encompassing ambitions of both Communists and Nazis to control every aspect of societal life, they have become known in historiography as “totalitarian”.

Both Communists and Nazis also believed that their task was to build paradise on earth, and they actually tried to modernise their respective states in terms of infrastructure, industries and urbanisation. The Communists talked about the global classless society and the need to extinguish all oppressive classes in the world. In principle, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was open for all proletarians in the world to join. The Nazis spoke about their *Lebensraum*, i.e., the living space for the Germans in Eastern Europe, and of the need to annihilate all Jews and most of the Gypsies, with the exception of those who had remained purely “Aryan” and were not contaminated with other “blood”. The Slavic populations should be heavily decimated, bereft of all intellectuals, and reduced to slaves (Wehler 1998).

Stalinism, nazism

Stalinism. Josef Stalin ruled the Soviet Union from 1924 to his death in 1953 with his merciless totalitarian regime. His policy of “Socialism in one country” meant in effect the forced collectivisation of agriculture and forced development of state-owned massive heavy industry with devastating social consequences. To achieve his goals Stalin ruthlessly exerted control using the police. Intellectuals and others considered to be enemies of the system were murdered, imprisoned or deported to the Gulag archipelago, a vast system of labour and concentration camps in remote areas of the Soviet Union.



Figure 20. Stalin being pulled down from his monument in Budapest in October 1956.

The collectivisation of agriculture resulted in mass murder, mass starvation and mass deportation of millions of people. In the name of Marxist-Leninist ideology, planned economy contributed to increased central control to make the Soviet Union a totalitarian state. The victory of the Soviet Union in World War II led to the expansion of Stalinism to satellite states in eastern and central Europe.

Nazism. Nazism was the political ideology of the National Socialist German Workers' Party, which was taken over by Adolf Hitler in the early 1920s to become the basis of his dictatorship in Germany 1933-1945. Nazism began as a protest against the German surrender in 1918 and the Versailles Treaty in 1919. Economic depression and unemployment caused widespread disappointment and the Nazis attracted mass support.

Hitler first gained power through constitutional procedure and then established a totalitarian regime in 1933. Nazism shared many of the features of Fascism in other countries such as the Führer principle. The special characteristics of Nazism were belief in the racial superiority of the “Aryan” race; vehement anti-Semitism and ambitions to establish German military power and hegemony in Europe.

The practical implementation of Nazi policy started with the establishment of concentration camps, where those considered inferior as well as enemies of the state were interned. Early on in World War II several of these camps were turned into extermination camps in which a total of 9-11 million people were killed.

3. The outcome of the Second World War

It is not necessary to go into the details of the Second World War. Suffice it to mention that according to the agreements in the so-called Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, which was concluded on 23 August 1939 and amended on 28 September, the eastern Baltic region was partitioned between two spheres of interest.

Finland, the three Baltic states and the Belarusian and Ukrainian parts of Poland went to the Soviet Union. Poland was partitioned and the Baltic states were incorporated in the Soviet Union in 1940. Finland managed to defend herself against the Soviet attack and the Soviet Union could only conquer the major part of Karelia and the Petsamo district.



Map 10. The states in central Europe after Second World War. Ill.: Radosław Przebitkowski

The Second World War ended with Germany's total defeat and the Soviet occupation of the eastern Baltic region and Central Europe. The Baltic States became Soviet republics. The new political order was recognised by the Scandinavian neighbours but not by the United States. Poland and the GDR (German Democratic Republic) – the latter was officially proclaimed in 1949 – became Soviet satellite states. Finland remained a sovereign, democratic market economy but had to accept restrictions on its foreign and military policies. A pact of Friendship, Cooperation and Assistance with the Soviet Union was concluded in 1948. In 1949, Norway, Iceland, Denmark, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom became members of NATO. In 1954, West Germany was included. In 1955, the Soviet Union created the Warsaw Pact. In 1961, East Germany erected the Berlin wall. Sweden remained

neutral but cooperated intimately with NATO and the United States. During the Cold War, which ended with the gradual but rather swift breakdown of Soviet power in 1989-91, the Nordic and West European states in the Northern Mediterranean Region all became economically prosperous welfare states, whereas the Soviet Union and its satellites the GDR and Poland remained backward.

The great empires of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have all had a large impact on economic, societal and cultural developments in the Baltic Region, i.e., the British, the German, the Soviet and the American. There has also been a profound demographic impact from the latter three. As hinted above, beginning in the nineteenth and continuing into the mid-twentieth century, emigration to the United States served to ease the political pressure from economic hardships, social discontent and religious dissent in Germany, Scandinavia and Russia, and last but not least, as a safe haven for political refugees from the Nazi and Soviet dictatorships. During Soviet and Nazi rule, on the other hand, many millions of people were murdered. The Nazis usually killed very actively by shooting people and gassing them, among others some six million Jews and several million non-Jews in Eastern Europe. The Soviets also killed millions actively by shooting, but they also starved people to death in millions, the best known case being the famine caused by the collectivisation of agriculture in Ukraine and southern Russia in 1932-1933.

6 Contemporary history in the Baltic Region and uses of the past

Kristian Gerner

1. The legacy of Rome

Pax Romana and the civilisation that gave the name to the world order in antiquity never included the Baltic Region within its boundaries, the *limes*, but the cultural impact was crucial and pervasive. With the introduction of Christendom, Roman civilisation came to the Baltic Region. In the contemporary era, *Pax Americana* is equally crucial and American civilisation equally pervasive as the original Roman civilisation once was. Wall Street in New York, the centre of American and of world capitalism, and the White House and Capitol Hill in Washington, D.C., i.e., the sites of the American President and Congress, respectively, dominate Europe in general and the Baltic Region also militarily and culturally. American English is the main common language, American customs, lifestyles and values permeate society. The scholarly world and the world of business are almost totally Anglified. This is not only a contemporary counterpart to antiquity and Latinisation. There are also elements of continuity, because American civilisation ultimately goes back to Rome. It is not a coincidence that the founders of the United States of America named the site of Congress Capitol Hill. The architecture of the official buildings in the capital is typical of their epochs, but it is also reminiscent of antiquity. After all, neo-classicism also refers to Rome.

In the early 21st century, economically, militarily and culturally the Baltic Region is part of the American empire. All the states that surround the Baltic Sea are distinct political entities, most of the people do not identify with the American empire, and huge numbers of people actively detest it. Nevertheless, they live in its very real shadow. However, Americanisation is difficult to come to terms with for people used to talking about “historical roots”, “path dependence” and “cultural identity”. These concepts refer to uniqueness, to the notion that states can be viewed as closed systems with peculiar characteristics. “Roots” and “path” are concepts that suggest causality in history and that there is a straight, isolated line from an opaque beginning to a clear contemporary end.

So at the end of this story, it is necessary to return to the question: what to make of history, how to use it, what to learn from it?

Sonderweg and Path Dependence

Thus, to “explain” the emergence and triumph of Nazism, German historians coined the expression “Sonderweg” (“special road”). Likewise, in order to “explain” why both the Soviet order and post-Russian society have not adapted to the Western legal and political order, some economists have borrowed a concept from a theory about the effects of choices of certain technologies for the formation of steady patterns of interaction among people and talked about “path dependence”. Whereas both concepts have metaphorical value and may serve as plausible “explanations” of “deviation” from “natural” rules for societal development, they do not have any explanatory value at all. Such “explanations” are *ex post facto*, i.e., constructed in order to make sense of history. Their ideological impact is tremendous. In common sense thinking, we do believe in historical causes and in historically rooted differences between... Yes, between what? Between “civilisations”? “Cultures”? Ethnic categories? States? Regions? Cities?

2. What is history?

History is about facts, monuments, records and institutions. Historiography is about giving sense to facts, constructing meaning, creating a time dimension to concepts such as economy, politics, culture and society. Myth is about history as origin, fate and destiny. Its mode of expression is rites and rituals. The present is made meaningful because it is perceived as a bridge which links the future with a past that has foreboded it. “Sonderweg” and “path dependence” are mythological concepts in scientific disguise.

Usually, history is understood as narration, as storytelling. Naturally, historical narration is about actors, processes and societies. It must necessarily build upon facts, but it must also contain elements of mythological thinking to “make sense”. In the eighteenth century, two different modes of conceptualisation and presentation of history were launched with regard to whom should be regarded as collective actors and whose collective memory should be written down. In Montesquieu’s philosophy of society we find the idea that climate and urbanisation, i.e., nature and civilisation, condition social practices and politics and forge collective identities. In Herder’s philosophy, the organising principle is the notion that humankind consists of separate ethnic communities on the basis of language, *Völker*. Montesquieu’s object is territory, a state with citizens, whereas Herder’s is kinship. The crucial difference when it comes to narration is that according to the philosophy of Montesquieu, territory and civilisation come first and the development of a shared identity on the basis of collective memory second, whereas according to the principle laid down by Herder, a shared identity based upon collective memory comes first and territory second. One may say that in Montesquieu, the state is the given and thus the natural object of historiography, whereas in Herder, the people as an ethnic community is given and thus the natural object of historiography. History is assumed to be respectively about France, i.e., a state structure, and about the Germans, i.e., a hereditary linguistic community of people. Our view of history has been formed by both traditions. The tradition from the Enlightenment is rational, civic and forward-looking. The tradition from Romanticism is emotional, ethnic and backward-looking. The first enables us to explain why certain things have happened and why certain processes resulted in certain structures. The second imputes meaning to what happened and creates a collective memory of the past. It gives meaning to history.

Officially, the Soviet project was rational, civic and forward-looking. In practice, however, it was historicist, irrational and reactionary. Contemporaries both within and outside the boundaries of the Soviet Union were confused because on the one hand the picture was one of

technological progress and modernisation, and on the other hand public life was characterised by archaic religious rites, superstition and aesthetic anti-modernism. The Soviet leaders as well as a majority of Western scholars took it for granted anyhow that the Soviet Union was a sustainable state. Until the changes brought about by Gorbachev's policies, neither ethnic nationalism nor history seemed to be important factors.

3. The metaphorical curtain of iron and die Mauer of concrete

The Iron Curtain was an expression that was used as early as 1920 to characterise the boundary of Soviet Russia (Brusewitz 1920). The concept won general recognition through Winston Churchill's use of it in a speech in Fulton, Missouri, in 1946. It became the symbolic image of the partition between East and West. Its real image was the wall through Berlin, which was erected by the East German government on August 13, 1961.

Die Mauer was a very old-fashioned wall made of bricks, concrete and barbed wire, although it was equipped with sophisticated surveillance and killing facilities. The builders bragged that it was the most advanced border in the world. Its official name was "The Anti-Fascist Protection Wall" (*Die Antifaschistische Schützmauer*). When it was opened and demolished in 1989, the political and symbolic impact on most Europeans was great. It was not just a killing device which was demolished, but the partition not only of Germany but also of Europe and of course of the Baltic Region was finished. Björn Engholm's ideas about the *New Hansa* seemed to have been vindicated by history. The idea was widely accepted that a sense of a regional Baltic identity could be created by invoking history, by interpreting the past as a shared memory for the people in all the states surrounding the Baltic Sea. "Roots", "paths" and "culture" became popular words in political language.

However, with the possibilities of a new Baltic order opening, the inherent conflict between Enlightenment and Romanticism as formative concepts in our thinking about history became manifest. Would there be a shared and common Baltic history to recall, or would there be many national histories that, moreover, may be intellectually and emotionally incompatible with one another? Many political actors sought arguments and inspiration from the divided past, whereas others looked to the common future. The Baltic University Programme is forward-looking and axiomatically placing territory first and ethnicity second. It is a clear choice of the rational, civic tradition of the Enlightenment or even what has been known as post-modernism. Here the implication is that history is composed from facts and processes from diverse epochs and territories according to the principle of "soft ecologism", i.e., that sustainability in the future is an aim consciously to work for. Accordingly, there is an ideological use of history in the respect that all the peoples living in the drainage area, which is a suitable entity for a project that aims at enhancing the protection of the natural environment from pollution, should be induced to feel and realise that they have this common task and thus belong together. This post-modern Baltic Region is designed as a definitive post-war region.

Fissures in the Soviet Empire

Kristian Gerner

The Soviet Union was one of the victor states in World War II. Its official ideology was Marxism-Leninism. This worldview dictated the foreign policy of Stalin. After the defeat of Nazi Germany, the United States was perceived by Stalin as the leading representative of capitalist imperialism. In order to prepare the Soviet Union for the next war, Stalin consolidated his grip on the states which were allotted to the Soviet sphere of influence at the Yalta and Potsdam conferences in 1945. By 1948, communist regimes controlled by the Soviet Union had been installed in East Central Europe. In the Baltic Region, Poland became properly communist in December 1948, when the Social Democrats were united with the Communists in the Polish United Workers' Party. On 7 October 1949, the Soviet occupational zone in Germany became the German Democratic Republic. Also in this country, the Social Democrats were united with the Communists in the Socialist Unity Party of Germany.

Poland and the GDR were not incorporated into the Soviet Union. However, Stalin had them moulded in the Soviet form, the one-party system, the planned economy and ideological regimentation according to the tenets of Marxism-Leninism. The period up to the dissolution of the Soviet empire in 1989 was marked by conflicts between Polish and German society, on the one hand, and the Soviet leadership and their satraps, on the other.

National political traditions. Although the GDR emerged from the ruins of the Nazi dictatorship and although Poland had seen authoritarian rule between 1926 and 1939 and had then been occupied by the Nazis and the Soviets, in both countries there were national political traditions which differed significantly from the Soviet model. Above all, both Germans and Poles had experience and memories of a civic society. In both societies, there was contempt for the Russians, who were felt to be less developed. The behaviour of the Red Army soldiers in 1944-1945 both in Germany, which was defeated and occupied, and in Poland, which was liberated, served to reinforce these attitudes.

Stalin died in 1953. His successors changed the foreign policy doctrine from total confrontation with the Western powers to peaceful co-existence, which implied that contacts with the West were allowed. Concerning internal policies, there was a shift from outright terrorism and one-sided stress on the armaments industry towards dialogue with the subjects and production of consumer goods. The problem was that these changes were interpreted differently in the Soviet Union, the GDR and Poland. In the latter countries, the notion of a civic society came to life.

The first outbreak of local discontent with the Soviet Union came a mere four months after the death of Stalin. On 17

June 1953, workers in the capital of the GDR, Berlin, went on strike and arranged political demonstrations of protest against the regime and its continued Stalinist policies. Some trade unionists were active protesters as well. Both the East German and the new Soviet leaders understood the protests as a lethal threat to the whole Soviet empire. The Berlin uprising was violently crushed by military means, the German trade unions purged and strict Soviet control enforced. In 1961, East Berlin was effectively sealed off from West Berlin through the erection of the *Berlin Wall*. The GDR was to remain a crude post-Stalinist dictatorship until 1989.

In Poland, the waves of protest against Soviet rule and the Soviet social system were to return over and over again. In contrast to conditions in the GDR, where the local rulers knew that they lacked political legitimacy because the subjects were aware of a better alternative in the Federal Republic of Germany and realised that they had to obey Moscow, in Poland there was an unclear line of division between the local rulers and oppositional forces. The former even had some feeling of being Polish first and communists second.

Poland remained a communist dictatorship until 1989, but it was a soft dictatorship. Political discontent could not be articulated and aggregated in a democratic way through a free press, free and secret elections and the formation of independent political parties. Instead there developed a pattern of political cycles or "waves". The discontent was



Figure 21. Workers in Poznan demonstrating for "bread and freedom", June 1956. Photo by courtesy of Solidarność Wielkopolska archive

articulated in the form of strikes and demonstrations, and the rulers answered by giving in to some of the demands. Leaders were shifted from “conservative” to “liberal”, but the one-party system remained. Society became more liberal, but new causes of discontent emerged as the next generation of leaders became complacent. This was the case from 1956 to 1989. The sequence was:

- 1956, demonstrations of workers in Poznan against low wages and high prices, put down by force. This was followed by protests of intellectuals against political and cultural repression, of peasants against collectivisation, and from the Catholic church against persecution. The party leadership changed, workers’ councils were permitted, collectivisation was halted and Cardinal Wyszynski was set free.
- 1968, demonstrations of students and intellectuals in Warsaw against the curtailment of cultural freedom. The demonstrations were put down by force – workers’ militia – their leaders imprisoned and a campaign of anti-Semitism – “anti-Zionism” – released. No change in the party leadership.
- 1970, demonstrations of workers in Gdańsk, Gdynia and Szczecin against low wages and high prices, put down by force. However, the party leadership changed and liberal reforms were introduced.
- 1976, demonstrations of workers in Radom and in Ursus in Warsaw against low wages and high prices, put down by force. However, intellectuals with their roots in 1956 and 1968, organised committees to assist and help the persecuted workers and their families, called the KOR. Underground activities increased, including the organisation of an independent trade union movement in 1980.

Solidarity

The Solidarity movement appeared in Poland in 1980. In the early summer, a worker at the Lenin shipyard in Gdańsk, Anna Walentynowicz, was dismissed from her job on political grounds. A peaceful strike of protest was arranged. It was organised by the Independent Trade Union Solidarity. Its local leader was an electrician at the shipyard, Lech Wałęsa.

The strike continued, spread to other places and developed into a nationwide movement of protest against political repression, bad social conditions and the anti-Church policy of the communist government. The shipyard in Gdańsk was transformed into a centre of oppositional forces. Because it was politically and ideologically impossible for the regime to resort to violent means and attack the shipyard with military forces, it had to negotiate with the strikers. A necessary precondition for this outcome was that the communist leadership was split. The reformist forces gained the upper hand.

Solidarity was recognised by the government as a legitimate counterpart. On 31 August, an agreement was reached in Gdańsk between the two parties, the 21 points. The right of the trade union to organise the workers was recognised as well as a number of rights and freedoms concerning social conditions, expression and the activity of the Catholic Church.

Theoretically, Solidarity was a non-political movement. However, in practice it not only assumed the role of democratic political opposition to the communist regime. It also emerged as a wholly alternative polity, encompassing both industrial workers and peasants, intellectuals and the clergy. By late 1980, it was estimated that Solidarity counted close to ten million members, one million of which came from the communist party, which counted three million members in all.

Solidarity meant a breakthrough for the forces of civil society. An alliance came into place, which had been formed in 1976 between protesting industrial workers and their dissident intellectual supporters, who organised the KOR movement. Among the latter were Jacek Kuron, Karol Modzelewski and Adam Michnik. The former two were veterans of the leftist opposition of the late 1950s, whereas Michnik had emerged as a political dissident in the 1968 student movement.

Solidarity’s success lay in a combination of a comparatively moderate political programme, an elaborated strategic goal, and skilful tactical moves. The intellectuals managed to bridge the gap to the workers by recognising the Catholic faith of the latter, at the same time as they channelled emotions in a democratic direction through a strong emphasis on local self-government and autonomy for different groups. A link was forged with the tradition of workers’ councils from the Polish October of 1956.



Figure 22. Solidarność leaders in September 1980, from the left: father Henryk Jankowski, Adam Michnik, Lech Wałęsa. Their political paths separated after 1990. Photo by courtesy of Solidarność Wielkopolska Archive

The Solidarity movement was based upon an ideology of Catholicism, social justice, democracy and legality. It represented a majority of politically conscious Poles. Its rise pointed to the demise of communist rule. That is why it was repressed by force by the government under communist party leader Jaruzelski on 13 December 1981. However, when the new Soviet leader Gorbachev made it clear that the Soviet Union would allow Poland to choose a democratic way, communist rule was doomed. Solidarity's leaders could work out a scheme for Poland's peaceful transition to democracy, and the government acquiesced. In early 1989, the round table negotiations in the Staszic Palace in Warsaw led to an agreement on democratic elections in June. This was a victory for the Solidarity movement. Communist rule came to a peaceful end in Poland.

4. Applying history and building social capital

The history of the Baltic Region is thus history in the Baltic Region. The Baltic Region is viewed as an arena for historical events and processes, as a space, where certain social structures have been built. However, there are a number of events and processes in the past to select from. The criterion of relevance must be to choose and concentrate on those memories of the past that may be instrumental in constructing a sense of community, a Baltic collective memory with a potential for contemporary and future identity-building. Here lurks the Romanticist tradition. In a certain sense, history strikes back. In the social sciences, theory-building and concept-formation come first and empirical facts second. This means that in principle, the scholar is aware of making choices when selecting historical facts. For the facts to make sense, they must be brought under concepts and placed into theories about correlations and causes. However, because historical facts represent events and processes that really took place in the past, concepts may be understood as real. Thus social science concepts may be treated as facts, as historical agents, as has been discussed above concerning "Sonderweg" and "path dependence".

The popular concept of social capital is closely related to the concepts of learning, acculturation, socialisation and training, but also to the notion of collective identities rooted in history. It is a vague and nebulous concept. Introducing the concept, American sociologist James Coleman mentioned that the main point was the interconnection between the individual and society: "The function identified by the concept of "social capital" is the value of these aspects of social structure to actors as resources that they can use to achieve their interests" (Coleman 1988).

The borderline may easily be blurred between denotation and normative stipulations. There are different possible ways of operationalisation, i.e., of applying the concept on history. In this context, the concept should be understood as a generalisation of Western European experiences of the creation and maintenance of a civic society. It is defined partly by opposition to its alternative, the clan or tribe society. Social capital has the connotation of reason, contract and cooperation, whereas clan and tribe denote emotional and biological bonds, subservience and obedience. We note that here we have a case of the opposition between Enlightenment and Romanticism. On the other hand, the concept of soft ecologism contains components from both the scientific Enlightenment tradition and the religious Romanticist tradition, because sustainability has the connotation of eschatology or at least utopia; it belongs partly in the natural sciences, in reason, and partly in the religious world, in emotions. It is a non-confessional acknowledgement of the idea that "man does not live of bread alone".

5. Russia's different way

Russia, not least under the guise of Soviet socialism in 1917-1991, has refused to adapt to Western “normality”. Well before the demise of the Soviet Union, some Soviet scholars pointed to a basic characteristic in Russian tradition, related to the encounter between Russian and Western European cultures of their different origins. Thus, in a classic text, well known to scholars in the field of Russian culture, Soviet culturologists Yurii Lotman and Boris Uspenskii once wrote:

Russian culture in the medieval period was dominated by a different value orientation. Duality and the absence of a neutral axiological sphere led to a conception of the new not as a continuation, but as a total eschatological change. — Under such circumstances, the dynamic process of historical change has a fundamentally different character: change occurs as a radical negation of the preceding state. The new does not arise out of a structurally “unused” reserve, but results from a transformation of the old, a process of turning it inside out. Thus, repeated transformations can in fact lead to the regeneration of archaic forms. (Lotman, Uspenskii 1985)

In numerous works, Lotman and Uspenskii demonstrated that Russian culture did not represent a simple continuation of Byzantine culture, but also developed in opposition to it, in the manner described in the quotation above. Moreover, they demonstrated how the process repeated itself with Peter's reforms in the early eighteenth century. A third instance was provided by the changes brought about by Lenin and Stalin in the twentieth century (Gerner 1986). Thus we have an explicit case of the thesis of a Russian Sonderweg or special path. It is certainly informative as an interpretation of the “meaning” of Russian history. If people believe in it and interpret it to imply the fate and destiny of Russia today, it may even have material consequences according to the Dorothy and William Isaac Thomas theorem which says: “If men define things as real, they become real in their consequences.” It is rather close at hand to interpret Russian developments after the introduction of the so-called shock therapy, i.e., the introduction of a market economy in 1991, as the consequence of external influence and reaction against the preceding social order.

The Russian historian Yurii Kagramanov has compared the Soviet experience with two major examples of an exogenous modernisation programme that failed in a downtrodden peasant society: Vendée in France and Sicily in Italy. Vendée was the province where resistance to the revolutionaries in Paris was strongest in the 1790s, and Sicily successfully resisted the northern Italian forces of democratisation, law and entrepreneur capitalism, not least during the regionalisation programme after 1970. In both cases an intermediary, a native bourgeoisie and trust in the legal state were missing. Primitive peasant society was directly confronted with the urban forces of modernisation (Schama 1989). Regarding the comparison between Russia and Sicily, Kagramanov observes: “... we find a great nearness in peasant psychology, and when we follow how it was fragmented, we discover significant parallels: the mafiasation of Sicilian society corresponds approximately to the mafiasation of Russian society in a period when trust in all universal values began to fall swiftly” (Kagramanov 1995).

In contemporary Russia, according to Kagramanov, mistrust in society is matched by disrespect for the value of the individual. The latter dimension may be viewed as a legacy from the Stalinist period of mass murder and its accompanying notion that the life of the individual is worthless (Kagramanov 1995). The reference is to the impact of a special shared memory, although it is of course not possible to argue that the past as such has caused what is going on in contemporary Russia. Furthermore, it would take comparative analyses with other post-Soviet societies and even with Western societies to validate the assertion that Russia is special concerning this “disregard” and how it materialises.

6. Europeanisation of Europe

The idea behind the shock therapy was to immediately introduce a market economy and spread and establish democracy and Western law – the so-called *Rechtsstaat* – in Russia in order to promote stability, peace and prosperity. A reviewer of a book from – but not at all about – this period by the Welsh historian Robert Bartlett with the title *The Making of Europe: Conquest, Colonization and Cultural Change 950-1350*, pointed out that the adequate title should be “The Expansion of Some Aspects of Western Europe in the Middle Ages” (Christiansen 1993). If we treat “Europe” not as a geographical but as a normative concept with the connotations of Latin Christian culture and all that goes with it in the political, economic and intellectual spheres even in the centuries after 1350, the criticism of the reviewer only adds to the significance of Bartlett’s own interpretation:

“The Europeanisation of Europe, in so far as it was indeed the spread of one particular culture through conquest and influence, had its core areas in one part of the continent, namely in France, Germany west of the Elbe and north Italy, regions which had a common history as part of Charlemagne’s Frankish empire. — By the late medieval period Europe’s names and cults were more uniform than they had ever been; Europe’s rulers minted coins everywhere and depended upon chanceries; Europe’s bureaucrats shared a common experience of higher education. This is the Europeanisation of Europe” (Bartlett 1993).

In the eyes of the chroniclers of the medieval Franks and Germans, the essential Europe was Western Europe. The mission of the Teutonic and Livonian Knights, the bishops and the monasteries was to civilise the Baltic Region. As we know, they were highly successful. Scandinavia and the eastern Baltic Region acquired Western Christendom and became incorporated in Roman civilisation. However, until Peter’s reforms in the early eighteenth century, Russia remained outside this cultural sphere. After 1917, the pre-Petrine pattern was repeated as the Soviet Union isolated itself from the Western democracies.

During the Cold War the Iron Curtain thus took the place of the old cultural divide between East and West. For four decades, socio-economic development in eastern Germany, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia was forced into the alien mould of Soviet society. Although the communists failed in their attempt to transform the societies concerned into perfect copies of Soviet Russia, a substantial “reformation” of a kind did take place. Both cities, buildings and institutions took on a special Soviet flavour in addition to the reconstruction of the economies, social life and politics. In spite of all difficulties, however, the Poles and the Balts in 1988-1989 quickly went back on the road, so to speak, towards reconstructing “normality” according to contemporary western standards but also according to what the actors perceived as the previous patterns of their own societies. The outcome was, evident ten years after the changeover, a new kind of society, neither Soviet nor Scandinavian, but a “post-modern” mixture of different life-styles.

7. Developments in Poland and Germany

In Poland, in some western and north-western counties and cities voters, local politicians and economic planners have revealed an interest in programs that would loosen Warsaw’s control and create a less centralised polity and strengthen economic cooperation with Germany and the European Union. One cannot discern any particular orientation towards the Baltic Region as such. It is relevant to note that historically, Poland has been directed towards Germany, East Central Europe and the Black Sea region rather than towards the Baltic

Region. The merchant cities on the Baltic littoral within the boundaries of contemporary Poland such as Stettin/Szczecin, Danzig/Gdańsk and Elbing/Elbląg were members of the Hanseatic league and oriented towards the German sphere in general. Of course, many Poles were active, but not as representatives of the Polish state. The cities in question and the local Pomeranian population of Kaszubians do relate to themselves as “Baltic”, but this may be interpreted as being of limited importance for the feeling of an eventual Baltic identity to emerge. It is rather a matter of bilateral communications across the Baltic Sea with Swedish cities such as Karlskrona, Kalmar and Nyköping.

On the border along the Neisse/Nysa and Oder/Odra rivers in the early 1990s Euroregions were formed. The idea was launched by the premier of the German Land Brandenburg. The aim was to attract attention from West Germany and the government in Bonn to the presumed development potential of the border zone. The regions were meant to create a focus for capital from West Germany and the labour force of West Poland, all to result in a booming local economy. Nothing much had resulted from all this ten years later. There is a well-functioning Viadrina University in Frankfurt an der Oder, but on the whole it is a matter of Polish students coming to Germany rather than German students learning Polish. (Viadrina is a Latinisation of Oder/Odra). There is also a well-developed cooperation between the frontier guards on the Polish and German sides of the Oder river against smugglers of tobacco, drugs, human beings and merchandise in general. However, it would be premature to speak of cross-border integration.

If we add to developments on Germany’s eastern borders recent developments on its north-western border, the picture becomes very complicated. Plans in Flensburg in Germany and Aabenraa in Denmark to create a Danish-German Euroregion with the name Schleswig/Slesvig have met with strong resistance from the local Danish population north of the state boundary. In opinion polls, roughly half of them have expressed a negative attitude. The reason given for the resistance towards further integration is fear of being swamped by rich Germans. Reminiscences of the German occupation of Denmark during World War II have been actualised and there have even been arguments to the effect that with the help of the new Euroregion, the Germans would re-conquer what they took in 1864 and had then to cede to Denmark as a result of the plebiscite in 1920. Similar concerns have been voiced in Poland, in this case with reference to the boundary changes in 1945.

8. Rethinking the Union of Lublin

In spite of the differences between the three Baltic states, they have one thing in common. The governments of them all have repeatedly expressed the ambition to join NATO and the EU. However, this common aim has not drawn the three states closer together. In the case of Lithuania the prospect of joining NATO promoted the idea that after seventy-five years of conflict with Poland regarding territorial and ethnic questions, the time had ripened for a Polish-Lithuanian detente. In 1994, the two states concluded an agreement of friendship and cooperation. The Vilna question was buried by not being mentioned. Speaking to the Polish sejm on 21 February 1997, the speaker of the Lithuanian Seimas, the renowned Sajudis leader, Lithuanian nationalist Vytautas Landsbergis, proposed the establishment of an interparliamentary commission. Cooperation between the two states was soon formalised through the creation of commissions that linked with one another the presidential chancelleries, the governments and the parliaments. The Union of Lublin in 1569 between the

Polish Crown and the Lithuanian Grand Duchy, the Polish-Lithuanian *Rzeczpospolita Obojga Narodów*, may be revived, so to speak, with the small Lithuanian part allied with Poland but without any Belarusian and Ukrainian lands attached. Moreover, this is not primarily a matter of Polish expansion eastward, but rather of a Lithuanian tendency to approach Europe by way of Poland.

Landsbergis underlined the importance of the old traditional links between the two countries and stressed that Lithuania belonged to Central Europe rather than being a “Baltic” state (Karpinski 1997). Interviewed about his position, he had the following to say:

The Estonians stress certain things, while Lithuanian politicians stress other things, other geopolitical possibilities. Culturally, historically, and geographically, we are a Central European state. At the same time, we are a Baltic-region state. ... Certain policies, such as our special relations with Poland, reflect this [reality] which is, perhaps, not the case with Estonia, but Estonia has special relations with Finland instead.

9. Scandinavisation of Estonia

Landsbergis’s assertions are historically well-founded as far as Lithuania is concerned. However, Estonia’s relationship to Finland is of quite another character, not as emotional and more based upon the fact that the Finnish language served, in the Soviet period, as a gateway to the west for Estonian intellectuals. It was possible to receive Finnish television in all northern Estonia, including the capital Tallinn. In order to understand the rather closely related Finnish language better, many Estonians acquired a working knowledge of Finnish. They were able constantly to compare Finnish and Soviet news reporting and to get an idea about life in a welfare state. However, one cannot speak of any “special relationship” between Finland and Estonia in the same sense as between Lithuania and Poland: the latter relation is more similar to the Swedish-Finnish relationship. The political impact of Landsbergis’s statement stemmed from the fact that it gave vent to the conviction that there was not any special common interest among the three Baltic states. We have noted earlier Poland’s analogous “tilt” to the centre of Europe by way of Euroregions on the border with Germany. It is not far-fetched to assume that Landsbergis’s idea of a new Polish-Lithuanian commonwealth grew out of the wish to let Lithuania join NATO and the EU by way of Poland. This would seem to be a safer way to gain alignment with the west than to be one of three “Baltic” states in a perpetual waiting-room.



Figure 23. Tallinn (etymologically ‘Danishburgh’), capital city of Estonia, was grounded by Danes in 1219. Photo: Katarzyna Skalska

On the other hand, after the prospect that opened up the possibility of their state becoming one of the first new members of the EU, Estonia’s political leaders have shown signs of trying to distance their country from the two other Baltic states. The argument is that Estonia is economically more advanced and thus more fit for an alignment with the West than the other two. Also traditions have been evoked both by President Lennart Meri and foreign minister Toomas Hendrik Ilves. In a speech delivered in 1999, the latter

grouped Estonia with the five Nordic countries and Britain among the *Yule* (Midwinter-celebrating) countries that presumably shared a common mentality that expressed itself in rationality, stubbornness and diligence. These societies also ranked lowest in the world in corruption. In another speech, Ilves showed that he was well aware of the importance of conscious image-making. He recalled the example of how Finland successfully defined itself as a Nordic and not as a Baltic country before the Second World War (Lagerspetz 2001).

The Estonian use of cultural and historical arguments belongs to the field of image-making. This is a conscious use of the Thomas theorem with the aim of convincing both Estonians and the Nordic public that Estonia is a Nordic country. However, Ilves was also referring to a corruption index. Using the term “state capture”, which places corruption in a wider societal and political context, Li Bennich-Björkman noted that in 2001, according to an international index of corruption, Estonia was a low capture and Latvia a high capture state (see chapter 26 in the present book). A low capture state is one with a political system that is capable of letting different political interests influence policymaking and a high capture state is a state where one category has monopolised influence over law-making and the executive, contributing to malfeasance and corruption. Latvian public institutions were “invaded by private interests”.

Bennich-Björkman concludes that the different outcomes, with Estonia having an autonomous institutional structure reminiscent of the Nordic states, and Latvia not, are not caused by different historical traditions but by recent history. In Estonia, the dissolution of the Soviet state and the re-establishment of the Estonian state were preceded by the growth in Soviet times of a network of students, *EÜE* (the Estonian Students Building Troops) who became important functionaries in society even before independence, and by the organisation of an informal “university” in Tartu, Young Tartu (*Noor Tartu*) along the lines of the famous underground “flying universities” in Poland under the Russian and Nazi occupations, respectively:

Clearly, the *EÜE* and the *Noor Tartu* group were crucial in that they assembled and gave opportunities for domestic, political young leaders to form who, at the time of independence, could initiate a reform process guided by norms and ideas other than those that dominated during Soviet rule (Bennich-Björkman 2001).

10. Latvia's own way

The first post-Communist government in Estonia was formed by these people. They did not represent vested economic interests but were motivated by ideas about Estonia and her fate. In Latvia, in contrast to circumstances in Estonia, neither were similar groups formed nor were there any discussions about different ideological ideas. Bennich-Björkman underlines that “clear ideological political alternatives were never allowed to form, making democratic Latvian politics from the start less of an arena for ideological struggle than a search for political power” (Bennich-Björkman 2001).

In Estonia, the political system was “unstable” in the sense that political parties not only competed for power but also formed new governments. In Latvia, the amalgamation of former communists and businessmen called *Latvijas Cels* (Latvia's Way) totally dominated politics and all successive governments: “The idea ... was not to present a clear political alternative but to unite elite actors under one umbrella”. (Bennich-Björkman 2001). The elite in question captured the state so to speak. In addition to these important differences, Bennich-Björkman argues, the codes of behaviour in business also became different in the two countries. Estonians traded with Finns and Swedes, who became role models for decent

behaviour. The Latvians traded much more with Russia, replicating the practices of that highly corrupted business world (Bennich-Björkman 2001).

The different Estonian and Latvian cases show that history is important, but only as an argument for image-making and as direct continuity, i.e., in the shape of organisational patterns that remain in force in spite of a change of system. An additional important conclusion is that the concept 'Baltic' has not been a source of image making. Integration on the premise that there exists a 'Baltic' sense of community seems to be a precarious project. Moreover, integration of the three Baltic States with either the EU or NATO or with both would have as a consequence the risk of alienation from the region of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine.

11. Constructing North-West Russia

In order to counteract tendencies of isolation of the Russians from the Baltic Region, the Swedish government has led a policy during the last decade of symbolic separation of what is labelled "North-West Russia" from the rest of the Russian state. This construction of a "Baltic Russia" is clearly inspired by historical memories of the Swedish occupation of Novgorod in the early 17th century and the attempt to unite this Russian state with Sweden. The Swedish scholar Per-Arne Bodin has argued that the Swedish government's assistance policy towards the Russian Federation "more or less consciously" relates to the Swedish occupation of Novgorod almost four hundred years earlier: "Today, exactly as in the seventeenth century, Sweden perceives Novgorod as her sphere of interest" (Bodin 2000).

As for Belarus, after coming to power as President of Alexander Lukashenka, Swedish assistance policy for this state has been directed towards strengthening the NGOs and civic society with the ultimate objective of seeing the people remove the authoritarian regime and introducing democracy. Concerning Ukraine, the policy has been more low-key, but certainly the country is treated as a legitimate object for Swedish attempts to build an enlarged Baltic community.

12. Creating a macro-region, or what Putin doesn't do

Historical precedents, ethnic relations, political culture and economic developments point to the fact that the Baltic Region is a highly diversified region with little except location on the map as a common denominator. In spite of strongly increased contacts and the emergence of different kinds of networks in the economic, political, cultural and ecological spheres, the region remains highly diverse. Moreover, some trends point in different directions concerning the external orientation of the different states in the region. Whereas especially Swedish, but also Finnish, Estonian and some Latvian politicians seem to be interested in promoting the idea of a Baltic Region, one may discern in the cases of Russia, Poland, Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine, Germany, Denmark and Norway other preferences when it comes to identification with a macro-region.

The contemporary ambitions to create a self-contained and self-conscious Baltic Region are based upon interpretations of historical experiences, on the one hand, and concerns about the future, on the other hand.

The concept of sustainability is an expression of the striving to avoid social and economic disturbances caused by ethnic conflicts, economic corruption, uncontrolled migration

and pollution of the natural environment. Among Danes, there is fear that the nuclear power station near Copenhagen on the Swedish side of the straits of Öresund may break down and spread radioactive pollution. Among Estonians and Latvians, there is fear that the “Russians may come back”, i.e., that the Russian government would use the unsettled question of citizenship for some of the ethnic Russian population as a pretext for pressure or even invasion. Such fears were not mitigated by the declaration by Russia’s President Vladimir Putin in June 2001, at his meeting with American President George Bush in Ljubljana:

“In some countries of the Soviet Union, for instance, you probably know – we talk about this very often – in the Baltic states, for instance, we feel that human rights are damaged, especially those of the ethnic Russian populations. In Latvia, for instance, 40 percent of the population is Russian-speaking. A huge number of non-citizens, in other words, people who can’t even get citizenship. We don’t send weapons there. We don’t support those people. We don’t call it terrorism. We don’t try to get people to rise up on the basis of national or ethnic origin or religious feelings. We don’t encourage people to take up arms to fight against that.” (Jansson 2001).

The disturbing fact with Putin’s pronouncement was that it could be interpreted as a veiled threat. Putin insinuated that the Russian-speakers had well-founded reasons for grievances against the governments of the states they lived in, and that this was a matter of concern for Russia’s government and the President personally. In this there was an oblique reference to Hitler’s arguments for putting pressure on Czechoslovakia in 1938 and on Poland in 1939, i.e., that Germans were suppressed. It is obvious that Putin’s veiled threat was of no special concern to the Nordic states, Germany and Poland, the governments and public opinion which trusted Putin as the man bringing stability to Russia and hence security to the whole Baltic Region. However, it is equally obvious that trust in Putin as a reasonable leader of Russia was not exactly enhanced among the citizens of Estonia and Latvia and their governments.



Figure 24. Modern sculpture of Peter I by Mikhail Sheruyakin in St Petersburg. Photo: Alfred F. Majewicz

13. Continuation states and successor states

Fear is a consequence of a perception of insecurity. Whereas the citizens of most of the states in the Baltic region experience that they live in states that have gained historical legitimacy in the eyes of all their neighbours, this is not the case with those living in Estonia and Latvia. According to the self-understanding and subjective state identity, these are continuation states. Their existence was suspended between 1940 and 1991, but after regaining sovereignty and international recognition they must be said to have really existed all through the intervening years as well, although occupied. However, Russia is not a continuation state, but one of twelve successor states of the Soviet Union. Russia inherited many institutions and most of the property of the Soviet Union, but it is not a continuation of the pre-Soviet Russian state. According to international law, Russia as a successor state has a right to grant Russian citizenship to former Soviet citizens in Estonia and Latvia who are not citizens of these states, and who want to be Russian citizens. On the other hand, if Estonia and Latvia are recognised by Russia as continuation states and not as successor states of the Soviet Union, Russia does not have any right to intervene in the domestic affairs of these states or to exert political pressures on them on behalf of the Russian-speaking population (Devynck 2001). Thus Russian recognition of Estonia and Latvia as continuation states is a necessary precondition for sustainability in terms of political stability in the Baltic Region.

7 A chronology of the history of the Baltic Sea region

Kristian Gerner

- 800-1250 Vikings; Early state formation and Christianization
- 800s-1000s Nordic Vikings dominate the Baltic Region
- 919-1024 The Saxon German Empire
- 966 Poland becomes Christianized under Mieszko I
- 988 Kiev Rus adopts Christianity
- 990s-1000s Denmark Christianized
- 999 The oldest record on existence of Gdańsk

Cities and towns

During the Middle Ages cities were small but they grew in number between 1200-1400 with increased trade, often in close proximity to feudal lords and bishops. Lübeck had some 20,000 inhabitants in the 14th and 15th centuries. In many cities around the Baltic Sea, German merchants became very influential. In Swedish cities tensions between Germans and Swedes were common.

-
- 1000s Sweden Christianized
 - 1000s-1100s Finland Christianized. Swedish domination established
 - 1025 Boleslaw I crowned King of Poland
 - 1103-1104 A Nordic archbishopric founded in Lund
 - 1143 Lübeck founded (rebuilt 1159 after a fire)
 - 1150s-1220s Denmark dominates the Baltic Region
 - 1161 Visby becomes a “free port” and develops into an important trade center
 - 1100s Copenhagen founded (town charter 1254)
 - 1100s-1200s German movement to the East
 - 1200s Livonia under domination of the Teutonic Order
 - 1200s Estonia and Livonia Christianized
 - 1201 Riga founded by German bishop Albert
 - 1219 Reval/Tallinn founded by Danes
 - ca 1250 Lithuanian tribes united under Mindaugas
 - ca 1250 Stockholm founded
 - 1250-1525 The Hanseatic League; Polish-Lithuanian Empire and Nordic Union
 - 1282 The Hanseatic League founded
 - 1283 Prussia completely conquered by the Teutonic Order
 - 1286 Königsberg becomes a town around a fortress founded by the Teutonic Order
 - 1300s Culmination of Hanseatic influence
 - 1323 The Treaty of Nöteborg between Sweden-Finland and Novgorod
 - 1323 Vilna capital of Lithuania
 - 1340s-1350s The Great Plague

The Black Death

the great plague that struck Europe in the late 1340s, was a pandemic. It spread from China and Central Asia into Europe and Northern Africa. It has been estimated that in some areas of Europe one third to half of the population was lost.

1346	Denmark sells its Estonian territory to the Teutonic Order
1360-	Danish domination over Scania (Skåne) and Gotland
1361-1370	Denmark at war with the Hansa
1364	University of Kraków founded

Universities

During the late Middle Ages universities began to emerge. In the Baltic region the universities are young compared to those on the continent. Bologna 11th century, Paris 12th century, Prague 1348, Kraków 1364, Heidelberg 1386, Rostock 1419, Greifswald 1456, Uppsala 1477, København 1478 and Vilnius (Wilno) 1579. The Swedish universities around the Baltic (including Dorpat (Tartu) 1632, Åbo/Turku 1640 and Lund 1668) became strongholds of Lutheran faith and culture.

1370	Defeat of the Lithuanians. Systematic German colonization
1386	Polish-Lithuanian personal union
1387	Lithuania adopts Catholicism
1392-1430	Lithuania becomes a great power under Grand Duke Vytautas
1397-1521	Union of Kalmar between Denmark, Norway and Sweden-Finland
1410	The defeat of the Teutonic Order

The Battle of Tannenberg (Grunwald)

in 1410 was one of the greatest in the Middle Ages. Joint Polish and Lithuanian forces defeated the army of the Teutonic Order and broke its military power. As a consequence, the authority and financial position of the Order was broken. Tannenberg became the site of another battle in August 1914 when the German army defeated the Russian troops that had invaded German East Prussia. Paul von Hindenburg, who later became German President, served as commander during the "second" battle of Tannenberg.

1456	University of Greifswald founded
1471	Sweden defeats Denmark in the battle of Brunkeberg
1477	University of Uppsala founded
1478	University of Copenhagen founded
1400s-1500s	Decline of the Hanseatic League
1517-1795	Wars, Feudal Dynasties and Religious split
1517	Martin Luther nails his 95 theses on the church door in Wittenberg: the Reformation begins
1523	Gustav Vasa elected Swedish king
1525	Secularization of the Teutonic Order in Prussia
1535	The earliest (preserved) Estonian literary text (a translation of the catechism)
1550	Helsingfors (Helsinki) founded
1561	Part of Estonia becomes Swedish territory.
1563-1570	The Nordic Seven Years War
1569	Polish-Lithuanian Union
1579	University of Vilna founded
1592-1599	United crowns of Poland-Lithuania and Sweden
1596	Union of Brest. Establishment of the Uniate (Greek-Catholic) Church
1600s	Sweden becomes a Baltic Sea Great Power, which is manifested in the idea of a Swedish <i>Dominium Maris Baltici</i>
1603	Gothenburg founded by Swedish King Charles IX
1605-1613	<i>Smutnoe vremya</i> , The Time of Troubles In Muscovy Russia. Wars of succession.

- 1611-1617 Swedish occupation of Novgorod
- 1612 Polish troops occupy Moscow
- 1613 Beginning of the Romanov dynasty in Russia
- 1617 The Treaty of Stolbova. Russia loses access to the Baltic Sea
- 1618-1648 The Thirty Years War

The Thirty Years War

1618-1648 began as a religious war and ended as a European power struggle between a large number of states. Many of the officers and soldiers were mercenaries. The civilian population paid a heavy price in terms of looting, destruction and disease. The war started in Bohemia where there was strong tension between Czechs and the Habsburg dynasty. When the Treaty of Westphalia was signed in 1648, Sweden and Holland had advanced to become great powers. The power of the Austrian Habsburg dynasty was broken. A line was drawn between Protestants and Catholics in Germany, which still remains. Germany continues to be divided between Protestantism and Catholicism. Sweden, Brandenburg and France expand their territories.

-
- 1621 Sweden conquers Riga
 - 1629 Livonia under Swedish domination. Treaty of Altmark
 - 1632 The Gustavus II Adolphus Academy is founded in Dorpat (Tartu) (becomes university in the early 19th century)
 - 1640 University of Åbo founded (moved to Helsingfors (Helsinki) in 1828)
 - 1648 The Treaty of Westphalia
 - 1655-60 “The Deluge”, Swedish Invasion of Poland
 - 1658 The Treaty of Roskilde. Swedish possession of Scania, Blekinge and Halland secured
 - 1660 The zenith of the Swedish empire
 - Peace of Oliwa. Polish king John Casimir Vasa renounces his claim to the Swedish crown and loses suzerainty over Brandenburg-Prussia
 - Peace of Copenhagen. Bornholm and Norwegian Trondheim are given back to Denmark
 - 1668 University of Lund founded
 - 1700-1721 The Great Northern War
 - 1703 The construction of St Petersburg begins (the capital of Russia 1712-1918)
 - 1709 Russia defeats Sweden in the battle of Poltava
 - 1719 Absolutism in Sweden abolished. Beginning of modernization
 - 1721 The Treaty of Nystad. Confirmation of Russian possession of Estonia and Livonia. The end of Sweden as a Great Power

The Seven Years War

1756-1763 was the first global war. Conflict between France and Great Britain spread to India and North America. In Europe, where all great powers were involved, the war consolidated the position of Prussia.

-
- 1700s Prussia becomes a Great Power
 - 1772-1795 The three partitions of Poland (by Austria, Prussia and Russia). Poland disappears as an independent state
 - 1795-1914 Continued Russian and German expansion, Nationalism**
 - 1763-1816 Abolition of serfdom in Germany
 - 1806 Dissolution of the German Holy Roman Empire
 - 1806-1807 Military collapse of Prussia during the Napoleonic Wars
 - 1807 Duchy of Warsaw sanctioned by Napoleon
 - 1808-1809 Russia defeats Sweden and Finland becomes Grand Duchy in Russian empire
 - 1812 Napoleon occupies Moscow after the battle of Borodino, but must soon retreat
 - 1812 Helsingfors (Helsinki) becomes capital of the Grand Duchy of Finland
 - 1814 Treaty of Kiel. Union of Sweden and Norway
 - 1815 Congress Kingdom of Poland established at the Congress of Vienna

The Congress of Vienna

1815 concluded the Napoleonic Wars. The foundation for a long European peace was laid, based on three principles: 1. Legitimacy, which meant that the banished royal families were reinstated. 2. Safeguard against expected French expansion. 3. Balance among the great powers on the European continent.


1825	Dekabrists' conspiracy in Russia revealed
1835-1849	Finnish epos Kalevala completed by Elias Lönnrot
1861	The Estonian epos Kalevipoeg (an equivalent to the Finnish Kalevala) completed, written by Friedrich Reinhold Kreutzwald
1861	Abolition of serfdom in Russia
1864	Danish-German War: Schleswig-Holstein becomes German
1871	Unification of Germany. Proclamation of the Second German Reich
1905	First Russian Revolution
1914-1939	The First World War and its aftermath
1914-1918	First World War
1917	February Revolution and October coup in Russia
1917	Finland becomes independent
1917	Swedish Academy of Åbo/Turku re-established
1918	The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk between Germany and Russia
1918	Civil war in Finland
1918-1920	Civil war in Russia
1919-1933	The Weimar Republic in Germany
1919-1920	Polish-Soviet Russian war. Poland defeats Russia in the battle of Warsaw 15-17 August 1920
1920	Recognition of new states

New States

Estonia and Finland are recognized by Soviet Russia as independent states in the Treaty of Tartu (Dorpat) February 2; Lithuania is recognized in the Treaty of Moscow, July 12; Latvia is recognized in the Treaty of Riga, August 11 by Soviet Russia.

1920	Polish aggression towards Lithuania. The Vilnius region under Polish domination (1922). Kaunas capital of Lithuania
1921	Åland stays Finnish after decision by the League of Nations
1921	18 March Treaty of Riga between Poland and Soviet Russia
1922	Union of Soviet Socialistic Republics (USSR) established
1926	Coup d'état in Poland (Piłsudski)
1926	Coup d'état in Lithuania (Smetona)
1929	Stalin begins a campaign to collectivize agriculture
1932-1933	Starvation in the Soviet Union
1933	Nazi takeover in Germany.
1934	Coup d'état in Estonia (Päts)
1934	Coup d'état in Latvia (Ulmanis)
1939-1989	World War II and its aftermath, the Cold War
1939-1945	Second World War
1939	Poland is divided between Germany and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union attacks Finland
1940	The Baltic States occupied by the Soviet Union
1941	Operation Barbarossa: Nazi Germany attacks the Soviet Union. Finland starts a war against the Soviet Union
1941-1944	The Baltic States occupied by Nazi Germany
1942	The extermination of Jews is intensified

Figure 25. The Warszawa Ghetto, established by the Nazi occupation forces, was closed in November 1940 and already in the summer of 1941 starvation was apparent. Deportations to the Treblinka concentration camp were to start in 1942, and the total destruction of the ghetto and its inhabitants took place in April/May 1943. Photo: United States Holocaust Memorial Museum



Map 11. The Jewish death toll. Ill.: Ulf Zander

The Jewish death toll 1939-1945

The Jewish death toll 1939-1945 by country. Between 1939 and 1945, six million unarmed and innocent Jewish civilian were murdered in Nazi-controlled Europe in a deliberate attempt to destroy all traces of the Jewish People and culture. As many as two millions of these were killed in their own towns and villages, shot at mass murder sites or starved to death in closed areas, ghettos. Another four were killed in concentration camps. (After Martin Gilbert 1978. All figures are approximate).

- 1944 The Baltic States incorporated into the Soviet Union
- 1945 End of World War II. Conferences at Yalta and Potsdam. Creation of UN in San Francisco
- 1947 Treaty in Paris with the former allies of Nazi Germany (Italy, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Finland)
- 1948 Communist takeover in Poland
- 1948 Finnish-Soviet agreement, The Treaty of Friendship, Coordination and Assistance
- 1949 Occupied Germany divided into Bundesrepublik Deutschland (BRD) and Deutsche Demokratische Republik (DDR)
- 1953 Stalin dies
- 1956 Nikita Khrushchev introduces a destalinization policy
- 1956 Polish October. Strikes against the Communists
- 1958 BRD member of the European Community
- 1961 The Berlin Wall erected

Berlin

attracted much attention during the Cold War. The city became a symbol of East-West relations, especially after John F. Kennedy's declaration in 1961: "Ich bin ein Berliner". According to the Yalta Conference in February 1945, the German capital was divided into four sectors, one for each occupying power. Berlin became an enclave in the Soviet zone. In 1948 the Soviets stopped all surface transport to West Berlin (the Berlin Blockade). The western powers responded with an immense airlift and after eleven months the Soviet blockade ceased. In 1952 West Berlin was integrated with West Germany. The united Germany has voted to move its capital from Bonn back to Berlin.

- 1964 Khrushchev forced to resign
- 1964-1982 Leonid Brezhnev leader of the Soviet Union. Stagnation marks his reign
- 1970 Violent riots in a number of Polish cities because of high rise in food prices leads to a massacre in Gdańsk. Party leader Władysław Gomułka has to resign and is succeeded by Edward Gierk
- 1973 Denmark becomes member of the European Community
- 1975 Helsinki Final Act
- 1978 Cardinal Karol Wojtyła from Kraków elected Pope in Rome
- 1979 Pope John Paul II's first visit to Poland. Mass attendance at celebrations

- 1980 Polish resistance against Soviet communist rule in Poland organized by Solidarność (Solidarity) movement by dissident intellectuals and discontented workers
- 1981 Martial law in Poland in order to eliminate Solidarity from political life (December)
- 1981 Incident with a Soviet submarine stranded in Swedish territorial waters
- 1982 Mauno Koivisto elected president of Finland after the ailing Urho Kekkonen's resignation (president since 1956)
- 1985 Mikhail Gorbachev chosen General secretary of the CPSU
- 1986 Introduction of the policies of perestroika, glasnost and new thinking in the Soviet Union. Attempts to introduce market economy, democracy and affiliation with the capitalist world
- 1988 Popular fronts for the support of perestroika organized by dissidents and native communists in the Soviet Baltic republics. By the end of the year, transformation into fronts for independence
- 1989 Post Cold War. Breakdown of the Soviet Union**
- 1989 'The Round Table' in Poland: Discussions on a democratic order by government officials and representatives of Solidarity. Free elections in June. Establishment of a non-communist, Solidarity government under Tadeusz Mazowiecki in September
- 1989 Peaceful demolition of the Berlin Wall. Total loss of legitimacy and of self-confidence of the East German regime
- 1990 Declarations of sovereignty by the Supreme Soviets in Lithuania (11 March), Estonia (31 March) and Latvia (4 May). Electoral victory for democratic parties in East Germany. 3 October the five East German states (Länder) become part of the German Federal Republic (unification of Germany). Solidarity leader Lech Wałęsa elected president of Poland (till 1995)
- 1991 On 12 June Boris Yeltsin appointed by the Supreme Soviet of Russia president of the RSFSR. Unsuccessful coup d'état by the vice president Yanayev against the Soviet president Gorbachev on 19 August. All three Baltic republics declare themselves independent (Lithuania already in 1990) and are recognized by the Soviet presidency on 5 September as sovereign states. Comecon and the Warsaw Pact are dissolved. The Soviet state is dissolved on 25 December. The Russian Federation becomes the main successor state. Gorbachev resigns from his presidency as the Soviet Union vanishes
- 1992 The Council of the Baltic Sea States is formed in Copenhagen (Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Russia, Sweden)
- 1993 Withdrawal of the Soviet army from Estonia and Lithuania
- 1994 Withdrawal of the Soviet army from Latvia
- 1994 Finland and Sweden become members of the EU
- 1999 Poland becomes member of NATO. The transition period is over

1 The development of the concept of a national identity in Belarus

Alena V. Korshuk
To my father

But who's tramping there, but who's tramping there, Such a tremendous throng in despair?
— Byelorussians.
But what are they carrying, through dirt and mud, In their arms, on their shoulders sweated to blood?
— Their unjust lot.
But whom do they want to show the load They carry, flocking along the road?
— To the wide world.
But what made these millions awake and arise, What taught them to be so daring and wise?
— Want and grief.
But what is it they now wish they could find, They, for ages oppressed and for centuries blind?
Their human lot.

Yanka Kupala 1907 *But Who's Tramping There?*
(after the anthology published 1982)

“...Belarus was known for its traditional calmness, tolerance and neutrality...”
“The Belarusians have a great desire for independence and autonomy, but they are steeped in tradition, and tend to follow powerful leaders without question”
Morrison T., Conaway, W., Border G., 1997

Identity

Identity is a primary mental construct. Identity is both a reflexive relation, defining an individual (“Who I am”) and a relation of belonging to (/being part of) a group. The set of identity characteristics is culture-specific and practically unlimited. Most salient components of **ethnic identity** are related to the native language, outward appearance, spiritual qualities (such as religion, beliefs concerning origin and kinship) and traits discriminating ego from alter.



Traditionally ethnic (and often social) identity is understood as an objective legacy, given from outside (“by god, sucked in with mother’s milk”, determined by kinship, origin, territory, or even biology, as encapsulated in the German expression *Blut und Boden*). An opposite point of view stresses an individual’s right to determine one’s identity by voluntary acts of access to an ethnic, religious or, for instance political or sexual group (“I am who I concern myself to be”, “I am a Swede/German/Russian... by my choice”).

The following articles are case studies on identity of two Baltic peoples, lesser known outside the region.

Map 12. Belarus. Ill.: Radosław Przebitkowski



Figure 26. Belarusian border post. Is the Polish-Belarusian border going to be a border of the European Union in future? Photo: Alfred Majewicz

I would like to start this survey with a disclaimer. The present paper is a personal view of a historically minded psycholinguist engaged in the analysis of intercultural communication issues. This view has formed as a result of putting together a whole range of works by representatives of various fields of science.

1. The territory and kinship

As with most nations, the boundaries of the territory inhabited by the Belarusian people are hardly ever stable, however, the Belarusians have always lived between the Western Dvina, Pripyat', Sozh, Niemen, and Dnieper rivers (see Burbis, 1999; Philipenko 1991).

There is a generally accepted view stating that there was an unknown ancient Finno-Ugric tribe, a Baltic substrate and three East Slavonic tribes—Dregovichich, Radzimich, Krivich, who had considerable influence over West Slavs and other East Slavs who contributed to the formation of the Belarusian nation.

Belarus has traditionally been an agricultural country despite its harsh climate and poor soil. The land ownership differed from

the communal one, typical for the Russians (see Burbis 1999).

Due to its advantageous – in this respect – geographical position, Belarus has always been a trading centre. Even the name of the capital, Minsk (*Men'sk*, *Menesk*) comes from the verb *meniat'*, to barter.

However, one can hardly think of it as a major trading centre as no major investments have ever been made into the development of this land and its potential with the exception of Soviet times. In the years following the October 1917 Revolution, and especially after the World War II, the centralised planned economy has turned Belarus, not very rich in natural resources, into a large assembly plant for the entire Soviet Union. For instance, it was only Minsk that produced the big road truck-refrigerators. One of the effects of this economic development was a large influx of people from other parts of the USSR who came to Belarus to work at these heavy industry enterprises and thus influenced some demography and linguistic processes.

The most unpredictable part of the objective factors shaping the national identity of Belarusians is the history of the nation. The general feeling of the process is probably best expressed by one of the most outstanding 20th century Belarusian poets, the ardent advocate of the Belarusian language and culture, Yakub Kolas, in his 1917 epic poem “Simon-Musician”.

My dear brothers, Byelorussians!
 In this book of human deeds
 Fate itself, perhaps as temptation,
 Has given us these fair meads.
 For here the tribes have gathered
 To decide their disputes by force
 To win our well-endowed country
 By conquest, all in due course,
 To deal us here a heart-wound,
 And to clamp on us their yoke,
 To defile our sacred treasure,
 To deride the soul of our folk,
 And in the slough of deception
 To leave of us not a trace,
 So that grandsons will not fathom
 Who were grandsires of their race.

.....
 And so have we not the right, then,
 By force to blaze our trail,
 And our own beloved country
 As our motherland to hail?
 (Yakub Kolas, 1982)



Figure 27. A drawing inspired by Chagall. Ill.: Małgorzata Sheiki-Binkowska

2. The memories

To cut a very long (hi)story short, let us say, that through the centuries Belarusian lands and its people made a part of a number of states (e.g. Kievan Rus, Great Lithuanian Principality, Rzeczpospolita, Russian Empire, etc.). Due to its geographical position it has suffered from all wars waged from North to South, from South to North, from West to East, from East to West. As an outcome of these historical events, Belarusians learnt to live side by side with people of different national and religious backgrounds.

At the dawn of the communist era in the history of Belarus, A. Burbis wrote that “the Belarusian national movement is deeply rooted in the unique past history of Belarus, in its economic, ethnographic and linguistic peculiarities”. In the 11-16th centuries the Belarusians experienced the golden age of its statehood, society, national culture, built on elements of democracy. In the long centuries of its life that merged together with Poland (16th-18th centuries) and later with Russia (18th-20th centuries) it could hardly put up with what was brought to Belarus by Poland “in the form of a gentry-aristocracy republic, and by Moscow in the form of a boyar oligarchy and absolute monarchy” (Burbis 1999).

As a result of national-religious antagonism and a whole number of social factors, class and social layer contradictions in Belarusian history, the Belarusians did not manage to preserve their state and social independence through the course of history.

Burbis also claims that the gradual loss of the socially privileged strata of society who were becoming alienated from the Belarusian popular masses in their language, life style, ways of thinking and feelings, made the people devote all their strength, active force, and creativity to build up the statehood and culture of the neighboring peoples. However, they still retain their national customs, which differentiate them from other peoples. Left on its own in its original primitive forms of life, the nation preserved both its mother tongue, its beliefs, its customs, its general cultural and its economic way of life (Burbis 1999).

The first attempts of a national movement in Belarus in the form of literary activities date back to the 1830s-1840s, and in the second half of the 19th century they took the form of more varied activities (e.g. the ‘*Narodniki*’ student group “Gomon” in St Petersburg in the 1880s) aimed at the restoration of the Belarusian culture, at building up national pride and awareness of the people. The basis for the idea of human and social rights was set in this manner, according to Burbis (1999). Whatever the expectations and aspirations of the well-to-do Poland-oriented landlords or of the mighty bureaucratic authorities, who considered Belarus and the Belarusians part and parcel of Russia, in an 1897 census quite a large proportion of the population of the so-called “North-Western Region” named Belarusian as their native tongue.

Leaving history aside, I would like to point out once again that it is the objective migration processes rather than only the political events concerning language and culture that have to be taken into account while thinking of the Belarusian identity.

Speaking of material culture it will be enough to remember the Belarusian architectural styles which reflect the history of the country (e.g. fortified monasteries), a whole series of unique arts and crafts (Slutsk belts, tapestries, straw and flax dolls, etc.), a school of painting that gave the world such a prominent figure as Marc Chagall, great Enlightenment personalities like St. Euphrosinia of Polotsk, Francisk Skaryna, etc., the first brotherhood schools of the 16th century, national Belarusian poets, novelists, playwrights.

As we can see, all the material prerequisites are here. Belarusians have their land, their history, their economy and their language.



Figure 28. The grave of Francišak Alachnovič (Frantsishak Alakhnovitsh), Belarusian playwright, in Vilnius. Photo: Alfred F. Majewicz

3. The little brother

Going back to the relations with a “Big Brother” there is no doubt that the other East Slavic nations, Russians and Ukrainians have no doubts in identifying a Belarusian even if the in-group feelings prevail. Belarusians are regarded as a little brother, and are called, most lovingly, “*bulbashi*” (potato people).

Though similar in many respects, Belarusians differ from the “Big Russian brother” in many culture-defining aspects, e.g. in attitudes to nature, to time, to activity and to each other.

Thus, relations with nature are closer, more of the harmonious living versus the conquering type. According to Russian tradition one is supposed to kill the Snake Queen should she cross your path in early spring, whereas the Belarusian way is to bow low and plead for a good year. This tradition is easily accounted for by the amount of wetlands (hence, snakes and the necessity to live with them) in Belarus.

Both nations are known for their hospitality, however it is only in Belarus that a guest is not supposed to taste food unless the host has asked him to do so at least...five times (the famous Belarusian “*prymus*”).

Belarusians have a reputation of being more diligent workers than some other nations (and of being stubborn).

“Belarusians’ concerns are for the immediate, particular situation” (Morrison, Conaway, Border 1997). Is this, as well as the primary value given by Belarusians to peace, not quite understandable for a nation torn by wars in which it had no interest whatsoever?

4. The contemporary views on Belarusian identity

How do the Belarusians see their traits these days? It has to be noted that although it is generally accepted that it is the non-urban population vs. the urban that used to be the carrier of the national type, and it is in the countryside that people speak more Belarusian than Russian, it has always been the city intellectuals who fought for the concepts and ideals of a national identity. A comprehensive sociological research carried out by Nadežda Yefimova in 1992 and 1998 also reflects the views of the intellectuals (men of culture, education, politics) on the issue of national identity. She analysed a whole range of newspapers, from the rightist to the leftist as to how they cover the national identity issue. In most papers, national culture materials ranked first followed by history, ethnography and religion. It was basically the Belarusian language and literature that were covered under “culture”. However, in 1998, the number of articles devoted to language issues diminished (from 28.4% to 13.1% of the publications). Language is no longer considered to be the major element of culture and cultural identity. Forced Belarusisation or Russification or Polonisation has never actually brought good results unless well-grounded in objective reality and economic needs. Both in 1992 and in 1998, it was the creation of an ethnocratic state (a term suggested by Yefimova) and the restoration of statehood that people saw as a way of national revival. National identity is seen as incorporating the following elements: national language (41.5% in 1992, 20.6% in 1998), original culture (27% respectively 15.7%), original history (9.6% respectively 11.8%), religion (4.8% respectively 0%), psychological traits (2.2% respectively 5.9%), ethnic peculiarities (4.1% respectively 0%), statehood (9.6%

respectively 9.8%). As can be seen, more comprehensive elements are coming to the forefront of the understanding of the concept a national identity.

The view on typical Belarusian qualities has also changed in the six years from 1992 to 1998 (to what degree it is the result of media influence on society is a different issue). The ranking of the features are as follows:

Table 2. Belarusian qualities

1992	1998
Tolerance	Persistence, tenaciousness, strong mindedness
Self-esteem	Self-esteem
	Modesty, simplicity Talent
Talent	Decisiveness, audacity
High moral	Being demanding, standards critical, austere
Devotion to the cause	Responsibility, sense of duty

There is a tendency to prefer active features to passive ones. Even if this is the result of media influence on the intellectual audience, I personally see it as positive progress, appropriate for a nation with a significant history, a nation which has its due place in the global village of the 21st century (Yefimova 1998).

5. Conclusion

What then is the driving force, the concept lying behind the national identity of Belarusians? Vyatsheslav Nosevitsh says that “for the mass consciousness to grasp an idea it has to be formulated in a rather simple, unequivocal way, which is a rather hard thing to achieve within the complex historical processes” (Nosevitsh 1998). He also thinks that the formation of the Belarusian nation was based on the principle that it was the people who were NOT Russian, NOT Polish, NOT Lithuanian, etc who founded the Belarusian nation (p.27).

I am inclined to regard this approach as salient to the Belarusian character, the modesty typical of the Belarusians, who do not like to stand out and who do not speak very highly of themselves. It is an issue of formulating the idea whether the glass is half-full or half-empty; is it the OTHERS who are NOT LIKE US or US who ARE NOT LIKE THEM.

Throughout its history, Belarus and Belarusians strove to be recognized as equals, as having “THEIR human lot”, to be left to choose their own way of life for themselves. National identity was mostly identified with national statehood.

The discontent of the intellectual elite has apparently been caused by the fact that there were more elements of assimilation than of integration in the relations with other, mostly dominant, cultures. (Assimilation is a denial of one's own culture in favor of a new, more powerful one, etc.; integration means retaining your own culture and acquiring a new one as well).

What is the future of this nation of SURVIVORS in the third millenium? Will they remain this unknown people who live inconspicuously somewhere in the middle of Europe? Will they stay immune to the avalanche of changes? Will they resist globalisation and stick to their simple peasant survival philosophy? Time will tell. However, there is a good chance that adaptability, tolerance, diligence, hospitality and a respect for other cultures are just the features that will make the transition to globalisation, the integration of Belarusians into the global village quite easy and natural.

We are the people of this land, “*tuteishyia*” (‘locals’), Belarusians, people of the third Millenium.




Figure 29. A girl of Tatar origin, Belarusian-Lithuanian border area. Photo: Alfred F. Majewicz

2 Constructing Karelia: Myths and Symbols in the Multiethnic Reality

Ilja Solomeshch

1. Power of symbols

Political symbolism is known to have three major functions – nominative, informative and communicative. In this sense a symbol in political life plays one of the key roles in structuring society, organising interrelations within the community and between people and the various institutions of state.

Specialists in the field of semiotics note that in times of social and political crises, at the stage of ideological and moral disintegration, some forms of the most archaic kinds of political symbolism reactivate in what is called the archaic syndrome. This notion is used, for example, to evaluate the situation in pre- and post-revolutionary (1917) Russia, as well as

Karelia



Karelia is a border area between Finland and Russia. Majority of its territory belongs to Russian Republic of Karelia, with a capital in Petrozavodsk. The Sovjet Union gained the marked area from Finland as the outcome of war 1944. Karelia can be compared with similar border areas in the Baltic Region, like Schleswig-Holstein, Oppeln (Opole) Silesia in Poland, Kaliningrad region in Russia. Probably the best known case of such an area in Europe is Alsace-Lorraine.

Map 13. Karelia. III.: Radosław Przebitkowski


The Soviet semioticity

When trying to understand historical and cultural developments in the Russian/Soviet/Post-Soviet spatial area, especially in terms of Centre-Peripheries and Break-Continuity paradigms, one can easily notice the semioticity of the Soviet system, starting with its ideology. New communist rites and rituals, as well as symbols, were destined to oppose the old religious ones associated with the Tsarist regime. While religious rituals were intended to prove, above all, the existence of a sacral community, the Christian church, the main assignment of Communist rituals was to prove the existence of a principally new sacral construction, the State, which, under the Communist Party's leadership, was building Communism. Some scholars believe this semioticity, where almost everything seems to carry a message, to be an old Russian tradition.

the fall of the Soviet Union and its aftermath. Among the main features of this phenomenon are its irrationality, insensibility to obvious contradictions, and the mythologisation of the abilities of the charismatic leaders. Thus, symbols and political myths are used as instruments of governing and manipulation by exploiting irrational spheres of human mentality.

2. Karelian perspective

Firstly, we must stress the fact that Karelia was (and actually still remains) a border territory with a very complicated ethnic composition. The latter ranges from Vepsians and Karelians, who had lived there for centuries, to the Finns who came there from Finland proper, from the historical province of Ingria as well as from America who settled there mostly in the 20th century, and to post-war Belarussian resettlers. Actually the very Finno-Ugric nature of Soviet Karelia's statehood could also be perceived as one of numerous mystifications and myths of Soviet times, since so-called national fractions of its population, i.e. Karelians, Finns and Vepsians, created a majority only in 1920, the year of the Karelian Labour commune foundation, and after that Russians (or non-nationals) have always created clear majority in this nominally Finno-Ugric administrative formation. Taking into consideration this specificity of the Karelian Republic, we can trace not only ways of adopting so-called 'all-union' symbols, but also of creating own local micro-symbols and micro-cults.



Map 14. Finno-Ugric People in the Baltic Region. (1) Finns and (2) Estonians. The area where these are in majority do not overlap precisely with the country borders of Finland and Estonia. The more than 300.000 Finns that live as immigrants in Sweden are not indicated. (3) Izhors and (4) Votes together with Finns are found in former Ingria in the St Petersburg area. (5) Karelians and (6) Veps live mostly in the Karelian Republic in the Russian Federation. (7) Livonians in Latvia. (8) Saami peoples. Darker colour indicate Finno-Ugrians in majority. Hatched line is the water divide. Ill.: Karin Hallgren

Table 3. Population of Finno-Ugrians in the Russian Baltic Region

People/Year		1913	1990
Finns	in Ingria	120,000	20,000
	in Karelia	–	15,000
	rest of Russia	–	15,000
	<i>Total</i>	<i>120,000</i>	<i>50,000</i>
Izhors	in Ingria	15,000	500
	<i>Total</i>	<i>15,000</i>	<i>800</i>
Votes		1,000	50
Karelians	in Karelia	160,000	80,000
	in Tver oblast	80,000	30,000
	<i>Total</i>	<i>240,000</i>	<i>130,000</i>
Vepsians		30,000	12,500

In Russian tradition the concept of boundaries has an exceptional socio-psychological meaning. The boundary, either artificial or natural, is first of all a defence line protecting the We/Ours from the hostile They/Others.

3. Borders

The symbol and the icon of 'the Border' should be outlined first. From the end of the 1920s and onwards the word 'Border' was usually linked with the motto 'The border is locked up!' with the emphasis on the strong need to safeguard the achievements of the Great October Socialist revolution from constantly existing external threats.

In the case of Finland, its relations with the eastern neighbour have been an essential constituent in the creation of Finnishness, and in many cases the boundary between the two states has been regarded as an icon of these relations. The concept of "natural boundaries" was getting more and more popular in the political lexicon due to the much publicised views of the German scientist Friedrich Ratzel, the founder of modern political geography and politology. During the same period there appeared translated into many languages investigations of the Swedish politologist Rudolf Kjellén who introduced the term "geopolitics" into scientific language as early as in the 1910s.

Due to the dominating pro-German orientation which had consolidated in Finland before 1917, the publicity of Ratzel's and Kjellén's ideas had not only scientific but political foundation as well. From that time onwards the concept of a "natural boundary" would be used in academic works by Finnish geographers as the scientific basis of the idea of the Greater Finland whose new boundaries should correspond to the natural ones and thereby stretch eastwards (as well as westwards) much farther than the borders did. In other words, the solution of the Karelian question began to be linked directly to the idea of the Greater Finland. Among the factors that determined the geographical position of "natural boundaries", there were listed not only the physical-geographical ones (seas, rivers, lakes, watersheds and highlands), but also the ethnocultural reasons – national, linguistic and religious. Thus the results of purely scientific geographical researches had

transformed into argumentation for political and territorial claims.

A special resonance to pondering the nature and role of boundaries was given by the foundation in 1919 of so called "buffer zones" in the framework of the Versailles system. This, in its turn, became the implementation of the earlier formulated geopolitical idea of the "medial tier" between Germany and Russia. "Buffer states" as viewed in particular by Lord Curzon after his successful activity on the border demarcation in India, were relatively independent states whose sovereignty was guaranteed by the third party countries. To old "buffer states" – Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg and Switzerland – the new ones were added, those of Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania.

4. External Menace

The related symbol of the external enemy beyond the boundary might be described as an integral part of the Russian mentality, playing a key role within the paradigm of eastern paternalism by providing a necessary justification for the system of relations between the Leader/the Father and the People. It can be argued that one can hardly find a stronger mental succession in people's behaviour, before and after the Bolsheviks' socialist revolution of 1917, than the implicit faith in the power of the Word and in the constant existence of an Enemy. Throughout the history of the Russian State, the latter concept has been repeatedly deployed, both to mobilise against actual external danger and to justify the struggle against a putative inner enemy, often a phantom. One can easily find examples illustrating this thesis in Russian history from its very beginnings to the present day.

The fate of the so-called Red Finns in Soviet Karelia, i.e. Finnish communists who fled from Finland to Soviet Union after the

unsuccessful revolution attempt in 1918, serves as but one illustration of this thesis. Perhaps the most prominent among them was PhD Edvard Gylling. Most of the top-level Red Finns, as well as great number of other groups of Finns in the USSR, suffered during the Stalin's purges in 1930s. Symbols of Border and Enemy, both being either external or internal, are closely linked to each other and, in Karelian's case, have a much wider spatio-temporal orientation.

External threat in the North-West borderlands has an extended record of resemblance with the situation on the eastern frontiers of Russia. In the early 1930s, after the occupation of Manchuria by the Japanese an almost hysterical fear of intervention gripped the Soviet Union, and this, above all, was used as grounds for a purge both against officers of Finnish origin in Karelia and in border regions where Karelians lived.

For the second time, after World War II and during the Korean war, Stalin, not being satisfied by the events in Korea, seems to have been stricken by a kind of war panic. Serious signs of war preparations were discerned by the Soviets even in Finland, and that was the last case when Otto Wille Kuusinen, one of the few prominent Red Finns who survived, was summoned to Stalin's cabinet.

And, finally, these issues have once again been connected together in public debates on the Karelian question during the perestroika and post-perestroika periods. Some Finns' approach towards the fate of lost Karelia was then compared to Japan's official approach towards disputed territories of the Kurile islands. Generally speaking, all these cases evoke latent appeals to the patriotic idea of inviolability of Russian borders and to the image of an external enemy.

For Russians, Karelia had always been and remained Russian territory, and any doubts on this score were perceived as representing an assault on the indivisibility and majesty of the State, be it the Russian Empire or the Soviet Union. The only change after the Bolshevik revolution of 1917 was that the idea of the Communist Motherland gradually replacing the Great Russian Orthodox idea. The image of An Enemy / A Stranger / The Other remained practically unchanged. At the beginning of the 20th century the defenders of the Great Russian idea blamed the Finns

for trying to expand Lutheran influence in Russian Karelia. Instruments chosen to resist this danger were not only ideological, but also economical ones. For example, one of the purposes of the construction of the Murmansk railroad, the first plans were elaborated long before World War I, was to strengthen Russian influence among not only Karelians, but also Finns in the border regions. In the 1930s the Finns were once again blamed for so-called bourgeois nationalism, a conspiracy in the attempt to join Karelia to Finland.

Soviet Karelian newspapers have played their role in creating such an image of Finland (and Finns), which was a priori aggressive towards Russia (and the Russians). This process culminated in late 1920s – early 1930s, when image of Finland was already presented as “part and parcel” of Fascism and a source of war threat. During 1920s and 1930s, media propaganda reproduced methods of propagandistic campaign against so called Panfennistic activities in Orthodox Karelia in the beginning of the 20th century, before the Russian revolution.

Russians viewed the orientation within Panfennism in the late 19th and early 20th centuries towards mostly Orthodox Karelia as a manifestation of Finnish imperialism, and, conversely, with no foundation whatsoever, the Finns suspected Russia of imperialistic ambitions when its central authorities proposed unification initiatives regarding Finland, culminating, in 1914, in the odious programme of Russification of the Grand Duchy of Finland.

Finnish enthusiasm about the fate of their Karelian brothers during the first two decades of the 20th century was labelled as Finnish irredenta, appealing both to the idea of natural boundaries for the Greater Finland and to the Finno-Ugric tribal brotherhood pathetics.

In the 1930s external threats were linked together once again with the threat of nationalism in Karelia. This, being a reflection of a much more general shift towards national Bolshevism in 1934, as defined by Gerhard Simon, in its turn was connected with the phantom notion of the Red Greater Finland and reflected a fight for power both at the central and peripheral levels.

5. Cults and Myths

If we return back to the symbolic world of Soviet reality, let us mention the motto of 'the United Family of Free Peoples', a symbol that correlates, above all, to the fate of Karelia. The correlation is obvious, as the unity was stressed more and more strongly whilst real autonomy, real freedom was becoming more and more nominal. This process culminated in the late 1920s.

We can therefore come to the conclusion that there is clear evidence of continuity in the instrumentality of national policy conducted in Russia towards non-Russian border regions before and after the Bolshevik revolution in an attempt to avoid the danger of disintegration of the State.

One of the most specific features is the Finno-Ugric nature of Soviet Karelia's autonomy, once again, real and nominal. During the period of Communist Fennicization of Soviet Karelia it was usually stressed by the advocates and initiators of the campaign that they were building a new Karelia (new schools, new engineering, new poetry, etc.). This sign of novelty should not be considered as a totally specifically local one. The hymn of the Soviet Union later pronounced that 'we will build our new world'. Local specificity becomes apparent in the Finno-Ugric involvement in the process of building something new.

As far as the role of a charismatic leader is concerned, it should be noted that the cult of Vladimir Lenin and later Josif Stalin was immediately reproduced at the local level, constituting a sort of hierarchy. As early as in the mid 1920s we can already trace back the existence of a local cult of prominent leaders, Gylling and Rovio. One of its most peculiar features was that these leaders were so-called Red Finns, representing by nationality the narrowest stratum of the Karelian population, and they were often perceived by the majority as strangers.

The famous Finnish epic compilation Kalevala offered good ideas to be used, among them Sampo, the mill of happiness (respectively, the Red Sampo), the traditional music instrument Kantele (respectively, the Red Kantele), etc. Needed scientific grounds for Kalevala's images involvement in propaganda have been carefully provided by Soviet scholars in order to draw a line separating bourgeois understanding of old Karelian mythology and the new Marxist, and, thus, the only lawful, one.




Figure 30.
Karelia, a
comb. Ill.:
Małgorzata
Sheiki-Biń-
kowska

The so-called Red Finns have played their prominent role in the history of the region, and this is also considered as a specificity. Soviet Karelia as a case study area gives a wide range of material for the discourse on the correlation of Soviet internationalism and patriotism as a legacy of disputes between Zapadniks and Slavophiles.

The Centre needed to maintain the State as united, strong, and indivisible. However, after the Bolshevik revolution, the idea of strong statehood could not be supported any more by the Orthodox idea, a new set of symbols and myths had to be invented. This was actually done during the first decades of the Soviet rule.

The symbolic world of Soviet Russianness seems finally to be moulded after World War II, more familiar to a 'rank-and-file' Soviet citizen than the Great Patriotic War, with, once again, strong emphasis on the notions of Border, Enemy and Fatherland. Within the Centre-Peripheries paradigm, this process had created a construction with much stronger and effective control from the Centre and much more emasculate and formal self-dependence at the local level. Under these circumstances, the real content of national, Finno-Ugric, specificity of Soviet Karelia was doomed to be demolished. Whilst formal attention to national culture and related symbols was constantly stressed, the very Finnishness of Soviet Karelia/Karelian Republic, as far as the second half of the 20th century is concerned, could be argued to shift its real meaning step by step towards a symbol per se.

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
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САМІЙЛО ЯШНИЙ. (90 років)

„Три брачі узобські“

„Будова і три сини“

„Дівка бранка“



Section II

CULTURE

Figure 31. Ukrainian kobzari player, Samijlo Jashni from Mirgorod, aged 90

II

Section

CULTURE

Editor: Witold Maciejewski

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INTRODUCTION

Witold Maciejewski

Peoples of the Baltic region have been divided and distant from each other for at least sixty years. At least three generations have lived in restricted spheres; communication between their countries and exchange of ideas were close to non-existent. Barriers constructed of ignorance, prejudices and even hostility have been solicitously cultivated by powerful organizations. When most of the obstacles had been removed in the early nineties, the peoples, facing each other, found themselves in a need of mutual communication. But interethnic communication is composed of two aspects: the technical and the spiritual.

The first one is on a good way to be clarified. The linguistic diversity of the Region, where about 50 languages are spoken, has been alleviated by extension of English, used as a regional language to an ever increasing extent. English, a language foreign to everybody in the Baltic region, is a tool of intercultural transmission.

The section on culture presents an attempt to solve the second question. The papers included contribute to the current debate on culture in general and on its diversity in the Baltic region. There are several theoretical paradigms, suggested by the authors of the chapters, and all of them stress various aspects of culture.

The first one, derived from the current post modernistic debate, claims that culture is our human invention that we, using our heads, can transform in a desirable direction. However, when facing challenges of the topical development we are also used to simplifying cultural issues. Michał Buchowski shows in his article how dangerous such simplifications can be if only labels of political correctness (as in the case of immigrant policy in Nordic countries) or nationalism (as in the case of constitutional nationalism in Baltic countries) are provided.

While Buchowski discusses culture as “refinement of thought, mind, emotions and behavior”, i.e. in a meaning spread in France around the 15th – 16th centuries and present in German though from 18th century, Charles Westin, when describing the Baltic landscapes and their inhabitants, emphasises the most basic component of culture – the Latin word *cultu-ra* means primarily “cultivation of soil”, in this case cultivation of the landscape. In this primary meaning culture is much closer related to environmental sciences. Westin defines the Baltic region as a human creation of natural units and points out correlation between the Baltic peoples ways of living and the geographical conditions.

Diversity of peoples, religions and languages is being considered a specific feature of the Baltic region. The region is a meeting point of four Christian faiths: Protestantism, Catholicism, Orthodoxy, and Greek Catholicism. It is also a historical home of Jewry. Apart from the confessions with most numerous believers there are several minority religions represented, such as non-conformist Protestant churches, Karaims, Muslims, Armenian Orthodox and many others. Religion is a basic part of culture; it stands for our beliefs, rituals, our every-day way of life, our way to understand the world and ourselves. Lennart Tegborg in his contribution stresses also the social and political role of religion.

This aspect of culture is being further analysed as a component of another paradigm, used by several authors, influenced by contemporary Anglo-Saxon thought on socio-economic development. The paradigm is summarized by the notion of social capital, determining pre-summptions for well functioning democracy and a prosperous society. Thorleif Pettersson's contribution, based on an extensive research program, shows correspondence between – on

the one hand – values held to believe by the Baltic societies and – on the other hand – the social capital of these societies. The study confirms that the countries of the Baltic region belong to four different cultural zones, and that the most distant, opposite positions concerning both the level of social capital and respect for traditional vs. secular-rational values are occupied by Sweden which is richest on social capital and Poland with its low level of social capital and highest respect for traditional-religious values. The presented study emphasizes that culture is values and that prosperity depends on adequacy between self-expression and social behaviour.

Music and art are ways of expression of our feelings and ideas. Jan Ling, Folke Bohlin and Andrzej Woziński describe different layers of musical and artistic symbols; the first two authors refer to social functions of music, while the third one is seeking the artistic identity of the Baltic region. The region has probably lost its relative artistic homogeneity of the 17th and 18th centuries, as a result of decline of the Nordic dimension in politics and decay of the Dutch influence in the Baltic trade and European artistic life. From the 18th century onwards the region has been divided in sub-regions, developing their art in more or less close connection to the European mainstreams.

The section is completed by two chapters on cultural exchange. Bernard Piotrowski's thesis is that the most efficient pattern of institutionalised cultural cooperation has been created by the Nordic countries and the Nordic experiences can be implemented in the whole region. Kazimierz Musiał claims that creation of common regional awareness is highly depending on an educational and research policy, which has already started to work, embodied in the Baltic University Program and similar projects at universities in Germany, Russia and other countries.

Although the analysed areas of culture are as different as the paradigms represented by the authors, there is a common message, expressed more or less overtly in each chapter. All the authors point out that culture(s) both unite and discriminate us, the individuals and the peoples of the Baltic. A consequence of the general thesis, expressed in the first contribution, is that this invention of ours should not resist our conscious influence. The following chapters define more precisely the desirable directions of changes towards openness and tolerance. These are the values that constitute precondition for any successful intercultural communication. The same values would, as expressed in Pettersson's chapter, provide more trustful relations and create a basis for enrichment of the regional social capital.

It happens, however, that political sciences formulate opinions dividing and setting people against each other, such as Huntington's idea of "clash of civilizations". According to this, peoples of the Baltic are located on different sides of a barrier between two opposite cultures: the Orthodox and the Western; the second one composed of Protestants united with the Catholics. The present textbook as a whole represents quite an opposite concept stressing the common characteristics of the regional culture. Our proposal corresponds well to the belief that the Baltic people understand their countries rather as bridges between East and West than as front states between two opposed civilizations.

Culture is a serious matter. It unites us and creates barriers between us, but it provides us also with moral and intellectual instruments, defining our responsibility and helping us to overcome at least some of the barriers we are aware of. The holistic view on culture is then being suggested as the specific flag of the Baltic University Programme, differentiating it from other, similar attempts.

8 The invention of culture

Michał Buchowski

1. The invention of culture

Culture is a notion that belongs to the basic kit of those who work in the social sciences and humanities. It is an often used and, as a result, abused term. We always hear about, e.g., cultured or non-cultured persons, folk or national cultures, primitive or civilised cultures,



Figure 32. Rituals are part of our ethnic cultures. *Midsommar* in Sweden. Photo: Katarzyna Skalska

musical and visual cultures, high and popular cultures, cyberspace cultures, and last but not least, the macdonaldisation of culture. The word is commonly used in media and daily communication with a hidden assumption that it carries a defined meaning shared by all of us. Meanwhile, it is rather like a magical spell, a master key that only deceptively opens new perspectives and serves various, often contradictory, purposes. Multiplicity of meaning does not flow from the semantic mastery over it, but in this case rather from the mystery of an intuitively perceived ‘matter’.

Zygmunt Bauman, in his work *Legislators and Interpreters* (1992), connects the emergence of such a hierarchical notion of culture not only with intellectual movements, but also with the emergence of a modern state that needed to control their

Cultura mentis

As in the case of any concept, the term culture was invented in a given social milieu. Derived from the ancient Roman agricultural context, in the period of Enlightenment it started to describe ‘cultura mentis’, the cultivation of mind. This developmental, bettering, ‘civilising’ aspect of the human nature has become one of the main strands in the history of the category. Making humans better beings was meant to transform them and make them more culturally refined. To that effect, the European elite constructed a differentiation of human beings and human groups according to the sophistry and complexity of their cultures whereby ‘primitive’ and ‘civilised’ societies were soon put alongside the evolutionary ladder of the development of humankind. Exotic tribes were survivors of the past history of Europe that served as living proof of our ancient history. Notions of high and low cultures were soon distinguished within ‘civilised’ societies. Those individuals who were educated, properly brought up and well mannered, the crust of society, who embodied high culture, while ordinary people, peasants and proletarians, the common folk, merely represented low culture.

citizens and to teach them how to behave in a unified way. Distinction into low and high culture made the process of disciplining and 'humanising' commoners legitimate. In the name of enlightening the people, the state imposed upon them a unified system of language, attitudes, norms and values, and world views. Note that from the beginning the notion of culture had a double goal of reconciling an urge for freedom of expression and creating order.

In the period so deeply concerned with the potential of the human mind there was a philosophical desire to organise a chaotic world of our experience into a harmonised pattern. Therefore, culture was invoked to serve a dual goal of taming nature and naturalising human activity. We make our own imprint on the universe around us and this activity becomes a part of this natural order. Society is a framework for this activity. This understanding gave birth to the next dichotomy that stretched along the lines of individual creativity and communal constraint. On the one hand, culture started to mean an aptitude to trespass the norm, to oppose compulsion, to create extraordinary, artistic things. Active creators break down barriers and set patterns for the passive masses that merely consume the products of the former. On the other hand, culture began to function as a concept of uniformity and regularity. This discourse expressed the need for stabilisation and a view of human society as solidified by some norms and values that supplied a foundation for common understanding and action. A distinction between two different modes of understanding culture is exemplified in such disciplinary approaches as, for instance, art history and cultural anthropology.

The above-mentioned three dichotomies concerning modern understandings of culture, i.e. the idea of high vs. low culture, the urge for freedom vs. the urge for making order and individual creativity vs. communal regularity, are strictly entangled. High culture as represented by the elite and avant-garde had to be disseminated in order to enhance individuals and societies whereby they could be liberated. Organised society of common people needs cultural patterns to function. The whole reflection on the 18th and 19th century European invention called culture could be presented as revolving around this ambiguity between order and disorder; making things unified and diversifying them.

2. Unity or diversity of culture(s)

Several features of these tensions are visible in the history of a discipline that made culture one of the main topics of its interest, i.e. cultural anthropology. What moral philosophers wrote about culture in general, anthropologists applied to and perfected in their cross-cultural studies. 'Primitive societies', initially the main subject of anthropologists' interests, appeared as unified by implicitly shared patterns. However, these patterns were indisputably perceived as inferior to that of Westerners. This view sanctioned external missions, as contrasted to internal ones directed towards lower classes within European societies, of colonial powers that did it in the name of bringing progress and spreading civilisation. First generation anthropologists, called evolutionists, never the less made it clear that culture, however diversified and differently developed, is a universal human phenomenon. Whatever the world view behind scholars' efforts and use of their expertise, anthropologists worked out hundreds of definitions of culture. Alfred Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn had already collected more than 160 such definitions by 1952.

In his *Primitive Culture*, published in 1871, Edward B. Tylor gave one of the first and, as it is proved to be, most often cited descriptions of the concept: "culture or civilisation, taken in its wide ethnographic sense, is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art,

morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of a society". This enumerative characterisation covered all human activities possibly imaginable, somehow mysteriously determined by society. Culture is a social product and sets a pattern for making our conduct orderly. This view of culture as a configuration of human life got its acme in the concept of culture elaborated in the forties and fifties of the twentieth century by an American functionalist sociologist, Talcott Parsons. Culture is a coherent system supported by repressive sanctions of internalised values and norms, habits and repetitive behaviours that ensure both reproduction of themselves and the maintenance of social structure. Parsons' neat and scientific vision of culture and society soon became superseded and interpretative approaches in anthropology prevailed. Clifford Geertz, one of the most celebrated anthropologists today, defined culture, in 1973, as "an historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitude toward life". Although culture is incorporated in several artefacts, it is an intentional 'reality' to be interpreted by other members of society and by the observer. However, this is again "an historically transmitted pattern".

3. Acculturation or assimilation

The fact that people have to interpret cultural patterns opens a possibility of viewing culture, thanks to the same act of an individual interpretation, as a changing field of negotiated meanings, however constrained by shared paradigms of thinking. A view of culture as an 'order maker' and unifying factor makes it difficult for social scientists to deal with the notion of cultural change. In order to embrace it concepts of assimilation and acculturation were introduced.

Isolated social groups are difficult to imagine, therefore, in this sense, we deal permanently with the processes of acculturation and, possibly, assimilation. In the latter, historical culture of the Baltic tribe of Prussians can illustrate the point. Slavic Sorbs, whose descendants currently live on the border of German provinces of Saxony and Brandenburg, have become almost totally assimilated. Ages of contacts and coexistence between Germans and Saxons, Prussian and German states made this people virtually indistinguishable from their neighbours. Only purposeful effort made some of the inhabitants of the region preserve their separate consciousness and, very rarely, language. Sorbs and Baltic Prussians illustrate the point that sentences often announcing the disappearance of a given group does not necessarily mean its physical extinction, but 'merely' its assimilation into the 'conqueror's' culture and absorption by it. One may say that the blood and bones of the Baltic Prussians survived, but their minds did not.

People interact and the diffusion of cultures is endemic to the human condition. However, cultural trade and merging of groups cannot explain the internal dynamic of change. This can be done with the help of the notion of practice as understood by the French scholar, Pierre

Acculturation or assimilation

Acculturation means the adaptation of cultural traits and borrowings of selected customs or habits. Assimilation applies to relations between two societies in which one incorporates or 'swallows' the other. Total assimilation is equal to the dissolution of a given group.

Bourdieu. We can function only through our existing daily activity structure. The system persists through action and each re-enactment reproduces culture. However, each act allows us to reinterpret the meaning and we can thereby, consciously or not, change the practice. This means that we are not passive objects of some determinant structures of history, but active subjects of them. Paradoxically, it looks as though that change is often an unintended result of a failed reproduction. One may also say that culture lasts through change. We reach out to 'culture' not as a set of determined blueprints, but rather as the resource of indefinitely potential permutations. Therefore, continuity and change go together. Some practices push out the others, and some slowly disappear.

4. Discriminatory work of culture

Implicit in the discussions on the meaning of culture that have lasted for decades has been therefore a tension between structure and chaos, continuity and change, stillness and creativeness and this has persisted for decades. As we have seen, the understanding of culture evolved gradually. It started from the evolutionist, enumerative, descriptive and all-embracing one; then it transformed into the functionalist, patterning, normative and structuring image; afterwards, culture started to be seen as a system of shared but variously interpreted symbols and meanings. All of them, however, exaggerate consistency and unity. As Lila Abu-Lughod (1991) writes, former conceptualisations of culture show "the tendency toward essentialism... tends to freeze differences... to overemphasize coherence [and] contribute to the perception of communities as bounded and discrete". A combination of view of culture as practice and of interpreted symbols have led to the conceptualisation of it "as – in Werner Schifffauer words – a 'field of discourse'... as an arena in which values, norms and patterns of meanings of cultural actors are permanently negotiated". The negotiation of meanings is not done only through language and discussions, but also through daily acts. Such an understanding allows us to explain both the internal dynamic of change, and also the logic of inter-cultural exchange.

The conclusion which stems from such a contemporary understanding of culture, no doubt related to the transformation of the current social 'reality', is that culture should be seen not only as the force uniting social groups, but also as a factor that differentiates people. In the same statement that culture is a set of values, norms, habits, language, etc., shared by certain people: there is also the implicit meaning that it is not shared by the other set of people. This discriminatory work of culture can be seen in the life of today's societies, including the Baltic region. Reverence towards culture may be easily turned against itself. Culture becomes an ambiguous notion that can be used both for the people and against them.

5. Factory of identity

The invention of culture went hand in hand with the establishment of the modern state legitimised by nationalistic ideas. As a result, the notions of culture and nation merged. Each political entity should be occupied by one single nation that is united by virtue of a shared culture. Each culture presents a unique entity that demands, in addition, a space for its existence. The blood of the people and the bones of forefathers marked the soil of a nation united by a mythical spiritual unity. As the national polities fought for their borders, so national

culture—producers become involved in the industry of drawing boundaries between their own invented cultures as opposed to equally clearly drawn ‘other’ cultures. This demanded a unification of diverse cultural features into one homogenous system, levelling off the intricate cultural factors that were delicately graded and merged one into another; and finally an ‘essentialisation’ of cultural features that supposedly drifted unchanged through history. Efforts of the state to create national cultures that their subjects would treat as objective entities were coupled with scholarly attempts to define culture as such; the state needed glue and sanction for its practice, and clearly defined cultures needed the state to be invented and implemented. This propensity left its imprint on the social consciousness of many generations of Europeans. The political map we have today is partly a result of these processes and culture perceived as ‘reality’ is often equalised with national units.

Thus, culture started to function as a factory of identity. The desire of a modern man was to belong to some (national) culture. Meanwhile, as Benedict Anderson shows, nations are nothing more than imagined communities in which traditional face-to-face forms of communication do not occur. We do not usually know millions of our fellow-compatriots, but we feel a community with them. Ernest Gellner (1983) wrote: “Nations as the natural, God-given way of classifying men, as an inherent though long-delayed political destiny, are myth; nationalism, which sometimes takes pre-existing cultures and turns them into nations, sometimes invents them, and often obliterates pre-existing cultures; that is reality, for better or worse, and in general an inescapable one”. Concern with ethnic boundary that encompasses, supposedly, similar cultural stuff, has become one of the major issues in the modern history.

Various communities across Europe defined their nationalist goals as the *sine qua non* of their existence. This idiom of identification became the major force that mobilised social action that dominated any other, e.g. class, gender or faith. The nineteenth century’s national awakening, which, in fact, followed upon the heels of former enlightened projects of France and other western states, illustrates the case. The state is not merely a political organisation of citizens; it should simultaneously be a community of people sharing the same culture. The idea of citizenship gave way to the idea of national belonging. Such a mode of thinking shows its force even today in a dramatic contemporary history of the Balkans and the Baltic republics. Each ‘imagined community’ seeks its independence and multi-ethnic states failed to become viable forms of political organisations. Their disintegration and fragmentation became a fact.

6. Globalisation and/or communitarianism

National cultures have become shelters of identity for people caught up in modernity. The process of unification of national cultures has never fully succeeded. A total homogenisation proved to be a dream of the ultra-nationalists. *Globalisation, postmodern conditions and post-industrialism*, together form new conditions for understanding and practising cultures. On the one hand, we participate in the mass and uniform culture spread via cross-cultural contacts and modern media of communication. No doubt, several of the ‘cultural goods’ we accommodate originate from other corners of the world and are produced on purpose for us ‘abroad’. In a sense, we are living in a global village. We all participate in a trans-national culture that forms an unprecedented melange. On the other hand, national communities fear that they will be dissolved in the globally homogenised culture generated by this inter-



Figure 33. “Macdonaldisation” on its way to Latvia. Photo: Piotr Grablunas

meant to be a cure in the period of losing identities. Belonging to a local group that is a part of a larger society can satisfy the need for identity. It also calls for more than rights of an individual. It demands the right of these groups to survive as separate, specific cultural units. Members of the group ascribe to themselves the right to determine the future of next generations. In that sense, communitarianism also stands in opposition to homogenising attempts of the national state.

However, the cultural logic of the two is similar. As Zygmunt Bauman, in his *Introduction* to *Culture as Praxis*, indicates, communitarianism follows similar, if not the same, strategy as the national state: shared cultures are posited as the compensation for the uprooting of culture. Both strategies exclude the possibility of rendering freedom of choice to an individual. In this sense ‘culture’ has replaced an old concept of ‘race’ that reduces individuals to their ‘ethnic coefficient’ and classifies them in advance as inevitable specimens of their groups of origin. Uniform and fossilised culture is inborn into individuals who once caught in this web, cannot change the state of affairs. This issue can assume a particularly acute dimension when we face the case of immigrants that settle in a state dominated by a given national culture. By way of culture itself, understood in such a national/communitarian manner, sometimes combined with race characteristics, newcomers are immediately made the designated ‘others’, different from and usually worse than the host culture ‘us’. Communitarianism defines persons and glues them to the groups of their origin; degrades them in advance on the basis of assumed ethnic attributes. Migrant groups themselves readily accept this idiom in the name of protection of their own traditions. In this way, however, they often reproduce existing hierarchy and internal power relations.

7. Case studies

The case of immigrants in Norway. The above issue can be illustrated by the Norwegian case study that is representative and urgent for many Scandinavian countries and Germany. Immigrants, from various parts of the world, such as Vietnam, Bosnia and Pakistan, and more than 130 nationalities, now comprise five percent of the total population. Two thirds of them settled in the 1990s. Despite intense and costly efforts by the Norwegian government to integrate migrant groups into society their social status remains

national industry and pop culture dominated by the United States. The term *macdonaldisation* epitomises these fears. In reaction to this people reach back to their national traditions or, what is becoming increasingly more popular, regional, local or ethnic traditions. This latter trend is called *trans-modernity*.

In Europe, after decades, if not centuries, of dismantling communities in the name of undividable nations, and in the face of globalisation, small communities, including ethnic minorities, try to remain intact. *Communitarianism* has become the term of the day that is



Figure 34. National day celebrations in multi-ethnic Norway. Photo: Katarzyna Skalska

very low. While the Norwegian unemployment rate is around five percent, among migrants it reaches sixty percent. Only one fifth of the latter have full time jobs, and a similar proportion have part-time jobs. More than half of the migrant population depends on the welfare system, as opposed to only one in thirteen of the native population. Double unemployment, meaning that both parents do not have work, happens only among four percent of Norwegian children, and among more than fifty percent of migrants' children. Uni Wikan, a Norwegian anthropologist, argues that this appalling situation is caused by the policy of the state being at pains to show 'respect for immigrants culture'. According to this policy migrant family's children learn languages of their parents and later are unable to find jobs in Norwegian society. As a consequence, these communities are marginalised. Welfare colonisation takes place that "is a matter of doing harm in the name of charity". The background of such an attitude is an 'essentialised' concept of culture. "It was assumed that 'culture' referred to a static, objective body of traditions that

immigrants en masse adhered to. Thus all members of one ethnic group were presumed to share a common culture, but since distinguishing ethnicities was difficult, it meant in reality that the members of one nation were presumed to be carriers of the same culture". An attempt to preserve closed cultures was a tendency within particular communities and, at the same time, to learn and abide by basic values and laws of a national society, is a 'contradiction in terms'. One cannot have cake and eat it, too.

Cultural fundamentalism ensues on the part of migrant communities. Meanwhile, protection of cultural rights may cover unequal power distribution within these groups. For instance, in Muslim communities men dominate women who, in the name of tradition, are destined to stay at home, sometimes forced to undergo clitoridectomy ('female circumcision' done by cutting off the clitoris) and deprived equal citizen rights enjoyed by other, both male and female, members of Norwegian society. Male dominant status that stems from their, often exaggerated, home country traditions, is exercised under the auspices of a government determined to protect singular cultures. Cultural community rights run afoul regarding individual human rights. It is almost certain, suggests Wikan, that individual's human rights, that simultaneously refer to a person's responsibility, work better regarding the assimilation of immigrants into society. It shows respect for their personal capacities and ensures them real equality of rights and opportunities in life. It accords dignity to people, which is much better than blind respect for communal cultural rights.

The case of Baltic states. The same logic of culture as a discriminatory factor today is officially at work in Estonia and Latvia. Similar to the Norwegian authorities, newly established polities have accepted the notion of culture as a feature that differentiates people. The dissimi-

larity between the attitudes of the Baltic states and Norway (as well as many other immigrant cultures in the region, such as Germany, Sweden or Denmark) is that the policy of the latter is motivated by the assumed respect for (alien) cultures while that of Latvia and Estonia, is motivated by the principles of *constitutional nationalism*. Robert M. Hyden defines it as “a constitutional and legal structure that privileges the members of one ethnically defined nation over other residents in a particular state”. This type of nationalism is a widespread practice in several countries in the former Yugoslavia and in the two former Baltic republics of the Soviet Union.

(*Ethnic*) *nationalism* appeals to a primordial sense of nationality that refers to the notions of blood and soil, which should produce a co-terminous nation state. Citizenship is restricted to the core nation members who do it in the name of preserving their culture and language. This is what occurred in the 1990s in Latvia and Estonia, but this is definitely a product of a long history. Let us take a closer look at one of these cases.

Latvia has a complex history that reaches back to the Middle Ages. By the end of 13th century it was a conquered by the “Brethren of the Sword” and the Teutonic Knights. A south-western part of Livonia was established in the 16th century as the Duchy of Kurland that functioned under the sovereignty of the Polish Commonwealth. The rest of Latvia was dependent on Poland, then Sweden, and, finally, after 1721, annexed by Russia. Following the second partition of Poland in 1773, Russia gained a total control over the region. However, national feelings of the inhabitants of the country, both the German nobility (*Ritterschaften*) and the Latvian peasants, started to develop in the 19th century. While the ethnic Latvian peasant smallholders became independent from their lords, indigenous proletarian and middle classes, national languages and customs were ‘discovered’ and recognised as national traditions. During World War I the demand for autonomy and independence was put forward and executed due to military action against the Bolsheviks. In the interwar period the Latvians made up three quarters of the total population of almost two million. Latvian became an official language and all the attributes of statehood enjoined. Minorities, Russians, Poles and Baltic Germans were granted civil rights.

Following the German-Soviet pact of August 1939 that divided this part of Europe between the two imperialist powers, Latvia became a part of the Soviet. With a short interruption during Nazi aggression, it was subjected to the process of *Sovietisation*. This meant heavy industrialisation, urbanization, and, last but not least, multi-ethnisation. Labour force to industrial plants was to a large extent drawn from the Slavic republics of the Union, mainly Russia. Agriculture, a stronghold of national feelings, was forcibly collectivised. Those who opposed Stalinist politics were killed, deported or escaped to the West. Industrial development made Latvia, along with other Baltic republics, one of the most advanced regions of the Soviet Union. Demand for work force combined with attraction of relatively high living standard. Policy of a Russification was therefore strengthened by the influx of Russophone migrants that contributed to the republic’s population growth. In 1935 Latvians comprised 75.5% of the population and, in 1989, only 50.7%. (The situation in Estonia was equally critical: Estonians composed 88% of population of the country in the inter-war period, and it decreased to 61.5% in 1989). Latvians, however, cultivated their own language and culture.

When the opportunity arose, in 1991, Latvia declared its independence. It did not come out of the blue; pro-independence movements had started to emerge during perestroika period. Popular Front, an advocate of self-determination, stressed three major issues: that it is a historical lie that Latvia voluntarily joined the Soviet federation; that it can afford economic independence; and that preservation of the national culture can be fully granted only in a Latvian polity. Guided by the latter principle a Latvian independent state re-emerged

and started to implement ethnic democracy. It is opposed to civic-territorial democracy that grants equal rights to all people living in a territory of a given state independently of their ethnic belonging. Among Baltic States only Lithuania accepted this so-called 'option zero' that officially approved full citizen rights to all those living in its territory at the moment of declaration of independence. Ethnic democracy, as Graham Smith writes, is based on three central features: "Firstly, [it] accords an institutional superior status to the core nation beyond its numerical proportion within the state territory. Secondly, certain civil and political rights are enjoyed universally... And thirdly, certain collective rights are extended to minorities".

The arguments of advocates for *ethnic exclusivism* are rationalised in several ways. The first one, referring to the core nation status, has just been discussed. It is closely related to the claim of a necessary de-Sovietisation. Both Latvia and Estonia were forcefully annexed and colonised by Russians and they currently have the right to win their homelands back into hands of the core nation members. De-colonisation means reclassification of the Soviet era settlers as 'aliens' who should either leave and return to their homeland or adjust to the hegemonic nation's rules. The modern nation state, able to join Europe, should function as a regulating and standardising subject that sets state official and administrative language mastery of which is indispensable for smooth functioning of the polity and society. Protection of (national) culture is a powerful contention in the hands of people who present themselves as victims of *Russification*. For endangered for decades politically and demographically culture a nation state should function as the only available shelter.

Implementation of such a policy means that a large part of the residents in the state cannot become citizens since they do not qualify as such. Initially, Latvian authorities granted citizenship only to those non-Latvians who could prove their or their predecessors residence in the republic before 1940, i.e. before Soviet annexation. This move was openly directed against Soviet era settlers. From among these only those can apply for citizenship who have lived in Latvia for sixteen (later reduced to ten) years and who can speak Latvian. One third of the residents became non-citizens. Owing to the pressure of international community, 'aliens' (mostly Russians) can apply for citizenship, but they have to meet language competence criteria and show loyalty to the state, but their quota was reduced to two thousand a year. As a result, ethnic minority is under-represented in the nationwide and local democratic institutions, since those who are language deficient cannot work in the public administration and do not have the right to acquire property or social benefits. Therefore, they are discriminated against on the basis of their ethnic affiliation; this is a part of cultural differentiation.

However justified, the reproduction of cultural difference is applied by social forces that have an interest in its implementation. The logic that lies behind it is similar to any ideology that implies inequality based on cultural differences. It can lead to '*ethnic cleansing*' (although in the discussed case of Latvia, and, by analogy, Estonia, it does not acquire such drastic forms) which was applied so severely not only in former Yugoslavia, but also in the Baltic's regional past. The Nazis used a race code to discriminate people. The Communists, guided by ethno-cultural code and despite lip services paid to internationalism, in fact, put enormous effort into building up ethnic states. However, historically vindicated, forced evictions of Germans from the Polish western territories and Ukrainians from south-eastern Poland comprise instances of the same mode of reasoning.

Prospects for Baltic region identity

Regions are invented in a similar way as cultures. Geographical neighbourhood is merely a secondary feature that helps to realise historically shaped political interests. Central Europe is such a construct that revived in the 1970s and 1980s as a result of a cultural emancipation project of satellite state's elite opposition to the political domination of the Soviet Union. This idea itself was a transformation of the old concept of "Mitteleuropa". Today it functions as a political project of several countries, such as Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Slovenia, aspiring to western European institutions and therefore interested in stressing their difference in relation to 'eastern European poverty' and 'the Balkan keg of powder'. How long will this notion be used as a trampoline for political notion?

The same rule applies to the Baltic regional identity. People around the Baltic Sea have different languages, traditions, religions, and histories. However, all of them can work as a springboard for future common identification. Whether they will be put into force depends on the interests all potential sides might have in building up such a community. Hopefully, it will be based on the inclusive principle that advocates plurality of culture and respect for human rights independent of ethnic roots. This is the only invention we all can accept!

8. Multiculturalism or pluralism of cultures

As the above examples show, culture works both ways at the same time: it unites members of the groups and differentiates them from the other. Integrative function is inherently coupled with a dividing one. The question is how these contradictory qualities are used in social practice. As we have seen, even good will, as in the case of Norway, can produce unintended discrimination. The ideal of living in small communities of solidarity operates in a similar way. Culture is also often used consciously to classify national 'others'. Multi-culturalism, understood as a plurality of cultures, can, as the Norwegian example shows, sully the idea of human rights that is an important value recognised within 'our European culture'. Therefore, tolerance towards other cultures and the coexistence of various cultures within one social organisation, such as a polity, is not enough. Instead, we need cultural pluralism in which a variety of cultural offers are open to all participants of social life independently of their ethnic origin. However, is this possible at all...?

9 The region and its landscapes

Charles Westin

1. Regions are human creations of natural units

Europe is bounded by seas on three sides; the Arctic basin to the north, the Atlantic to the west and the Mediterranean and Black Sea to the south. Only in the east is Europe attached to the mainland of Asia, although even there the Caspian Sea marks some of the boundary between Europe and Asia. One particular feature that distinguishes Europe from other land masses in general is the interplay between land and sea in the form of inlets from the ocean, moderating the direct contact between the vast stretches of ocean and the vast stretches of continental land mass. The Baltic is one of these inlets. It is our contention that the Baltic drainage area should be seen as a region.

“Region” is a concept that is employed when classifying and delineating territory with respect to spatial extension and organisational purpose. Thus regions are human creations for the purpose of analysis, synthesis and planning. The extent and character of a region will depend upon the purpose for which it is created. The number of possible regions is infinite. One might put it that the concept of region is to the social sciences what ecology is to the biological sciences. In defining regions, two classes of criteria are employed: the physical factors of geography, climate or natural resources; and the social phenomena of culture, economics or government. For a region must not only have a geographical framework. It must also possess sufficient cohesion among its occupants and homogeneity in conditions to allow it to deal with common concerns and to differentiate itself from other regions.

According to various kinds of criteria the Baltic area may be regarded as a region. Physically, it does have internal cohesion in terms of its common drainage area. Although we did not regard the Baltic area as a cultural, political or economic region during the period 1939-1989, a need to do so arose once the Cold War had come to an end. One of the most urgent problems that has not found a satisfactory solution is environmental pollution. Contaminated rivers in one part of the area affect the entire seaboard. Equally serious are the effects of *wind-born pollutants*. A large part of the Baltic region was contaminated by the radioactive downfall deriving from the Chernobyl catastrophe.

Our demarcation, derived from physical geography, cuts right across traditional historic, cultural, religious and political borders that we have grown accustomed to. Culturally and politically it is not immediately obvious that the drainage area constitutes a region. Historically, however, it makes good sense. The waterways provided by the rivers flowing into the Baltic, and the lakes linked to these rivers, have always been important means of communication.

The Baltic region embraces or touches upon the following states ordered clockwise around the sea: Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Russia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Germany. The Baltic region also touches upon Norway, Belarus, the Ukraine, the Czech Republic and

Slovakia. The three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are situated entirely within the region thus defined. Practically all of Sweden, Finland and Poland are situated within the Baltic drainage area. A greater part of Denmark also belongs to the region. However, only the northern coastal strip of Germany and the Oder-Neisse/Odra-Nysa-valley come into the Baltic drainage area. Russia is represented by the drainage area belonging to the Neva, Lake Ladoga and Lake Onega, as well as by the Kaliningrad enclave.

The skeleton of Europe is formed by a series of mountain ranges which are found in the southern part of the continent. The one exception is the Scandinavian range separating Norway from Sweden. A second topographical category worth noting is formed by the regions of hills and modestly high mountains spreading through central Europe to the north of the main ranges. The plains and lowlands which border upon the southern shores of the Baltic are a third category of terrain. From the North Sea coast of the Netherlands through northern Germany and Poland, and southern Scandinavia, to the Baltic states, Belarus, the Ukraine and Russia proper runs a continuous belt of lowland plains. It is not uniform. Various sections have their distinctive features. Most of this zone is highly fertile, but there are also broad tracts of infertile moors and marshes.

North of the great plains, approximately from the 55th parallel, begins the taiga zone, consisting of coniferous forests that cover most of northern Russia, Estonia, Finland and Sweden. It stretches north to the Arctic circle. It is a thinly-populated zone. The soils are of rather poor quality. This fact, in combination with climatic factors, makes the conditions for traditional agriculture harsh. In modern times, however, the great coniferous forests have been an immense economic asset to Sweden and Finland. Timber and paper pulp have been highly important export products and have contributed to the economic growth of these two countries. North of the taiga the tundra zone provides for even more severe living conditions.

2. Mountains in the south and the northwest

The mountain ranges form the watersheds of Europe. Several major rivers of central Europe flow northwards. The two most important ones entering the Baltic are the Oder/Odra and the Vistula. From the Scandinavian ranges a number of comparatively short, turbulent and unnavigable rivers flow to the southeast through the Swedish forests to the Gulf and Sea of Bothnia. Eleven larger rivers enter these waters on the Swedish side, one of them constituting the border between Finland and Sweden, and three larger rivers on the Finnish side in addition to a number of smaller streams. The Daugava and the Nemunas enter the Baltic through Latvia and Lithuania. At the head of the Gulf of Finland the Neva runs from lake Ladoga through St-Petersburg into the Baltic.

Regarded as a whole, the landscape of the Baltic region is quite flat. The two mountain ranges of the region are situated on the fringe – the Scandinavian range to the northwest and the Carpathians with the adjoining Sudeten mountains in




Figure 35. Mountains in northwest Sweden. Photo: Andrzej Szmal

the extreme south. The flatness of the landscape is particularly obvious in the great plains to the south and east of the Baltic. Although much of the Swedish and Finnish landscape consists of broken land, a general impression is that the landscape is rather level. This makes the Baltic environment region very different to the Mediterranean landscape. The Mediterranean is a deep sea, almost entirely surrounded by impressive mountain ranges. One thing the Mediterranean and the Baltic have in common is the existence of many islands. The Mediterranean islands, however, are the result of the ongoing dramatic geological reshaping of that region. Many of them are volcanic. This does not apply to the Baltic islands.

Geologically speaking, the rock bottom of the Baltic region is considerably older and more stable than the Mediterranean region. However, in recent geological times, that is to say for the main part of the past 100,000 years, most of the Baltic region was covered by a 1,000 metre thick layer of inland ice. In the region there is virtually no seismic activity of a volcanic or tectonic nature. However, a considerable elevation of the land has taken place during the past 10,000 years. It is quite noticeable within the span of a human lifetime. One consequence of the land elevation is that many of the waterways that were used by the Vikings are now silted up.

The existence of a great many small islands and correspondingly the existence of numerous lakes in Finland, Sweden and northern Russia is due to the rising of the land, once it was relieved of the weight of the inland ice. The very flatness of the Baltic region itself is due to the planing effects of successive glaciations.

The Sudeten and Carpathian mountains separate Poland from Bohemia, Moravia and Slovakia. Whereas the Sudetens are moderately high, the Carpathian range boasts the highest peaks within the Baltic region. People living in mountain regions tend to conserve traditional ways of life to a larger extent than those living on the plains.



Map 15. The deglaciation of the Baltic Sea Region. As the ice sheet melted (15,000 B.C.), water collected in the Baltic basin forming a vast lake (the Baltic Ice Lake). Due to the melting of the enormous masses of land-locked ice, the ocean level gradually rose, thus connecting the Atlantic with the Baltic lake, making it into an arm of the ocean and turning it saline (the Yoldia Sea, 10,000 B.C.). A further consequence of the melting of the ice was that land that hitherto had been covered and suppressed by the ice sheet slowly began to rise once the pressure exerted by the weight of the ice was gone. As land gradually rose this sea again was cut off from the Atlantic and turned into a fresh water lake (the Ancylus Lake, 9,400 B.C.). As we know, the inland ice has retreated completely from the European mainland, with the exception of some comparatively insignificant glaciers in the far north. The sea was once more connected to the Atlantic (the Litorina Sea, 8,000 B.C.). Ill.: Karin Hallgren

Mountain regions usually presuppose harsher living conditions than plains. Climate, of course, is one factor. Altitude measured in metres corresponds to higher latitude measured in tens of kilometres as far as temperatures are concerned. Mountain regions are wet. Clouds condense into rain over the mountains. The little soil there is on the slopes risks being eroded. Mountainous regions consist primarily of unproductive land, either because it is barren or because it is difficult of access. Fertile valleys exist of course, but even in the valleys there is a need to terrace the ground so as to withstand soil erosion. Terracing allows for small-scale agriculture. Usually it is labour-intensive. Moreover, valleys in mountainous regions can be far apart by way of practicable routes, even when they may be quite close as the crow flies. History has repeatedly shown that mountain regions are difficult to conquer and pacify. Guerrilla movements, that challenge foreign occupation, have their bases in the mountains. Mountain regions thus serve as places of refuge for ethnic minorities. They show a wide spectrum of ethnic diversity. All these factors combined thus form mountainous regions into a mosaic of small worlds.

It is hardly surprising, then, that the Saami have managed to maintain their traditional reindeer husbandry in the northerly regions of the Scandinavian mountains. The Saami have exploited a particular niche that is well adapted to the specific topographic and climatic conditions of northern Scandinavia.

The Sudeten mountains represent a border region in central Europe. For centuries Germans, Czechs and Poles could get by without serious clashes until the ethnic map of central Europe was changed as a result of World War II. The branch of the Carpathians known as the Tatra mountains separates Poland from Slovakia. In this part of the world Poles, Slovaks and Ruthenians (Ukrainians) encountered one another. Today, the people living in the Polish parts of the Tatra mountains are regarded as mainstream Poles. However, they are seen as representing traditional ways. They are thought of as provincial in relation to the Poles of the great plains.

3. The great plains

Man may travel by sea and make his living from the sea, yet, he makes his home on land. That is where he is born, and that is where he wishes to be buried. No wonder, then, that land and sea have acquired different meanings, not only to individual human beings but also to states and nations. Whereas the open sea is recognised as international water, not belonging to any specific nation or state, land masses, with the sole exception of the Antarctic, are divided among states. One criterion by which a state is internationally recognised is that it controls the territory to which it lays claim.

We need to consider the meaning of different types of land upon which people live. Conditions on continental mainlands differ from those on islands. Peninsulas may be viewed as an intermediate category. Economic factors, communications, means of subsistence, all come into play in shaping the collective representations that make the mentality of islanders different to the mentality of mainlanders.

East of the Baltic, land extends continuously through the Russian plains and the taiga of Siberia, touching upon the deserts and mountains of central Asia, all the way to the Pacific Ocean. To understand Russia's importance in the Baltic region we must look beyond the drainage area itself. The whole weight of the Russian population, economy, military power and culture affects the Baltic region through the focus of St Petersburg. People from every corner of Russia walk the streets of St Petersburg. In this respect, St-Petersburg is very much a mainland city, having an immense hinterland.

Do the southern shores of the Baltic reflect the facets of the considerably smaller but more densely populated land mass that we know as central Europe? The Vistula and the Oder/Odra lead right into the heartland of central Europe. Yet, we cannot say that cities like Gdańsk and Szczecin, or Rostock and Kiel, reflect the entire European hinterland in the way that St Petersburg mirrors Russia.

The southern shores of the Baltic are divided into two heavily populated states, Germany and Poland. Present-day Germany's relationship to its Baltic coast differs considerably from the situation some sixty years ago when the Baltic coast represented Germany's front garden. Today, Germany's Baltic region might rather be characterised as its back yard. The Baltic coast no longer plays the vital economic role it once used to play. Its recreational importance has declined. Today's Germany faces Western Europe. The Federal Republic of Germany has rejected the ambitions of the Third Reich and other predecessors, of expanding to the east.

The inclusion of the territory of the former German Democratic Republic, East Germany, into the Federal Republic has suddenly more than doubled the Baltic coast of the Federal Republic. However, this coast, and the territory of former East Germany as a whole, is an addition that involved problems of a run-down economy, mass unemployment, polluted cities and serious damage to the environment. Although conditions have improved considerably in the former East German *Länder* since October 1990, when they merged with the Federal Republic, sharp differences in living conditions, general standards and public infrastructure still exist. These problems have not supported the German establishment's sense of membership in a Baltic community of nations.

Poland, on the other hand, is a country that actively faces the Baltic. Practically the entire country is situated within the drainage area. When Poland was reconstructed as a sovereign state after the Great War of 1914-1918, one of the problems that had to be solved was its access to the Baltic. The German claim to the notorious corridor that separated German East Prussia from the rest of the Reich in 1919-1939 was the pretext for Hitler's invasion of Poland in September 1939.

Northern Germany and northern Poland are embedded in the great plains of northern Europe. One problem of plains is water collecting into marshes and swamps. The province of Mazury in northeastern Poland is a landscape of many lakes and marshlands. Further east, in Belarus and Russia, the armies of Napoleon and Hitler got bogged down when the autumn rains set in. An immense undertaking for centuries was to drain the plains by constructing systems of ditches and channels, that eventually became canals as people improved them.

Territorial minorities of the plains tend to become assimilated into majority populations as one group gets the upper hand. Due to the inherent homogeneity of the land, and for reasons of economic rationality, plains tend to be dominated by one particular mode of agricultural production during one specific period of time, thus rendering it difficult for minorities to maintain their specific economic independence. Economic independence is usually a necessary condition for ethnic independence.

Without resorting to geomorphic determinism one may ponder, as Fernand Braudel (1972) does, on geographical environments (mountains, plains, coasts, islands) as settings for societies and communities. And one may pursue this reflection further and wonder about how different ways of life in these respects may link up with belief systems, collective representations and mentalities. Indeed, it was one of Braudel's notions that mentalities, ways of life and natural environments were interlinked. These mentalities, in turn, could imply that people individually or through concerted effort went about reshaping natural environments through terracing mountain sides, damming up rivers, draining marshlands and cutting down forests.

A landscape of plains, intersected by navigable rivers and canals, does not encourage geographical mobility out of the region. On the contrary, it is reasonable to assume that plains promote intermixing within the region. In densely populated regions, villages and towns are never far apart. Interacting with neighbouring villages is easier to undertake on the plain than in mountainous regions where the sheer efforts of travel, not to mention the time consumed in doing so, are so much greater.

4. Coasts, peninsulas and lakes

The Baltic has an immense seaboard. This is due to the great number of inlets from the sea, the great number of lakes that are connected to the sea by navigable rivers, and the great number of islands in the sea. Coastal zones in general are biologically highly productive. This applies both to life in the water as well as to life on shore. The Baltic is no exception. The coast, rivers and lakes provide a means of subsistence for man. Sea food has always been an essential element of the commoner's diet.

Soils in the vicinity of lakes and coasts are considerably more fertile than elsewhere in the region. This is due to the fact that a lot of the coastal zone has been a sea bottom in recent geological times and thus rich in deposited sediments. In addition, the coasts and rivers have served as the most essential requisites for communication. Moreover, the climate is usually less severe in the coastal tracts.

For these reasons, populations tend to be attracted to the coastal zone. This is true of the situation several thousands of years before now. It is also true today. However, it should be noted that the location of the coastline has altered a lot due to the elevation of the land. Ancient population concentrations are still significant for the density of populations today in the different zones and tracts of the region. Cities of the Baltic region did not really start to grow until industrialisation, when the population of many of them increased dramatically. All the major cities of the region are still situated on the coast, on lakes or rivers. Many of them were founded some 800 to 1,000 years ago.

There are several important lakes in the region. Lakes Ladoga and the Onega in Russia are Europe's largest. They are inland seas. Other important lakes in the region are Peipus in Estonia, Saima in Finland, and Vänern and Vättern in Sweden. These major lakes are all connected to the sea by rivers and canals and played an important role in the early history of settlement of the area.

The Baltic sea is separated from the Atlantic by two interlocking peninsulas. If the Baltic might be compared with the cavity of the mouth, the Scandinavian peninsula could be represented as the teeth of the upper jaw, and the peninsula of Jylland as the teeth of the lower jaw. Peninsulas represent a particular kind of land, surrounded on three sides by the sea. This means that the vital force of the sea carries its weight far into the land of the penin-

Capitals

One measure of the historical importance of the seaboard is the number of capital cities situated on the Baltic coasts. Five capital cities of sovereign states are directly on the Baltic coast, two of which lie on the Gulf of Finland, namely Helsinki and Tallinn. At the head of the gulf we also find the largest city within the entire Baltic region, St Petersburg, formerly the capital city of the tsars of Russia. The other capitals that are situated on the Baltic are København (Copenhagen), Riga and Stockholm.



Figure 36. The city of Ribe, southern Jylland. Photo: Ewa Niewiarowska-Rasmussen

sula, not only in a metaphorical sense. The presence of the sea is definitely felt on Jylland, for instance in the unique landscape of the Lim fiord, a stretch of water that connects the Kattegatt with the Atlantic.

Jylland is a direct continuation northwards of the main land mass of the European continent. Motorways lead directly from Jylland down to central Germany. One can imagine that Jylland could easily have become German. That scenario never developed because, as Fernand Braudel puts it, peninsulas tend

to become independent of the main land mass, almost in the way that islands represent worlds of their own. In the case of Jylland, the early roots of the Danish realm are found in ancient Hedeby, a town no longer in existence, but once situated on the east coast of Jylland.

The Fenno-Scandinavian peninsula is joined to the Eurasian mainland. Yet for all practical purposes Sweden and Norway are an island in relation to continental Europe, and Finland is an island in relation to Sweden, something which was highly apparent during the Cold War, when Finland's border to the Soviet Union was sealed.

5. The sea

The Baltic is a sea that comprises of distinctly separate parts. The main basin of the Baltic is situated between the 54th and the 60th parallel, and between the 16th and 24th degree eastern longitude. It is a shallow sea of low salinity. North of the main basin is the smaller basin known as the Bothnian Sea where the salinity is even lower. Still further north is the basin of the Gulf of Bothnia. East of the main basin we find the Gulf of Finland and the Gulf of Riga.

The Kattegatt, between Denmark and Sweden, will be regarded in this context as part of the Baltic. It differs from the rest of the Baltic, however, in being considerably more saline. The Kattegatt has the salinity of the North Sea and the Atlantic itself. Thus, from a strictly physical point of view, it would be more appropriate to regard the Kattegatt as an arm of the North Sea than as the mouth of the Baltic. From a cultural, historical and political point of view, however, the Kattegatt can readily be seen as the entrance to the Baltic.

The Danish sounds represent yet another kind of environment. Between the Baltic proper and the Kattegatt there are three straits running in a north-south direction; Öresund, between the southernmost part of Sweden and the island of Sjaelland, Store Baelt between Sjaelland and the island of Fyn, and Lille Baelt between Fyn and the Jylland peninsula. One can see across these straits and it is easy to make out the opposite shore. A bridge between Jylland and Fyn was built many years ago. A bridge across Store Baelt was opened in 1997 and a combined bridge and tunnel across Öresund, linking Malmö with København, was opened in 2000. All three constructions include both road and rail connections.

Hardly anywhere else in Europe do we find the transition between sea and land as gradual as it is in some parts of the Baltic. The Danish isles and sounds represent one particular

instance of this interplay between land and sea. The archipelagos of Finland and Sweden, though differing greatly from the Danish isles as to their geological structure, present another instance of the gradual transition of sea into land and land into sea. These archipelagos make very specific living conditions. The coasts along the Gulf of Gdańsk and the Kaliningrad enclave display yet another form of gradual transition between land and sea, here in the form of sand-reefs and long-shore bars. In some sections of the Baltic coast the transition between land and sea is more direct.

Like other seas, the Baltic has many varying aspects. Occasionally on summer mornings you will find the whole surface quite calm. Not a wave, hardly even a ripple will be seen. Other times, quite frequently in the early autumn, the sea can be ridden by violent storms that whip up towering waves which threaten any voyage. It was in one of these storms (September 28, 1994) that the MV Estonia was lost with a death

toll of 912 persons. Only 139 survivors were rescued. This loss of the Estonia was the worst maritime catastrophe in peace time since the Titanic. The vast expanse of frozen sea that may be seen during cold winters represents yet another face of the Baltic. Normally, most of the inlets and bays along the coast are frozen in winter, from Poland and Kaliningrad north along the eastern shore right round the Gulf of Bothnia down along the western fringe to Skåne in the far south of Sweden. During exceptionally cold winters the entire Gulf and Sea of Bothnia are covered by ice down to 60th parallel. The Gulf of Finland and the Gulf of Riga too can be covered by ice. The Kattegatt does not freeze. Nor do the Danish sounds, although there are historical records of the latter. The main basin of the Baltic never freezes.

The Baltic is a northerly sea. In one important respect it is quite unique. It is the largest sea of brackish water on the planet. The brackishness is due to the fact that the narrow and shallow outlets into the North Sea through the Danish sounds only rarely permit any large quantities of heavier saline Atlantic water to flow into the Baltic. At the other end, the sea is continually fed by a great many fresh water rivers. Another factor of some importance is that the main stretch of the Baltic is in a north-south direction. Moreover, it is a shallow sea.

Several important consequences follow from these facts. First of all, tidal movements in the Baltic are quite insignificant, which, of course, is beneficial to shipping. Secondly, the brackish and rather cold water has made the Baltic into a sea that only hosts a restricted variety of species. Those that have adapted have, until quite recently at least, flourished. The Baltic has abounded with some species of Atlantic as well as typical fresh-water fish and seals. All this has made the Baltic into a very special and rich sea for human exploitation.

The sea routes of the Baltic have enabled trading contacts from the south to the north, from the west to the east, and vice versa. One ancient route was from the north German coast via the Danish isles along the south coast of Sweden. Then it continued via the sheltered ways



Figure 37. Öresund bridge. Photo: BUP archive

of passage inside the islands of Sweden's eastern coast up to the latitude of Åland. From there it crossed an open stretch of water into the Finnish archipelago, along the sheltered southern coast of Finland, right up to the head of the Gulf of Finland and then, via the Neva, it entered the great lake of Ladoga. As naval technology developed, ships no longer needed to follow the coast but could cross the open waters. The island of Gotland, situated right at the very centre of the Baltic, grew immensely important and wealthy during the Mediaeval ages. Today Gotland has lost its economic importance as a trading centre. Today, it is a popular tourist resort.

6. The major islands of the Baltic

There are tens of thousands of islands in the Baltic, ranging from small skerries of some thousand square metres to the largest island, Danish Sjaelland, which has an area of 7,027 square kilometres. Apart from the multitude of skerries and small islands in the Finnish and Swedish archipelagos there are some larger islands that need to be mentioned.

Generally speaking, islands provide an environment that is rather different for human societies than the mainland. Fernand Braudel has pointed out that island communities are as a rule rather more conservative than mainland societies, withstanding change and novelties. In a sense, island communities are complete in themselves. Thus, islands resemble the valleys of mountain regions. On the whole, the major islands of the Baltic confirm Braudel's hypothesis. Some of the main islands are, or were at any rate, ethnically distinct communities.



Figure 38. Medieval Østerlars kirke on Bornholm, founded 1150. Photo: Ewa Niewiarowska-Rasmussen.

People on islands, whether large or small, tend to keep to their own kind. Spouses are sought on the island rather than on the mainland. In itself, the sea does not prevent contact. On the contrary, the sea has always been a means of communication to islanders. The presence of the sea in their lives promotes development and novelties in ship-building. It is the spatial restriction of the island itself that becomes part of their mentality. They know instinctively that the territory of their island cannot expand. Islands in general represent a small world.

During the times of the Hanseatic league, the islands of the Baltic were extremely important trading points. With industrialisation, railways and modern land transport, the economic importance of the islands has declined, although their strategic importance has remained. In modern times these islands, like many others around the world, have suffered from the emigration of young people to better job

opportunities found on the mainland. This population drain has skewed the demographic distribution. A larger proportion of elderly persons will be found on the islands than in major cities. In the case of Åland, migration movements have been to Finnish mainland cities, such as Turku and Helsinki, as well as to Stockholm. The fact that island communities, however well they are serviced by communications with the mainland, tend to be worlds of their own, is one reason why island societies have always been favoured objects of study among social anthropologists.

There is no rule without exceptions. In this case the exceptions are the central Danish islands of Sjaelland, Fyn, Lolland, Falster and Møn, together with a large number of smaller islands. These islands are not isolated worlds but the very centre of the Danish state, commanding as they do the entrance to the Baltic. Sjaelland itself has well over two million inhabitants, which is approximately 40% of the total Danish population. Situated on Sjaelland is the dynamic and progressive city of København, dynamic and progressive at least as far as lifestyles are concerned. København and Sjaelland are not on the periphery. In the Scandinavian, and indeed in the Baltic context as a whole, they very much represent the centre.

The islands

Map 16. The islands. The Estonian islands of **Saaremaa** and **Hiiumaa** once had a dominant Swedish-speaking population, originating from settlers in 13th and 14th centuries. A good many of these Swedes were forced to resettle in the Ukraine by Catherine II in 1779. A Swedish-speaking minority existed, however, all the time until the Soviet occupation of Estonia.

The islands constituting **Åland** have a Swedish speaking population. They enjoy a certain amount of local autonomy. In 1921 the League of Nations decided that Åland was to be ruled by Finland, not by Sweden, despite the will of the Ålanders in a referendum.

The people of **Rügen** and Fehmarn, the largest German islands in the Baltic, are not ethnically distinct from the mainland population of northern Germany. Rügen, however, does have a history of Danish as well as Swedish rule.

The island of **Gotland** is Swedish territory today. Gotlanders themselves are viewed as Swedes.

Historically, culturally and linguistically Gotland is special. The landscape is not typical of mainland Sweden but rather of western Estonia. The countryside abounds with Mediaeval memories. Nowhere else in Sweden are so many churches found per unit of land as on Gotland. The island has been ruled by Danes and by the Hansa. Visby, the main town, was an important station en route from Lübeck to Russia. During Mediaeval times Gotland enjoyed a semi-independent relationship to Sweden. It still has an atmosphere that makes it distinctly different from mainland Sweden.

The island of **Bornholm** is located in the southern Baltic. In the Danish context Bornholm is something of a small world in itself. The island is what remains under Danish rule of Denmark's former eastern provinces. The Bornholm dialect is easier for a Swede to understand than the Danish spoken in København. For a brief period during the 17th century the island was under Swedish rule. There are, however, no traces of Swedish influence from those times. During the previous century Swedish farmhands were recruited to the properties on Bornholm. Ill.: Karin Hallgren



7. Living conditions – climate

The Baltic region's latitude places it firmly within the world's northern temperate zone. There are, however, significant variations in local climate that relate to the natural north-south differences. The further north one moves in the northern hemisphere, the colder it gets. This is due to the fact that the maximum altitude of the sun decreases as one moves towards the Pole. Lower solar altitude implies lower intensity of solar radiation.

However, in the Baltic region there is an east-west dimension to the climate as well, relating to contrasts between land and sea. In general, surfaces of land masses are heated more rapidly by solar radiation than the surfaces of oceans. In summer there is a surplus of radiation coming in from the sun in relation to the losses of heat at night when the sun has set. Continental land masses thus experience hot summers. The reverse applies to the winter climate. The losses of heat to the atmosphere are greater than the gains from incoming solar radiation. Continental land masses thus experience cold winters.

The surface of the sea does warm up during the summer. However, due to the fact that water is not an efficient absorber of heat, and due to the constant play of winds and currents, heated surface water mixes with colder water from deeper layers. During the winter months, winds and currents prevent the surface of oceans from freezing. Thus, maritime climate is characterised by temperate summers and winters.


These climatic factors greatly affect living conditions in the Baltic region as a whole. The western fringe enjoys a maritime climate which is tempered by warm water carried into the north Atlantic by the Gulf Stream. The climate of the eastern Baltic region is typical of the continental type.

By way of summary, we may distinguish three general climatic zones within the region. North of a line intersecting mid-Sweden, continuing through the gulf of Finland and right into Russia we have a climate which is subarctic. Winters are long and severe and summers are short and not especially hot. The further east one moves, the more pronounced is the continental type of climate.

To the south and east of this line we have a humid continental climate giving rise to hot summers and cold winters. To the southwest of this line we have the maritime climate of western Europe characterised by moderately warm summers and not particularly cold winters.



Figure 39. *Midnattsolen*, the midnight sun – the sun is visible at midnight in the sub-arctic regions of Sweden, Norway and Finland. Photo: Andrzej Szmal



Cfb	Marine west coast climate, normal
Cfc	Marine west coast climate, cold
Dfa	Humid continental climate, warm
Dfb	Humid continental climate, normal
Dfc	Continental subarctic climate
ET	Tundra climate
H	Highland climate

Map 17. Climatic conditions of the Baltic Sea Region. Ill.: Karin Hallgren

10 Populating the Baltic region

Charles Westin

1. The origins of man

Man, like all forms of life, has been shaped by biological evolution through immense spans of time. The species modern man belongs to, *Homo sapiens sapiens*, evolved from an earlier but basically identical form of *Homo sapiens*, referred to as Cro Magnon, with origins in what palaeontologists know as *Homo erectus*. Through the genetic screening of a large number of human populations, it has been possible to trace the origin of *Homo sapiens sapiens* to Africa to about 200,000 years ago. After more than 100,000 years in Africa the ancestors of modern man (*Cro Magnon*) moved north, making their way into the Middle East some 70,000 years ago. By continuous “migration”, *Homo sapiens sapiens* spread over Asia, Europe, Australia, the Americas and finally to the Pacific islands. Other branches of the human species that had populated the world or parts of it until then (such as *Homo neanderthalensis* in Europe and the Middle East) became extinct, probably through competition with their more successful relatives.

2. The original settlers

Throughout the entire period 100,000 – 30,000 years B.C. the average temperature of the earth was several degrees lower than it is today. During the last glacial period, large amounts of ice covered the earth to form polar caps extending far beyond the present limits. Practically the entire Baltic region was covered by a Pleistocene ice sheet. Like earlier glacials this latest one was succeeded by a warmer interglacial with a higher average temperature, starting some 20,000 to 15,000 years B.C. As the ice sheet retreated and new land was uncovered, plants, insects and small animals moved in. As biological life established itself on uncovered grounds larger animals of prey followed. The people moving into the Baltic region in these remote times were hunters and gatherers. It is generally assumed that they hunted big game such as reindeer and elk. They must have fished. Nuts, berries, eggs, honey, small game and roots were probably other ingredients of their diet. Because winters could be severe, and because of the seasonal migration of the reindeer, these early inhabitants were probably nomadic. Who they were we do not know. The archaeological records are scant. It is reasonable to assume that the early settlers of the Baltic region faced the same kind of challenges and developed similar general solutions to their needs for food, shelter and protection.

Once the ice sheet was gone climate improved rapidly. A new plant life, now including deciduous trees, soon established itself. Animal life also changed as a consequence. The reindeer retreated further north to the tundras. In the south it was replaced by deer, bison



Figure 40. *Hällristningar* – petroglyphs in Tanum, Sweden, dated around 1,000 – 500 BC. Photo: Katarzyna Skalska

and boar. The climate of the Baltic region was considerably warmer than it is today. This period of warm climate lasted from the Neolithic Stone Age (approximately 6,000 B.C.) well into the Bronze Age (4,000 B.C.) and beyond.

These climatically benign conditions made new kinds of human settlement possible. Agriculture and animal husbandry were gradually introduced. Goats and sheep, brought into the Baltic region from the Middle East, were the earliest animals to be domesti-

cated. In the north the reindeer became semi-domesticated. Game provided an important additional source of food, as it still does in Sweden, Finland and northern Russia.

As lifestyles changes from hunting to a more sedentary ones, populations started to grow. People's labour was not solely occupied in the struggle for survival. Rudiments of organised society began to emerge. Archaeologically, we see the remains of this gradual process in the constructions of passage graves, burial mounds and fortifications of various kinds. Central rule of some kind was required to organise these constructions. The megalithic cultures of Western Europe, concentrated to the Atlantic seaboard in Bretagne and southern Britain, also touched the western extremes of the Baltic region. Although populations increased as a result of the introduction of agriculture, northern Europe was sparsely populated. Distances were great. Eventually this had to lead to cultural and linguistic differentiation.

Archaeology provides us with findings from the Neolithic, through the Mesolithic down to historic times from which contemporary written records of some kind or other exist. We do possess some general knowledge of living conditions in these remote times. It is possible to trace cultural contacts over different parts of the region. However, it is harder to establish the exact locations of the ancestors of particular peoples. Little is known of the populating processes in the Baltic region before the era of the Great Migration. In all likelihood it was populated by people approaching it from the south and from the east. The distribution of languages on the Scandinavian peninsula seems to indicate the existence of two different approaches, one coming via what is now Danish territory, the other coming from the east through what is now Finland, and then entering the Scandinavian peninsula north of the Gulf of Bothnia. We are talking about occurrences many thousands of years ago. Our knowledge of the Great Migration, taking place from around 400 A.D. to 600 A.D., derives mainly from the records made in Rome of the contacts between Germanic and Slavic speaking peoples with the Greco-Roman world. Another source of knowledge of locations and habitats of various people is through comparative analysis of loan-words in different languages. The language in which place-names are given is especially important. Data of these kinds are, however, not all that reliable.

3. The Finno-Ugric groups

In the vast expanses of northern Russia a number of minorities have existed (some are now extinct) speaking Finno-Ugric or Uralic languages as they are also termed. There is reason to believe that these Finno-Ugric groups represent languages that were once widely spread in these northern stretches of present-day Russia, from the Baltic to beyond the river Ob, and also in Hungary. Most languages within this family are spoken by small minorities, many of them facing extinction. Hungarian, Finnish and Estonian, however, are spoken by majority populations in sovereign states. One conjecture is that the origins of these languages are to be found amongst the ancient tribes that settled the taiga region of northern Russia and who supported themselves by hunting and domesticating the reindeer.

From archaeological evidence we know that the entire Baltic region was populated once the land-locked ice had disappeared. Recent findings support the idea that people have made their living far up north at a much earlier stage than was generally believed. It seems reasonable to conjecture that the Saami represent an indigenous people in northern Scandinavia. There is evidence of human presence north of the ice sheet about 10,000 B.C. on the fringe of the Arctic Basin. These people may have been ancestors of the Saami. Another theory is that the Saami originated in the northern regions of present-day Russia, possibly as far east as the Ural mountains. At some stage they settled in the region of the Gulf of Finland. As Finnish tribes eventually migrated into the territory of present-day Karelia and Finland, these southern Saami were driven north to their present habitat.

The most recent theory, launched at the end of the 1990s, takes into account findings from genetic, archaeological and comparative linguistic research. Genetic analyses point to the fact that the Saami have certain genetic traits that make them uniquely different from other populations in the region. This indicates that ancestors of the Saami must have been isolated from other human populations for several thousands of years. At the same time the Saami speak a language that clearly belongs to the Finno-Ugric language family, indicating common origins with other peoples that do not show evidence of extended isolation. How does one account for these contradictory findings? The hypothesis is that small numbers of hunters and gatherers from central and southern Europe followed the retreating ice sheet to the west along a narrow land corridor on the Norwegian coast, establishing themselves north of the ice on the shores of the Arctic Ocean where conditions were relatively benign. This northerly settlement in isolation from other human populations for a very long period of time accounts for the specific genetic set-up of the Saami people. Other hunters and gatherers followed the retreating ice to the east, settling in the taiga region of northern Russia, and developing Finno-Ugric languages. At some time, when the inland ice had almost disappeared, these two populations met. According to this theory, then, the Saami trace ancestors to the settlers north of the inland ice as well as to the Finno-Ugric speaking peoples moving north through Karelia and Finland.

In historic times the Saami practiced reindeer husbandry in mountain regions as far south as central Sweden and southern Norway. The Saami were eventually forced further north as Swedes and Norwegians gradually colonised the northern parts. However, small groups of Saami are still engaged in reindeer husbandry as far south as the province of Jämtland in central Sweden.

4. The spread of agriculture and Indo-European languages

All native languages of the Baltic region, except the Finno-Ugric tongues, belong to the Indo-European family of languages. It is general knowledge that this family includes a wide range of interrelated languages spoken throughout Europe, Iran and northern India. For many years the origins of the Indo-European languages have been disputed among scholars. How could these languages show such a remarkable relationship to each other and yet be spoken by peoples that are so very different to each other, culturally and phenotypically? One theory suggests that the original Indo-European language speakers spread to Europe and to India by military conquest. The conquerors imposed their language on the conquered. But, then, where did they come from and where did the Indo-European family of languages originate? Who were the conquering people?

Besides the Finno-Ugric languages, only one indigenous non-Indo-European language is still spoken in western Europe – Basque. According to one hypothesis Basque, and a few since long-extinct Italic languages such as Etruscan, originate from languages that were spoken in Europe before the diffusion of the Indo-European tongues.

Colin Renfrew, a British archaeologist, has presented a synthesis of ideas about the origins of the Indo-European languages in his book “Archaeology and Language”, published in 1988. Renfrew challenges the conquest theory. His basic hypothesis is that the proto-Indo-European language spread over Europe, Iran and northern India, at the time that agriculture and animal husbandry were introduced and began to spread into these regions from a centre in south-eastern Anatolia.

Renfrew claims that the spread of the Indo-European languages was related to the very transition from an economy based on hunting and gathering to one based on agriculture and animal husbandry. This transition coincided with changes from nomadic ways of subsistence to sedentary ones. Archaeologists date this transition to a time about 7,000 B.C. This means that Indo-European languages were established in Europe a lot earlier than has been believed before.

The most important explanatory element of the theory is that the agricultural revolution fundamentally changed the demographic situation. Peoples engaged in agriculture grew in numbers much



Map 18. Land use map for the Baltic region showing improductive, land forests, grazing land and area of agriculture. Ill.: Karin Hallgren

more rapidly than those that relied upon hunting and gathering. It has been estimated that per unit of land even the very primitive forms of early agriculture and animal husbandry could support a population that was 50 times as large as a population dependent upon hunting and gathering for its livelihood. Thus, the introduction of agriculture involved a profound change of the demographic distribution of different language groups and cultures.

The rapidly increasing sedentary populations were in constant need of more land to cultivate. This land was appropriated from the far less populous tribes of hunters and gatherers. Agriculture and sedentary forms of subsistence spread slowly and steadily from Anatolia up through the Balkans into central Europe and north to the Baltic region. The rate has been calculated at approximately 15 kilometres per generation.

The other side of this process was that existing populations of hunters and gatherers were gradually assimilated into an agricultural economy and mode of existence through intermarriage. These early sedentary agriculturalists spoke a language from which all the Indo-European languages gradually evolved. The introduction of a new means of subsistence, which in turn involved employing new kinds of implements and technology, had essential implications for language. It all boils down to the fact that the speakers of the ancient Proto-Indo-European languages had a powerful advantage over existing nomadic peoples and the languages they represented. In time this led to the dominance of the Indo-European languages in Europe.

5. The Baltic, Slavic and Germanic peoples

Comparative linguistic research indicates that the Baltic languages are among the most archaic of the living Indo-European languages. This is probably due to the fact that for many hundreds of years these languages were spoken by peoples living under constant threat of domination by powerful neighbours. For half a millennium Lithuanian, and particularly Latvian, survived as living languages among peasant populations. Foreign rulers succeeded each other – Danes, Germans, Swedes, Poles and Russians – but they did not, or could not, impose their languages on the peasants. These conditions partly explain why Baltic languages have maintained various archaic phonetic elements and grammatical forms.

Prussian, now extinct as a spoken language, was also a Baltic language. The Prussians, under the rule of the Teutonic Order, gradually assumed German as their language. Half a millennium later the Prussian state united Germany.

Latvian and Lithuanian, the two living Baltic languages of today, are spoken only in the republics of Latvia and Lithuania, and in smaller emigrant settlements in the USA. However, place-names in Russia and Belarus indicate that Baltic languages once were spread more widely. At a later stage in history, at the close of the Mediaeval times, Lithuania was an important European power commanding a territory that stretched from Vilnius south to the Black Sea.

The Baltic language group is more closely related to the Slavic family of languages than it is to the Germanic languages. Baltic and Slavic languages are believed to have branched off from one another at a later stage in pre-history than the proto-Balto-Slavic language branched off from a proto-Germanic language.

In ancient times Baltic languages seem to have been spoken by tribes living south of the Finno-Ugric speakers and north of Slavic speaking peoples. The existence of loans from Finno-Ugric and Slavic vocabulary indicate that contacts must have existed at the least for some two thousand years



Map 19. Migration of Slavic tribes. About 2,000 BC the core area of Slavic tribes was situated in contemporary northern Ukraine. During their expansion towards the south, west and north-east they encountered Germanic, Baltic and Finno-Ugric tribes, as shown in the map for the period 500 BC to 100 AD. During the time of the great migration around 600 AD, the Slavic expansion continued essentially along similar routes. Ill.: Karin Hallgren

in time. A greater amount of Finno-Ugric loans are found in Latvian than in Lithuanian. Proximity, and not in the least, periods of joint history with Poland led to a greater Polish influence on Lithuanian than on Latvian.

The term Germanic languages was assigned to the languages spoken by the Germanic peoples inhabiting the country north of the Roman empire in central and eastern Europe. Peoples speaking a proto-Germanic language settled on the southwestern shores of the Baltic, crossing the sea to the southern tip of the Scandinavian peninsula. In all likelihood this took place when agriculture was introduced in the region, some three thousand years ago. The peasant populations spread north along the coasts, replacing the indigenous people.

In pre-historic times the tribes speaking proto-Slavic languages inhabited a region neighbouring to Iranian tribes on the northern shores of the Black Sea. Most evidence goes to show that when the Slavs formed as one people they were settled to the northeast of the Carpathians. One conjecture is that Gothic domination was of enormous importance in the development of the Slavs.

The Great Migration is the name given to the centuries when Germanic and Slavic peoples were on the move throughout central and southern Europe from about 400 A.D. to 600 A.D. The causes of this chain process are disputed. Due to the many wars and internal frictions the Roman empire was weakened and could not withstand the attacks from Germanic peoples. Another factor was the invasion of Huns from the distant stretches of Eastern Europe. Germanic peoples moved towards the west and the south from a habitat in central and northern Europe.

Slavic speaking tribes were caught up in this turmoil. From a central habitat in the basins of the Wisła, Pripet and Dnestr, roughly coinciding with present-day northern Ukraine, southern Belarus and the Kursk region of southern Russia proper, they migrated south, west and north. From this period the distinction between East Slavic, West Slavic and South Slavic languages originated. The Eastern Slavs, the ancestors of the Russians and Ukrainians, encountered and assimilated Baltic and Finnish tribes as they spread north. The Western Slavs migrated to the southern shores of the Baltic. The Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Cashubians and Slavic minorities of northern Germany originate from them.

The distribution of various peoples and language groups is never fixed. Wars have constantly changed the boundaries between different states in the Baltic region. Powers have succeeded one another. During the 1,300 years that has passed since the Great Migration, Russian speakers have colonised a lot of the territories that once were inhabited by Finno-

Ugric speaking tribes. During the most recent century there has been a large immigration of Russians into the Baltic states. For a long period of time small groups of Germans settled in various parts of Eastern Europe. Since World War II things have changed. People who can claim German origin are accepted into the Federal Republic of Germany. Because Germany was defeated in the war, it lost a considerable part of its former eastern territories. This has led to a shift of German speakers to the west.

6. The Jewish settlement

From the 15th century until World War II the southern section of the Baltic region was the spiritual and cultural centre of Judaism. During the 15th century a surge of hostile actions directed at the Jews took place in Western Europe. In Spain, for instance, Jews and Moors were forced to convert to Christianity or face expulsion. Many of the Spanish Jews migrated to the Balkans, others to the Netherlands and the German states. But there, in the Rhine valley, they were compelled to move east into Brandenburg, Saxony and Silesia. Soon they were required to leave these parts as well. However, Jews were invited to settle in Poland and Lithuania. Because Lithuania commanded an extensive territory in those days, parts of which are present-day Ukraine and Belarus, Jews also concentrated to towns in these two countries. Apart from Israel itself, there is no other part of the world where so many Jews have lived for such a long time.

In time Jewish centers of learning and pious life started to flourish. Vilnius was one of these centers. In this setting, Yiddish developed into a distinct language. Jewish presence, however, was not appreciated by all parties. Over the centuries the Jews of

Poland, Lithuania, Ukraine, Belarus and Russia were subjected to numerous pogroms. During the mid-17th century one third of the Jewry in Poland were killed and Jewish property was destroyed in the Bohdan Khmielnicky rebellion. Whereas the Jewry in the West gradually assimilated into civilian society and were accepted as citizens this never happened in the East.

The Jewish population of the region was approximately 8 million around the turn of the last century. This figure represented about 80% of the total world Jewry. Emigration to the United States in the early decades of this century, and then the Nazi extermination of the Eastern Jewry, reduced the Jews to merely a small fraction of their original numbers. Today they number some 200,000 persons in the Baltic region.



Figure 41. Jewish restaurant in Kraków. Photo: Alfred F. Majewicz

11 Religion

Lennart Tegborg

1. Two borderlines

In the Baltic Region there is still a borderline between East and West – concerning religion. The “Icon Wall” has replaced the “Iron Curtain”!

There is, however, a big difference between these two borderlines. The “Iron Curtain” was a real *barrier* guarded by armed forces in order to block the free movement of people and limit exchange of ideas. The “Icon Wall”, taken as a symbol eastern liturgy and church architecture, is a cultural *border*, where East and West have met for one thousand years, a line feasible to cross for contacts, exchange and dialog.

This borderline between East and West follows the western border of Russia-Belarus-Ukraine. It is the result of the historical development in the Middle Ages that established the boundaries between the Western Church, under the leadership of Rome, and the Eastern Churches. Through the actions of the Patriarch of Constantinople, Russia, Belarus and Ukraine were incorporated into the fellowship of Greek Orthodox churches.

The map also reveals that there is another borderline in the area, the one between North and South. North of this line, in the four Nordic Countries, Denmark, Norway, Sweden

and Finland, and in Estonia, Protestantism is dominant. (In Latvia, the majority is hard to determine.) This dividing line was drawn during the time of the Reformation in the 16th century and confirmed during the era of the Confessional Wars in the 17th century.

In Germany, the dividing line goes from North West to South East, including the Northwestern part of the former West Germany (BRD) and the entire former East Germany (DDR) in the region, where Protestantism is the dominant religion. East of Germany and South of this dividing line The Roman Catholic Church is predominant. In Poland and Lithuania this is quite obvious.



Map 20. Christianity approached the region from three directions around 1,000 AD. About 200 years later, crusaders spread the word, brutally waging religious wars in Finland, Estonia and Livonia. Ill.: Karin Hallgren

2. The complex picture

There are, however, some modifications to be made to this geographical description of religion in the Baltic region. There are Orthodox churches west of the dividing line. In Finland, for instance, there are two established churches with equal rights, a Lutheran Church with about 4.6 million members and an Orthodox Church with 53,000 members. The Orthodox Church presents a valuable contribution to the spiritual life of Finland, not least through its cloister, New Valamo, in Savolaks in Eastern Finland, not far from the present border with Russia.

During the 18th century the three Baltic republics were incorporated into the Russian Empire, a situation that lasted until the end of World War I. The presence of the Orthodox church in these republics is dependent to a large extent upon that fact. Russians moving westwards brought Russian Orthodoxy to the eastern shores of the Baltic. Moreover, Russian religious groups who opposed the official Russian Orthodox Church took refuge in the area that is today the three Baltic republics, adding to the religious diversity of the region. From the 1830s and on, there was a clear intention by the Russian emperors to use the promotion of the Orthodox religion in present-day Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania for political purposes. As the Russian Church law of 1832 was made law there as well, the Lutheran and Catholic Churches lost their previous privileges as established churches. The Orthodox Church became the official church of the state. Conversion was allowed, but only one way: into the Orthodox Church.

In Poland and Lithuania the Roman Catholic Church is predominant. There are, however, other religious groups as well, including two Catholic churches, which have broken all ties with Rome. From the time of the Reformation, Protestant congregations have been established in the two countries, especially in Southern Poland and in Western and Northern Lithuania. Protestants are still there, even if they are a minority.

In the Czech Republic a census in the 1990s showed some interesting information. 433,000 people, 4 per cent of the population, called themselves non-Catholic church members, mainly Protestants. The Catholics were 4 million (39 per cent), according to the same census. About the same number considered themselves agnostics, 4.1 million, 40 per cent of the population. This situation goes back to the development that began in the late Middle Ages, when Czech nationalism and Roman Catholicism were in conflict.

In the Slovak Republic, where the Roman Catholic Church is relatively stronger than in the Czech Republic, roughly 3,242,000 persons (60.5 per cent of the population) claim to be members of that church. Approximately 420,000 persons (7.8 per cent of the population) considered themselves Protestants.

In a similar reverse way Protestants and Catholics are also present in the East. Despite the fact that the Orthodox Church is predominant in Russia, other religious groups are also active



Figure 42. Orthodox Easter celebrations in Białystok, Poland. The Orthodox community in Poland amounts to 500,000 people. Photo: Alfred F. Majewicz

in Russia and in other parts of the former Soviet Union. The breaking up of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the new openness towards religion in the 1990s have led to better conditions for them as well. The Baptist Church in Russia, for instance that suffered very hard conditions during the Soviet era, has been growing. The Pentecostal Movement is active as are new evangelical movements mainly with an American background.

The Lutherans now have two bishops in St Petersburg for congregations East of Finland and the Baltic republics. One is responsible for Finnish speaking Lutherans outside Finland, mainly in Ingria and Karelia (about 15,000 people). The other heads the other Lutheran congregations – mainly with German background – in the rest of the former Soviet Union.

In Ukraine another phenomenon is crossing the boundaries between East and West, the Uniates. Their history goes back to the end of the 16th century. In 1596, in Brest-Litovsk, the metropolitan of Kiev signed a document agreeing to a union with the Church of Rome, a triumph for Jesuit diplomacy. According to the Brest-Litovsk Union, the members of the Orthodox Church inside the Polish-Lithuanian Empire were taken into the Roman Catholic Church. They maintained their eastern liturgy and church order but acknowledged

the Pope as their superior. Great numbers of believers became Uniates and, over the centuries, became strongly committed members of the Roman Catholic Church. They have remained anti-Russian and have become staunchly anti-Communist, a not quite inconsiderable factor in developments during the end of the Soviet period. The Brest-Litovsk Union in 1596, intended to reduce the religious split, in fact increased religious diversity in the region. In consideration of their liturgy, the Uniates belong to an eastern branch of the Christian church. Organizationally, they belong to the Roman Catholic Church. In that way they have added to the complex situa-



Figure 43. Uniate church in Verhovyna, Ukraine. Verhovyna, inhabited by Hutsuls, is supposed to be the largest village in the BSR. Photo: Alfred F. Majewicz

tion in the region and contributed to the rather strained relations between the Patriarch in Moscow and the Pope of Rome up to the present time.

3. Post-war changes of the map of religion

One religious group has nearly disappeared from the region, the Jews. They were once an important minority in the southeastern part of the Baltic Region – in fact one of the most important territories for Jewish culture and religious life. In the beginning of the 20th century the predominant majority of the Jewish population of the world (90%) lived in the region, chiefly in Poland, Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania. The biggest aggregation of Synagogue buildings in Europe, “Grosse Alte Choral Shul”, was to be found in Vilnius at the beginning of the 20th century where the Jewish population constituted 40% of the population. Today Jewish life is next to extinct in that region, because of the Holocaust and emigration mainly to Israel and the USA.

The Second World War led to another change: The repatriation and mass deportation of the German population from East Prussia. In that way East Prussia and its capital Königsberg, renamed Kaliningrad, ceased to be the stronghold of Protestantism that it had been from the time of the Reformation.


During the post-war period labor migrants and refugees have had an impact on religion in the Baltic region and contributed to religious pluralism. Sweden can be used as an illustrative example. Traditionally Protestant Sweden today has a number of non-Protestant Churches and other religious groups. The Roman Catholic Church is now the second biggest church in Sweden. From 1975 to 2000 the membership of the Roman Catholic Church in Sweden has increased from 70,200 to 158,000 members. That means an increase of 125 per cent. During the same period, the Orthodox and Oriental Churches in Sweden had an increase of 98%. In 2000 the membership of these churches – organized in 14 different church bodies – taken together was close to 100,000, compared to 50,500 in 1975.

The present Swedish religious society also includes a substantial number of followers of other religions, most of them Moslem refugees and asylum seekers. The number of regular attendants at the different mosques in Sweden can be estimated to 100,000. In 1999 a big mosque, which can accommodate 1,500 people, was opened in the center of Stockholm. Other religious groups, such as Buddhists (perhaps 8,000) and Hindus (about 5,000) are harder to determine. The number of Jews, 16,000, has been fairly constant during the last 25 years. The present religious pluralism has not resulted in any real conflicts, except local protest against plans to build a mosque in a local area. The attitude of the churches has been important. When a pyromaniac destroyed the mosque in Trollhättan, the local Lutheran church made a collection towards the reconstruction – an example of good neighbourship!

The vast majority of the Swedish population, 83.5% (7.4 million people) are still members of the national Lutheran Church, Church of Sweden. At the same time religious pluralism inside Swedish society is obvious. This was one of the factors which finally concluded the debate – fifty years of discussions and inquiries – about the relationship between the Church of Sweden and the Swedish State. At the end of the 20th century the Swedish state-church system came to an end. That change was not an isolated Swedish issue. It was part of a common European pattern. In the European context, the Nordic national churches, with their close connections to the national state, have in fact been exceptions in the period after the First World War.



Figure 44. Saami people in front of the church in Jokkmokk (in Lappland, Sweden). Photo: Andrzej Szmal



Map 21. The map of religion in the Baltic area thus appears fairly simple:

1. Protestant in the North: The four Nordic countries, Estonia and the part of Germany that, as it happens, belongs to the region in our field of interest.
2. The Roman Catholic Church in the South: Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic.
3. The Orthodox Church in the East: Russia, Belarus and Ukraine.
4. The Uniate Church in Western Ukraine.

Ill.: Radosław Przebitkowski

4. Church and State in the West

The relationship between church and state has developed in different ways in the west and the east. By the end of the 19th century in the west, the normal situation in the region was that of a close relationship between the state and the dominant church. In the years following the end of the First World War, a major change occurred, partially because of the new political situation.

In Germany, for instance, where the principalities disappeared, the Evangelical Lutheran and Calvinist Churches had to be reorganized as independent “Landes-kirchen”. There was, however, another important factor as well: during the second half of the 19th century the claim for freedom of religion had grown strong. That claim meant demand for individual freedom and the abolition of all kinds of religious compulsion. It also meant equal rights for different churches and groups, as well as self-determination and autonomy for the dominant church.

Germany set the example of a peaceful solution that was satisfactory to both sides. “Separation between church and state”, as it was proclaimed in the Weimar Constitution of 1919, was carried out in a way favorable to the church. It did not turn the churches into private organizations, left totally on their own. In fact the conditions meant interrelationship and cooperation. The state collected the church taxes as part of the public taxes and supported the work of the church through public grants. In return the church gave a very significant contribution to social welfare through its institutions and the work done by its deacons and deaconesses.

However, during the period between the two World Wars, the relationship between church and state in Germany was not totally harmonious. Questions about schools and religious education were a major field of conflict. This issue is dealt with later on in this article.

The experiences during the Nazi period demonstrated the importance of religion as an independent force in society. In West Germany, during the post-war and Cold War periods the churches – Catholic and Protestant – were recognized as important factors in society. They were treated as independent, legal entities, which could negotiate with state authorities. Church taxes were collected by means of the state.

5. Church-state relationships in the East

The situation in East Germany was in many ways contrary to that in West Germany, despite the fact that the principle of separation between church and state was declared in East Germany as well. However, the content of the principle was given quite another meaning in East Germany. There, the state took no part in collecting church fees, but often interfered in church affairs and obstructed the work of the church. The relationship between church and state in East Germany was an example of the eastern solution. This is most clearly seen in Russia.

In the Russian Empire the connection between church and state had been very close. The Russian Orthodox Church, almost a state department and thoroughly loyal to the state, was the religious foundation for the Russian state and the Russian emperor for centuries.

The events in 1917 meant a total change. The phrase “separation between church and state” acquired a totally different meaning from that in contemporary Germany. The Bolsheviks, who came to power in November 1917, were clearly hostile towards the church and Christianity, even towards religion as such. In their opinion, the new order in society would cause religion, being unnecessary, to fade away within one or two generations. Until then, the church, as a foreign entity in a Socialist society, had to be controlled and its activities restricted.

As a consequence of an atheistic world view, religious education was totally abolished in the schools. Decrees in 1921 and 1924 also made it illegal for the church to offer regular religious education for children and young people less than 18 years. No more than three children at a time were allowed to receive religious education at home by their parents or a teacher. The Soviet version of freedom of religion got its programmatic form in 1929: “Freedom for religious cult and anti-religious propaganda”. According to that program, the activity of the church was restricted to religious activities inside the church buildings, while the state and anti-religious groups were free to make anti-religious propaganda without restrictions.

Even access to church buildings was restricted. Church buildings were taken away from congregations. Some of the churches were demolished. Others were used for non-religious purposes, such as factories, warehouses, gymnastic halls or museums. They were often used even as propaganda centers for atheism and for the new Socialist world order. Monasteries were closed, access to theological seminaries limited and controlled by the communist party or by state authorities. In spite of the principle of strict separation between church and state, the national church was strictly controlled by the central Soviet agencies, the congregations controlled by local authorities and Communist party representatives, often obstructing the work of the church.

In spite of all that, religion in the Soviet Union refused to die. The Divine Liturgy, the heart of Orthodox piety, was offered in divine services in overcrowded churches. Grandmothers took responsibility for the primary religious instruction of the children at home and took




Figure 45. Ruins of the cathedral in Kaliningrad under reconstruction (in 1996). Photo: Katarzyna Skalska

them to church. That activity, often mocked in the Soviet press, did not cease in the next generation.

The Soviet policy towards religion was not always the same. Periods of oppression were followed by periods of relative calm. In emergency situations the Soviet authorities even called for the support of the church, for instance in crises and time of war.

As a result of World War II, the Soviet outlook was partially “exported” to other countries behind the Iron curtain. The role assigned to the church in the Soviet Union was not satisfactory to the Orthodox Church. It was, however, not totally devastating from the Orthodox point of view, as long as the liturgy was observed. West of the religious dividing line, in countries where the Catholic or Protestant Churches were the dominant religious bodies, the restrictions laid on the churches by Socialist regimes were even harder to stand. In this way, quite unintentionally, the church turned out a potential alternative and a national force, opposite to the Socialist vision of a New World order beyond national limitations. This is what happened with

the Catholic Church in Poland and Lithuania, and with the Protestant Churches in East Germany.

One consequence of viewing religion as a marginal phenomenon of no real interest to society was that no official statistics in religious matters were kept. Even today religious statistics from most of the countries of the former east bloc are slightly uncertain.

6. The church and the downfall of communism

The fact that Poland has survived as a nation, in spite of partition and oppression from Russians in the East and Germans in the West, can to a large extent be explained by two factors: the geographical setting and religion. Poland has always had a significant Protestant minority and a substantial number of Jews. The majority of the Poles, however, normally consider themselves good Catholics. Catholicism made Poland and the Polish people different from German Protestantism in the West and the Russian Orthodoxy in the East.

In spite of being a supranational entity, Roman Catholicism became a national force in Poland. For the same reason, the Polish Socialist government after World War II never succeeded in subduing the Catholic Church in Poland, being the main target in its anti-religious politics. When the opposition against the Communist regime grew strong in the late 1970s and 1980s, religion played a major role, supporting and sustaining the members and leaders of “Solidarity”, the new labor union.

The visit to Poland in June 1979 by Pope John Paul II, a Pole by birth, was an important event. His message to the Poles, repeated in many sermons was the words of Jesus to his disciples: “Don’t be afraid” (Mark 6:50). By vindicating human rights, the Roman Catholic Church contributed to a national moral renewal in Poland, that finally brought about a new political order.

In Lithuania, Poles traditionally dominated the Catholic Church. At the beginning of this century the Catholic Church in Lithuania could hardly be considered a national force. In the 1970s, however, it appeared as the only remaining national symbol of the country.

The Lithuanian guerrilla war against the occupants had ceased. The Lithuanian intellectuals were silenced by the Socialist regime. The only major, independent factor in Lithuanian society was the Catholic Church. The church was restricted in its activities, deprived of its religious orders and some church buildings and other property, cut off from the major part of its own leadership hierarchy which was exiled and forced to silence, forbidden to give religious education to children and young people. It was even isolated from the surrounding world.

In spite of all that, and because the church did not submit to the Socialist regime, the Catholic Church in Lithuania became one of the most powerful symbols of the liberation movement. Large crowds of people gathered at Cathedral Square in Vilnius to celebrate mass outside the confiscated cathedral. That was an important manifestation of a development that led to the revival of Lithuania as an independent republic in 1991.

In East Germany the Luther jubilee in 1983 seemed to be an indication of a major change in the policy regarding religion. “The plowshare movement”, was an important force, that literally took the Socialist peace propaganda and turned it against the Socialist regime itself. It was made up mainly of young people who used biblical arguments for their pacifism. The name of the movement was taken from the Book of Isaiah 2:3: *The Lord shall judge between the nations, and he shall decide for many peoples; and they shall beat their swords into plowshares, and their spears into pruning hooks; nations shall not lift up swords against nations, neither shall they learn war any more.*

The plowshare symbol was banned by the state, a decision that contributed to strengthening the unity of the movement against the Socialist regime. The activists began to gather in Protestant church buildings and in this way Protestant churches became sanctuaries and regular meeting places for opponents of the actual political order in East Germany, despite the fact that the liberation movement included people without primary religious interests. A development had started that ended with the fall of the Berlin Wall at the end of 1989 and the reunion of Germany in October 1990. During the last period of East Germany as a separate state, Protestant pastors even played a major role in politics.

As a result of the reunion of Germany, the constitution of West Germany – including regulations of church-state issues – was made valid even for former East Germany, where the churches faced new assignments – and new problems – for instance in the field of religious education.

In the last period of the Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachev called on the Russian Orthodox Church for help. This was an indication that the religious situation was in a process of rapid change. Another indication was the fact that church officials were able to participate in political life as members of the People’s Congress. Religion was again recognized as a factor of some importance, church buildings were restored and returned to the Church, cloisters reopened. A new Church law for the Soviet Union, recognizing the existence of the church, was promulgated some months before the demise of the Soviet Union. The time of religious oppression had come to an end.

New, independent states came into being when the Soviet Union ceased to exist in 1991. In some of them, mainly outside our field of interest, religious division proved to be crucial for national unity. In Ukraine old problems came to the surface. The antagonism between the Orthodox Church and the Uniates, who used the eastern liturgy and church order but acknowledged the Pope as their superior became visible. In addition to that a tension within the Orthodox Church itself was brought up; the Orthodox Church in Ukraine was divided in two with one independent group and one subordinate to the patriarch in Moscow. All these three groups consider themselves the legitimate keepers of the religious heritage of the country and the true local Church.

The disappearance of the Soviet system also meant that the borders were opened to influences from the West. Revival movements and evangelical sects immediately exploited the new situation east of the Baltic. As a reaction, a Russian law on Religious Freedom was approved which has meant a safeguard for traditional Russian religion, a provision welcomed by the Russian Orthodox Church.

The development in the East during the last years has meant a rediscovery of the role of the Church in society.

7. In the West: religion as the foundation of society

Religion was also a factor in the formation of the New Europe of the West. The founding fathers of what is today the European Union were committed members of the Catholic Church, well aware of the role of Christianity as the foundation of a new unity in Europe. The opposition to Socialist anti-religious Eastern Europe during the Cold War period was of some importance too.

8. The historical role of the Church in education

In regard to its spread and influence in popular education up to the end of the 19th century, few books can compete with the Catechism, a short confessional summary usually in the form of questions and answers. In many countries around the Baltic Sea the Catechism was the very first book to be printed in the national language. Luther's Small Catechism was translated and printed in the Estonian language in 1535. The first Lithuanian edition, translated by one of the most influential Lithuanian reformers Martin Maz'vydas, was printed in Königsberg in 1549.

Even more interesting is what happened in the field of the Latvian language. The first printed book in Latvian was a Catholic catechism printed in Vilnius in 1585. The following

Natural Rights

The concept of *Natural Rights* is fundamental to Western Democracy and the European Community. It means the acknowledgement of individual rights, valid even in opposition to the state. These rights have to be respected by inter-state organizations, by states, by international as well as national local governments and authorities. Firmly rooted in the Christian theology of creation, the concept of Natural Rights puts the interests of the individual ahead of those of the state, in a way unknown to the east-European ideology of the Soviet era.

year another Latvian catechism was published, a translation of Luther's Small Catechism, printed in Königsberg in 1586.

These two books could serve as an illustration of Latvian Church history during the time of the Reformation. Two different religious centers, Catholic Vilnius and Protestant Königsberg, were actively involved in the development of Latvian religiosity. They were both promoting higher education, an important factor not least during the time of the Reformation. The University in Königsberg and the Academy in Vilnius were important institutions for higher learning. They were also promoting popular religious education in which the Catechism was a major tool.

Luther's Small Catechism is also an illustration of the close connection between church and education. The catechism contained the central Christian teaching, the Creed, the Ten Commandments and the Words of the institutions of Baptism and Eucharist, the Biblical texts and Luther's commentary. It was also a prayer book to be used in church and at home, and last but not least it was a book that offered the basic tools for promoting the ability to read. The Catechism was the first real popular book. In Protestant countries it was the basic book for religious education in church, at home and in schools for more than three centuries. School education was considered part of religious education, which the congregation offered its baptized children. Religious education in schools was therefore dependent on the doctrine of the Church.

9. Religious education in secular and post-communist states

As a more complex society asked for a broader public education at the expense of religious education, the role of the Church in public education was gradually reduced and has actually disappeared during the 20th century. Secular society has taken full responsibility for the instruction of the youth. This development has not been totally painless, because of conflicting interests. The religious education issue was in fact one of the major subjects of contention in Europe after World War I.

Germany is again an illuminating example. The interest of the state in creating a homogeneous school system clashed with the interest of the Churches that wanted to use the teaching of religion in the school system for the purpose of confessional instruction. It sometimes also conflicted with the desires of the parents. It was not possible to solve the issue about religious education in public schools at the national level. Different German states tried different solutions, and the issue remained an irritating factor during a major part of the Weimar period. The memory from that period, in combination with the experience of the totalitarian state of the Nazi period, made it important to find a solution to the issue in the period following World War II.

The solution of the church-school issue in West Germany was that religious education was to be kept as part of the public school program, but assigned to be the responsibility of the Churches. In that way the interests of the state as well as of the churches were satisfied, and the choice was left to the parents. One of the difficulties concerning religious education in the public schools in the period between the two World Wars was the religious diversity inside the borders of the states drawn up in the peace treaties.

Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania solved that problem in the period between the two world wars by granting cultural autonomy and state support to minority groups.

In Scandinavia the question about the relationship between state-school-church in the matter of education has not been such a burning issue as in Germany. Even there, however, the conditions have changed. A major change concerning religious teaching occurred in Sweden in the 1960s. The solution was different from that in Germany. Religion is still on the schedule of the elementary and secondary schools, as it is seen as being in the interests of Swedish society. The church, however, does not decide the content of the school curriculum in religion, nor is the teaching supervised or led by the church. It has the form of objective teaching about religion. The purpose is no longer to contribute to a Christian upbringing, but to confer knowledge about religion in order to explain one aspect of human life and its effect on society. This is even more important in a pluralistic society.

The situation in the East implied a total change during the 1990s. In countries east of the former “Iron curtain”, Religion was back as a subject in the public schools and was basically compulsory. However, the pupils could be excused, if the parents so requested, and be given an ethical education or an alternative religious education organized by their own church.

This new situation in the 1990s also meant many new problems. There was no experience of teaching religion in a school setting and a lack of satisfactory teaching material. The question of how to satisfy the interests of minority religious groups, not numerous enough to justify separate religious education, was also to be taken into account.

In Lithuania, for example, the possibility of religious education is offered in public school, with ethical education as an alternative. The church appoints special teachers with a pedagogical education approved by the state for teaching religion – chiefly priest and catechists. For minority groups such as the Lutherans it is possible to arrange for religious education with Lutheran teachers by gathering children from different schools. That could often be arranged in cities but not so easily in the Lithuanian countryside.

10. Church life in the post-communist countries in the 1990s

“The church has won the war! How to deal with the peace?”

In the 1990s Russians tried to reorient themselves in “a New World”, where religious belief was a matter of conscience, whereas Communism was a fallen idol. In the political situation at that time in Russia, politicians of entirely different political opinions were trying to make use of the symbolic values represented by the church. The rebuilding of the mighty Church of Our Savior just outside the Kremlin walls in Moscow was a clear symbol of the roll ascribed to the church by the politicians. It was to a large extent paid for by the city of Moscow and by the Russian State.

In a period of deep confusion and the possibility of a historical renewal of Russian society, the Russian Orthodox Church, as the dominant Russian denomination, as well as the minority churches in Russia, got a new importance and had to determine their new role in society.

In Poland, the Roman Catholic Church appeared the winner after a long period of suppression and struggle. It had successfully supported the forces that finally defeated the anti-religious, Socialist regime. That victory also resulted in a possibility to exert an influence on Polish legislation. The result in the form of new laws against abortion and birth control is quite obvious. These laws and the reaction to them, however, revealed a growing discontent with the involvement of the church in state affairs.

During the period of suppression, the Roman Catholic Churches were overcrowded with people. When the suppression was over, church attendance in Poland was declining and

seemed to be more and more like that of the Churches in the West. The tendency, however, changed again in the middle of the decade. By the end of the century church attendance was at the same level as it was in 1989.

All the Churches in Poland, not only the dominant Roman Catholic Church, had to face a new situation in the 1990s. They had to realize that they had a special mission in the field of social work and personal caring. They also had to take new initiatives in the field of religious education for adults. Initiatives do not necessarily emanate from the church leaders and are not always the result of a good economy but of faith and pious devotion among ordinary lay people.

The German occupation of Poland and the Holocaust had left hard feelings and memories in Poland. As early as the 1960s the Roman Catholic Church in Poland decided deal with that issue. As an act of reconciliation the Polish Cardinal sent a message to the German Catholic bishops, but he got no answer. In the late 1990s the Roman Catholic Church in Poland, stimulated by the example of the pope John Paul II, has confessed its sins in regard to the Holocaust and the hatred towards the Germans and asked for forgiveness.

In Lithuania religious life seemed to prosper in the 1990s. Church buildings were given back to the congregations and restored. Different confessions, not only the Catholic Church, were supported by the state. The services in the churches were well attended, as they were during the last years of the Soviet period. There was, however, towards the middle of the decade some decline in attendance, and, more seriously, a growing discontent among young people: "Why do the church leaders not meet the new challenges? Why is the church not willing to move?"

One reason for that reaction was that the Catholic hierarchy in Lithuania had been exiled for about 25 years and cut off from the development in the rest of the Roman Catholic world. For those reasons the renewal of Roman Catholicism, which is the result of the Second Vatican Council, had only partially influenced Lithuanian Catholicism.

An important new element in Catholic Church life in Lithuania in the 1990s was the return of the religious orders. Through them new roads for international contacts have been opened, which is important not least for young people. The contribution of the religious orders to Catholic spirituality in Lithuania is probably also important as an alternative to the enticement of new religious movements from the West. These movements have been consciously active, here as in other parts of the former East.

In the former East Germany two patterns are apparent. First: the time for the Protestant churches to be the places for protest and forming the future is over. The crowds have left the churches. Second: the Church has not been able to change the predominance of the secular youth inaugural ceremonies, or non-religious "confirmation" once introduced by the Communist regime as an alternative to the church confirmation. The church is also losing members because of migration westwards. The introduction of church taxes has also brought about withdrawal from church membership.



Figure 46. In Licheń, a town 100 kilometers east of Poznań, people who are struggling with poverty are building a huge church with a bell, which is considered to be the biggest in the world. Photo: Alfred F. Majewicz

In spite of the fact that the Protestant Churches in former East Germany only have 25% of the population as their members (the majority of the population have no church membership at all), they still see themselves as “Folk churches” with a mission to the entire population.

11. The Church in secular societies

There has been no official campaign against religion in the countries west of the former “Iron curtain”. However, there has been a continuing process of secularization. The Churches are no longer expected to be the source of values and norms in society. The voice of the Church is but one of many in the marketplace of ideas in a pluralistic and secular society. Religion is, at best, one aspect of modern culture. Even in private life, religion plays a minor role today.

A general pattern in the Western countries in the Baltic Region is a decline in church membership and church attendance. There is no real difference between Catholic and Protestant churches. With few exceptions there is not even a difference between state-affiliated churches and free-churches. The only growing churches are mainly the new Churches of immigrants, American inspired evangelical movements with a fundamentalist character, and sects such as the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Mormons.

There is, however, another that is pattern just as obvious. The Churches are still important on special occasions, both in public and private life. Festival days, where the church service is part of the family celebration, are still important in the social calendar. The role of religion is apparent in times of personal crisis and catastrophes.

The most important contacts between churches and individuals are at the momentous occasions in life: baptism, confirmation, weddings and funerals. The church offers not only a ceremony of celebration, but also a pattern for interpreting life and what it is all about. The tenability of these rituals of passage is also an indication of demand for a spiritual dimension. Part of that pattern is also the need for a sense of belonging in a time of rapid change. Even in regions with few regular churchgoers the common response to proposals to the closing of church buildings has been: “Don’t take away our church!” The church building as such is still a matter of identity.

In the 20th century, secular society has taken full responsibility for social welfare, leaving a minor part to the diaconia (social work) of the churches, mainly as a personal service to individuals. In this process, tensions between secular society and churches have been inevitable. Today, however, new ways and means of cooperation are in sight. Secular society has had to realize that it is not able to fulfill all the needs of its inhabitants any more. There is a new tendency to ask for help from the churches and from voluntary organizations within or outside the churches. The reason is the so-called “custody crisis”, mainly a question of staff and money. A new role for religion in society is also appearing as a result of an increasing sense of a lack of ethics.

In many countries there is a new interest for religion and a search for spirituality. That does not, however, mean that people are returning to the church. It is mainly a change of attitude and it manifests itself as private religiosity outside the traditional and inherited forms of religious life.

The church must ask the question: what does it mean to be a Church in a modern society, and what is the mission of the Church towards the people of the country and in a worldwide setting? This has, in fact, been a major field of research, studies and the makings of programs in many Churches around the Baltic.

12 Social capital and traditional-conservative values in the Baltic region

Thorleif Pettersson

In a globalizing world, national states are often said to lose power and influence. In contrast, both inter- and intra-national economic, cultural, and political regions are assumed to gain in importance and prominence. The Baltic region is one of the candidates for such increasing importance. The region is of a considerable geographical format and includes not only the coastline states of Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Russia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Germany, but also a large hinterland including Norway, Belarus, Ukraine, and the Slovak and Czech Republics. All in all, the Baltic region covers a large area and it is inhabited by some 80 million people, speaking a number of different languages and demonstrating a substantive cultural diversity. Among the many variations of the Baltic countries, their different cultural heritages and languages, their different economic and industrial structures, their different welfare and living conditions, their different political systems and foreign alliances are often noticed.

But there are also important similarities between the Baltic countries. Over the years, the Baltic Sea has not only separated, but also connected the peoples living around its shores. Even if the region has witnessed previous periods of national isolation and aggression, it was mainly during the postwar period between 1945 and 1990 that the Baltic Sea lost its predominant integrative importance for the Baltic Region (Andersson & Sylwan 1997: 301). In contrast to this period, it is well known that Baltic people have witnessed a number of shared formative experiences during previous centuries. The Viking networks, the German Teutonic Order, the Kalmar Union, the Hanseatic league, the Swedish 17th century empire, and the Polish-Lithuanian 16th century union, are but a few examples of the common formative processes which have contributed to a shared Baltic social and cultural framework. Generally, it can be concluded that the postwar period of segregation was an exception to the more frequent tendencies towards economic, political, and cultural integration of the Baltic countries. As for future developments, the economic integration of the region is said to become especially important for the smaller Baltic countries, and countries with similar languages are assumed to tighten their economic relations (Andersson & Sylwan 1997: 297). The Baltic region is also noticeably rich in creative scientific and cultural milieus. The Stockholm-Uppsala, Åbo, Helsinki, and St Petersburg axis has demonstrated great potential for scientific collaboration and development and the Baltic region is said to display substantial possibilities for developing a dominating influence in creative and artistic areas such as music, musical theater, ballet, film and theater (Andersson & Sylwan 1997: 319). In summary, it has therefore been concluded that “the Baltic region now has a considerable potential

for developing into an important global region with regard to scholarly and cultural co-operation” (Andersson & Sylwan 1997: 320; translated here).

Needless to say, there are substantial differences among the Baltic countries with regard to structural and institutional resources, but the Baltic people also possess important human and social resources for further developments of the region, such as their skills, value motivations and socio-political aspirations. This chapter will explore these kinds of resources, and analyze the world views and value systems of people living in the Baltic region. The focus of this paper will be on two basic dimensions of values and world views, which are known to differentiate in important ways between a large number of countries and regions throughout the world. Thus, the chapter will explore Baltic mentality in a wider context. The main conclusion will be that although the Baltic countries at first may look surprisingly similar in certain value dimensions, there are also noticeable differences. The Eastern part of the Baltic region appears to be significantly poorer on social capital, an important cultural factor for social, economic, and political development. However, it is also tentatively concluded that the lack of social capital in this part of the region might be repaired by successive population generational replacements, as well as by deliberate platforms aimed at the increase of such capital.

1. The European Value Study/the World Value Survey

The following analyses of the world views and value systems of the Baltic people are based on data from a large comparative research project, sometimes called the European Values Study (EVS), and sometimes referred to as the World Value Survey (WVS). The EVS project was launched at the end of the 1970s and aimed to investigate the degree of cultural integration with regard to basic individual level value patterns in Western Europe. In 1981, large-scale personal interview surveys were conducted in all countries of the European Community (EC), as well as in Spain, and the Scandinavian countries, at that time not all of them members of the EC. The research aroused interest in a number of other countries, and many of them joined the project. In order to explore value changes over time, a second wave of the EVS was fielded in 1990. This time all EC countries (apart from Greece) as well as Hungary, the Scandinavian countries, South Africa, Japan, the United States, Canada participated for the second time. In Austria, Switzerland, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, the Baltic States, and the former German Democratic Republic, the survey was conducted for the first time (see e.g. Ester et al. 1994). In 1990, the non-European part of the survey had grown considerably. This part of the project is often referred to as the World Value Survey (WVS). In 1996, the survey was conducted for the third time, mainly in non-European countries. In 1999/2000, a fourth survey has been conducted, both inside and outside Europe.

The EVS/WVS project is one of the largest investigations ever of peoples' values, attitudes and beliefs with regard to religion, morality, socio-economic life, politics, democracy, work, leisure time, family, marriage, gender roles, sexuality, social relations, ethnocentrism, etc. In each country, personal interviews of about 1.5 hours are conducted on representative samples averaging 1,400 respondents in each country and year. The project covers more than 65 countries from all inhabited continents of the world, and about 75 percent of the world population. The participating countries differ greatly on basic dimensions of social, political and economical life. Some of the countries are highly urbanized, while others are mainly agricultural in nature. The gross annual per capita national products of the countries range from very poor to very rich (from 300 USD to 30,000 USD), and the political systems vary from

long-established stable democracies to newly established authoritarian states. Thus, the project allows analyses of how value systems and world views differ in countries of very different economical, political, and social profiles. Since the project has collected data in 1981, 1990, 1996, and 1999/2000, it also allows analyses on how changes of value systems and world views are related to economic, political and social structural changes. Further information on the EVS/WVS project, including extensive bibliographies, can be found on the following websites: <http://evs.kub.nl>, and <http://wvs.isr.umich.edu>, respectively.

2. The Baltic region in a global perspective

In order to present a kind of very abstract overview of some of the EVS/WVS results, a global cultural map of the 1990 and 1996 EVS/WVS data is of considerable interest. The cultural map, which is presented in Figure 47 below, shows the location of 65 countries on two basic bipolar value dimensions. The vertical dimension corresponds to the polarization between traditional authority and secular rational authority and taps a value syndrome in which deference to “the authority of God, Vaterland and Family are all closely linked” (Inglehart & Baker 2000: 25). The horizontal dimension corresponds to the polarization between survival values and self-expression values and taps a value syndrome which emphasizes the importance of interpersonal trust, tolerance, subjective well-being, political activism and self-expression. These virtues are highly valued at the self-expression pole. Detailed information on the various




Figure 47. Locations of 65 societies on two dimensions of cross-cultural variation: Data from EVS/WVS 1990-1991 and 1995-1998. Figure taken from Inglehart & Baker (2000)

aspects of the cultural map, which is shown below, can be found elsewhere (see e.g. Inglehart 1997; Inglehart & Baker 2000; Pettersson 2000).

It has been demonstrated that a given country's position on the cultural map can be fairly accurately predicted from economic indicators. Along the diagonal from the lower left quadrant to the upper-right, societies are becoming increasingly rich. Countries which score high on the self-expression values tend to be so called post-industrial countries with high levels of social security, and where a substantial part of the workforce is employed in the knowledge and service sector. In this sense, the growth of self-expression values seem to be linked to the rise of the new service and knowledge economy. On the other hand, highly industrialized countries score high on the secular-rational values, and the shift from traditional values towards secular-rational preferences seems to be linked to the shift from an agrarian mode of production to an industrial one. However, it must also be underlined that economic structural characteristics are not the only determinants of a country's position on the cultural map. The value profile of a given country also appears to be path dependent. "A history of Protestant or Orthodox or Islamic or Confucian traditions gives rise to cultural zones with distinctive value systems that persist after checking for the effects of economic development. Economic development tends to push societies in a common direction, but rather than converging, they seem to move on parallel trajectories shaped by their cultural heritages" (Inglehart & Baker 2000: 49). Thus, both the degree of economic development and the cultural heritage of a country or region seem to have a profound impact on peoples' value systems.

The cultural map shows that in a global comparative sense, the peoples of the Baltic countries are divided between four different cultural zones, which differ in one or other of the two dimensions which constitute the map. The Nordic countries belong together with Germany to the zone called "Protestant Europe", while Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia are located in the "Ex-communist Baltic" zone. Russia is located in the "Orthodox" zone, and Poland in the zone labeled "Catholic Europe". Since these four cultural zones differ significantly on the two basic value dimensions, it would certainly be misleading to conclude that the Baltic peoples are similar in their basic value orientations. However, disregarding the divisions between the cultural zones, the Baltic countries also appear to be fairly similar on the vertical axis, while they seem to differ far more on the horizontal. Thus, it can also be concluded that in a global perspective, the Baltic people appear to be fairly similar with regard to the importance they ascribe to secular-rational values, while they seem to be far more different with regard to different kinds of self-expression values. According to what was said above about the explanations for why countries differ in their locations on the cultural map, the similarities between the Baltic countries ought to be explained by their similar cultural heritages and/or economic structures, while the dissimilarities should be explained by their different cultural heritages and/or different economic structures. But whatever the explanations, the cultural map suggests that in a global bird's eye perspective, the Baltic countries seem to be fairly similar and belong to the same part of the map with regard to one basic dimension of value systems and world views, while they differ with regard to another dimension.

However, what one sees in a global bird's eye perspective may of course change when one takes a closer and more detailed look at the Baltic region as such. It cannot be excluded that careful and detailed investigations may reveal other patterns than abstract and general comparisons. The remaining part of this chapter will therefore take a closer look at the world views and value systems found in the Baltic countries.

3. Social capital and traditional-conservative values: Two basic value dimensions

For reasons of space, a more detailed discussion of the value profiles in the Baltic countries has to be confined to cover only two basic value dimensions, which will be used as the basis of a more limited cultural map of the Baltic countries. The horizontal axis of the global cultural map was said to tap “a syndrome of trust, tolerance, subjective well-being, political activism, and self-expression” (Inglehart & Baker 2000: 25). The starting point for the Baltic cultural map is that this syndrome shows obvious similarities to what is often called social capital, a key and much debated research topic in the social sciences (see, e.g. Levi 1995). Social capital has been considered an important factor with regard to social relationships (Coleman 1990), family life (Boisjoly et al. 1995), economic development (Fukuyama 1995; Knack & Keefer 1997), as well as a well-functioning democracy (Putnam 1993). In these regards, social capital is said to strengthen basic dimensions of social life, and it is considered to be the key component of a logic of action, which eases social cooperation and the attainment of collective common goods. Thus, social capital is assumed to allow “the achievement of certain ends that would not be attainable in its absence” (Coleman 1990: 302) and to constitute a fundamental basis for a well-functioning democracy and a prosperous society. When social capital flourishes, “individuals, firms, neighborhoods, and even nations prosper” (Putnam 1993: 319).

In summary it can therefore be concluded that previous research on social capital has focused on social trust and trustworthiness, together with peoples’ active involvement in formal and informal relations as important cultural resources which are assumed to strengthen social, political, and economic development.

The vertical dimension of the global cultural map was said to reflect the contrast between societies in which religion is very important and where the family is a major theme and such

Social capital

In the much noticed book *Bowling alone*, the concept of social capital is said to refer to the “connections among individuals – social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them” (Putnam 2000: 19), and it has been argued that interpersonal trust is a basic condition for a wide variety of social relationships to emerge. Since transaction costs are low in instances of mutual trust, interpersonal trust is seen as fundamental to a flourishing economy. “If people who have to work in an enterprise trust one another doing business costs less” (Fukuyama 1995: 27). Social capital thus refers to close and trustful social relationships which enhance the capacity of the participants to achieve their common interests. Thus, another major component of social capital is social involvement. The more socially involved people are, the greater the chances of establishing reciprocal relations and generating interpersonal trust. Trust is not only necessary for getting involved in networks of civic engagement, – but it is also necessary for continuing such networks. “Social relationships die out if not maintained; expectations and obligations wither over time; and norms depend on regular communication” (Coleman 1990: 321). In this sense, social relations constitute a capital asset, that is “a resource that, once accumulated, can be drawn on or accessed as needed.... (a resource) that make possible otherwise impossible goals” (Boisjoly et al. 1995: 609). In this regard, two kinds of civic engagement can be distinguished, one formal, and one informal. “Some types of social capital, like a Parent-Teacher Association, are formally organized, with incorporation papers, regular meetings, a written constitution, and connection to a national federation, whereas others, like a pickup basketball game, are more informal” (Putnam 2000: 22). Thus, not only the formal kinds of civic engagement like membership and active involvement in political parties, civic associations, sports clubs, unions and the like, should be seen as social capital, but also the informal connections people make when they get together for drinks after work, play bridge every Tuesday night, share a barbecue picnic, etc. “Like pennies dropped in a cookie jar, each of these encounters is a tiny investment in social capital” (Putnam 2000: 93).

countries where such virtues are less adhered to. In a previous study of the 1981 EVS data, these values were said to be part of a “traditional-conservative” value dimension (Harding et al. 1986: 223, 232). Traditional-conservative values see religious institutions as important, and look to the church to give adequate answers to man’s spiritual and moral needs, and to people’s questions about family and social life. In traditional societies, family is crucial to survival, and traditional family values refer to strict relations between parents and their children, and a dislike for divorce and new forms of family relations. In traditional societies, a main goal in life is to make one’s parents proud and one must always love and respect them (Inglehart & Baker 2000:25).

Since the traditional-conservative values refer to religious authorities, they can be related to secularization theory, which regards religion as a key component of cultural change. Secularization theory can also be related to social capital. Religion is often assumed to create social trust and to support norms of reciprocity, two of the major components of social capital, and secularization and the increased emphasis on individual autonomy have been looked upon as threats to collective norms and the maintenance of social trust. Stable family patterns and social contexts can also be seen as important conditions for social capital to emerge (Pettersson 1991; Halman & Pettersson 1999a). Such linkages relate the traditional-conservative values to social capital.

In contrast to the assumption of a positive relationship between traditional-conservative values and social capital, the prevalent view in secularization theories is that religion has gradually lost substantial parts of its former impact on social life. The secularization thesis asserts that modernization “brings in its wake (and may itself be accelerated by) ‘the diminution of the social significance of religion’” (Wallis & Bruce 1992: 11). Therefore, secularization theory seems to question the assumption of a positive relationship between traditional-conservative values and social capital. Secularization is associated with social differentiation, which refers to the process “by which specialized roles and institutions are developed or arise to handle specific features or functions previously embodied in, or carried out by, one role or institution” (Wallis & Bruce 1992: 12). The process of differentiation made each social sphere an increasingly autonomous specialized social unit with its own set of values and rules (Münch 1990: 443). The church has lost several of its traditional functions such as schools, hospices, social welfare, registry of births, marriages and deaths, culture, and the organization of leisure (Dogan 1995: 416). Institutional domains have become segmented in the sense that within each institutional sphere, norms and values became increasingly autonomous and self-referential. Arguing along such lines, secularization can be regarded as “the repercussion of these changes on the religious sub-system. It denotes a societal process in which an overarching and transcendent religious system is reduced to a sub-system of society alongside other sub-systems, the overarching claims of which have a shrinking relevance” (Dobbelaere 1995: 1). In other words, according to secularization theory, religion has lost many of its societal and public functions and has become privatized and marginalized within its own differentiated sphere (Casanova 1994: 19). From this point of view, one would not expect a strong relationship between the traditional-conservative values and social capital; rather, these two value dimensions would by and large be independent of each other.

However, the diminishing social significance of religion has not occurred to the same degree in all parts of Europe (see e.g. Halman & Pettersson 1999b; Willaime 1998; Therborn 1995). The modernization, secularization, and individualization processes took a specific form in the Northern Protestant parts of Europe, whereas in Southern European Catholic countries, these processes developed in a different way. Religion’s impact on social capital can therefore

be assumed to be stronger in Catholic countries as opposed to Protestant ones. Further, it has been argued that the Eastern Orthodox tradition is more oriented towards collectivity than Western Christianity (Nagle & Mahr 1999: 53). Thus one might assume the relationship between traditional-conservative religious values and social capital to vary in different parts of Europe and to be strongest in Eastern Orthodox countries and weakest in Protestant countries, whereas the Catholic countries can be assumed to fall in-between the Eastern Orthodox countries and the Northern European Protestant countries. Since the Baltic region contains all of these religious traditions, one might expect both the traditional-conservative values and social capital to differ between various parts of the region.

4. EVS/WVS measurement of social capital and traditional conservative values

As can be easily imagined, the EVS/WVS project, which covers more than 60 countries from different parts of the world, is met by considerable methodological difficulties. “The cross-national survey faces all the problems of the national survey problems of conceptualization, sampling, interview design, interviewer training and so forth. There is, however, one major difference. In the cross-national survey all these problems ... are multiplied by the number of nations studied” (Almond & Verba 1970: 349). Since the EVS/WVS project works with more than 60 countries, various methodological difficulties are indeed frequent. However, and despite these difficulties, comparative analyses are essential for anyone seeking valid knowledge of a specific country or region. In order to find out what is specific to a given country or region, one has to compare it to others. “He who knows only one country, knows none” (Sartori 1991: 245). Comparative analyses are indeed difficult, but nevertheless necessary!

As already mentioned, this chapter will present findings from the 1999 EVS data for the ten Baltic coastline states of Denmark, the former Federal Republic of Germany, the former Democratic Republic of Germany, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Russia, Finland, and Sweden. In each of these countries, the 1999 EVS investigation covered representative samples of the adult population (aged 18-75) of about 1,000 respondents, except for Russia where the sample size was 2,500. All in all, the following analyses of the Baltic countries are based on data for 11,743 respondents.

In order to compare the Baltic countries on the dimension of social capital, I will use the following measurements:

- 1) *Interpersonal trust* is measured by a 3-point indicator, which is based on one item which asked the respondents whether other people can be trusted or not, and one item on whether it is important or not to show other people respect and tolerance (those who favor both opinions get a score of 2; those who favor neither get a score of 0).
- 2) *Social relations* are measured by a 3-point indicator, which is based on two batteries, one on doing voluntary work for a number of social movements, and one on how often one meets other people (those who both do voluntary work for at least one social movement, and who meet friends, workmates, or movement co-members regularly each month get a score of 2, those who do neither get a score of 0).
- 3) *Post-materialism* is measured by a 4-point indicator, which is based on a standard four-item battery (see e.g. Inglehart 1997) on post-materialist priorities for giving people more influence on important decisions and for protecting freedom of speech,

as compared to the materialist priorities of maintaining order and fighting rising prices, respectively (those who give first and second priority to the two post-materialist options get a score of 4; those who give first and second priority to both the last-mentioned materialist options get a score of 1).

- 4) *Protest behavior* is measured by a 4-point indicator, which is based on a battery of items which asked about the respondents' experiences of signing a petition, joining a boycott, or attending a lawful demonstration (those who have been engaged in or could imagine being involved in all three kinds of social protest get a score of 3; those who have not and cannot imagine being involved in any of the them get a score of 0).

In order to compare the Baltic countries with regard to the *traditional-conservative* values, I will use the following measures:

- 1) *Religion* is measured by a 12-point indicator, which is based on one battery which asked whether the church gives adequate answers to man's spiritual, social and familial problems, and on one 4-point indicator which taps how important religion is in one's life (those who say that the church gives adequate answers to all three problems and who say that religion is very important in their lives get a score of 12 ($3 \times 4 = 12$), while those who say that the churches do not give adequate answers to any of the three problems and who say that religion is not at all important in their lives, get a score of 0 ($0 \times 1 = 0$)).
- 2) *Family* is measured by a 24-point indicator, which is based on a battery of six questions which ask about family views and one 4-point item which asks how important the family is in one's life (those who say that the family is very important in their life, and who are of the opinion that 1) marriage is not an outdated institution, 2) that parents are obliged to do the best for their children, even at the expense of their own well-being, 3) that children are obliged to love and respect their parents, regardless of their qualities and faults, 4) that a child needs a home with both mother and father in order to grow up happily, 5) that a divorce is never justified, and who 6) disapprove of a woman who wants a baby but who does not want a stable relation with a man get a score of 24 ($4 \times 6 = 24$)).

With regard to the measurements I use for traditional-conservative values, it should be noted that they do not include any component which taps the "nationalistic" strand of these values (cf. above on this aspect). The reason is simply that the questions in the EVS/WVS questionnaire on national pride and national belonging, which might be considered for this purpose, did not give easily comparable data for the various Baltic countries. This is a good illustration of the fact that the data from the EVS/WVS project meet considerable methodological problems, for instance with regard to the degree of comparability of data from different countries. With regard to the Baltic region, it is therefore important to ask whether or not the data from such differing countries as Russia, Germany, and Sweden can be meaningfully compared.



Figure 48. Family is important, according to inhabitants of all Baltic countries. The meaning of family is, however, culture specific and slightly different in each country. Photo: Katarzyna Skalska

Fortunately enough, there are ways to investigate this problem. The interested reader can find a clarification of such issues in the book *Methods and Data Analysis for Cross-Cultural Research* (Vijver & Leung 1999). In order to demonstrate that the indicators described above can be used for comparisons of the Baltic countries, I have performed a set of factor analyses. The results of two of these are described in Table 4.

Table 4. Results from two varimax rotated principal component analyses of 6 scales based on the 1999 EVS data from 10 Baltic countries. Entries are varimax factor loadings

	Aggregated data (n = 10)		Individual level data: (n aprx 11.000)	
	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 1	Factor 2
Scale:				
Trust	.88	-.34	.66	-.04
Social relations	.89	-.35	.61	-.05
Post-materialism	.89	-.25	.59	-.16
Protest behaviour	.86	-.42	.67	-.16
Religion	-.03	.87	-.04	.81
Family	-.13	.86	-.13	.78

The results shown in Table 4 demonstrate that the factor structure for the six indicators of social capital and traditional-conservative values is the same, both at individual level data and at the aggregated level of the national means for the six indicators. In this regard, the results from a so-called confirmatory factor analysis of the six indicators and their relation to the hypothetical two-factor structure on a 25% sample of the data from the 10 Baltic countries (n = 3.021) should also be noted. The results confirm the two-factor structure (Chi-square: 18.43, 8 degrees of freedom, p = .02; RMSEA = .02, p = 1.0; AGFI = .99; cf. Byrne 2001). As already mentioned, the inclusion of questions about national belonging and national pride into this factor structure disproved the model. Therefore, this aspect of the traditional-conservative value dimension had to be omitted from the analyses.

Furthermore, since the confirmatory factor analysis did not affirm that the factor loadings were equivalent in each country, I have not calculated factor scores for the two dimensions, but for each country and each dimension simply calculated the mean score for two additive scales, one for each dimension. Thus, the additive scale for social capital gives one point each for 1) value 2 on interpersonal trust, 2) value 2 on social relations, 3) value 3 on protest behavior, and 4) values 3 and 4 on post-materialism. The combined scale for social capital thus ranges between 0 and 4, where 0 means that none of the above criteria are reached, and 4 means that all four criteria are met. The additive scale for traditional-conservative values gives one point each for 1) values 16-24 on the family values, and 2) values 9-12 on the religious values. The combined scale for traditional-conservative values thus ranges between 0 and 2, where 0 means that none of the two criteria are met, and 2 that both criteria are fulfilled.

5. A cultural map of the Baltic region

Based on the results from the three factor analyses and the measurements described above, the location of the 10 Baltic countries on social capital and traditional-conservative values can be plotted on a cultural map for the Baltic region only. The Baltic cultural map is shown

in Figure 49 below. It should be noted that for the sake of comparability with the global cultural map discussed above, the traditional-conservative values are inverted on the Baltic cultural map. Thus, a high numerical value on this dimension of the Baltic cultural map indicates a low value on the traditional-conservative dimension. It is obvious that the Baltic cultural map in many respects coincides with the pattern displayed on the global cultural map. Thus, with the exception of Poland, the Baltic countries seem fairly similar with regard to the level of traditional-conservative values, while the differences on social capital appear more pronounced. On social capital, the three Nordic countries score highest, while Russia, Latvia, Estonia, and Poland score lowest. Interestingly enough, the two parts of Germany are fairly similar on social capital, while the ex-communist Eastern Germany scores lower on the traditional-conservative values. A cluster analysis of the results shown in the Baltic cultural map, ends up in three clusters: one for the Nordic countries, one for the two parts of Germany, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Russia, and one for Poland ($p < .01$). Russia, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania can therefore be said to be more similar to Germany than to the Nordic countries, while Poland can be seen as a kind of outsider in the Baltic context, scoring comparably high on the traditional-conservative values and low on social capital. This combination seems to be unique in the Baltic context. With regard to the Baltic cultural map, it can be concluded that comparatively high levels on the traditional-conservative values, and especially the religious values, do not seem to be a necessary condition for high levels of social capital (cf. the above discussion on this topic).

In order to give a more direct and easily read presentation of the magnitude of the differences between the ten Baltic countries with regard to social capital and traditional-conservative values, respectively, Tables 5 and 6 present response rates for each country and components of the two dimensions. In Table 5, the countries are ordered from highest to lowest on social capital. As expected, the response rates presented in Table 5 demonstrate substantial differences between the Baltic countries for each of the five ingredients of social capital. In the Nordic countries, the levels of social trust are about three to four times higher compared to the countries that score lowest (Latvia, Estonia, Russia). In a similar way, considerably more people are socially engaged in the Nordic countries, and the percentages who do voluntary social work and who demonstrate strong informal connectedness are about two times higher there (20-30% as compared to 10%). In the Nordic countries, people are also more prone to take part in various kinds of social protests (50-70%




Figure 49: Social capital and traditional-conservative values in 10 Baltic countries. Results from the 1999 EVS survey. Ill.: Thorleif Pettersson

as compared to 20%). Nordic people are also more likely to demonstrate a post-materialist value orientation, which is said to be “only one aspect of a still broader process of cultural change that is reshaping the political outlook, religious orientations, gender roles, and sexual mores of advanced industrial society” (Inglehart 1997: 31). In summary, it can therefore be concluded that the 1999/2000 EVS data demonstrate a substantial East-West difference in the Baltic region, where the

Eastern part appears considerably poorer on social capital, the social resource which has proven essential for a positive social, economical and political development.

Table 5. Percentages meeting five criteria for social capital in 10 Baltic countries. Results from the 1999 EVS investigation

Country:	Social trust	Voluntary soc. work	Informal connections	Protest proneness	Postmaterialism
Sweden	59%	33%	53%	79%	52%
Denmark	57%	21%	61%	49%	40%
Finland	48%	22%	57%	50%	36%
Germany: West	22%	8%	53%	40%	43%
Germany: East	28%	7%	42%	36%	35%
Lithuania	16%	8%	27%	31%	40%
Poland	15%	7%	29%	22%	32%
Latvia	11%	10%	36%	20%	29%
Estonia	16%	11%	41%	18%	23%
Russia	16%	5%	28%	19%	19%

Social trust: Say that others can be trusted, and that it is important to respect others

Social work: Do voluntary work for at least one social movement

Informal connectedness: Meet friends, workmates and/or movement co-members monthly

Protest proneness: Have done or can imagine signing a petition, taking part in boycott, lawful demonstration

Post-materialism: Favour post-materialist values (score 3 or 4 on post-materialist index)

In Table 6, the countries are ordered in descending order by their average levels of traditional-conservative values. In connection with the Baltic cultural map, it was said that apart from Poland, the Baltic countries seemed to be fairly alike with regard to these values. This conclusion is, however, substantively moderated by the data presented in Table 6. With regard to religion, the differences between the countries are far from minor and negligible. In Poland and Russia, about four out of ten people are of the opinion that meaningful answers to man's spiritual, social, and family problems can be found in the teachings of the churches. In Sweden and Denmark, substantially fewer or only about every tenth person is of this opinion. Religion is also seen as substantially more important in, for instance, Poland and Lithuania compared to Estonia, Denmark, and Sweden. In the former countries, more than 50% of the adult populations say that religion is an important part of their lives; in the latter countries it is only a minority of about 20-30% who share this opinion. Thus, with regard to the religious component of the traditional conservative values, the Baltic countries do indeed differ significantly.

Quite as expected from the factor analyses presented above, the results presented in Table 6 demonstrate that the countries which score high on religious involvement also score high on a traditional-conservative view on family life. Also in this regard the Baltic countries show different patterns. A traditional view on family life is expressed of about 90% of the Polish population, as compared to only one third (about 30%) in Sweden and Denmark. This is indeed a substantial difference. However, this difference does not imply that the family should be of significantly lesser importance in the Nordic part of the Baltic region. On the contrary,

Table 6. Percentages meeting four indicators for traditional-conservative values in 10 Baltic countries. Results from the 1999 EVS investigation

Country:	Church-adequacy	Religion important	Traditional family view	Family important
Poland	45%	84%	65%	91%
Russia	36%	46%	47%	76%
Latvia	27%	34%	58%	72%
Germany: West	31%	39%	42%	79%
Lithuania	40%	57%	32%	67%
Germany: East	17%	17%	41%	74%
Finland	23%	42%	33%	80%
Estonia	17%	22%	39%	68%
Sweden	10%	35%	31%	90%
Denmark	7%	27%	30%	87%

Churchadequacy: Thinks that churches give adequate answers to man’s social, spiritual and family problems

Religion important: Say that religion is important or very important in own life

Traditionalfamily view: Favor at least 4 out of six indicators of traditional family view

Family important: Say that family is very important in own life

in almost all of the Baltic countries, the family is seen as a very important part of the respondents’ lives. This positive evaluation of the family is, however, less pronounced in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. However, in a general sense one can say that the differences in family values seem to pertain more to the kind of family life one prefers, and less to the importance one ascribes to family life, regardless of what kind it is. Most people say that the family is very important, although the kind of family life they prefer may be different.

6. Concluding remarks

This chapter has discussed differences and similarities with regard to two basic value dimensions between the ten Baltic coastline states of Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Russia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, together with Eastern and Western Germany. When seen in a global perspective, the Baltic countries were located in four different cultural zones. In a bird’s eye global perspective, the Baltic countries could also be seen as fairly similar with regard to secular-rational values, but different with regard to values for self-expression and individual autonomy. A closer look at the Baltic region indicated however that Baltic people were substantially different on four components of social capital, and also different in their views on religion and family values, but only to a lesser degree. These differences demonstrated that the Baltic countries could be subdivided into three subregions, with the Nordic countries in one cluster, and Russia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and the two Germanies in another, while Poland seemed to constitute a kind of cultural “outsider” in the Baltic region.

Thus, the greatest differences between the Baltic countries were found with regard to a set of indicators of social capital, where the Eastern part of the Baltic region demonstrated a comparatively restricted access to this important resource for social, economic and political

development. However, this fact does not necessarily imply that the national differences in this regard need continue. Values may change and social capital can grow. According to a well-known theory of such processes, value shifts at the societal level often occur via generational population replacements, where the younger birth cohorts gradually replace the older ones (see e.g. Inglehart 1997). Signs of greater access to social capital among the younger generations may therefore signal future increases in social capital, and the size of the generational differences may anticipate the speed of the changes. The greater the generational differences, the faster the expected changes.

Separate comparisons of social capital in successive birth cohorts in the different Baltic countries indicate that the “generational gap” in social capital is greater in those parts of the Baltic region where social capital is lowest. The younger generations in the Eastern part of the Baltic region are e.g. comparatively more rich on social capital in comparison to their older countrymen than the younger generations in the Nordic countries are in comparison to the older generations in those countries. In the Nordic countries, those who are between 18 and 30 years of age, show a mean value for social capital of 1.83, while the corresponding value for those who are between 61 and 75 years of age is 1.35. The younger are, in other words, richer on social capital than the older. The ratio between the values for the youngest and the oldest generations in the Nordic countries is $1.83/1.35 = 1.39$. The corresponding ratio for the remaining Baltic countries is, however, higher ($0.87/0.57 = 1.53$) and the generational gap in social capital is in other words greater in the non-Nordic part of the Baltic region. Based on the assumption that value changes occur by generational population replacements, this difference can be said to indicate a possibly faster increase in social capital in the Eastern part of the Baltic region in comparison to the Nordic countries.

One of the of the seed-beds for increases in social capital in the Eastern part of the Baltic region is, in other words, positive. It can not be excluded that further analyses of the EVS/WVS data from the Baltic countries may add to this optimistic conclusion. That the conclusion is optimistic can be substantiated from a number of analyses which show that in each of the Baltic countries the relationship between social capital and a democratic outlook, a positive view on gender equality, a less ethnocentric attitude, an emphasis on work achievement, a reluctance towards anti-social behaviors, and last but not least subjective well-being, respectively, are all heading in the expected directions. Only with very few exceptions, these good social fruits appear related to social capital in each of the Baltic countries.

In a discussion of the declining levels of social capital in the United States during the last decades, it is said that the decreasing levels of social capital “threatens educational performance, safe neighborhoods, equitable tax collection, democratic responsiveness, everyday honesty, and even our health and happiness” (Putnam 2000: 367). As a remedy to these threats, a platform for finding ways to, e.g., increase the level of civic engagement among the younger generations, to make the workplaces more family friendly and community-congenial, to reduce the amount of time needed for traveling and to increase the time available for connecting with neighbors, to reduce the time spent in front of de-activating TV-sets, and to make people more interested in politics and communal public life, is suggested (Putnam 2000: chap. 24). Whether such a platform would also work in the Baltic region is an open question that deserves attention.

13 Cultural exchange

Bernard Piotrowski

1. Areas of cultural exchange

At the turn of the 21st century, the exchange of cultural values has gained increasing importance when so much is being said about integration processes and globalization in the broad sense of the word. The aim of this paper is an overview analysis of the main trends and mechanisms of cooperation and exchange of cultural values among the countries and societies living in the Baltic Sea Region.

It is possible to divide Baltic Europe into three main areas of cultural cooperation and exchange:

- a) Scandinavian Europe (Norden), in which the exchange is most intensive and institutionalized (e.g. The Nordic Council and Nordic Council of Ministers), and boasts a hundred years' tradition of development
- b) The Baltic Area, i.e. Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, in other words countries that gained independence shortly after 1991
- c) The Area of Unified Germany (the Baltic area) and Poland (mainly the adjacent Baltic provinces).

Cooperation and the exchange of cultural values in Baltic Europe take place on several levels:

- a) local (micro regional, relationships between local cultures, sometimes of folk character)
- b) national (e.g. Swedish, Polish, Finnish culture)
- c) Nordic (various forms of inter-Scandinavian cultural cooperation and exchange)
- d) Baltic (intercultural management between adjacent Baltic countries and societies)
- e) European (e.g. institutionally valid in the case of the Baltic states such as Denmark, Sweden, Finland and Germany, i.e. members of the European Union).

2. Nordic cultural community

Today's Scandinavia is almost a model area for cultural cooperation on the regional level. The last twenty five years have been crucial in strengthening the Scandinavian belief that in an era of continuing integration and globalization processes, the culture of Nordic societies (there is such a notion as Nordic culture) must be "open to all kinds of cooperation and diffusion of different values and cultural principles" (Duelund, 1994). This kind of culture is based on the notion of *'openness towards winds of the world'*, where 'the arm's-length principle' concerning all forms and areas of cultural exchange is in force. It is both a practical duty and a spiritual mission of a culture interpreted in this way. In geopolitical

terms, it proves the mobility and dynamism of Nordic culture, sometimes perceived as specific to peripheral areas. Nordic committees, official agreements as well as national departments of culture in the Scandinavian countries are interested in processes of internationalization, and, in a narrower scope, in '*Baltization of culture*'. As stated by a Danish researcher, Peter Duelund, any progress in the development of both national and supranational cultures is possible and necessary, provided that it is placed politically in the international exchange. Today we can use the notion of a 'Nordic cultural exchange'. The Nordic Council and the Nordic Council of Ministers understand culture in such a macro-regional perspective.

Principles of the Nordic integration are currently in force in the cultural policy of Sweden and in the development of the Danish model of culture (Duelund, 1995). The significance of the phenomenon of an '*openness of culture*' is particularly stressed in the cultural policy of contemporary Finland (Heiskannen, Kangas, Linberg, 1995) and Norway (Vestheim, 1995).

Nordic Ministers, at a Nordic Council theme meeting, converged in Oslo in early April 2001 to discuss the Nordic Council of Ministers' short-term and long-term strategies for sustainable development. The president of the Nordic Council, Svend Erik Hovmand, opened the meeting with a speech in which he called for debate at the local, regional and global level and stressed the need for global cooperation for the sake of the environment. Although the conference regarded mainly environmental-climatic problems, the current new Nordic sustainable development strategy also concerns complex problems of cultural cooperation at local, national, Nordic, Baltic Sea Region, European, and global levels. In the Scandinavian region, promoting cultural exchange and cooperation between the various Nordic countries and between the Nordic countries and the countries further a field is commonly discussed. It is obvious that in the building and shaping of cultural networks some pan-Nordic cultural projects are essential. Peripheral areas of Europe like the Nordic Countries inspire and consistently strive for various forms and levels of cultural exchange



Figure 50. King Friderik IX of Denmark addressing the first session of the Nordic Council on 13 February 1953 in the chamber of the Danish Upper House at Christiansborg Castle, Copenhagen. To the right Queen Ingrid. Less than half the members of the Council appear in the photograph. Photo: by courtesy of Bernard Piotrowski

with the Baltic states, as well as Poland and Germany. As part of the so-called Network North, all forms of exchange with other Baltic states take place in a broad range of Nordic visual arts, literature, music, contemporary music and theater (with drama), contemporary ballet and dance, new folk and classical music, films and exhibitions, and particular attention is paid to children and youth culture.

Institutionalization. The Scandinavians have a 100 years' tradition of an organized and institutionalized cooperation and cultural exchange within the Nordic region. Shortly after the end of the World War II, the idea of a Nordic cultural cooperation came to life in various forms of contact. The *Nordisk Kunstförbund* was established in 1945. The organization has organized, among others, art exhibitions in the Nordic countries (and since 1955 also outside the Scandinavian region). In 1950s, actors, actresses, musicians, composers, film makers, publishers and writers were supporting an idea of various forms of inter-Scandinavian cultural exchange.

In 1952 an extra governmental pan-Scandinavian organization, the Nordic Council, began to operate. At its first meeting in Copenhagen, in February 1953, the issue of deepening Nordic scientific and cultural cooperation was given priority. The Nordic Cultural Committee was established together with the Nordic Council. The Committee was to be responsible for academic, research, educational, and artistic cooperation. The organization was also concerned with the development of cultural policy in the Scandinavian countries. In order to organize, finance, and propagate cultural exchange in the Scandinavian region, the *Nordisk Kulturfond* was established in 1966. In 1990s, the fund was involved in creating a network of cultural contacts in the Baltic Region in various forms of cultural activity, e.g. in film, literature, fine arts, music and theater. Through granting stipends to university students and junior scholars and scientists from the whole of Scandinavia, the fund has been successfully promoting all the Scandinavian cultures. In 1975 it was decided that the fund would support these cultural projects concerning three Scandinavian countries.

In Helsinki, on 15 March 1971, Scandinavian ministers of education and culture signed a document on Nordic Cultural Cooperation. Through planning, effective coordination, effective division of labor and short-term financing of various forms of inter-Scandinavian cultural exchange and cooperation, they wanted to develop and shape a 'Nordic cultural community'. The Secretariat for Nordic Cultural Cooperation was set up in Copenhagen in 1972. It has been operating through three committees: the committees of education, research, and cultural activity. In order to finance it efficiently, the secretariat prepares long-term plans for Nordic cultural exchange. The Senior Officials' Committee for Nordic Cultural Cooperation also prepares agendas for meetings of the Nordic Council of Ministers (e.g. perspective plans, proposals and priorities of cultural cooperation). In 1977 a session of the Nordic Council was held, during which effective forms of intensifying inter-Scandinavian cultural cooperation were recommended. In 1953-1970 the Nordic Council issued over 200 recommendations regarding culture, only a part of which was put into effect (Klepacki, Ławniczak, 1976, p. 81). The idea of a 'Nordic cultural community' is widely spread among the decision-makers of the fund who, in order to intensify the idea, finance on a short-term basis work groups, associations, organizations, institutions and all the units that deal with culture in the pan-Scandinavian sense of the word.

Activities of the Norden Association (*Föreningen Norden*) is an important link in the cultural cooperation in the Scandinavian region. Through a series of lectures, activities of 'study circles' exhibitions and publications the sense of the 'Nordic cultural community' has become popular among various groups of people, especially schoolchildren.

Numerous forms and networks of inter-Scandinavian cooperation in various fields of cultural activity have become standard models. A unique form of cultural cooperation as far as Europe is concerned is the regional cooperation and promotion in the field of literature. Thanks to the financial support of the Nordic Council, works of Finnish as well as Old- and New-Icelandic literature have been translated into other Nordic languages and English. Through reinforcing both personal and institutional contacts between writers, reader and publishers, a sense of a Nordic 'literary community' has been developed. Children's and youth's literature is promoted in particular. Promotion of folk literature is supported and research on literary folklore is conducted. Furthermore, since 1972 the *Nordiska Institutet for Folkdiktning* (NIF) has been operating in Turku.

Finally, since 1962 prestigious annual literary prizes have been awarded by the Nordic Council to support the artistic work of new writers, supporting those who are better known and acclaimed. It is a way of promoting the more outstanding and artistically matured literary works. Cooperation (exchanging experiences and information) between libraries, publishers and readers has been functioning efficiently as well. Public libraries in all of the Scandinavian countries organize joint courses, exhibitions, lectures and seminars, the aim of which is a more efficient promotion of the various Nordic literatures and in recent years also literatures of the Baltic states. With this end in view, the *Nordisk Folkebibliotekkomitéen* was established as a part of the Nordic Council. The objective here is, above all, the creation of an effective market for book trade in the Scandinavian region. It is also an important component in the building of the Nordic 'cultural and language community'.

Various forms of exchange and cooperation exist among actors and playwrights of the Scandinavian countries. In 1981 the Nordic Theater Committee was set up. The body coordinates, among others, exchange of experiences, programs and theatrical information. The committee organizes courses and trainings for actors and directors. The committee's office is located in Stockholm and is responsible for a close cooperation of Scandinavian actors and directors. The above-mentioned Nordic Cultural Fund supports financially artistic activities of assorted, mainly experimental, theatrical and ballet groups from Scandinavia. Special attention is drawn to the development of children's and school theaters as well as amateur theaters (for this purpose the Nordic Amateur Theater Council was brought into being).

Teater og Dans i Norden – an organization whose main concern is the development of Nordic stage art cooperates with one of the committees of the Nordic Council of Ministers. The organization arranges seminars and symposiums to enable the exchange of experiences of actors, grants stipends and other forms of aid for screenwriters, directors, choreographers and actors. In order to promote the artistic achievements of the Scandinavian theaters, annual 'Nordic days of theater' are organized and since 1993 there have been Nordic festivals of theater schools. The purpose of the above-mentioned undertakings is to arouse the feeling of active work and, above all, community and mutual solidarity of the men of theater and ballet in the Nordic countries.

As early as the 1960s and particularly in the last quarter of the century, the Nordic Council has supported the development and various forms of cooperation of the people from press, radio and television including exchange of programs, documentation and current professional experiences. Since the 1960s and 1970s the School of Journalism in Århus (Denmark) has been organizing annual specialist and debating courses for people working in press and radio. In the field of mass communication Nordic cooperation has been functioning well thanks to the Nordic Council for Scientific Information and Research (*Nordisk Dokumentationscentral for Massekommunikationsforskning*, NORDICOM). The council gathers information on the development of mass

media in the Scandinavian countries and promotes various forms of cooperation between centers, especially press cooperation (Bibliography of Nordic mass communication research, 1994). Many research projects in the field of journalism and socio-political use of mass media have been initiated and implemented by the council. The above-mentioned NORDICOM cooperates with the Scandinavian Documentation Center, SCANDOC that has been operating since 1960.

Coordinating role in the field of gathering and distributing of scientific and technical documentation in the broad sense of the word is done by the Nordic Council of Scientific and Technical Documentation (NORDOK) – a part of the Nordic Council.

Radio is also one of the fields of the Nordic cultural cooperation. A common legislation has been worked out, but most important is the fact that the exchange of experiences, transmission of information and radio programs between the Nordic countries has been functioning superbly. The systematic cooperation in the field of radio has been going on since the beginning of the 1960s.

Since 1962, administration workers, authors of programs, directors and the people responsible for short-term socio-political information and cultural cooperation have been cooperating effectively within the pan-Nordic Nordvision. In Scandinavian consciousness, not only does the notion of national television exist, but also television in a macro regional sense – Scandinavian. After 1980 different forms of cooperation between radio and television of the Nordic countries appeared. In recent years Scandinavian cooperation regarding the exchange of experiences and distribution of diverse satellite television programs (satellite television operates within the whole area of Scandinavia) have been functioning effectively. The expensive program was introduced and implemented in the last quarter of the century and it is one of the more spectacular forms of inter-Scandinavian cooperation of radio and television networks. The effective promotion of various fields of Nordic culture broadcast on the radio and television has been carefully monitored by the association Nordic Film and Television Fund.



Figure 51. Musical life is strongly supported by non-governmental organizations in the Nordic countries. Photo: Katarzyna Skalska

Since the beginning of the 1960s the Nordic countries' cooperation and exchange in the field of production and distribution of films has been noticeable. Here, the support of talented directors and actors has been considerable. Both the short-term and long-term plan was to intensify diverse forms of cooperation of directors, actors and producers in order to create a Nordic film market. The film market was supposed to be competitive with American, Japanese and Western European film making. The idea of creating a dynamic and competitive Scandinavian cinematography was born in the 1960s and 70s, at the time when Swedish, Finnish and partly Danish cinematography could boast good films, talented actors, ingenious directors

open to various artistic and technical innovations. For the purpose of financial support of Scandinavian film production, the Nordic Film and Television Fund was founded. As early as 1961 the Nordic Council suggested that all the obstacles be removed and a pan-Nordic film production be initiated. Children's, youth's and scientific films became a special field of Scandinavian cooperation. Since the 1970s such organizations as the Nordic Film and TV-Union have supported productions of national film making centers. They have also been strengthening bonds between Scandinavian directors and producers. The Nordic Film Committee was created in 1978 for the purpose of creating the 'Nordic film market'. As children's and youth's films were of great importance, the Nordic Board for Children's Films was established. In Scandinavia there is even a tradition of organizing children's film festivals. As a result of the endeavors of the Nordic Council and the Nordic Film Committee, in the 1990s a lot of organizational effort was made and subsidies raised to accelerate the development of short-feature films and documentaries, especially those which dealt with universal, social, moral and ecological problems. Scandinavia is now, as far as Europe is concerned, a model area of regional cooperation in the field of cinematography.

The Nordic Musicians Union unites musicians of the Scandinavian countries. In 1963 the Nordic Music Committee (NOMUS) was set up as a part of the Nordic Council. Since then, the committee has played a legislative, administrative and advisory role in the field of music. It has also published *Nordic Sounds* magazine. The Nordic Council promotes Scandinavian cooperation between composers, organizes concerts of Nordic music, festival and music conferences. Now, apart from Finnish or Swedish national music, one talks of 'Nordic music' pointing, in general, at its mutual artistic features and a regional range. The Nordic Council is also involved in supporting various forms of folk, amateur, children's, youth, school and religious music. The Nordic Amateur Music Cooperation Council (SAMNAM) on a pan-Scandinavian scale organizes festivals, seminars and conferences regarding this kind of music. The regional organization Music of Youth gathers young musicians through organizing annual festivals of 'Nordic music for youth'. In addition, the Nordic Council takes an active part in the development of music schools of both secondary and academic level (here The Union of Nordic Music Teachers). The Nordic Composers Council is an extremely active organization. Even in the field of church music one has the Nordic Sacred Music Council. The Nordic Music Publishers Union also operates supporting an exchange of publications, repertoires and music programs. Since the 1980s the 'modern Nordic music' with its contemporary trends has been promoted as a part of Nordic days of music. Prestigious Nordic music awards have been awarded annually to new artists as well as outstanding and original composers by the Nordic Council since 1965.

A part of Nordic cultural exchange is also a cooperation in the development of fine arts, such as painting, graphics, artistic artisanship, industrial design, typography and architecture. The Nordic Council, together with its specialized committees support young artists, both experimental and professional, through organizing exhibitions, conferences and symposiums. One result from the initiative of the council was the establishing of the Nordic Arts Centre, NKF (*Nordisk Konstcentrum*), inside the rooms of the Swedish fortress of Sveaborg (Suomenlinna) near Helsinki. There are numerous studios for young artists inside the fortress and modern Scandinavian arts exhibitions are organized there. Meetings, conferences, seminars and workshops of artists and art critics have also been held there since 1945. For the artists of contemporary Nordic art, particularly those of the younger generation, it is a real forum for the creative exchange of ideas.

Nordic cultural strategy. In the 1980s and 90s there circulated a notion of a 'Nordic cultural strategy'. What it meant was that the achievements of culture in the broad sense of the word should be adjusted so they met the demands, conditions and threats of the 'fast-changing world'. In the spring of 1994 at a session of the Nordic Council in Stockholm, the connection between shaping 'Nordic culture' and the spiritual needs of a modern human being was stressed. At another meeting of the council, in March 1997 in Helsinki, complex problems of the development of the 'Nordic culture' with regard to the aggressiveness of mass media, commercialization of culture and a greater openness towards the needs and interests of the Baltic region societies were being discussed. It was stressed that the processes of globalization would intensify both communication between people and the transfer of values and ideas. One talks of a multicultural Scandinavia, as well as a Scandinavian variety of style of life, mentality, the need to maintain a freedom of creation, taste and artistic expression. This influences methods of perception and models of cultural communication of the Baltic and Scandinavian societies. One may fear that the so-called global economy contradicts the social rules and cultural values of the Nordic world.

The Nordic Council's conference in Reykjavík in February 1990 was devoted to the issue of the 'Europeanization' of cultural models and standards. 'The New Norden' must become a cultural part of Europe. A '*Nordic case*' or '*Nordic exception*' does not actually exist, since the Nordic World is a mixture of unity and diversity under linguistic and geographical differences. In the cultural aspect, Scandinavia must be a component of the growing European integration. Baltic Europe is a 'mega-region' of Europe (S.O. Kerlsson, 1994, pp. 21). As well as Denmark, Sweden and Finland became members of the European Union in 1995. The cultural 'Nordic diversity' could be realized in a global, European perspective. In the case of Nordic culture, the Scandinavians support, on the one hand, integrating and unifying trends and tendencies, but on the other hand they believe that the Baltic Sea Region is an area of cultural diversity. The bridge, which was inaugurated in 2000 and joins Denmark and Sweden is a kind of 'Cultural Bridge 2000'. Looking at it from the perspective of the 21st century's, this could intensify the cultural exchange between the West and the East, the North and the South.

3. The three Baltic states

As far as cultural policy is concerned, the three Baltic states – Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia are about to solve a number of problems:

- a) In the collective identity and cultural mentality of the societies, all ideological traces of the era of total sovietization of the region by the local and central authorities of the Soviet Union must be got rid of.
- b) The goal is to maintain traditions and promote further unhindered development of the national culture, and in this field all the three republics have achieved positive results.
- c) With the foundation of the Baltic Council, cultural exchange between Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia was made possible. So far, however, this has not been taken full advantage of.
- d) Within Nordic cultural cooperation one talks of the so-called Adjacent Areas that cover the Baltic states (i.e. the area of independent Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and north-west Russia and the Arctic).

At a session of the Nordic Council in Copenhagen in February 1991 it was decided that cultural exchange with the new Baltic states should be enlivened as an important element of the reorganization of democratic and socio-economic structures. In the following years, intercultural exchange was actually enlivened (*Cultural Exchange*, 1994). The Scandinavian policy is 'to promote security, stability, shared values and closer economic, social, cultural and political ties between the Nordic region and the adjacent Baltic areas'. Cultural networks between Finland and Estonia, historically and culturally treated as part of *Norden*, are especially complex. The Estonian university in Dorpat (Tartu) founded in 1632 by the Swedes (*Academia Gustaviana*) is interested in scientific and cultural cooperation, particularly with Sweden and Finland. 18th century Dorpat was an important center of education for Poles (e.g. medical studies) and nowadays various forms of cooperation with Poland are an important issue. Estonia and in part Latvia take part in various forms of cultural cooperation, mainly with the Scandinavian countries, i.e. open-air concerts, poetry festivals, special literary afternoons, song festivals, visual arts exhibitions. These particular forms of cultural cooperation are a kind of manifestation of a practical Nordism or dynamic Nordism.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, cultural contacts between Russia and the Baltic region have decreased significantly. There is practically no cultural link between Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Russia. The only cultural bonds St Petersburg has are with Sweden and Poland. The Russian central authorities have not yet prepared any program of Baltic policy limiting themselves only to political, military and economic issues. In the near future it is crucial to enliven and intensify the cultural contacts of the Baltic societies with Russia, Poland, Germany and the Scandinavian countries.

4. Poland and Germany

On the threshold of the 21st century it is of utmost importance to invigorate the cultural exchange between Poland, the Baltic and Scandinavian countries. The years between 1965-1975 were ones of intensified cultural and scientific exchange between Poland and Scandinavia. Back then the Polish poster, theater plays, Polish films, folk design and partly Polish avant-garde painting were highly valued. After 1990, with the prospect of a free and open culture, new possibilities of a specific and versatile cultural exchange with both the Baltic and Scandinavian countries came into being. Scandinavian departments at the universities of Poznań, Gdańsk and Kraków are an important link in promoting the knowledge of the Scandinavian cultures, as well as in raising Scandinavian philologists. Danish Culture Institutes located in Warsaw and Poznań contribute to the promotion of Danish culture. Compared with the 1970s, however, the number of translations of Scandinavian literature into Polish has decreased. Contacts between artists and producers in the fields of film, music, fine arts and architecture have become more seldom. The notion of an exchange and cooperation within the Baltic area is not seen in the activities of Polish artists and culture activists. One talks a lot of 'Europeanization' of culture but the Nordic dimension plays a very limited role in this.

After the unification of Germany, new possibilities and perspectives for versatile cultural contacts with Scandinavia, Poland and the Baltic states came into being. In the case of these contacts, the term '*intercultural communication*' or '*intercultural management*' is used (*Interkulturelle Kompetenz*, 1997, p. 37). In Germany there is a tendency to talk more of the need for economic exchange, and political and tourist contacts rather than cultural contacts

with Northern Europe. The most active in the field of cultural cooperation are adjacent Baltic Lands (*Bundesländer*) such as Schleswig-Holstein and Mecklemburg-Vorpommern. The real spokesman of the scientific and cultural exchange is *Ministerium für Bildung, Wissenschaft, Forschung und Kultur* of the above-mentioned Land Schleswig-Holstein, supported by the cultural environment and staff of Christian Albert University of Kiel. The German government has not yet proposed any specific strategic guidelines regarding the Baltic policy, very often included in the German Ostpolitik. In the 1990s German cooperation in the Baltic region with ambitious guidelines regarding the realization of an idea of a global culture were discussed (*Interkulturelle Kompetenz*, 1997, p. 125).

5. Conclusions

On the threshold of the 21st century, the internationalization, integration and globalization of social and economic life creates the need for various forms of intercultural communication. The conditions of a faster development in the Baltic Sea Region are of social, cultural, historical and linguistic character. At the turn of the century networks of institutional, administrative, social, economic, scientific and cultural connections were created in this region. Instead of the previous unfriendly attitude, various forms of cooperation and exchange are taking shape spontaneously.

Scandinavia is nowadays what one could call a model area of multilateral contacts in the field of culture and science. The Nordic Council with its whole organizational infrastructure inspires, recommends, promotes and finances various forms of inter-Scandinavian cultural exchanges. The great and modernized scientific, technological and economic potential of the Scandinavian countries makes cooperation much more realistic.

After 1990 the independent republics of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia joined the network of cooperation and exchange. Eventually in 2000 the cultural cooperation of Scandinavia with these countries was more intensified than with Poland (perhaps with the exception of Lithuania) and with Germany.

Germany and Poland play an important economic, political and strategic role in the Baltic Sea Region. However, the potential of both countries as far as cultural cooperation and exchange with the rest of the countries of the region is concerned, has not been taken full advantage of.

14 Education and research as cultural policies

Kazimierz Musiał

1. Introduction

Increased educational and research activities concerning the Baltic Sea region in recent years let us speak of them as of some form of distinctive cultural policies. This chapter deals with the potential of these policies as a possibility for transforming the region into an efficient unit of inter- and sub-national cooperation. On the regional level, overcoming the legacy of the past and meeting the challenge of the future places particular responsibility and awakes expectations with regard to educational and research policies. They are regarded as a likely means of transformation, which in a rational manner may help to turn the Baltic Sea littoral states into a cooperating community. A point of departure is an interest group comprising of independent states which, through cultural policies, starts viewing itself as an integrated socio-cultural community.

Benedict Anderson has shown that a community emerges if the belief in it is shared by a sufficient number of its inhabitants (Anderson 1983). In the prospective Baltic Sea community this implies that the inhabitants should, apart from their national or sub-regional background, be able to identify with common patterns and artefacts which they would regard as constituting a distinctive achievement of the peoples inhabiting the Baltic Sea region. Education and research are able to deliver a matrix for regionalism, i.e. regional identification, through the exchange of ideas among networking scholars and the introduction of common, regionally integrated curricula. So far this aspect of cultural policies has often been overseen, which results in the scarcity of relevant enquiries and research papers.

A reason for underestimating the role of regional education and research as cultural policies has often been their conceptual ambiguity. The concept of “policy” is relatively easy to explain as an organised human activity aiming at achieving social or societal change in a structured manner. The concept of “culture” is more complicated as it includes both abstract and material elements. One refers to learned and accumulated experience or knowledge, the other to the man-made part of the environment. The concept of culture connotes both patterns of behaviour and patterns for behaviour (Keesing 1981:67).

Education and research refer both to the realm of ideas and to the realm of observable phenomena. Within the realm of ideas, culture emerges as “the organized system of knowledge and belief whereby a people structure their experience and perceptions, formulate acts, and choose between alternatives” (Keesing 1981:68). In the realm of observable phenomena created by education and research, culture is identifiable in such artefacts as institutionalised, “material” centers of learning and research. Within both realms, educational and research policies create and transmit symbols, including their embodiments in artefacts, such as schools, institutions, degrees and procedures.

2. Context of transition in the Baltic Sea region

During the last decade of the twentieth century the Baltic Sea region witnessed many changes in political and social constellations which had existed in Europe since the end of World War II. In the 1990s regional actors received an unprecedented chance in modern history of defining the region according to new categories and new paradigms. These were different from those of a geopolitically frozen area clearly divided between two military, ideological and economic blocks. The new political situation enabled some countries to regain their independence and made others redefine the old doctrines and world views. This induced the construction of new cultural and spatial awareness.

The new Baltic Sea region seemed attractive as it allowed for both temporal, spatial and causal redefinition of local actors and policies. In the beginning of the 1990s environmental and security considerations, being partly the legacy of the past decades, were still the main driving forces behind budding co-operation in the geographical space denoted by the Baltic Sea region. Gradually, new aspects were added and building up foundations for a sustainable political, social and economic development became of primary concern.

Education and research have been growing increasingly popular and presently they lie at the very heart of the ongoing transformation. In the long run, it is believed, only the society that bases its development on knowledge has a chance to develop and advance in a sustainable manner. This specific stage of development has been called the knowledge society. The Baltic Sea region is a case in point, inasmuch as its development coincides with the general course of events in the European Union and the world. Similar to the knowledge society being declared the main potential for developing a successful and prosperous Europe, improving a Baltic Sea region knowledge society should provide sustainability and growth in the region.

If one applies the slightly outdated terminology of peace studies and international relations, the knowledge society addresses the ideal of a security community as defined by Karl Deutsch in the 1960s. In the knowledge society, instead of the wartime hardware, it is the “software” provided by education and research and generated in closely co-operating states, which brings about cultural change and which, in turn, guarantees security by means of ever closer collaboration, interdependence and growing cohesion. In their capacity of

Knowledge society

In 1997 a communication from the European Commission declared building up the knowledge society as one of the fundamental pillars of the European Union's internal policies for the future. The declaration was influenced by a belief that at present a transition is taking place from an industrial to a knowledge-based society. In the knowledge society the production and distribution of knowledge is increasingly significant in the determination of economic competitiveness and development. It is the social capital in the sense of “trust”, “norms” and “networks”, more to than the GDP figures and investment capacity, which are supposed to bring socio-economic progress in the 21st century. The policies which drive the knowledge society are innovation, research, education and training. The emerging knowledge society requires new forms of learning like interactive learning between organisations and a new approach to individual learning. As for the interactive learning it has been argued that many regions which are “learning regions” are economically dynamic and characterised by a high level of social capital, while the role of the state is to facilitate the creation and sustain the positive environment. Individual learning, which refers to the acquisition of knowledge, is not primarily about the generation of knowledge but rather about the dissemination of existing knowledge.

constructing identities and transforming culture, education and research become of strategic importance. Their importance is evident when analysing them as particular definite strategies of regional development. In the following, educational and research policy will be shown as a possible tool and a functional correlate of community construction, region building and modernisation.

3. Cultural construction of a regional community

In the 1990s construction of community in the Baltic Sea region happened through challenging the general mode of thinking caused by the bi-polar world system. For instance, the “sea of peace” metaphor launched during the Cold War had to be revised because, instead of forging a community, it rather weakened the feeling of cultural affinity and communion. The idea did not include exchange and communication among the peoples of the region and, as a matter of fact, the “sea of peace” projected war in its field of discursivity. Instead of closely cooperating partners it implied the existence of enemies in the region. Countries on the southern and northern or eastern and western Baltic Sea coasts did not feel they were members of any regional, socio-cultural community (Cf. Stråth 2000:199ff).

More plausible images of a community in the whole region emerged in the late 1980s. Carefully selected events of co-operation in the remote past provided a more credible foundation for the newly projected regionalism. Trade relation or political domination in the pre-nation state era were employed to present region-building as a natural process. A specific version of history suggested a certain naturally founded, generic community of destiny in the Baltic Sea region. Hanseatic trade or the geopolitical figure of *Dominium Maris Baltici* were among the most spectacular constructs.

New Hansa. The images of Hansa especially were found suitable for defining a functional region based on historical identity. This referred to former territory controlled by the Hanseatic League, whose towns were efficiently organised in a network partnership stretching from Bergen in the West to Novgorod in the East. With this historical evidence in mind, the policy makers fuelled the debate with carefully chosen examples like, for instance, the New Hansa coined in 1988 by the former prime minister of Schleswig-Holstein, Björn Engholm. For at least a decade the concept of the New Hansa enjoyed the unceasing attention of politicians and journalists and was frequently addressed in the German Ostseeraum-discourse.

However, the New Hansa was not equally attractive to all regional actors. Instead of references to remote history, Scandinavian scholars preferred imagining the future co-operation across the Baltic Sea within the framework tried out among the Nordic countries. In Sweden “soft” environmentalism, i.e. propagating ecology and environmental protection, emerged as a new regional ideology. This was a starting point for many foundations, educational initiatives and government policies. Functional region-building within the scientific community, with a point of departure in the environment and nature protection, became a priority for some of the educators and cultural policy makers and a point of departure for building the region by educational means.

The first educational initiative. One of the most spectacular examples of this orientation was undoubtedly the establishment of the Baltic University Programme in Uppsala in 1992. The program gradually developed other interdisciplinary syllabi to cover such issues as demo-

cratic institutions and political and social development. Up to now the programme has been associated mostly with environmental protection and sustainable development. In 2000 Prof Lars Rydén, the program director, was awarded a prize for his work “to combine care for environment and nature protection with a sustainable economic development in the Baltic Sea Region”. In a broader sense these are still the main fields of interest of the Baltic University Programme, despite its explicit attempt to promote courses dealing with politics, culture and other issues at the regional level.

Nordic approach. The construction of a Baltic Sea region community emerging in the Nordic countries was also enhanced by some Scandinavian scholars who hinted at a possible evolution of the Nordic identity into a Baltic Sea identity. This was supposed to compensate for the vacuum which allegedly occurred in Norden after it had lost its “Middle Way” status when the iron curtain had collapsed (Wæver 1992). Indeed, the great interest which the reinstated Baltic states enjoyed in the Nordic countries throughout the 1990s could have become a catalyst of cultural change. Increasing subregional co-operation and common educational ventures bears witness to this burgeoning process in which the Nordic countries often provided the most significant assistance to the three Baltic republics. Nevertheless, throughout the 1990s, the Nordic countries were not willing to dilute their relatively homogeneous Nordic identity for an emerging, diversified Baltic Sea community.

Furthermore, the Nordic approach mostly disregarded the role of the three largest national actors in the region, i.e. Russia, Germany and Poland. From the Polish side, like in the Baltic republics, only at the beginning of the 1990s pursuing a new common Baltic Sea identity became part of the strategy towards the European integration (cf. Heurlin 1997a, p.121). An echo of this rhetoric is still present in Poland, yet the attractiveness of the Baltic Sea region community for the Polish politicians started fading away once the perspective of joining the EU became more realistic (Cf. Kwaśniewski 1999). For the Polish public the Baltic Sea region as a community of practice, i.e. a closely networking, policy-based territorial community, still remains to be discovered.

What is the Baltic region? A problem which has accompanied projection of a socio-cultural community is the very definition of the region in the Baltic Sea context. For one thing, the terms denoting sub-areas and their inhabitants shift over time and are linked to political changes, for the other, different sciences have defined the geographical space of their interest

in a discipline-specific way. For the natural sciences, for instance, watersheds mark the regional borderlines and according to them the Baltic Sea region is congruent with the drainage basin of the Baltic Sea. Conversely, a cultural definition opens up for a more diversified interpretation but, in reality, a political construction of the region is taking place and it negotiates its field of discursivity with the geographical definition of the subject matter.

Hence, regardless of whether the emphasis is on drainage basin



Figure 52. Students of the Baltic University Programme. Photo: Lars Rydén

or common history, the Baltic Sea region can hardly be defined by institutionalised state membership or exclusion. It is rather, as suggested by some authors, a truly post-modern creation in the sense of a possible, negotiable construction. It may be seen as a region without strict boundaries or with varying boundaries (Cf. Joenniemi 1997:222 and Lehti 1999:435). Depending on definition the Baltic Sea region is as large as from Norway to Ukraine or, when narrowly defined, only covering the sub-regions of the Baltic Sea littoral states. When trying to identify a community or regional identity one has to be aware of these floating connotations.


Like other communities, the Baltic Sea region is made up of history. So far some constructs of the past decade have helped to imagine a common cultural basis by referring to the same nodal points in the region-building discourse. Up to the 1990s, common care of the marine environment was the only platform for pan-regional scientific cooperation. In the 1990s, fields of discursivity created around civil society, human rights, subsidiarity and democracy have contributed to creating a sequence of common denominators for co-operation. Some new pan-regional institutions were established on the grounds of this platform as a proof of progressing regionalism. Broadly understood cultural policies were supposed to follow, among them education and research involving region-oriented academics and students.

4. Education and research as a strategy of region-building

Improving a regional knowledge society is important, inasmuch as it may provide common patterns for and of behaviour in the Baltic Sea region of the future. In this regard the question is whether education and research organised in a regional network and realised through regionally-oriented training and innovation is attractive enough to become a new “unifying” factor for the whole area. The historical record prior to the 1990s in this domain is not very impressive, owing to the fact that the Baltic Sea region epitomised the constraints and limitations of the Cold War policies in a nutshell.

Ecological concerns. The first serious attempt to include scientific research into a regionally-based confidence-building initiative happened with the participation of the natural sciences. Ecological concerns and protection of the marine environment in the Baltic Sea were issues which, despite the Cold War, provided the first functional platform for regional co-operation among the scientists of the region. The Helsinki Commission (HELCOM) set up within the framework of the 1974 Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment in the Baltic Sea Area guaranteed that all countries were treated as equal partners and it became one of the first forums of dialogue on the regional level. The convention stipulated, among other things, extended scientific cooperation through the receiving, processing, summarising and dissemination of relevant scientific, technological and statistical information among the parties of the convention, which would further the promotion of scientific and technological research. This could have become a foundation of building the region through common educational and research initiatives.

Nevertheless, the real breakthrough for devising a qualitatively new region-building was shaped by the extraordinary opening of unmitigated and face-to-face contacts between peoples, organisations and institutions. The cultural landscape changed rapidly and both the so-called “transition countries” and the more stable “old democracies” in the Nordic countries and Germany had to adjust to the reality in which a “bottom-up” perspective on regional policy-



Map 22. The Baltic University Programme network. Ill.: Karin Hallgren

making grew more popular. The scientific community was affected by this reorientation and scholars became active participants in defining the framework of transformation. This time, however, not only the ideologically “neutral” natural sciences, but also the social sciences and humanities in general entered the discourse.

Region building from social sciences’ perspective. The fall of the iron curtain brought about the so-called post-modern condition in the social sciences. In studies of international relations, the geopolitical approach based on bi-polarity became a less favoured mode of looking at the developments. Due to new regionalism the realist paradigm with its point of departure in the individual state as an actor in international politics has been particularly subject to criticism and often disqualified. Bi-

polarism and traditional notions of security, which in the past had been used as a constant of international relations, have gradually lost their relevance. Building up security by other means, such as promoting education for civil society or enhancing interdependence, has grown increasingly important as a more rational strategy of the region-building process.

Region-building became one of the main categories taken on board by different social sciences as a plausible framework to describe what was happening below and above the statist level in the age of globalisation. Some historians and political scientists saw region-building bearing a great deal of resemblance to nation-building. Their point of departure was that any community, be it national or regional, needs preachers of the community as well as a number of cohesive artefacts to prove its existence (Hettne et al. 1998, p. 419ff). To define region-building meant defining the actors and institutions of the process. Furthermore, following an observation of E.J. Hobsbawm that “nationalism made nations” (Hobsbawm 1993:10) the quest was on to define the ideological content of regionalism. Regionalism, with its artifacts, would seem necessarily to have existed before the region in question was established. The concept of regionalism, i.e. regional consciousness, has emerged as an ideological correlate of the region-building.

Parallel to this direction in studies of region-building, several other attempts to conceptualise regionalism and regionalisation in the Baltic Sea area could be witnessed. For instance, region-building was explained as a strategy towards establishing a Baltic “security community” in a longer perspective (Heurlin 1997b, p. 220). According to this agenda, in the course of the 1990s a gradual transformation of the security dimension in the area has taken place in the direction of regionally oriented “soft” security. Security ceased to be solely a statist, high policy theme, and the “magnetism of integration” made the societal and less institutionalised world-view more attractive for diversified region-builders (Cf. Joenniemi 1997).

New regionalism. The majority of the social scientists and research institutions regarded region-building as a process which could be studied as a model case in relation to some arbitrary ideal type. Many conferences and workshops have been organised, older theories of international relations tried out and new theories formulated (Wæver 1992, p. 31ff). In studying region-building, both old and new theories were tried out and the concept of new regionalism emerged as a means of explaining the qualitative change in policy making in relation to the previous era. The dividing line between the old and new regionalism was at the beginning of the 1990s.

The old regionalism emerged as a correlate of older theories of international relations, formed in and shaped by a bi-polar world system, and classified regional policies as created “from above” by the superpowers. It concerned relations between formally sovereign states and was very specific with regard to objectives, some organisations being security-oriented, others being economically-oriented (Hettne 1999:7f). Old regionalism would be mainly realised through institutions at an international level, propagating a top-down pattern of region-building. Conversely, new regionalism denotes a multidimensional form of integration which includes economic, political, social and cultural aspects and is promoted “from below” by a large number of different types of institutions, organisations and movements.

According to this typology education and research in the region during the Cold War developed mostly within the framework offered by old regionalism. Institutions and policies furthering the cultural dimension of regional policies were few and formalised. Cultural exchange agreements between states and governments, including education and research, were bound to follow a top-down principle of implementation. Cultural agreements not only provided very tight and rigid frameworks of formal co-operation but established limits on who could go abroad to study or perform, and for how long. The antagonised blocks of the Cold War organised their cultural policies without much openness for the ideas developing on the other side of the iron curtain.

The beginning of the 1990s marks a qualitative breakthrough in region-building in the Baltic Sea region. It is at this point that theoretical studies postulate new regionalism as the most fitting matrix for explaining the developments. By definition the new regionalism opens up for a more pragmatic and future-oriented vision of a community of practice based on increased networking within a policy-based regional community. The main argument for it is that in the whole region a great number of new initiatives and new policies have been introduced in order to come to terms with the new reality.

Regionalism the Nordic way. However fitting the dichotomy of the old and new regionalism is for marking the fall of the iron curtain, it may be argued that some limited policymaking within the scenario of the new regionalism was present in the Baltic Sea area throughout the Cold War. Whenever any policies were supposed to serve the ideology on the

south-eastern coasts of the Baltic Sea, exceptional initiative of cultural and political exchange and co-operation among the Nordic countries grew more concrete. It was only in the 1950s that the Nordic Council started its activities as a consulting organisation, where questions of common interest for the member countries should be discussed and proposed for ratification by the national governments. Establishment of the Nordic Council institutionalised the original feeling of close cultural affinity among the Nordic peoples and a region-building policy based on the least common denominator was initiated.

Consequently, the Nordic Council addressed issues which helped create many non-statist institutions and which were answers to initiatives from below. For a long time, indeed, it was the only viable pattern of a functional and functioning regional co-operation in the Baltic Sea area. From 1946 to 1972, for instance, a Nordic Cultural Commission operated, from 1952 parallel to the Nordic Council, as a permanent co-operation organ responsible for identifying questions and suggesting common solutions in the broadly defined domain of cultural policies. These were initiatives in education, research, popular education as well as in literature, music, theater and other arts (Stråth 1994; Andrén 1994). Within the community of the Nordic countries the new regionalism was practised along with a more formalised old regionalism long before its application in other parts of Europe.

The novelty of the “new” regionalism emerging in the Baltic Sea region since the 1990s is that it has concerned the whole region and has not been limited to the Nordic countries alone. Educational and research cooperation is one of the most spectacular examples of the regional community of practice emerging around the Baltic Sea. Education and research, strengthening the construction of regional identity, have become some of the main tools in the region-building cultural policy kit. More importantly, nowadays not only the natural sciences but also the social sciences provide grounds for co-operation within the scholarly community of the region.

5. Regional Knowledge Society as a strategy of modernisation

Initialising educational and research network. At the beginning of the 1990s the Nordic countries were among the first actors to devise a region-wide strategy of modernisation based on education and research. This was due to their long-lasting tradition of educational networking and co-operation in research that had been tested during the previous decades. After the collapse of the iron curtain the Nordic Council of Ministers became the first insti-

Strategy of modernisation

The experience of the past decade shows that region-building may be treated a strategy of modernisation. Within this framework, region-based educational and research networks have been gradually made more prominent because a scholarly structured diffusion of progressive ideas in the region has a greater chance of creating a coherent pattern for social and political advancement. A learning Baltic Sea region dominated by trust, norms and networks is able to bridge the gap between the peoples and countries while generated economic dynamism brings all partners more wealth and prosperity. Initialising educational and research networks may be regarded as the most effective strategy of regional modernisation, since scholars and the academic community are probably the quickest to accept common standards and norms.

In May 2000 a special “Initiative for strengthening the Baltic Sea region” was motioned by the opposition parties in the Bundestag and in November the government answered with an 80 page-long paper summing up the chances and risks of economic growth existing in this region. The discussion suggested that the region might become an “engine of new development and well-being” in Europe and the world. Furthermore, with over 300 universities and research institutions, it might also become a significant educational and research centre in Europe. The German academic community has for some time prepared for a clear stand on this issue and suggested solutions.

Prof Bernd Henningsen, director of Nordeuropa-Institut at the Humboldt University in Berlin, who is one of the most active protagonists of institutionalised educational and scientific co-operation in the area, promotes the idea of a pan-regional Baltic Sea University (Henningsen 2000). This is to become an institution, both virtually and of bricks and mortar, where the old ideal of university as a cultural centre will meet the challenge of regionalism and, within this framework, of identity-building. As the first stage on the way towards its establishment, a research training network The Baltic Sea Area Studies: Northern Dimension of Europe (BaltSeaNet) was started in summer 2000. With eight participating universities and coordinated by the Nordeuropa-Institut this venture promotes the exchange and education of young researchers who in the future will become regional professionals and, at the same time, a new elite implicitly aware of the region’s diversified culture.

Nonetheless, the BaltSeaNet is not the only recent initiative with a modernising effect on the university co-operation in the region. The idea of higher-education and research institutions being able to provide patterns of modernisation for the whole region finds its protagonist in all Baltic Sea littoral countries. The universities of Turku and Tartu University offer courses in their centers for Baltic studies, aimed at developing local awareness of the regional issues. So far, their curricula have mainly covered Finland and the Baltic states while the pan-regional dimension has been represented to a limited degree. In Sweden a Baltic and East European Graduate School (BEEGS) created in 2000 and based at Södertörn University College has the ambition of functioning as an international research centre, graduate school, school of further education and research depository for the Baltic Sea region.

An educational initiative which deserves special attention in the context of its modernising effect on the region is the EuroFaculty called into being by the Council of Baltic Sea States in the middle of the 1990s. The EuroFaculty was formed to foster the establishment of modern teaching programs in economics, law, public administration and business administration in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. In 2000 the Kaliningrad State University inaugurated its first EuroFaculty courses, thus expressing its will to increase the cohesion of its educational offer with the other universities in the region. However costly, initiating EuroFaculty in Kaliningrad seems to be one of the feasible means of modernisation and integration of this Russian academic centre based in the Baltic Sea region into the western academic world.

Among all educational and research initiatives called into existence in the Baltic Sea region, the EuroFaculty has been the most spectacular as to its explicitly defined goal to modernise higher education in the Baltic republics. It has managed to a great extent to realise its mission, even though establishing EuroFaculty in Kaliningrad may take more time and money than expected. Even if the EuroFaculty is criticised – the program has implicitly recognised the superiority of the “western” academic world over its east European counterpart – there is no doubt that it has furthered decent academic standards while at the same time forging greater unity among and within the participating universities. It has also introduced good practice in education and research, which is a prerequisite for local scholars on the eastern coast of the Baltic Sea for their participation in the regional knowledge society.



Figure 53. Photo: Katarzyna Skalska

6. Conclusion

Cultural policy shaped and furthered through education and research has the potential of becoming one of the most important means of region-building. Apart from propagating sustainable development in the sense of nature protection and the use of resources, education for civil society has been the most spectacular achievement of regional scholarship so far. This has been important because the Baltic Sea region is a laboratory of transition and transformation, in which the problems of uniting Europe are particularly tangible. More importantly, the social change experienced during the past decade requires effective cultural policy to let the people absorb the rapidity and irregularity of transformation.

In this regard a knowledge society in the Baltic Sea region provides a possibility for adapting to the ongoing changes in the least problematic manner. Educational and research policies which promote the physical mobility of learners and teachers, virtual mobility and the various uses of new information and communication technologies, introduce a new cultural pattern where everybody is given equal access to the existing facilities. Further development of co-operation networks, the promotion of language and cultural skills, pilot projects based on trans-national partnerships etc. offer a chance to turn the Baltic Sea region into a learning region in which innovation in resources, the acceptance of common academic standards and dissemination of good practice in education will be realised in full. Thanks to education and research, the regional factory of identity can be managed in a more rational way and the result become advantageous for the futures of the individual states and their citizens.

1. Soundscapes

Music in the Baltic Region can be divided in two different layers:

- (1) the soundscape of the countryside including working songs, herding calls, songs and instrumental tunes of the *pendulum of life* and the change of season,
- (2) the soundscape of the city with its art music and popular music.

The two different soundscapes were more or less separated until the first decades of this century. In the 19th century the interplay between the songs and tunes of singers and fiddlers from the countryside with art and popular music by composers of the city emerged into a different kind of symbiosis: the musicians of the rural society not only changed their instruments but also gave up the medieval drone technique (which used a sustained note 'droning' below the melody) and introduced harmonic thinking. The composers incorporated melodies and sounds from country singers and fiddlers in their solo, chamber, and orchestra music and many operas were based on folk tales.

Because of the industrialization and medialization, including the growth of the mass media during the first part of the 20th century, most of the old rural soundscape disappeared or was transformed into staged folklore, often based on a nationalistic ideology. At the same time the impact from different waves of popular music from Germany and later from England and the USA created a kind of musical mainstream with very few "nationalistic" characteristics. Modern art music can also be characterized as a kind of musical mainstream with very few traits that can be identified as typical of a nation or a region. Instead there are different schools, created by an individual composer, whose ideas can dominate for a long time.

We will start this survey of music in the north of the Baltic region and then continue south. We will discuss different segmentations of music: how different sounds, which

are defined as "music", were used in different societies and connected with different parts of cultural, religious and political life.

2. Saami music – the 'yoik'

The 'yoik' is a very special kind of song, still thriving among the roughly 35,000 Saami (or Lapp) people who live mainly in northern Sweden, Norway and Finland as well as on the Russian Kola peninsula. The 'yoik' has many variants. What is described below is a sort of common denominator of the original 'yoik' and its later transformations.

The 'yoik' is neither song nor speech but a mode of expression of feelings or story telling in small, rhythmically varied motifs with dramatic shifts in dynamics and accent. There is a Saami word for this very special type of performance: 'juoi'gat'. In the southern Saami areas the older forms dominate, characterized by a tense vocal technique, nonsense syllables, a small number of notes and various kinds of 'sliding' notes. In the northern areas there are often pentatonic melodies, or a mixture of melodies, in which major tonalities predominate. The melodic form can be constant, but the pitch shifts upwards during the performance.

In a travelogue from a journey through Lapland in 1673, Johannes Schefferus described a Saami named Olof Sirma performing 'yoiks'. This description corresponds well to the 'yoik' as it is performed today, confirming the durability of the tradition:

The performer begins in his own fashion, choosing to sing louder or softer depending on his sense of the composition. Sometimes he repeats the entire song over and over. He sings on no special note, but performs according to his habit and however it sounds best to him.

When the Saami migrated west from their Asiatic camps, they brought the rituals of shamanism with them, and the shaman drum. Both are closely associated with the 'yoik'.

In heathen times, the drum was used by the Saami priest, the *nåjden* to make contact with the gods. Scenes portraying the higher forces of nature who were the drummer's 'help and his bane' were painted in red on the drum skins. Using the drum, he would put himself into a trance. His soul would rise from his body and then, a spirit himself, he would learn things about the future. The 'yoik' has also inspired different composers to interpret the world of the Saami, from Abbott Vogler and Wilhelm Peterson-Berger (Symphony nr 3, *Same Ätnam*, 1913-15) to young composers today such as Rolf Enström, who won the Prix Italia in 1987 with a composition based on a 'yoik'. In the 1980 Eurovision Song Contest the Norwegian contribution 'Samiid Aednan' was based on a 'yoik' by Saami musician Mattis Hætta. This is a contemporary example of a 'yoik' presented as popular music.

3. Music as signals and communication – herding calls

All over the Baltic Region the human voice and implements such as animal or man-made horns, rattles, and the drum were important work tools for communication. Rattles have also been used to scare away birds out of gardens or vineyards, and guards have also used them to communicate with one another. The songs, calls, and instrumental melodies on the shepherds' horn and flute, the herding calls, are probably the best-documented working songs, followed by calls associated with harvesting.

Pastoral cultures in the Baltic region had a highly refined signaling system. The signals both had a communicative function for work and a decorative, aesthetic function. In this environment shepherds and shepherdesses developed their own music, which both carried a message and was beautiful to listen to. Music intended for gathering domestic animals, rather than repelling wild ones, almost always contained an "aesthetic" element, as did the music used to communicate with other shepherds.

Shepherds' signals contained short themes with frequent interruptions, were constructed asymmetrically and constantly used their musical phrases in varying combinations. The calls were constructed of alternately short and long phrases, often distinctly rounded off and clearly distinguished from one another. There was interplay between functional and aesthetic

elements. For functional reasons, there were vocal variations including pure speech-song, calling for attention, and melismatic song in a high register. The calling songs are structured in alternating long and short phrases, often clearly rounded off, and distinctly separated from one another by rests for breathing. The phrases are added to one another according to their function and combined into segments of varying length and with constantly shifting combinations of phrases.

The transformation of herding music from cow-calls to tourist attractions started just after the first published notation of the music. Today we find it as an element of tourism, folk music festivals and in the mass media. In practical life there is no more a need for herding calls and they have been replaced. Those who tend their animals in mountain pastures today, may "commute" by automobile between their homes and their pasture cottages, and in the cottages turned into cafés serving waffles there is "real folk music" played as recorded background music. However, many things still remain authentic and unchanged.

4. Songs of work

Singing at work, while planting, harvesting, working indoors or walking to and from work, served to bridge the gap between work and leisure time in the Baltic region. There are also rhymes for work, and songs for pile-driving, loading, sailing, fishing, driving, rowing, spinning, weaving, and sizing cloth. Sailors also had a complete battery of calls, songs, as well as instrumental melodies for different aspects of their work.

Like herding music, many of these songs were purely "communicative", with shouted formulas and loudly pitched notes to keep farm labourers in contact with one another despite the distance between the fields. The texts sometimes describe the different aspects and phases of harvest work, and some are love songs. Harvest songs from the North Eastern part of Europe have melodies which seldom span more than a few notes and identical melodic structure is repeated and varied by adding pedal-points (a low, sustained base note), melodic ornaments, falsetto screams and imitative effects. These songs are often performed by a group of at least two or three singers. Change of register is an important stylistic device used to achieve

a harmony or “heterophony” of consonants. Different groups and regions also seem to have different aesthetic ideals.

The harvest songs are a highly specialized genre of folk singing, related to a signaling function and with a strong aesthetic emphasis. But primarily this kind of mainly female singing originates in a magic function. Migrant harvest workers, men and women, traveled together in large groups and worked for pay. They had one or two leaders who negotiated their terms with the masters, and who also distributed the tasks among them. One Estonian manor lord made special use of the bagpipe player he hired at harvest time:

It was a strange sight to see the squadrons flattening the grain, moving continually forward with the bagpiper as their field musician, and with their sergeants (= the foremen) commanding them with their sticks in hand. The harvesters took it as a shameful criticism of themselves if the bagpiper began to play fast tunes, as this was a sign that they were working too slowly. Thus their work continued to the beat, with no interruptions, as long as the bagpipe was played. If the bagpipe grew silent, work stopped, and the scythe each worker held in his hand appeared to droop. The day after the harvest was all in, there was a great celebration, known as “Talkus” in Estonian. This is one of the happiest days of the year for poor Estonian farmers. Usually the day workers were also invited to a Talkus put on by the estate owner.

In recent years harvest songs have experienced something of a revival. They are sung by choirs in Eastern Europe making efforts to reproduce the sharp nasal sound that characterizes many harvest melodies.

Today, shanties, sailors’ working songs, are also a special feature of the folk music movement. The first International Shanty Festival, Shanty ’87 was held in 1987 in Kraków, Poland.

In the 18th century Acerbi described the Finnish milling songs, sung to the endless task of hand grinding grain. This was a job done all the year round with vocal accompaniment, in contrast to tasks like flax-making, the songs of which were associated with a particular season. Songs associated with spinning are also common in the Baltic region:

A Westphalian farmer encouraged his children and servants at their spinning by singing to them: “As soon as I notice the wheel spinning less joyfully I suggest a cheerful song, and you should hear how fast the spinning wheel cheers up as well...”. The best of the spinners sing and spin long verses in the time it takes others to begin to spin their thread or to sing their first couplet. I must admit that it would be difficult to find a nobler yardstick by which to measure the skill of this handicraft.

Songs were also sung (by women) while they were weaving, carrying water, washing, berry picking, rocking the cradle, etc. Most of these songs of work were intended to take their minds off the domestic chore at hand. Probably the rhythms were not as important as the rhythms of the rhymes and songs sung during heavier labor.

Thus working music may contain sound structures forming simple signals with an unambiguous meaning relating to a given task, but it may also be complex and beautiful music for voices and instruments. These are the two ends of a long spectrum of music that has been an important aspect of the everyday life of people in the Baltic region as well as in other parts of Europe.

5. Song as narrative – the runo songs

In addition to lyric songs, which are found all over Europe, there are narrative songs which are very typical for parts of the Baltic region.

Like the ‘yoik’ of the Saami, the Finnish *runo song* can hardly be considered ‘singing’ in the traditional sense of the word. It is more like a mixture of recitative and calling, with some melodic features as well. The runo song might well be described as a kind of drama including both imitation of sounds from nature and mime.

A number of runo melodies were written down in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.

The actual narrative is the basis of the runo song, and the dramatic story telling is interspersed with lyrical elements. It is probable that there was a sort of ‘grammar of folk poetry’ handed down from generation to generation (see also Laitinen 1985). The poetry was based on the ‘Kalevala’ metre, with free grouping of the lines of verse. This ‘grammar’

contained alliteration, repetition and recurrent patterns. If a person was familiar with the ‘grammar of folk poetry’, he could shape his song during the performance, and he knew how to make the transitions between narrative prose and lyrical poetry, where to interject incantations and joking verses, and how to set his pitch and rhythm.

The stories themselves have been gathered into an epic poem, the Kalevala. This process of transformation was not unique to narrative song in Finland, Estonia and the area of Russia from which the *runo* song probably once migrated to the north. We can see the same historical development regarding the



Figure 54. Kobsari player. The Ukrainian narrative song *duma*, was accompanied on a string instrument the kobzari, as pictured here. The *duma* is related to the *bylina*, and accompanied on a *gusli*, a similar instrument that was more common in Northern Russia. The *gusli* is also related to the Finnish *kantele*

byliny, the *dumy* and the heroic songs from the Balkan peninsula.

In ancient times, the singer had an assistant, who repeated the final verses or, if the singer required a break, repeated an entire verse. Sometimes both singers were accompanied by a *kantele* player.

The art of creating *runo* songs is said to have accompanied the Finns as they wandered north, leaving cultural traces in both Russia and Estonia. The Kalevala gave the Finnish culture its identity. Poets, painters and composers have constantly returned to this epic, finding in it new inspiration for portraying the destiny of their people. Today, hard rock bands and television producers give us their versions

of an apparently inexhaustible and indestructible heritage of ideas, stories, visions, and love poetry. Today, as in the past, the Kalevala is performed using pitch and rhythm, although the music of the *kantele* is usually replaced with that of a symphony orchestra or rock group.

6. Russian byliny

Byliny, or Russian narrative songs of heroes and their traditional exploits, are related to *runo* songs in terms of content and, most importantly, in terms of function. Like the *runo* songs, *byliny* represent the history and heritage of the peasants. Many *byliny* have been annotated and recorded. The poetic language and performance technique of the *byliny* are very special. A *byliny* is held together by a recurring melodic formula. Various poetic techniques, such as assonance (vowel rhymes, internal rhymes or half-rhymes), are used to weave the language into a tonal whole.

Byliny are not adapted to any particular metre. Their textual structure is very free. The stories progress through highly patterned melodies, punctuated with recurring phrases that serve as cadences. Many of the melodies only use a few notes.

The wandering singers, poets and *byliny* tellers accompanied themselves on a *gusli*. The only place where the *byliny* survived until modern times was in northern Russia near Arkhangelsk. The origins of the *byliny* are shrouded in the mists of history. Some scholars believe that the early *byliny* were medieval heroic songs performed at the royal courts, and that when they began to be outdated as real history among the boyars, they were taken over by the peasants and mythologized in the world of imagination.



Figure 55. ‘Kashubian notes’ – teaching folk music Photo: Alfred F. Majewicz

Even though historians have identified real people and places in these old songs, no one considers them a reliable historical source.

Later, the byliny also were 'discovered' by the intellectual middle class. Early collections were made by devoted amateurs. In manuscripts from the eighteenth and nineteenth century, byliny are mixed with prose narratives describing the ancient Russian heroes. The byliny have become part of the Russian national culture, not unlike the Kalevala in Finland. At the beginning of Glinka's opera *Ruslan and Ludmila*, a Russian story teller appears with his *gusli* telling tales of Russian heroes and their traditional feats, a kind of Russian Homer. Reinhold Glière's Symphony number three (opus 42, 1909-11) also portrays Ilya Murometz, the byliny hero.

The Ukrainian narrative song is referred to as the *duma*. Although it bears a resemblance to the bylina, it also has many independent stylistic features.

7. Choral music

Folke Bohlin

The musical difference between rural and urban areas is similar in most European countries. Opera stages, symphony orchestras and music conservatories, for example, are to be found only in cities. But regardless of local conditions or national boundaries, certain types of music reach out everywhere through the modern mass media. One can therefore ask if there are any musical traits which give a character of their own to the musical life of the countries around the Baltic Sea.

Let us focus here on one phenomenon, which also exists elsewhere, but has become of unique importance in this area: *the most widespread form of musical activity in the region is choral singing*. It appears in several different forms: professional and amateur choirs, male, female and mixed choirs, children's and adult choirs, big and small choirs and so on.

A choir can have primarily musical aims, but very often the work of the choir is also connected with extramusical, ideological aims. This opens two main perspectives on choral singing during the past century in the Baltic Region.

Christian belief is, of course, the ideological background for all church choirs. But the different types of Christian Churches have provided different conditions for choral singing. In

the Lutheran countries with their state church system, multipart music had been sung at the church services for centuries by the pupils of the Latin schools. It was mostly accompanied by the organ and other instruments. In the 17th century it was paralleled by another type of sacred music when the new style of expressive solo song was introduced at the courts of the Lutheran kings. But at the end of the 18th century, both school and court showed less and less interest in church music.

How different was the situation at the same time at the imperial court of St Petersburg! The liturgy of the Russian Orthodox Church was almost entirely sung, instruments not being allowed. The court choir consisted of more than 100 singers. They sang new multipart sacred compositions or arrangements of the old liturgical melodies. This music was written in a style which was influenced by Italian opera music and Protestant German sacred music. Nationalism, which grew out of the victory over Napoleon, led to a protest against these foreign influences and some composers began to use Russian folk tunes in their church music. Gradually the choral tradition spread from the court all over the empire. The repertory was more and more enlarged by composers such as Tchaikovsky and Rachmaninov. In post-Soviet Russia the choral tradition has become very lively again.

Since the end of the 19th century choral singing of volunteer amateurs has been a growing movement even in the Lutheran Churches. This is true especially of the Church of Sweden which organizes around 80,000 singers today.

8. Art music

The concept of art music in the Baltic Region is very much connected with the church as a major actor. In the 16th century local hymn books were published in Denmark, Sweden, Latvia and Lithuania. Of special interest for the development of art music is a collection with Latin school songs, *Piae cantiones*, published 1582 in Greiswald.

In the 17th century, prominent musicians such as Dietrich Buxtehude in Denmark developed church music, allied with organists in north Germany. The part of the Baltic Region, which was organized on Lutheran principles, was very much influenced by the new church music, which was the base for further

development of art music. Besides religion, the art music was contributed to the Baltic Region by the kings' courts and the aristocracy. Copenhagen was a meeting place for musicians and composers from different parts of Europe as early as in the early 16th century. In Vilnius, you could listen to Italian opera as early as 1636.

In the 18th century operas and concerts were established in the main cities. Opera performances started with companies from abroad (Italy, France, and Germany). Public concerts with European orchestral music were given in Stockholm 1731, Copenhagen 1744, and Turku 1747. Classical Viennese influence was very strong at the end of the 18th century all over the region: in Tallinn Mozart's *Zauberflöte* and *Don Giovanni* were performed already in 1795. From the middle of the century national composers began to compete with composers of foreign origin. Amateur composers, organists and student leaders tried to establish a national musical style, inspired by the growing national movement and the interest for folk songs and folk music. Institutions like the Swedish Royal Academy of Music, founded in 1771, due to the patronage of the enlightened Gustav III, gave the main cities an opportunity to establish national tradition in education and national operas. Even the creation of private academies played an important role for subsequent musical life.

In the 19th century different movements separated the region in more national profiles. In Latvia and Estonia the 19th century was the great age of choral societies, with Baltic-German song festivals (Riga, 1836, later in Tallinn, 1857). In Denmark, Sweden and Lithuanian *opéra comique* and *vaudevilles* of native composers interested a new, socially broader public. Individuals gradually played a role for the whole region.

In the 20th century the Baltic region was more or less a part of European musical life, following stylistic trends and with internationally established composers and musicians staying for a long time or short visit in the main cities. The musicians and composers in the Baltic region became international at the same time. Especially since the restoration of national independence in 1990 Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have developed an amazing musical creativity and are now equivalent, or perhaps more interesting than many other countries' musical voices in the choir of world music in the small sector of art music.

St Petersburg, later Leningrad, played an important musical role as an eastern metropolis for the Baltic Region. Catherine II forced the aristocracy to attend musical and theatrical entertainment. The first opera house opened in 1734, and the first public concert was given in 1746. Foreign troops and musicians were given performances of operas and music from different musical centers of Europe. Until the Russian revolution and even after that St-Petersburg was very important for knowledge about art music and musical education for the eastern part of the Baltic Region.

In the history of European music few of the activities in the Baltic states have been given their appropriate place and interest. To take one example, Poland. In the Middle Ages Poland already had a very prominent church music culture with composers on an international level. Troubadours were later exchanged by different kinds of court musicians and in the 16th century a renaissance musical culture was established with many immigrant musicians from Italy and other parts of Europe. We can follow the development with the help of organ tabulatures and after the reformation in printed collections, for example 'Melodies for the Polish Psalter'. Italian opera was performed in Poland already at the beginning of the 17th century. In spite of wars and times with very bad economic conditions, musical life was mostly on a European level. It was first with Frédéric Chopin (1810-1849) that Poland got an internationally recognized composer who conquered the world with his piano music, and he is still in an incomparable leading position. Chopin was very much influenced by Polish folk music, especially the polonaise and mazurka. The polonaise and mazurka belong to an old layer of European folk dances very popular in the Baltic region. The dances have moved between different countries and social classes and developed individual types, which have melted however over and over again together to international "main stream" types.

9. Singing for independence

Folke Boblin

In the decades before World War I the Catholics in Poland and Lithuania had very few opportunities to express their revolutionary dreams of independence. But singing in church choirs opened one way for them. Thus nationalism and Christian belief were combined in church

choir singing, in favour of Orthodox Russia as well as against it!

The so called “singing revolution” which led a few years ago to the new independence of the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian republics, has its background in the choral movements that originated in Estonia and Latvia after the middle of the 19th century. The first Estonian song festival (the form of which was already traditional in Germany) was held in Tartu (Dorpat) in 1869 after a long struggle to get permission from the Russian authorities. In the organizing committees there were representatives for the Lutheran Church as well and for the German barons, the great landowners. The 865 singers and instrumentalists performed to approximately 15,000 people! The effect on the fight to establish a cultural and later also a political Estonian identity was enormous. The song festivals went on also after the liberation in the first period of independence between the two World Wars and also astonishingly during the Soviet era. The communist party tried in vain to give them a new ideological content. The Estonians knew very well how to use them for their own purposes. The festivals were attended by around 100,000 persons at the special song festival

stadium in Tallinn (Reval). Similar song festivals have been held in Latvia since 1873.

The song festival tradition in Finland, which is officially bilingual, also goes back to the Russian time. The Finnish speaking and the Swedish speaking Finns have separate choral organizations and festivals. But both are marked by Finnish nationalism.

The choral movement in Sweden began around 1810 among the university students of Uppsala after the loss of Finland and the revolution that led to a new constitution. Marching through the streets the students sang out their enthusiasm for the elected Crown Prince Karl Johan (Marshall Bernadotte) and their willingness to die for the Fatherland. But due to the exceptionally long time of peace and independence the country has enjoyed, the Swedish choral movement has not been nourished very much by nationalistic ideals. We must try to find other explanations for the fact that today more than 250,000 Swedes regularly devote themselves to choral singing.

Let us conclude: choral singing must be regarded as a factor of great interest, not only from an aesthetic but also from an ideological point of view, in the life of all of the peoples around the Baltic Sea.

УСТЬ-ЦИЛЕМСКИЙ РАЙОН
СТАРИНА ПРО СТАРА КАЗАКА НАБЮ МУРОМЦА
(К тексту 35)

Трусовская.
Ермолин Н. Ф., 70 л.
Фонограмм—архив, М. 209/2

Figure 56. The byliny. A byliny is linked together by a recurring melodie formula. The melodies are not connected to a specific text and are often performed differently by different singers

Folk music instruments

Many folk music instruments spread all over the Baltic region probably because they originated at roughly the same time in various places with similar functional prerequisites, or they spread from a single center in one culture in many directions. Undoubtedly, many factors contributed to this spread. It appears that certain instruments, such as the flute, were 'universal' from an early stage. Instruments found at archaeological sites all over the region include many types of flutes with varied designs and playing styles. To some extent, the same can be said for single reed instruments (of the clarinet type) and for double reed instruments (of the oboe type), which are found in a wide range of forms, as separate instruments or, for example, as parts of a set of bagpipes. Virtually all hierarchical studies lead to the conclusion that the instrument in question developed from a primitive to a more complex form as it moved from the past towards the present.



Figure 57. Lemko flute player. Photo: Alfred F. Majewicz

Children take in the sounds of the world around them in the process of learning to understand and integrate a cultural pattern. In noisy urban environments children naturally seek out strong, aggressive noisemakers. In this way, the musical instruments used by children are a measure of the quality and structure of the soundscape in their society. Let us take one example of an older child instrument which developed.

The reed pipe was made in the spring season when the sap was rising, making it easy to loosen the bark from the wood. Today, this once spontaneous instrument has been exploited by the musical instruments industry, and is available in plastic for use as a folk music instrument or tourist souvenir, whether the sap is rising or not.

Revivals, in the form of renewed interest in the truly old folk instruments such as the traditional bagpipes, hurdy gurdies, keyed fiddles, etc. may be regarded as a parallel to the 'authenticity movement' that has led to the development of 'original instruments' in the playing of music from the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, the Baroque period, etc. Folk fiddles stand somewhat separate from this development, as they have had a more direct relationship with the violin since the seventeenth century.

Beginning in the eighteenth century, folk music has also increasingly been played on "art" instruments. During the nineteenth century when it became possible to mass-produce the harmonica and the accordion, these quickly became regarded as "folk" instruments because they came into use by a broader spectrum of the general public than just the elite lovers of classical music.

Glossary to Case Chapter 4

- Aisle:** A longitudinal space flanking and parallel to the nave, usually separated from it by columns or piers.
- Ambulatory:** The extension of the aisles around the sanctuary of a major aisled church to form a passage or walkway.
- Apse:** A semicircular or polygonal vaulted space, usually at the end of a basilica nave.
- Basilican church:** Oblong, aisled type of church with the nave taller than the aisles, permitting upper clerestory windows above the aisle roofs.
- Buttress:** Mass of masonry or brickwork projecting perpendicularly from a wall to give additional support to that wall along its length or at the corners.
- Chapter-house:** A principal assembly hall in a medieval religious community, whether monastic, canonical or secular, normally located next to the church.
- Choir:** see presbytery
- Crypt:** A subsidiary vaulted room normally below the main floor level but not necessarily wholly subterranean.
- Epitaph:** A burial inscription referring to the identity and personality of the deceased, sometimes with his portrait or symbolic scene.
- Flying buttress:** A buttress consisting of two parts: the flyer arch, either segmental or quadrant transmits thrusts from the vault and the high, exposed timber roof of a Gothic building across the aisle to the outer, upright support or buttress.
- Frontal:** Also called an antependium, from the Latin ante, before, and pendere, to hang. A decorative covering for the altar; it could take the form of a cloth, a rectangular wooden panel or connected panels covering the front of the altar.
- Gable:** An ornamental treatment of the upper part of a wall at the end of a building with a pitched roof.
- Hall church:** A church in which the aisles are the same, or almost the same, height as the nave, so that the nave is lit indirectly by the aisle windows. The hall church differs from the basilica, the distinguishing characteristic of which is the fact that the nave is higher than the aisles and is lit by a clerestory.
- Keystone:** Vital central, wedge-shaped stone voussoir.
- Portal, also called porch:** A covered structure sheltering the entrance of a building.
- Presbytery:** Also called a choir. The space surrounding the altar in the eastern end of a church and usually the western part of the chancel, used for the performance of the clergy and singers, generally raised and separated from the nave by steps or a screen.
- Pseudo-basilican church:** An oblong, aisled type of church with the nave taller than the aisles, but contrary to the basilican church, the nave has no a clerestory and it is lit indirectly by the aisle windows.
- Refectory:** A communal dining area in a monastery.
- Retable:** The painted, carved, or decorated artwork situated upon and behind an altar; it could take the form of a panel with movable wings, which can be closed to cover it.
- Stalls:** The places in the choir of a church set aside for the daily use of the clergy; they are usually made of wood.
- Star-vault:** The type of vault with star patterns created from ribs.
- Stave church:** A type of timber-framed church often with carved decoration, built in Norway and Sweden from the 12th to the 14th centuries.
- Transept:** A transverse structure, comparable in height and width to the nave that crosses the main body of a church of basilican type. The most common position for the transept is at the choir, immediately to the west of the chancel, but transepts also occur at the western ends of naves.

4 Case Chapter

In search of the artistic identity of the Baltic Sea region

Andrzej Wozinski

1. Art of the Viking Age and the beginning of Christian art

The Viking Age. The artistic homogeneity of the Baltic coastal areas started to evolve in the Viking era. This dates back to ca. 800 AD, when almost the whole of the area was still pagan. Our knowledge of Viking art is fragmentary, as only some remains of the architecture, sculpture, painting and textiles have been preserved. Most surviving items are objects of artistic handicraft: jewellery, weapon irons, vessels, tools, and transportation equipment such as boats or sleighs. The artistic talents of the Scandinavians, coupled with their organisational and military skills, mobility and expansiveness, made their art the first artistic manifestation of the unity of the Baltic coastal region.

The Vikings set up their settlements not only in the whole of Scandinavia, but also in

Figure 58. A Vikings' breast pin. Ill.: Małgorzata Sheiki-Binkowska



Rus, on the southern coast of the Baltic, in the British Isles, Ireland, Iceland, and Normandy. They even reached Greenland and America, and they had regular contacts with Byzantium. They brought their art with them, with the specific style, iconography and high skill level. Works of Viking art have been preserved in many locations the Vikings reached. They were produced in the newly established settlements, or occasionally brought by the Vikings to the areas they conquered or visited. They were also

The art of the Baltic

Like a keystone coupling the elements of a vault, the Baltic Sea links the Scandinavian countries with the small Russian areas on the Gulf of Finland and around Kaliningrad, separated from each other by Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, and with the northern areas of Poland and Germany. As one compares the art of this territory with the artistic achievements of other European regions, one cannot escape the impression that the Baltic coastal areas constitute something more than just a geographical category. In spite of the political, ethnic, linguistic and religious divisions, they must be treated as a homogenous artistic region. This distinct character has changed with the changing epochs, and it has varied in intensity. Shared artistic features have not been distributed evenly across the area, sometimes only including some parts of it, and there have also been periods where it was utterly impossible to point to individual features. This distinctness has shown up at various levels: in the forms, styles, artistic predilections, materials, technologies, iconography, content, sponsorship systems, ways of working and character of manufacturing centers. Naturally, many aspects of art in the Baltic region do have their equivalents in other artistic regions, but it is here that they make up a mosaic of elements that is not to be seen anywhere else.

Art historians have already identified a number of distinguishing features of the Baltic region but only for the Middle Ages (especially the Gothic) and the 16th century. The present sketch is an attempt at a broader look at the art of the Baltic, and at showing its specific character. It covers a much longer period: from about 800 AD up to the 20th century. This is a long period, and there have been no in-depth comparative works yet; this, coupled with some editorial factors, means that the attempt is not free from generalisations and only touches upon selected issues, just pointing to some others.




Figure 59. A Vikings' amulet – Thors' hammer, *Mjölner*, was made into a cross in the early Christian period. Ill.: Małgorzata Sheiki-Binkowska



Figure 60. A medieval comb from Gotland. Ill.: Małgorzata Sheiki-Binkowska

imported by the local rulers and noblemen who recognised their high artistic value. There were so many works of Viking art in various areas of the Baltic coast (although they have also been found in other European regions) that one may certainly say that there was some artistic unity and distinctness in the region even in the early mediaeval period (which was also a pre-Christian time in many areas). To mention just a couple of important examples, there are the treasures of Gnezdovo near Smolensk (Hermitage Museum, St Petersburg), Vårby, Sweden (Statens Historiska Museum, Stockholm), Hiddensee, Rügen (Kulturhistorisches Museum, Stralsund), all dating to the 10th century, and the treasure of Hon, Norway (containing not only Scandinavian items, Universitetets Oldsaksamling, Oslo) dating to the 2nd half of the 9th century; there is the lost reliquary of St. Kordula dating to about 1000 AD from Kamien Pomorski cathedral; and there are many isolated jewellery objects, including the Gotland-produced, magnificently ornamented drum-shaped brooches which have also been found outside of Gotland – in other regions of Sweden, as well as Finland and Estonia. The art of those Scandinavian tribes is characterised by distinct ornaments with geometrical and animal motifs, such as winding ribbons and interweaving fantastic monsters forming dense, sometimes multi-levelled compositions totally filling up the ornamental space. The famous Oseberg (Norway) find of 1904 (Universitetets Oldsaksamling, Oslo) is representative for Viking art. Its main component is a magnificently sculpted and exquisitely equipped *funeral boat* more than twenty metres long, the burial place of a probable Viking queen and slave dating to ca. 800-850 AD. All kinds of objects were included in this splendid funeral, some of them richly ornamented and located not only on the boat itself but also around it (including a car-

riage and sleigh, cases, beds, chairs, tents, textiles and everyday objects).

Early Christian art. The adoption of Christianity in the 9th and 10th centuries never wiped away the Viking art; it came to be adapted to the new needs. This meant introducing new themes and iconographies; however, the style remained traditional or changed just slightly. One illustration of this synthesis of new and old elements is the famous *runic stone* that stood between two burial mounds at Jelling, Denmark, founded by the king of Denmark Harald the Bluetooth in ca. 965 as a dynasty monument in honour of his parents, commemorating the christianisation of the country at the same time. The stone depicts a crucified Christ in an exceptional manner, surrounded by some characteristically Viking interweaving ribbons. This Christian theme borders on a typical Viking motif on the other side of the stone: a beast wrapped in a creeper-like ornament.

Scandinavia's first Christian sanctuaries were structurally very simple and built of wood. None have survived but some fragments have been preserved under Romanesque churches erected in the 12th and 13th centuries. These were built of stone in Denmark and Sweden, while Norway continued the tradition of wooden structures. A



Figure 61. A portal motif from the stave-church in Urnes. Ill.: Małgorzata Sheiki-Binkowska



Figure 62. A so-called Eskilstuna coffin, made in the late 11th century and at the beginning of the 12th century. The runic inscription around the four edges translates as: *Kristin had to make this memorial for her son. Every man who can interpret runes shall pray for the soul of Alle. Sune was Alles' father*

special church type evolved in Norway in the 12th century, known as the *stavkirke* (stave-church). The structure of a stave-church is characterised by wooden posts which were initially driven directly into the ground, and later into underpinning brickwork, and by steep shingle roofs. Classical Viking motifs of pagan origin also show up in these churches, for example the intricate plait-work of twigs and monsters in the famous *portal* dating to ca. 1060 and later transferred to the 12th-century stave-church at Urnes, or the sculpted dragon heads at the gable tops of the 12th century stave-church at Borgund. About one thousand such churches were erected in Scandinavia, with only about 30 surviving to our times in Norway. Romanesque stone architecture was brought into the area by Western European builders. The first stone church was erected in Roskilde in ca. 1027. Strong

English (Lund cathedral, St. Alban's church in Odense and Venge Abbey) and German (Dalby and Ribe cathedrals) influences are to be seen in the architecture of Danish stone churches. Lund cathedral, completed towards the end of the 12th century, has elongated *aisles*, a *transept*, a splendid *crypt* and a *presbytery* (ending in a tall *apse* decorated with blind arcades on the outside) and a pair of towers on the western side. It became the model for many Scandinavian temples. Viborg cathedral is its scaled-down replica. The first Danish brick churches started appearing in the second half of the 12th century. The brick arrived through contacts with Lombardy and remained the basic building material of the whole Baltic region for a very long time. The monastery churches in Ringsted and Sørø were Scandinavia's first brick buildings; however, the most important brick structure of the period was Roskilde cathedral, inspired to a large extent by French architecture. Before the end of the 12th century, many small parish churches were built in Denmark. These were constructed of various materials and were mainly built on rectangular ground-plans, and modeled on English and German solutions. The round church form was also known, as can be seen, for example, in Bornholm churches. These temples were modelled, in turn, on the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem, even though the direct sources may have been Central European. English architecture also provided inspiration for Norwegian churches, e.g. Stavanger cathedral, St. Mary's church in Bergen or St. Olav's church in Trondheim. The English models were brought in by *Cistercian monks* from Fountains, Yorkshire who set up Lyse Abbey



Figure 63. The city of Lund with the cathedral in the very center

near Bergen in the mid-12th century. The form of the first Swedish cathedrals was then partially obscured by subsequent changes. The partially-preserved Cistercian abbey at Roma, Gotland, was among the most impressive pre-1200 buildings. A number of parish churches exhibit English influences here, too. As opposed to wooden churches, Scandinavian stone temples did not encompass any new architectural solutions. However, they are interesting for their impressive numbers, and their diversity. Additionally, they have been mostly preserved in their original forms – at least when compared with other regions.

Figural arts had a very important role to play. Bas-reliefs were used to adorn architectural elements, tombstones, baptismal fonts, and altar *frontals*. Mural paintings and fully plastic sculptures were placed in church interiors. Gotland became a leading manufacturer of stone sculpture, with mass production of sculpted stone baptismal fonts that can still be seen in many Baltic coast churches. Scandinavian sculptors working in wood achieved exceptional virtuosity, producing ornamental-figural relief decorations of churches and everyday items, both liturgical and secular, that were exceptional on a European scale. As wars spared Scandinavia, and the Reformation proved quite tolerant towards mediaeval sculpture, exceptionally large numbers of such objects have survived in the region. The earliest of them, dating to the first half of the 12th century, depict the Crucifixion of Christ, crucifixion groups, Mary with the Child, and the saints. Some were inspired by French, German and English motifs, and some were imports. A whole range of representations, including Christ Crucified and altar frontal depictions, were executed in a manner very frequent in Scandinavia: a wooden core was covered with a gilded copper plate in which the details were modeled. The Scandinavian sculpted altar frontals covered with gilded copper plates are among the most numerous monuments of this type that have been preserved in the Christian world. They adorned the frontal parts of altars in many Scandinavian churches, including parish churches. The most impressive one, dating to the 1150s, comes from the church in Lisbjerg near Århus, Denmark (Danmarks Nationalmuseum, Copenhagen). Its iconographic program is dedicated to Mary, who is depicted in the centre, with scenes from her life, representations of virtues and saints surround-

ing her. The golden Lisbjerg altar is equipped with a *retable* depicting Christ and the twelve apostles, capped with an open-work arcade. The altar from the church at Sahl, Denmark, dating to ca. 1200, is quite similar in its form. The two arched retables have no equivalents in European art, and as such can be regarded as specifically Scandinavian formulas. Two sculpture materials that were characteristic for the region (and for the North Sea coast) were amber and walrus tusks, chiefly used in small forms. Mural paintings showed monumental Passion scenes, the Last Judgment, depictions of Mary and the saints. One surprising phenomenon was the strong Byzantine and Byzantine-Italian influence visible in some Swedish and Danish mural paintings. This concerns both the style and the iconography. Examples of book painting are on the other hand scarce. It is noteworthy that some motifs appeared in the iconography of the Viking era that later became typical for the art of the region. One inherent, natural element of the Baltic coast landscape has always been ships. Depictions of ships can be found, among other places, on the Gotland picture stones from Ardre and Tjängvide, both dating to the 8th-9th centuries (Statens Historiska Museum, Stockholm), and on the fabric from Tune, Norway.

Up to ca. 1200, the artistic development of the Baltic region was quite uneven. Scandinavia was the leader (not all of it, however: northern Sweden and Norway, along with Finland, remained peripheral areas), while the eastern Baltic coast was only in the early stages of its artistic development. The southern area was the best developed one, with the Romanesque St. Michael's church at Hildesheim occupying a prominent place. The above-mentioned Danish church at Dalby was modeled on it. During the second half of the 12th century, some important temples were started, including the cathedrals in Lübeck, Brandenburg, Ratzeburg and Kamien Pomorski, the church at Jerichow (considered to be the first brick church), and the Cistercian abbeys at Kołbacz, Oliwa and Lehnin. The Cistercian order, which grew rapidly and built new branches of the already established abbeys (that was, for example, how the Polish Kołbacz abbey was built as an offshoot of the Danish Esrom monastery), played an important role in the dissemination of related forms of the modest and austere architecture in the Baltic region.

2. Art in the period of the flourishing of the Hanseatic League

The rise, flourishing and fall of the Gothic style between the early 13th century and the first quarter of the 16th century laid out a new epoch in the history of the region. The period was intertwined with the history of the Hansa, the growth of Baltic coastal cities and commerce, and with the economic, political and cultural expansion of the burghers. The activity of the Hansa was undoubtedly the most important factor that cemented the Baltic region between the 13th and 16th centuries – possibly the strongest such factor in history. The Hansa also played a role in the formation of the region's artistic landscape, as works of art also traveled along the commercial routes laid out by the merchants. A specific lifestyle, mentality and aesthetic taste developed among Hanseatic burghers. However, not all the phenomena of the Gothic art of the Baltic region were wholly related to the Hansa; for instance, the art of the Teutonic Order in Prussia and Livonia was an exception. The artistic development of the Baltic region followed, for the most part, a path of its own which was, at the same time, detached from political or economic developments. The production of the works of art, as well as their importation and exportation, took place in spite of the conflicts, wars or economic embargoes.

Art mainly developed in the cities, which also gave support to the Hansa. Lübeck, founded in 1159, played a leading role. It was the most important city of the Hanseatic League, and also – from the beginning of the 16th century onwards – one of the most dynamic creative centers on the Baltic coast. The centers took part in the exchange of artistic experience. Within all branches of art, a number of phenomena developed that were specific for the region.

Churches. A characteristic building material appeared in architecture, and specific types of temples and secular buildings developed, along with some extremely individualist solutions. This basic building material was brick, but there were also local “deviations” from this rule: for example, limestone was used in Gotland, while most Finnish structures employed granite, with bricks only used for details (here, brick only became more popular in the 15th century). Lübeck's St. Mary's church, erected at the turn of the 13th and 14th centuries, became the

model for many Baltic coastal cities. Replicas, repeating the model to varying extents, were built in Malmö, Uppsala, Schleswig, Wismar, Lüneburg, Doberan, Schwerin, Rostock, Parchim, Stralsund and the distant Riga, Reval (today's Tallinn) and Dorpat (present-day Tartu). The most important element of the temples was the adaptation and transposition of the *basilica* scheme of French Gothic cathedrals, with a *presbytery* surrounded by an *ambulatory* and a circle of chapels, a system of *buttress* and *flying buttresses*, and two towers on the western side. The type of a *choirless hall* temple with decorative *gables* – with St. Mary's church in Greifswald as a leading exponent – was inspired by Westphalian and Cistercian architecture, and became popular in Mecklenburg and Pomerania in the 14th century. The Dominican and Franciscan orders propagated a different temple type, with an elongated *presbytery* and a main body with two or three *aisles*. One striking feature of the sacral architecture of the Baltic coast is the diversity of the spatial and construction systems used: next to the *hall churches* that are so characteristic for the area, there are also *basilicas* and *pseudo-basilicas*. As far as the scale is concerned, Gdańsk's St. Mary's Church, completed in 1502, is among the largest and most impressive. At times, apart from the sacral function, the churches also performed extemporaneous social, commercial or military functions. There are some so-called merchant churches in the region which, in addition to liturgical space, had rooms intended for warehouses, counting-houses or exchanges. St. Michael's church in Stralsund had such a complex function: it was a parish church but also a town hall and a covered market. St. Mary's church in Visby, Gotland, was also a warehouse and archive where the merchants kept their documents. The military character of the state of the Teutonic Order in Prussia was reflected e.g. in the cathedrals in Königsberg, Frombork and Kwidzyn, which were parts of the fortification systems both architecturally and functionally.

Secular architecture. Within secular architecture, a characteristic town hall type appeared, with a magnificent frontal facade. Excellent examples of this are the town halls of Lübeck, Rostock and Stralsund. Another town hall type, with a tall tower, inspired by Flemish models, is to be found in Gdańsk, Torun and Reval. Artus and Blackhead houses formed a functionally exceptional type. Their names derive

form the legendary King Arthur and the dark skinned St. Maurice. Such buildings were built exclusively in Pomerania and Livonia, although they seem to have Western European origins. Artus Courts were built in Torun, Elbląg, Gdańsk, Braniewo, Königsberg and Stralsund, while Blackhead Houses were erected in Reval, Riga and Dorpat; the oldest date to the early 13th century. They were situated close to the key municipal edifices – the parish churches and town halls. They had *gable facades*, and were erected on rectangular ground-plans, with presentable, arched halls with columns and auxiliary rooms. Meetings and games were held in them, and theatrical plays staged; the tradition of chivalry was also cherished. The societies that used them were elitist organisations. Burgher houses usually had narrow facades with decorative gables facing the streets, and the interiors divided into an entrance-hall, living-room floor and warehouse space. A recurrent motif of the landscape of Hanseatic cities was the granaries, preserved e.g. in Gdańsk and Lübeck, and the hoisting cranes which are still to be seen in the ports of Gdańsk and Lüneburg. Defence structures developed rapidly. Walls with towers guarded access to the cities (preserved in large parts in Visby and Reval), as did fortified gates (e.g. the monumental Holstentor in Lübeck). Castles, erected by the kings, princes, knights, bishops and monks, had very diverse forms. The architecture of some of them was adapted to the surface relief, others had regular, rectangular shapes. The Teutonic Order castles in Prussia constituted an exceptional phenomenon regarding their proliferation, number, homogenous character and artistic value. They performed a complex military, administrative, economic and religious function. They were built on approximately square ground-plans, with four wings, a cloister yard, and towers rising from the corners, one of which was always given a monumental form. The most important rooms – the chapel, *refectory* and *chapter-house* – were on the first floor. The castles were surrounded by moats and had extensive commercial approaches. The leading edifices of this classical style were erected between the late 13th century and the 1330s, including the castles in Gniew, Golub, Radzyn Chełmski and Malbork (the High Castle). The subsequent expansion gave the latter castle a number of individual features which made it one of Europe's most magnificent defence and residential complexes. The Grand Master's palace, added in the late 14th century,



Figure 64. Gdańsk, the interior of the Artus court. Photo: Alfred F. Majewicz

is among masterpieces of mediaeval architecture. References to the Malbork castle may be seen in the mid-14th century King's Hall and castle chapel in Turku, Finland. As one tries to understand the artistic connections between the various parts of the Baltic region, one has to note that *star-vaultings* also appeared in 15th-century Finnish churches, possibly under the influence of Prussian architecture. In turn, the above-mentioned Turku castle and cathedral were started by Swedish builders but completed by Reval masters. Among those Baltic basin architects whose names we do know, one outstanding figure was that of Henrik Brunsberg of Szczecin, active between the end of the 14th century and the 1430s in Pomerania and Brandenburg. He created some exceptionally presentable, harmonious and elaborately decorated churches in Brandenburg, Prenzlau, Szczecin and Stargard, as well as the Tangermünde town hall.

Painting and sculpture. Within painting and sculpture, Scandinavia was still the leader at the beginning of the 13th century, being an intermediary in the dissemination of French and English influence. Soon, north German centers took

over. In the early 14th century, the first winged *retables* appeared in northern Germany, in the monasteries in Cismar (1301) and Doberan (1310). Those were triptychs shaped like flat cases, divided into parts by rows of arcades, in which figures of saints and relics were placed. They were an important development stage in the history of Gothic *retables*. The compositional scheme they used, with the rows of figures, survived in numerous Baltic coast *retables* until the late Middle Ages. In the 14th century, Lübeck-produced bronze baptismal fountains, chandeliers and liturgical vessels made their way into many Baltic coast churches. They were among the earliest examples of the standardisation and industrialisation of artwork manufacturing. At the other extreme were some exceptionally original works of prominent artists who enjoyed widespread fame. Their works set the aesthetic and quality standard, providing the inspiration and model to be copied in many variations, more or less faithful. There were a number of outstanding individuals among the Baltic region artists who laid out the directions of artistic development. Master Bertram of Hamburg, active towards the end of the 14th century, was one prominent painter. He used light-and-shade modeling and some elements of perspective, showing moving figures, introducing some landscape components and enriching the Gothic convention with realist elements. Konrad von Soest, working in Dortmund at the end of the 14th century, was a very influential figure. He created paintings that were characterised by an elaborate elegance of form, slender figures and light colouring. Master Franke, who worked in Hamburg in the first half of the 15th century was a highly renowned artist. His works, charming with their fairy-tale poetics, were commissioned, among others, for the Turku cathedral (St. Barbara *retable*, before 1412, today at the National Museum, Helsinki) and by the Blackhead Fraternity for St. Catherine's church in Reval (a lost *retable*, before 1436). Sculpture achieved a very high level at the turn of the 14th and 15th centuries, thanks to the works of such outstanding masters as the Master of the Madonna of the Darssow family of St. Mary's church in Lübeck (destroyed) and Johannes Junge, the author of, among other things, the Madonna of Niendorf (St. Annen-Museum, Lübeck), and the Master of the Torun Madonna of St. John's church in Torun (lost). Their works, full of elaborate grace, harmony and lyricism, are among the finest examples of

European sculpture of those times. They had widespread artistic consequences visible in the whole of the region, sometimes even in the 1450s. One of the most impressive chapters in the history of the late-Gothic art of the Baltic region was the work of the versatile painter and sculptor Bernt Notke of Lübeck (ca. 1440--1509), who made quite a career not only as an artist but also as a businessman and civil servant. His works proliferated to all parts of the Baltic region, and even reached Frankfurt am Main. They were characterised by a richness of form and lively stage-setting, and made their way to churches in Lübeck, Uppsala (lost), Århus, Reval and Stockholm. Stockholm's St. Michael's church houses his famous sculpture of St. George fighting the dragon, commissioned by the Swedish leader Sten Sture to commemorate his 1471 victory over the Danes. The works of other late-Gothic north German artists also had a widespread influence, from Scandinavia to Reval, including Herman Rode, Benedikt Dreyer, Claus Berg, Hans Brüggemann, and Henning van der Heide.

Outside influence. The Baltic region also absorbed art from outside. This was a result of transfers of style, artwork importation, and the importing of foreign artists. Some circles enjoyed special recognition. Between the late 14th century and the early 15th century, the painting and sculpture of the Baltic region were strongly influenced by Czech art. More or less at the same time, English alabaster sculpture was imported in large amounts. Until the end of the Middle Ages, Rhine and Westphalian elements were important components of Baltic region art. However, the Netherlands remained the strongest influence. Artistic ideas were imported from there, as were artists, such as the sculptor Jan Matten, working at the turn of the 14th and 15th centuries in Prussia. Works of art were also brought in, chiefly painted or painted and sculpted *retables*, including such masterpieces as the ones executed by Hans Memling in 1491 for Lübeck cathedral (St. Annen-Museum, Lübeck). Moreover, artists from the Baltic region went on study trips to the Netherlands, e.g. Michel Sittow of Reval, who learned his trade in Memling's workshop itself. Some influences of south German art appeared in the painting and sculpture of the region at the beginning of the 16th century. Among others, the styles of Veit Stoss, the so-called Danube school and Lucas Cranach were copied.

Albrecht Dürer's engravings were in widespread use, while the painter Michael of Augsburg worked in Gdańsk, receiving his commissions from Finland, among other places.

Iconography. The iconography of Baltic region art often included those saints whose lives and legends were somehow associated with the area, such as St. Olav, or those who were the patrons of important professional, social or religious groups: St. Nicolaus (the patron saint of merchants and sailors), St. James the Elder (the patron saint of pilgrims and travellers), St. Leonard (the patron saint of imprisoned merchants), St. George (the patron saint of knights and nobility), and St. Gertrude of Nivelles (the patron saint of travellers). Secular themes infiltrated into art, leading to depictions of urban life and town-dwellers: the functioning of the justice system, the loading of a ship, marine transportation, commercial transactions, e.g. on the *stalls* at St. Nicolaus' church, Stralsund, founded by a merchant corporation dealing with Russia's Novgorod, or the portraits of the Gdańsk patrician Georg Giese, painted by Hans Holbein the Younger in 1532 (Staatliche Museen, Berlin). Knight motifs were characteristic for the art of the Teutonic Knights.

Founders and craftsmen. Burghers were among important founders of works of art in the Baltic region. Individuals, trade societies or fraternities founded them for churches and chapels with a view to ensuring redemption for themselves. But at the same time, those foundations were also manifestations of some well-defined aesthetic tastes. Sometimes, the founder strongly influenced the form, iconography and content of the work commissioned.

In the Middle Ages, not only in this region, paintings, sculptures and especially altar retables (combining a number of artistic genres) were usually collective works, created by many craftsmen. The notion of the artist in the modern sense was non-existent. Usually, the craftsmen had to be members of some professional organisation – a guild. In contrast to other German-speaking regions, where it was known as the “Zunft”, the guild was called the “Amt” or “Werk” in this area. A guild would often consist of craftsmen of several specialisations, e.g. wood-carvers, painters and goldsmiths. Guild statutes regulated the ways the trade was taught and performed. Artistic production was subject to strict materials and quality control; for example, guild regulations in some

Baltic coastal cities stated clearly which kinds of wood might be used for sculptures.

Regional unity. At the end of the Middle Ages, the development of art encompassed more or less the whole of the Baltic region. A number of great artistic centers had evolved, such as Lübeck, Stockholm, Reval and Gdańsk, but there were also some smaller centers. In comparison to other Central European artistic centers, those in the Baltic region were more sparsely distributed. The craftsmen of the time were extremely mobile, much more so than in the subsequent period, which aided the dissemination of artistic innovations, and helped the unification of the region to a considerable extent. Another integrating factor was the above-mentioned importation and exportation of works of art. What its scale was may be testified by the fact that about 600 altar retables were exported from Lübeck to Reval in the 15th century, and some of them traveled even further north, to Finland, which also imported large numbers of artworks from Prussia. Many retables from the Netherlands were brought in, too. Several dozen of them have been preserved in the Baltic region, mostly in Sweden (36).

3. Art of the period of the Reformation

The modern times in the Baltic region were ushered in by the Reformation, which was almost universally accepted in the region by the 1550s, and which marked a clear turning point in art. The Reformation caused changes in the patronage system, as well as in the form, function, iconography and content of works of art. These transformations coincided with the proliferation of Renaissance forms, mainly in the Netherlandish variety. The Reformation meant that the role of the church as a patron of art was greatly diminished. In Sweden, this role was taken over by the royal Vasa court (1523-1654), who financed, among other things, the construction of the Gripsholm, Vadstena, Uppsala and Svartsjö castles. Later, the nobility also entered this field. A similar situation existed in Denmark, where, among other things, the royal castles of Kronborg and Frederiksborg were built. In Mecklenburg, Prince Ulrich III financed the conversion of his Güstrow castle. In Gdańsk, the nobility financed a number of projects. The approach to some types of works of art was changed. No more free-standing sculptures or side altar retables were commissioned for

churches; instead, the demand for tombstones and *epitaphs* rose. Within secular art, many residences, private houses and public buildings appeared, and these were furnished with paintings, sculptures and appropriate equipment of all sorts. Motifs associated with the Virgin Mary disappeared almost totally from sacral iconography, while secular art developed allegorical and historical themes, as well as portraits.

Netherlandism. In comparison to the Middle Ages, there were fewer elements in the region's art of that period that could be considered to be integrative. The most important feature was the "Netherlandism". The Netherlands were, at that time, one of Europe's leading artistic centers; Netherlandish artists achieved a high artistic level, and created formal and stylistic models that were characterised by a predilection for elaboration and abstract-grotesque ornamentation. One renowned artist was the Antwerp sculptor and graphic pattern-book author Cornelis Floris. It was to him that several patrons from the Baltic region turned to, asking to design an epitaph for the Danish Princess Dorothea (1552), a tomb for her husband Prince Albrecht I (1574) in Königsberg cathedral, a tomb for Frederik I of Denmark in Schleswig cathedral (after 1553), and a tomb for the king of Denmark Christian III in Roskilde cathedral (1569-1576). Netherlandish artists were ubiquitous on the Baltic coast in the 16th and (partially) 17th centuries. Willem van den Blocke, who settled in Gdańsk in 1584 and became one of the region's most prominent sculptors, learned his trade in Floris' Antwerp workshop, and later collaborated with his master in Königsberg. He was a virtuoso of the chisel, creating psychologically convincing portraits and elaborate compositions; he was responsible for the dissemination across the whole of the Baltic region of a type of tombstone with kneeling figures. In Königsberg, he left behind a tombstone of Queen Elisabeth, the wife of Prince George Frederic of Prussia (1578-1582), and also executed a number of works in Gdańsk, including the exquisite epitaphs of Johann Brandes, his wife Dorothea (1586) and Eduard Blemke (1591) at St. Mary's church, and the tombstone of the Kos family (ca. 1620) at the Post--Cistercian church in Gdańsk Oliwa. He also executed external commissions, including the tombstone of John III Vasa (1594-1596) ordered by Sigismund III Vasa and the Swedish Senate (and only put in

its place at Uppsala cathedral in 1817-1818), the tombstone of the Ture Bielke family at the Linköping cathedral (ca. 1615), the epitaph of Christoph von Dohn at St. Canute's church in Odense (1596), and of Stanisław Radziwiłł at the Bernardine church in Vilnius (1618-1623). There were also other Netherlandish architects, painters and sculptors in the then exceptionally prosperous Gdańsk. The most prominent of these were the architect, painter and art theorist Hans Vredeman de Vries (responsible for the 1592 conversion of the Artus Court, the paintings therein and the paintings at the town hall) and the architect Antoon van Opbergen, the designer of, among other things, the Great Arsenal, a masterpiece of northern architecture of 1605-1605. Other Baltic cities also employed Netherlandish artists: the architect and sculptor Willem Boy worked in Sweden under the protectorate of the Vasas, at Svartsjö castle (1570-1590) and Uppsala cathedral (the impressive tombstone of Gustav I and his two wives, 1560-1570), among other places; the sculptor Antonius Timmerman (d. 1592) was involved in the conversion of Turku castle; the architect and construction expert Hans van Steenwinkel worked in Denmark under Frederick II (who ruled 1559-1588); and Arent Passer executed the architectural design and sculpture decoration of the Blackhead House in Reval (1597).

Italian influence. Italian forms were a little less popular than Netherlandish ones. Northern Italian Renaissance reached a number of Baltic coast centers thanks to some members of the Parr (Pahr, Parrio) family that originated from the shores of Lake Como in northern Lombardy. After spending some time in Silesia, they worked at the Güstrow castle in Mecklenburg as architects and sculptors (1558-1565), as well as at Schwerin castle (1560-1563) and in Swedish palaces and castles in Kalmar, Borgholm, Uppsala, Nyköping and Eskilstuna (after 1572).

Lithuania was a somewhat different area. The Reformation did not prove very popular here, and other artistic sources were exploited. Florentine Renaissance dominated in this area, mainly thanks to the activities of the architects and sculptors Bernardo de Gianotis, Giovanni Cini, Filippo da Fiesole and Giovanni Mario Mosca Padovano, who worked at the Grand Duke's palace in Vilnius, having spent some time in southern Poland.



Figure 65. Neptune statue outside the Artus court in Gdańsk. Photo: Katarzyna Skalska

Other links. Artists whose work created links between the various centers also included the German painter Jacob Binck, who worked at the royal court of Christian III in Copenhagen, and then for Prince Albrecht I in Königsberg. Binck was instrumental in propagating the works of Floris in the Baltic area, mentioning him to the patrons and acting as a mediator in the commissions.

However, the art of the period used more than just the new trends. How profound the influence of the brick Gothic was may be attested by the numerous brick churches which were still erected in the 17th century, both in Sweden and Poland. Mediaeval forms also found a continuation in the structures of Finnish wooden churches.

4. Looseness of artistic relationships in the period after 1600

After the 17th century, there were fewer integrating features in the art of the Baltic region. The individualism of tastes was pronounced more strongly, both on the part of the patrons and creators. Netherlandism ceased to be a distinguishing feature, even though it remained an important

component of the region's art. Netherlandish artists were still invited to the Baltic area: the Dutch painters Pieter Isaacsz, Karel van Mader III and Abraham Wuchters worked at the 17th-century Danish royal court of Christian IV, and the sculptors Adrian de Vries and Geraert Lambertz were at the castle in Frederiksborg. The Flemish artist Thomas Quellinus was active in Copenhagen (creating, among others, the tombstones in Vor Frue). The Dutch sculptor Nicolas Soeffrens (d. 1694) was active in Latvia, while a considerable number of Netherlandish artists remained in 17th-century Gdańsk. Many artists went on study trips to the Netherlands, where they saw the works of the most prominent European artists, whose styles they imitated or creatively expanded. The painter David Beck and the Frenchman Sebastien Bourdon (remaining under the influence of Van Dyck) worked in 17th-century Sweden. The most prominent Swedish painter of the time, David Klöcker Ehrenstrahl, was partially trained in the Netherlands. Among the Gdańsk painters who studied in the Netherlands, three were the most prominent: Andreas Stech, Bartholomäus Strobel and Daniel Schultz the Younger, an artist of European format (his style evolved in contact with the works of the circle of Rembrandt, Bartholomäus van der Helst and Ferdinand Bol).

Neoclassicism. French art increased in importance: the French architect Jean de la Vallée (1620-1696) worked in Sweden and fabrics and paintings by, among others, Francois Boucher and Nicolas Lancret were purchased in France for the newly-built Christiansborg palace in Denmark after 1740. The French painter J. F. J. Saly worked in Denmark after 1753. Many artists of the Baltic region, especially Scandinavians, trained in France or were influenced by French art. France offered art that partially satisfied the local demand for styles full of elegance but devoid of exaggeratedly dynamic forms, or ornaments obscuring the structure.

The trend towards simplicity and accentuation of the tectonics of forms became a distinguishing feature of Baltic region art after the 17th century, covering all the subsequent styles with a cloak of a neoclassicism of a sort.

The neoclassical coolness and simplicity dominate in various 17th and 18th-century architectural projects on the Baltic coast: Stockholm's knight school, completed by Jean de la Vallée in 1641; Kalmar cathedral started in 1660 and built

by Nicodemus Tessin the Elder; one of North Europe's largest buildings – the Royal Castle in Stockholm whose construction was supervised by Nicodemus Tessin the Younger after 1727, and completed by Carl Harleman in 1742; the projects of the German architect Samuel Berner who worked in Turku and erected, among other things, the Court of Appeal building in Vaasa (1780-1787); and the Turku Academy, designed by Carl Christopher Gjörwell (1766-1837), and completed by Carlo Bassi. Neo-classicism also permeated almost all of the architecture of the remaining part of the Baltic region.

The projects of Bartolomeo Francesco Rastrelli (1700-1770), who worked in St-Petersburg and Livonia, were more decorative and *rococo-like*: the Winter Palace of tsaritsa Elisabeth I, and the Rundale (Ruental) residence of the Livonian vice-regents Ernest-Johann Biron and his son Peter.

Again, Lithuania was in a different position, where the *Baroque* style marked the churches and palaces of Vilnius, Kaunas and Nieswiezys with a lushness of forms and decorations, alluding to Italian models.

Forms that emanated simplicity and calmness were also present in the works of a number of painters working in the Baltic area at that time, and especially in those of the sculptors, who had a number of outstanding figures among them: the internationally renowned Swede Johann Tobias Sergel (1740-1819),

Stephan Sinding – the only 19th century Norwegian sculptor of European repute, and the Dane Johannes Wiedeweld who lived in Rome between 1754 and 1758, where he befriended the main theorist of classicism, J. J. Winckelmann. The main figure of international neoclassicism in sculpture was the Dane Bertel Thorvaldsen (1770-1844), who worked in Rome for more than 40 years and returned to Denmark in 1838, using antique models in search of an ideal harmony of forms.

Orthodox art. Next to the restrained forms of neoclassicism, a new common element appeared in the architecture of the eastern coast of the Baltic in the 18th century. During this period, many orthodox churches came to be erected in the vast area of the western provinces of the Russian Empire, from the Grand Duchy of Finland to the Baltic Provinces, to historical Lithuanian lands, the Kingdom of Poland and the Ukraine. They were not only used for religious purposes, but also served as demonstrations of the political and military power of the Russian Empire. They were erected at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries in styles reminiscent of the Russo-Byzantine, Russian, Baroque, Neo-Romanesque, Neo-Gothic and Neo-Russian styles. Sometimes, temples of other denominations were given the form of orthodox churches. For example, in the case of the Lutheran St. Nicolaus cathedral in Helsinki (1830-1852), this was supposed to symbolise religious tolerance in Russia on the one hand, but also to remind one – through the huge dimensions of the building – of the power of the Russian Empire on the other.

Neo-Gothic. Exceptional were the classicising or Gothic-like buildings of the most prominent 19th-century German architect Carl Friedrich Schinkel and his workshop. They started appearing on the southern coast of the Baltic, from Hamburg to Vettin, Gransee, Annenwalde, Szczecin, Kołobrzeg, Torun, Braniewo and Lidzbark in the first half of the 19th century. The works of this architect, and his activities as an art restorer, gave rise to the interest in the mediaeval period in Pomerania. As a result, the second half of the 19th century was a Neo-Gothic period here, both in religious and secular (private and municipal) architecture, e.g. in Szczecin, Gdańsk and Torun. The Neo-Gothic wave also submerged



Figure 66. St. Nikolaus cathedral in Helsinki. Ill.: Małgorzata Sheiki-Binkowska

other Baltic areas - references to mediaeval architecture were present in the 19th-century churches of Sweden, Denmark, Estonia, northern Germany and Norway (the so-called “dragestil” style, borrowing from the decorations of stave-churches, became fashionable in the latter country).

Painting. In the 19th century, a number of common threads appeared in painting in the Baltic area in Germany and Scandinavia. Between 1790 and 1840, the contacts between various exponents of Romanticism became much stronger. One thing that made this possible was the fact that artists from various countries might study at the same academies, e.g. the German painters Caspar David Friedrich, Philip Otto Runge, Georg Friedrich Kersting and the Norwegian Johan Christian Dahl all studied at the Danish Royal Academy of Fine Arts in Copenhagen. In turn, the Danish got to know German painters at the Academies in Dresden and Munich, and in Rome, where they formed a circle focused around Bertel Thorvaldsen. There were some themes that united the artists who worked on the southern and northern shores of the western tip of the Baltic, such as an interest in light, concealing some defined philosophical, religious and artistic issues. Apart from the above-mentioned, these artists included – to name just the most prominent ones – the Germans Carl Gustav Carus and Jacob Gensler, and the Danes Christoffer Wilhelm Eckersberg and Christen Købke. The themes were unveiled through similar topics, such as a seaside landscape, dusk, a nocturne, clouds in the sky, a window. Views of specific places on the Baltic coast also appear in the compositions: the shores of Rügen, views of Greifswald, Copenhagen, and old churches and castles, which were characteristic for the interest of that period in the local environment and its history.

Up to the 1860s, the then famous Kunstakademie in Düsseldorf was popular among the painters of the Baltic region. Scandinavian and Estonian artists studied there. Later, the artists of the region went to Paris more and more often, where they got acquainted with the new trends – realism and impressionism.

Scandinavian realism, even though it was French-inspired, had a special, local variation. This was visible, for example, in the works of the painters associated with the rise in the 1880s of the Skagen artistic colony in Jutland:



Figure 67. A Norwegian stave-church. Ill.: Małgorzata Sheiki-Binkowska

the Norwegian Christian Krohg, and the Danes Anna Ancher and Peder Severin Krøyer who mainly focussed on depictions of the typical local landscape and the life of the local people. Typical for Swedish and Danish painters was also the emphasis they placed on the traditional simple Scandinavian lifestyle, and the distance they had towards western industrialisation and urbanisation. This thread is also present in the works of some artists originating in other artistic trends, e.g. in those by the prominent exponent of symbolism, the Dane Vilhelm Hammershøi, whose compositions depict extremely modest, empty living rooms, filled with an atmosphere of nostalgia and loneliness. Similar references to traditional values, associated with the fight for the preservation of national identity, are present in Norwegian and Finnish painting, e.g. by Gerhard Munthe and Akseli Gallen-Kallela, who used themes from Nordic myths and sagas, and forms originating in folk art.

Symbolism had a very special form in Scandinavia, often taking up topics associated with erotic life, fears, alienation, and the dark, untamed side of human nature. The most prominent exponent of this trend was the Norwegian Edvard

Munch, who created some exceptionally expressive works. The topics were also touched upon by another Norwegian, Eilif Peterssen, the Swede Richard Bergh, the Finn Hugo Simberg, and the above-mentioned Hammershøi and Krøyer. In sculpture, the most outstanding Scandinavian symbolist was the Norwegian Gustav Vigeland, who executed some complex, dynamic compositions, such as the Wheel of Life (1934, Vigeland Park, Oslo). The Lithuanian painter and composer Nicolaus Konstantin Čiurlionis, working at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, was also associated with symbolism. In his pictures, e.g. in the Sun Sonata cycle (1907-1909, Kaunas Museum), he tried to create plastic equivalents of musical compositions.

References to the regional tradition in 20th century art. Various subsequent avant-garde 20th-century art movements had their exponents in the Baltic region. Some of them, like the excellent Finnish architects Eliel Saarinen and Alvar Aalto, came to be internationally renowned. It is difficult to find threads that would be characteristic for the whole region in the highly individualist creations of the modern artists. One manifestation of regional identity might be the various references to the area's artistic history. Some of them, such as the Stockholm town hall, alluding to mediaeval brick architecture, and completed by Ragnar Östberg in 1925; the Copenhagen town hall built by Martin Nyrop between 1892 and 1905; the West Prussian Bank in Gdańsk, designed by Kurt Hempel in 1904-1905; the buildings of the Central Station in Gdańsk (1904) and the Gdańsk Polytechnic building (1900-1904) that allude to *northern mannerism*, may be seen as continuations of 19th-century historicism. However, some quite modern buildings, post-modernist structures, using pastiche and free stylisation, such as the 1987 Municipal Library in Uppsala, seem to look back towards the historical forms of the brick architecture of the Baltic region. 20th-century sculpture also alludes to the region's history. The German expressionist Ernst Barlach (1870-1938), for example, referred to the extraordinary achievements of the late Gothic, especially to the works by C. Berg. The 1970s works of the Danish artists P. Kirkeby and R. Winther seem to be inspired to some extent by the neo-classicism that was once so widespread in the region.

5. The Baltic Sea area as an artistic region

The links that integrate the Baltic region and define its distinct character have developed in various ways over time. In the early Middle Ages, they developed as a result of the marked domination of one centre, which radiated out into the less developed areas via various channels, mainly through the exportation of works of art and artists. In the Hanseatic period, the links became much stronger and more complex, leading to the strongest consolidation of the Baltic region in the whole of its history, in spite of the local differences. That was when a number of strong centers developed, remaining in bilateral contact, with people of similar mentalities, financial abilities and aesthetic needs who worked in those centers. Some outstanding artists appeared, sometimes active at a number of different locations that may have been quite distant from one another. Sometimes, they would produce for export, and inseminate the minds of less talented artists with the strength of their art. Some artistic problems were solved in ways that proved so exceptionally attractive that they were copied. Mass production of some kinds of artefacts developed. All these circumstances meant that a strong, multi-layered artistic community evolved, stretching out over an area that overlapped with the Baltic coast. In the subsequent periods, the links grew weaker.

In the 16th century, the Baltic region was united again by the fashion to follow the style of one foreign centre. Later, the predilection for some distinct stylistics, ways of expression or topics proved to be the binding medium, as did the interest in similar artistic problems. In addition to all these factors, there was one more: the references that appeared in the local art of the various periods, directed towards the most characteristic and splendid elements of the region's artistic history. Various references to the Gothic brick architecture, encountered along almost the whole coast, the Norwegian dragestil, or the travesties of Netherlandish mannerist projects in early-20th-century Gdańsk architecture all meant that some historic artistic links within the region were amplified ex post, finding reflections in the mirror of the art of the following periods.

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Section III

LANGUAGES AND MULTILINGUAL SOCIETIES

Figure 68. Runic slab from Kälsta (Sweden). Stärkar and Hjorvard had to erect this stone after their father Gere who was a lifeguard of Knut the Great. Photo: Uppsala University Archive

III

Section

LANGUAGES AND MULTILINGUAL SOCIETIES

Editor: Witold Maciejewski

Autor of chapters 15-18:

Sven Gustavsson

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INTRODUCTION

Witold Maciejewski

The aim of this section is to give some linguistic points to notions referring to the feeling of collective identity, as defined in the two foregoing parts of the present textbook. The most salient marker of our ethnic, social and territorial identity is our native language. It is often believed that the “*mother tongue*” runs into blood rather than is inherited as a part of our cultural legacy from our ancestors. The origin of language is quite commonly identified with the origin of the humans. We inherit the *spoken language*; this is the primary stratum; and it is the pronunciation, which indirectly exposes our background for the native speakers. The mother tongue is a part of the *ethnic language*, used by a group of people we usually recognise as being closer to us than other peoples, speaking different, “foreign” vernaculars. The common language unites us with our compatriots and discriminates from foreigners and aliens.

The ethnic languages are by linguists called “*natural*”, as opposed to *artificial* constructs, consciously created by their inventors, such as Esperanto. However, the “*naturalness*” of an ethnic language is in reality a quite composed state as many languages are built of quite different layers; some of them exist only in the primary, spoken version and other have been provided by their users with developed, codified and standardised “*literary*” dialects. While the spoken language has probably accompanied the development of humankind for more than 200 000 years, the origin of the *written language* can be traced to about 4000 years before present time. *Writing* is obviously a late human invention, the most important of all our inventions. It has influenced the development in an incomparable scale, especially during the last 150 years, when it became gradually accessible to all societal classes in our part of the world. Codification, standardising procedures and usage have transformed some written languages into so-called *standard languages*, much less “*natural*” than the spoken dialects. We have to learn a standard language in a completely different way than when acquiring the mother tongue. The metaphor saying that “*language runs into blood*” would be inadequate when referred to our written language. Well-developed and complete written languages cover all domains of a society’s life and are parts of standardised and refined cultures. There are not many (less



Figure 69. Ludwik Zamenhof’s grave in the Jewish cemetery in Warsaw: *Doktoro Lazaro Ludoviko Zamenhof, kreinto de Esperanto* (the Inventor of Esperanto). Photo: Alfred F. Majewicz

than 100) of all about 7000 existing languages of the world, which have reached the highest stage.

Distinctions and barriers between the written languages and vernaculars are of different nature. Vernaculars compose continua, their territories are not as strictly divided as the territories of “national” languages. *Transitory* and *mixed* spoken languages are rather a rule than an exception, something that can not be said about the written languages. National languages are often seen as flags, important symbols, and that is why they are imposed on minorities. As a rule, vernaculars are mutually intelligible in a higher degree than the formal, written dialects. For instance, spoken versions of Belarusian, Polish and Ukrainian are mutually intelligible in a much higher grade than the written versions of these languages because of different alphabets. The opposite relation illustrates Swedish and Danish which standard forms are closer to each other than the vernaculars. It can be then stated that the vernaculars can compose territorial units (“regions”) which may markedly differ from units pointed out by the standard languages.

A linguistic search of a diversified multiethnic region has to consider the abovementioned dependencies between the territory and communicative relations. A linguistic region can be defined (in a “hard” version) as an area of a common, inter-ethnic language or an area where the languages are mutually intelligible. According to these criteria there are at least seven communities, covering the Baltic Sea region and stretching out of it parallelly to the East-West axis. The two largest and most populous are the Slavic-speaking community in the southeastern part of the region and the Nordic linguistic community in the North.

However, among about 50 languages of the region there is no one – nor spoken or written – that would symbolize our common “Baltic” identity. Though the Low German played the roll of a pan-Baltic lingua franca in the past, still it has not been replaced by any other of the local languages after the fall of Hansa. Only English, a “foreign language” for everybody in the region, spoken by relatively few inhabitants of the southern provinces of the region, is the candidate for the neutral “tool of communication”. All the local languages are ethnic tongues representing four different linguistic families or branches, and as a consequence, they are not mutually intelligible. Mixed languages do not unite Nordic, Slavic, Baltic nor Fennougric languages, there are no transitory dialects nor lingua francas either. Even a soft construction of a “linguistic region”, assuming existence of region-specific grammatical properties (but not necessary the intelligibility) has to fail in the case of the Baltic Sea region as defined by the ecologists. There are no specific “pan-Baltic” features, uniting the local languages.

The analysis does not point out any Baltic linguistic differentia specifica. The first conclusion may be formulated negatively; the two largest communities (Nordic and Slavic) of the region are separated by a sharp barrier, testified both by lack of mutual intelligibility and a small number of loanwords, which demonstrate that the linguistic contacts between these communities have been of a small scale. No mixed languages, created by languages of these two communities, have been reported either, differently from the White Sea region, within which a Norwegian-Russian *pidgin* (the “Russo-Norsk”) has been in usage. On the other hand, linguistics can distinguish regions differently shaped than the ecological regions as defined by the Baltic co-operations.

However, constructing regions may get a linguistic justification from a completely different point of view. According to the Baltic University Programme, the notion of the region has been provided with some values and postulates, related to the rights of minorities, multiculturalism and security community. These values form also principles for language planning and protection of endangered and minority languages (there are at least 19 languages endangered or

dying in the Baltic region). Some of these ideas have already been implemented. For instance, the educational policy in Sweden has been changed towards an appreciation of minorities and minority languages. In year 2000 Saami, Finnish (Suomi), Meänkieli, Romani Chib and Yiddish became recognized as languages of instruction in the school system. Scandinavian solutions, even if still not implemented, seem to create a pattern, recommendable for the whole region.

Predictions concerning the ways of linguistic integration within the Baltic region may be then in a part treated as an expression of wishes rather than derived from a thorough, study:

1. Emergence of a new, “Baltic-English” speaking community is a result of activities around the Baltic Sea. In time to the development of these activities the community is going to extend. For the time being less than 20% of grown-ups in the south-eastern Baltic sub-region can communicate in English.
2. Redefining of relations between majorities and minorities in accordance to the postulated values of multiculturalism is to be expected. Standards postulated by the European Union should encourage the so-called ‘post communist countries’ to improve the conditions for their minorities, like conditions for Kashubian and Lemko in Poland (compare Sven Gustavsson’s remarks on that in the following chapter), Latvia and Estonia may also revise their policy of “constitutional nationalism” (compare Michał Buchowski’s chapter on culture, in this volume). A desired result of it should be a change of the traditional pattern of domination and maintenance of the linguistic diversity.

The last prediction can be a self-verifying one. Contributions, collected in this part of our textbook represent a quite new direction of linguistic research; they are a study of communicative relations in a specific European region. Emergence of a new field of *eurolinguistics* is probably not too early to be announced.

Glossary

<i>Standard language:</i>	A language (also called literary language) with a written form and a norm codified in grammars and dictionaries, used in all spheres of society.
<i>Vernacular:</i>	Language spoken in a country or region, especially as compared with the official language of the country.
<i>Lingua franca:</i>	Language for communication over the borders of national languages. Today English, Russian and German are used as Lingua francas in the Baltic region.
<i>Church language:</i>	Language used exclusively in religious ceremonies, liturgy and holy texts. Latin (Catholic Church), Church Slavonic (Russian Orthodox Church) and Hebrew (Jewish church) are church languages in the Baltic Region.
<i>Diglossia:</i>	The use of two languages or language varieties in different social contexts. Linguistic minorities mostly live in a diglossic situation.
<i>Bilingual:</i>	A truly bilingual is a person able to use two languages equally well.

15 Language and multilingual societies

Sven Gustavsson

1. Language families and language groups

In the Baltic area two language families have been in contact since prehistorical times, the Indo-European and the Uralic language families. Indo-European is represented by three linguistic branches, the Germanic, Baltic and Slavic groups, and Uralic by the Balto-Fennic branch and the Saami language(s). In addition, relatively early settlers in the area are the Tatars in Belarus (Belorussia, Byelorussia), Lithuania and Poland, and the Karaims in Lithuania and Poland who have partly kept their languages (of the Turko-Tataric language family) and the Roma (Gypsies) who speak various dialects of Romani or Romanes (an Indo-Iranian language).

An enumeration gives an overview of great linguistic diversity in a relatively small area but this is not the full picture. The overview may be both simplified and complicated. Many of the languages mentioned above are small. Only Swedish, Norwegian, Danish, German, Finnish, Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Russian, Belarusian (Belorussian, Byelorussian, Belarusian), Ukrainian and Polish count more than a million speakers, and these languages are the only ones able to fulfil the role of national languages. All the other languages are minority languages, spoken by as few as 50–60 people up to as many as a hundred thousand. Some of them are near extinction, such as Votian, Livonian, Ingrian, the South Saami, and Lower Sorbian.


2. Language and dialect

In defining a language it is never easy to draw a borderline between dialect and language. This is especially cumbersome in the case of very closely related languages such as the Scandinavian, the Slavic, or the Balto-Fennic ones. In many of these cases the distinction between a dialect or language is, or was, decided by extra-linguistic factors such as state borders. The dialects of the present Swedish provinces Skåne, Blekinge, and Halland would have been Danish if Sweden had not captured the area in the 17th century. The same goes for the Swedish provinces Bohuslän, Härjedalen and Jämtland but with the difference that they would have been Norwegian. Another example is that the dialects of the Smolensk area, which in the beginning of this century were considered Belarusian, are now Russian.

The problem of differentiating between dialect and language has also been used for political purposes. In the second half of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century the Ukrainian (Little Russian) and Belarusian dialects were considered dialects of a greater Russian language, and consequently any attempt to develop a Ukrainian or a Belarusian literary language could be labelled an attempt to break a greater Russian unity. Another example is the

Language families

Studies of the relations between different languages allowed scientists in the 19th century to construct languages trees. These have more recently been confirmed and extended. Extinct languages, such as Prussian and Gothic are indicated to the left of the contemporary ones.



Map 24. Spread of Indo-European and Finno-Ugric languages. Ill.: BUP archive

Three of the 12 groups constituting the Indo-European language family are found in the region: Germanic, Slavic and Baltic. Many scientists suggest that the two latter have a distant common origin as a Balto-Slavic language. The original Indo-European language is believed to have been spoken in a region in contemporary south-eastern Turkey some 10,000 years ago. The present extension of the Indo-European languages is shown in the map as the dotted area. The Finno-Ugric language family, shown as a dark grey field in the map, is found in the northern part of the Eurasian continent. Nine of the Balto-Finnish languages found in the Baltic region are spoken by minority people (see also Table 7c).

Some researchers hypothesize that the Finno-Ugric and Indo-European languages have a common origin some 15,000 years ago in the Eurasiatic superfamily of languages. The language trees have more recently been confirmed by genetic investigations. These suggest that the human species spread over the Euroasian continent some 45,000 years BC.

status of the Kashubian dialects. Are they dialects of a separate West Slavic language or are they dialects of Polish? Researchers have differing views, but Polish linguists have typically regarded the Kashubian dialects as Polish.

These problems could also be exemplified with the northern Balto-Fennic languages, i.e. Finnish, Karelian, Vepsian, and Ingrian. The Karelian dialects have been considered Finnish, and there has been discussion about the Ingrian dialects. Do they belong to the Karelian dialects or not? The Ludic dialects are now counted as Karelian dialects but were earlier considered a separate language.

Dialects of a given language area can be more or less differentiated. It is possible to claim that all speakers of Russian are able to understand each other. The same probably also goes for the speakers of the other Slavic languages in the area. In this respect Sweden has much more variation. Between the most extreme poles mutual intelligibility is low. Most speakers of Swedish dialects would not, for example, understand the dialect of Älvdalen in the northwest of the Swedish province Dalarna. The difference between standard Swedish and this dialect is also huge. For that reason most inhabitants in the area are bilingual, speaking both Swedish and their home dialect. If we take intelligibility as the criterion for what constitutes a language, it could be argued that the Älvdalen dialect is a separate language. In the Saami language, which is spread over four states, Finland, Norway, Sweden and Russia, the differences are especially great, so great that some researchers even talk about 9 or 10 Saami languages.

Common languages around the Baltic Sea

Russian was the common language in the former Soviet Union and is still understood and can be spoken by a majority of the people in the new independent countries. But the Russian language is still seen in the former Soviet republics as a language of dominance, and only time can wash away that brand. Nevertheless, Russian will be an important language of communication in the area, especially if Russia succeeds with its reform policy. Then knowledge of Russian will probably be seen as an advantage in the neighbouring countries.

In the Scandinavian countries **English** is clearly the first foreign language. Nearly all of the younger generations have some knowledge of English. The dominance of English in television and in pop-music is also evident. English is rapidly gaining ground in other countries as well.

The unification of Germany, the strong economic position of the country and its interest in economic and other contacts with the former Socialist part of Europe have increased the role of **German** in the area. Thus there are at least three languages which could function as *lingua francas*, and all three will be important in the Baltic region in the future. English, however, has the advantage that it is not the native language of any of the Baltic nations. Thus all nations would be in a relatively equal position concerning the language for international communication.

Some of the national languages might also be influential outside the domain of their own countries. If the Polish economic revival continues, knowledge of **Polish** will be of interest, particularly for neighbouring Lithuania, Belarus, and Ukraine with their Polish minorities, but also for the other countries around the Baltic. At the same time Poland also has Belarusian, Lithuanian, and Ukrainian minorities. In Karelia and Estonia, **Finnish** is an important language. **Swedish** is an official language in Finland and during discussions in Finland about the study of Swedish in the schools, it is often pointed out that knowledge of Swedish is a means for deeper contact with Sweden as well as with Norway and Denmark. One of the hallmarks of the Nordic community has been the possibility to use all three Scandinavian languages, Swedish, Norwegian, and Danish freely at meetings, conferences, etc.

Today, one important obstacle for cooperation in the Baltic area is the lack of a common foreign language. A common policy concerning the teaching of foreign languages in the countries and regions in the Baltic area is thus of utmost importance for the future. A harmonization of language laws and language rights would also be an important step forward.

3. Linguistic systems and standard languages

The word language has two meanings. Internally defined, that is, from a strict linguistic angle, it can be defined as a system – so called diasystem – of dialects united by a set of common features. In this case it does not need to have any written form. However, the term language is today most commonly associated with what is usually called a “standard language” or a “literary language”, that is, a language variety having a written form which has a norm, codified in grammars and dictionaries; which is polyvalent, meaning that it can function in all spheres of society; and which is also stylistically diversified.

A standard language has always some degree of political recognition, a fact which often accounts for why national languages and standard languages are relatively synonymous notions. Due to the increased mobility of the populations and the impact of education and mass media in today’s societies, standard languages usually have a spoken norm. A standard language is always artificial to a certain extent, a deliberate creation by one or more individuals or groups.

There is no one-to-one correspondence between language defined as a linguistic diasystem and language defined as a standard language, although both politicians and laymen mix up the definitions, sometimes deliberately. A good example that shows that the two notions of language do not necessarily correspond is Norway, which is one nation with definitely one linguistic diasystem but with two standard languages, the Danish-based Bokmål and the dialect-based Nynorsk. The Kashubian written language is another example, though it is not yet a full-fledged standard language. If the Kashubians are to be considered Poles and the Kashubian dialects Polish, we then have two Polish written languages, the fully standardized Polish and the less standardized Kashubian.

The Norwegian example shows us that one nation can have two literary languages. To a certain extent this is also true for Ukraine and Belarus, where parts of the Ukrainian and Belarusian population have Russian as their mother tongue.

That two and more nations or peoples can have the same standard language is also evident from the German example. The German standard language is the national language in both Germany and Austria, as well as one of four official languages in Switzerland. In modern times this is not the case in any of the countries around the Baltic, but when Norway belonged to Denmark, Danish was also the official language in Norway. A similar example was the situation in the Russian empire or in the eastern parts of the Polish state in the period between the two World Wars. The situation in Belarus before 1989 also displays similar traits. Russian had taken over most functions in society, while Belarusian had a very limited area of use and was more or less banished to the countryside.

Any dialect or language variety may be developed into a standard language given the right conditions, such as a separate ethnic, or regional identity in the group of speakers in question, an identity based on a common history, a common culture (including religion), common myths, etc. which differ to a greater or lesser extent from those of the main bulk of the population. That is why Kashubian intellectuals have attempted to develop a written language of their own since the middle of 19th century. The Kashubian area was then a part of Prussia, and Kashubians had lived apart from Poland since the first division of Poland in 1772. On a smaller scale, the same reason – that is, a feeling of a separate identity which very well could be included in a wider national identity – stands behind every attempt at writing in dialect or creating regional variants of a language.

The Multilingual Baltic Region

Any language or dialect has a unifying and at the same time a demarcating function. To speak a language or dialect means that you are (or are counted as) a member of a group of speakers of the same language or dialect and that you are identified as a member of that group both by the other speakers of the language and by speakers of other languages or dialects. Languages are thus a very important means for both internal and external group identification. The concern about the vernaculars in the last few years in the Baltic area, especially on the eastern side of the Baltic, has had as its goal the reinforcement of internal group identification among the nations and nationalities in the area and to demarcate the vernaculars against the dominant Russian language. At the same time political changes and the opening up of the former Socialist countries towards the West have increased the need for a common language or common languages in the countries around the Baltic Sea as a region and in Europe as a whole. This means that profound knowledge of one or more languages, in addition to a vernacular – that is, bilingualism or multilingualism – is very important for contacts outside one's own group.

In the multi-ethnic Baltic region, bilingualism and multilingualism must have been a fact from prehistoric times.

Most early towns were to some extent multi-ethnic, and the tradesmen and artisans came from various ethnic groups. The soldiers who were often hired also contributed to the multi-ethnicity. For example, early Novgorod had a population consisting of Slavs, Swedish Varangians, Finnish peoples, and others. Later, Novgorod was a main trade centre, with special parts of the town reserved for foreign tradesmen. Multi-ethnicity and consequently bilingualism and multilingualism were typical for most of the towns around the Baltic Sea from the Hanseatic times, towns such as Riga, Viborg, Gdańsk (Danzig), and others. In the Slavic and Baltic parts of the area at the beginning of the 20th century, the population composition in the towns was still very mixed. Minsk then had, for example, 51.2% Jews, 25.5% Russians, 11.4% Poles, 9.3% Belarusians, and 0.7% Germans. Vilnius had 40.3% Jews, 31.9% Poles, 20.2% Russians, 4.2% Belarusians, 2% Lithuanians, 0.3% Ukrainians, and 1.1% Germans. Kyjiv had 54.2% Russians, 23.4% Ukrainians, 12.1% Jews, 5.6% Poles, and 1.8% Germans.

The population mix has changed greatly during this century, but the same cities are still multiethnic and at least bilingual. In the West, many of the towns and cities are now multiethnic and multilingual due to post-World-War-II immigration. For example, Berlin has huge Turkish areas, and in Stockholm you find areas where the majority of the population is immigrant and where approximately 70 languages are taught as so-called home languages in the schools.

The peasants in the countryside were mostly monolingual, due to their low mobility but at the same time the countryside as such was not exclusively monolingual. A foreign German nobility was typical for the Estonian and Latvian parts of the area, and there were also many villages with non-Estonian and non-Latvian populations. In the Eastern part of the Polish state, the nobility in time became Polish and after the divisions of Poland, partly Russianised. Due to colonisation, many villages with non-native populations were dispersed over the area.

4. National minorities and language

National minorities, that is groups from nations living in another country, are abundant, due to the shifting history of the Baltic area. In relative isolation from the majority of the nation, minorities tend to develop specific traits in their languages even though they may well have decided to use the standard of the motherland. The minority languages are still subject to interference from the dominant language or culture in the area. This is the case with Swedish in Finland. It has a pronunciation norm that differs from that of the spoken standard in Sweden. The vocabulary is also different to some extent.

That the vocabulary is influenced is typical for most national minorities and perfectly natural, since different countries have different realities. In the case of closely related languages such as Belarusian and Polish, Russian and Belarusian, or German and Danish, the changes

do not only concern the vocabulary. Both morphology and syntax might be involved. This is typical for the pidginized or mixed Belarusian-Russian in Belarus and for Ukrainian-Russian in Ukraine, the so-called *Trasjanka and Surzhyk*.

The linguistic complexity of the Baltic area is not fully described without mentioning the effects of the post-World-War-II worker and refugee migrations and the effects of migration inside the Soviet Union. This movement of people has resulted in groups of speakers of many of the world's languages ending up in Germany, Sweden, Denmark, as well as to a certain extent in Norway, and to a much lesser extent in Finland. Most of the more numerous groups of speakers of immigrant languages come from Europe or the Middle East, but there are enough speakers of even more far-away languages to make it possible to talk about between 150 and 200 immigrant languages. As in the case of the languages of national minorities, many cases of interference in the immigrant languages exist.

The policy of the Soviet Union has led to an ethnic mosaic in the former Soviet republics. Most of the approximately one hundred nationalities and ethnic groups are represented. Many of the groups' members probably still use their native languages at home, but it is evident that many, or the majority of the representatives of the non-Russian nationalities, used and still use Russian as their first language.

5. From vernaculars to lingua francas

Long before modern times the linguistic diversity of the Baltic area created a need for languages for communication over the linguistic borders of the *vernaculars*, the spoken languages. The fact that most of the area was Christianized from Rome made Latin, the official *church language*, a common high language for a long period of time. In the East Slavic part of the area that was Christianized in 988 from Byzantium, the church language and the common language became Old Church Slavonic, a tongue based on the South Slavic dialects around Thessaloniki. Created for missionary purposes in West Slavic Moravia, in the tenth century this language was developed and refined in the Bulgarian state.

The differences between Old Church Slavonic and the East Slavic vernacular were not huge. Old Church Slavonic could easily be counted as an indigenous language variety while Latin was clearly a foreign language in the Catholic parts of the Baltic area. The diglossic situation was thus clearer and sharper in the Catholic countries, whereas Church Slavonic and the vernaculars can be seen as communicating vessels with varying proportions of either Church Slavonicisms or vernacular traits, depending on genre. Christianization from Byzantium and the choice of Old Church Slavonic as the church language came, after the split of the Western and Eastern churches in 1054, to isolate the Slavic orthodox world from the Latin culture of Western Europe and also to a great extent from the Greek heritage. For the greater part of the East Slavic area this isolation deepened with the Mongol-Tartar invasion in the 13th century.

The Christianization of the area was an uneven process. In the Finnish, Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian areas this process was not completed until the 13th-14th centuries. In the Saami area Christianization came even later and was not finished until the 18th-19th centuries. In most of the area except among the Germans, we do not see any written texts in the vernaculars before the 11th century. From the 11th century we have, for example, most of the laconic runic inscriptions in Sweden and Denmark or some few texts in Old Russian (Old East Slavic) – for instance the inscription on the Tmutorakan'

stone from 1068. During the Middle Ages the number of texts in Old Swedish, Danish, Norwegian, German, and Polish, as well as in Old Russian, rose. To some extent, Church Slavonic elements are nearly always present in Old Russian. The number of genres of the texts written in the vernaculars is limited. Of great importance are the judicial texts and to some extent belles lettres. In Sweden, Denmark, and Norway the vernacular languages influenced each other but the most important source of influence was the Low German language of the Hanseatic League, which in the 14th and 15th centuries was the dominant commercial power of the Baltic Sea.

The Renaissance and the Reformation were turning points in the use of the vernaculars. Translations of the Bible, either partial or whole, and of other Protestant religious works, such as Luther's catechism or his spiritual songs, marked the beginning of modern literary languages. Such translations were the first written and often printed works of a particular vernacular language. Luther's printed translation of the New Testament in 1522 and of the whole Bible in 1534 into High German were cornerstones for the development of this language and a model for translation into other languages such as Danish (1524 and 1550) and Swedish (1526 and 1541). In Poland the translations of the Bible were also extremely important for the development of a vigorous literary language.

The first religious works in Latvian, Lithuanian, Kashubian, the now extinct West Slavic language Slovincian, the now extinct Baltic language Old Prussian, Estonian, and Finnish came in the 16th century, while the first works in Saami came in the 17th century. Latin was, however, not ousted by the vernaculars until the 18th century and in some spheres the 19th. The Reformation and Counter-Reformation also made their impact on the Eastern parts of the *Rzeczpospolita Obojga Narodów* (*Commonwealth of Poland and Lithuania*).

In the main part of the East Slavic area, in Moscovite Russia, the Reformation, Counter Reformation and Renaissance had no real impact. The language was still Church Slavonic or in some genres the vernacular with Church Slavonic traits. But Church Slavonic was now a conserved language which differed greatly from the vernacular which in time had developed considerably. The absence of influence by the huge cultural and religious movements in the West (the only real gateway for this influence, Novgorod, had been effectively closed at the end of the 15th century) hindered any reforms, including linguistic reforms, until the end of the 17th century when Peter I realised that his growing empire also needed a functional language based on the vernacular. The creation of a functioning literary language, however, took more than a century of trial and error, of battle between the Church Slavonic and the Russian elements and was not completed until the beginning of the 19th century. The result of this century-long battle was a compromise between Church Slavonic and Russian which means that the Russian literary language is the Slavic language most influenced by the Church Slavonic tradition.

The modernization period of the 18th century opened Russia for influences from other languages. German, Dutch, and Latin influenced Modern Russian but in time French became the most influential language, since it was the first language of large portions of the Russian nobility. French was also important in the Western part of the Baltic area, becoming in the 18th century the language of diplomacy and culture. In the 17th-century multiethnic Swedish empire, Latin, Swedish, and German were, however, more common languages in the chancelleries and in contacts with foreign countries. In Denmark, German was used as an administrative language until the middle of the 19th century.

6. Romanticism, nationalism and language

The 18th century saw a rise in the use of vernaculars but it was with Romanticism and its coupling of language and nation that the use of vernaculars also gained the status it has today. The rise of the vernaculars had its roots in the needs of changing societies in which industrialization had caused greater mobility of the population. The spread of at least basic education to larger strata of the population and the increased role of mass media enhanced the vernaculars' position.

The principle of national self-determination became an inalienable part of European life, one which later spread to the whole world. This statement does not mean that nationalism did not exist before Romanticism, but at least the strong coupling between language and nation must be seen as a result of Romanticism. From this time onwards there is also a strong coupling between language and culture. Language is thus seen as an inalienable part of a nation's culture. The formula which developed and which has been of utmost importance in the history of 19th and 20th century Europe is thus that any people or nation has the right to develop its own language and culture and the right to at least some kind of self-determination, varying from cultural autonomy to total independence.

The strong coupling between language and nation is to a great extent due to the fact that many of the Romantic ideologists were Germans. At the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th century Germany was, in most respects, a divided area. The only common denominator was the literary language which had its roots in Luther's Bible translation. The German literary language was thus the strongest uniting factor, the strongest reason for the unification of the various Germanies into a German nation and state. Language thus fulfilled a very important role in the unification of Germany.

By the beginning of the 19th century, Swedish, Danish, German, Polish, and Russian were already full-fledged instruments for communication and the expression of culture in the Baltic area. This does not mean that these languages were essentially fully developed at the time. As for the other literary languages which had their basic development in the 19th and or 20th centuries, the development of these languages was to be influenced by nationalist and Romantic ideas.

7. Language in multilingual societies

Most countries in the Baltic region are, as mentioned, more or less multilingual. This means that the relation between languages and the status of language in any of the societies in the area are of huge political and social importance. The relation between various languages in a society is mostly a relation of inequality; one language is more widely used and fulfils more functions in the society than other languages. This is the case in most states with a language majority and in most national states with one national or state language, like for example in Sweden. The notion of a nation state is to a great extent equal to the notion of language inequality.

The situation when one language or language variety in a society fulfils more functions and is more widely used than other languages is called *diglossia*. Diglossia does not always mean that the speakers of the *high language* or language variety are more numerous than the speakers of the low language or language variety. In many cases, as for example in many of the republics of the Soviet Union, Russian was not the majority mother tongue, but nevertheless the *dominant language*. In most multilingual societies of today, the speakers of *minority lan-*

languages must know the *majority* or *dominant language* in order to function in society or to be able to climb socially. He/she must be *bilingual*. The majority member or speaker of the dominant language does not have the same incentive to learn the minority language. Thus, bilingualism is usually a characteristic for a member of a linguistic minority. Only in cases where there is a power balance between various language groups, bilingualism may be more equally dispersed. Bilingualism is usually considered a characteristic of the individual. This does not mean that a bilingual person normally knows all varieties and registers of both languages equally well. A bilingual person, however, has the ability to switch from one language to another more or less unconsciously.



Figure 70. Chestnut street in Lithuanian, Polish and Russian in multilingual Eišiškės (Lithuania). Photo: Alfred F. Majewicz

Language contacts

Language contacts often result in language conflicts. To a great extent such conflicts are inevitable in multilingual societies, due to the fact that there are very few, if any societies, where full equality between languages exists. The majority-minority relations, the thinking in terms of national states, the need for effective communication in modern states, and the internationalization inevitably create a hierarchy of languages in function, a superior position for some languages and a subordinate position for others, usually minority languages. This does not mean that the “subordinate” languages are to be regarded as inferior. Every language is unique and has the right to live and refine and to function as an expression of the specific feelings and culture of its speakers.

A multilingual society also inevitably means that languages *influence* one another. A common term for this influence is *interference*. Interference is more widespread when the languages concerned are closely related. *Language contact* thus leads to interference, and in the long run to structural changes within the languages concerned. Usually the dominant language or language variety influences the non-dominant one(s). This was the case in the Russian empire and even more so in the Soviet Union, where this influence was considered beneficial for the other, “less developed” languages. Tribute was sometimes paid, rather rhetorically, to influences in the other direction.

The meeting of two languages often results in what is called *mixed languages* (pidgins). The attitude towards such languages is usually negative. The mixed Ukrainian-Russian and Belarusian-Russian spoken languages have their own nick-names: *Surzhyk* and *Trasjanka*. The inhabitants of the Nordic countries use a kind of mixed Nordic, called Scandinavian or *Samnordiska* in every-day communication.

The existence of more than one language in a society inevitably also has as an effect on the possibility to choose between languages. This choice is seldom free, but depends on the

hierarchical relations between the various languages. Even when parents have the possibility to send their children to minority language schools or classes, parents who belong to a linguistic minority often tend to send their children to schools where the majority language is the language of instruction, in order to give their offspring better opportunities in society. For the same reason it is often the case in more or less bilingual families that the parents speak the majority language with their children. In mixed marriages the language of the parent belonging to the majority language usually takes the upper hand. In groups with strong patriarchal traditions this might not be the case. The language of the male parent is often the choice there.

Many minorities find themselves in a *triglossic* situation: local dialect (sometimes influenced by the surrounding society) + the standard language of the mother country (usually taught in minority schools and often very different from the local dialect) + majority language. Depending on how close the ties with the mother country are, this might lead to a resistance against the study of the standard language of the mother country and to the creation of new standards, as for example in the case of the Finns in the Torne Valley in Sweden or to a double depreciation of the local dialect both vis-à-vis the standard language of the mother country and to the majority language of the settlement country. This type of *triglossia* is very common among many of the new emigrant groups in, for example, Sweden, where the language spoken in the families often differs sharply from the so-called home language (now called mother tongue) taught at school. This situation easily furthers linguistic assimilation to the majority language.

Intense language contact results more often in *assimilation* than not, and in some cases even in language death. A change of mother tongue is usually the forerunner of loss of ethnic identity. This also leads to the conclusion that the preservation of the mother tongue is of utmost importance for the preservation of ethnic identity.



Figure 71. Lemko performance during their yearly festival Watra ('camp fire') in Michałowice (southern Poland). Photo: Alfred F. Majewicz

Writing in dialect is a relatively common phenomenon in most countries of the Baltic region. During the last decades a dialect-based literary language, called **Meänkieli** has found increasing use among the Finnish-speaking population in the Torne Valley in Sweden. A dictionary was published in 1992. From April 2000 this language, together with Finnish, **Romani Chib**, **Saami** and **Yiddish**, is an officially recognized minority language in Sweden. A Polish example is the literature written in the **Silesian** dialect. A very interesting effect of the great changes in Eastern Europe was the attempt to create a new Slavic literary language in Western Polesia in the southwest of Belarus, the so-called **West Polesian** or **Yatvingian** language. The area to a certain extent also has a history of its own. The attempts to create a separate language were accompanied by demands for at least some cultural autonomy. This has irritated some Belarusian patriots who feel that these demands split the efforts to re-Belarusianize the Belarusian society.

Another group worth mentioning in this connexion are the **Lemkos** in Poland who claim that they are not Ukrainians (they have been counted as Ukrainians in the post-War period) but rather Rusyns and who are trying to develop a **Lemko** literary language in cooperation with Rusyns in other countries.

Table 7a. Romani languages of the BSR

INDIC (Indo-Iranian)	Territory	Number speakers	Written records	Cross-ethnic communication
Romani (Chib, Lovari, Sinti, Kelderari, Èurari, some of them •)	The Baltic region	~30,000 in Poland, 10,000 in Scandinavia, about 50,000 in the entire Baltic region	20th c.	Polyglossia

16 Nordic and Fenno-Ugric languages

Sven Gustavsson

1. German, Danish, Swedish and Russian

After the Vienna Congress in 1815, the Baltic area had only four independent peoples: the Danes in Denmark, the Russians in the Russian empire, the Swedes in Sweden and the Germans to the south of the Baltic Sea. The German area was, however, divided into smaller ones of which the most influential was Brandenburg-Prussen. Sweden had lost its last possession on the eastern coast of the Baltic Sea, Finland, to Russia; Poland was divided between Brandenburg-Prussen, Russia, and the Austrian empire; and Norway had been forced into a union with Sweden. Consequently, only German, Danish, Russian, and Swedish could develop in total freedom. All the other languages were hindered in their development, some more than others, with the exceptions of Norwegian and to some extent Finnish.

2. The two Norwegian languages

In Norway the break-up of the century-long subordination under Denmark and the union with Sweden gave national forces more freedom to act. This change influenced the development of the literary language which, having been Danish, became in the course of the 19th century more and more Norwegianized. This standard language took the name Riksmål and later Bokmål. In the last half of the century when Norwegian culture had a long period of development, this language was refined by the great authors Ibsen and Bjørnson. But this was not enough for the most nationally-minded Norwegians. In the middle of the 19th century the Norwegian language reformer Ivar Aasen suggested a new Norwegian language based on what he considered the purest Norwegian dialects, the so-called Landsmål. Later this language got the name Nynorsk (New Norwegian). After some decades of struggle, Landsmål was recognized in 1892 as an equal language of education. The Norwegianization of Riksmål/Bokmål continued after Norway's independence in 1905.

Though many attempts have been made to get the two languages closer to each other, Norway still has two official languages. One difference between the use of Bokmål and Nynorsk is that the former language has more of a spoken standard than the latter, the users of which normally tend to use their own dialects as the spoken language.

Table 7 b: Germanic languages of the BSR

Historic languages of the Baltic region	Territory	Majority l. Number of speakers	Minority l. Number of speakers	Earliest written records	Regional /cross-ethnic usage
GERMANIC					
West Germanic:					
English	Baltic region	–	–	10th c.	Baltic region
!Yiddish	Baltic region	–	?10,000	14th c.	–
Low German 1300–1500	Germany		+	8th c.	Baltic region 13th – 16th
German	Germany	+	?	9th c.	Western Baltic region
Nordic:					
Danish	Denmark	5,000,000	+ Norway, Sweden, Germany	9th c. runic, 13th c. Latin	Nordic community
Swedish	Sweden	8,900,000	300,000 in Finland	9th c. runic, 13th c. Latin	
Norwegian (2 languages, Bokmål and Nynorsk)	Norway	4,300,000, 500,000 of which speak Nynorsk	+	20th c.	
?Gotlandish	Sweden			15th c.	
?Bornholmish	Denmark				
! ?Älvdalian	Sweden				
East Germanic:					
† Gothic (extinct in the Baltic region in ca 500)				4th–6th centuries	

3. The diversified Saami languages

The Saami dialects or languages are spoken by approximately 40,000 people in four countries, Sweden, Norway, Finland and Russia. The differences between some of the dialects could be compared to the differences between Swedish and Danish, or in the case of other dialects between Swedish and German. These differences result from the fact that the speakers of Saami live over a very large geographical area and in more recent times because the vocabularies of Saami have been influenced by the dominant languages in the respective states.

Codification of Saami

The codification of the Saami languages is connected with religious missions among the Saamis. Consequently, except for grammars and dictionaries, the overwhelming majority of works written in Saami before the 20th century are of religious character. In Sweden, work on codifying the language began in the 17th century and intensified in the 18th. The first efforts in Sweden to codify Saami concerned the South Saami dialects. The orthographies of this so-called South Lappish book-language have changed in time.

The present **South Saami** orthography gained official status in Norway and Sweden as late as 1978. However, the large dictionary of South Saami, published in 1981-85, has another orthography. The **Lule Saami** became a written language in the 19th century through the religious writings of Lars Levi Laestadius. An important contribution for the Lule Saami was the dictionary by Harald Grundström, published in 1946-54. A grammar was published in 1977 and a new dictionary in 1979. The latest Lule Saami orthography, which is used in Norway and Sweden, was sanctioned by the Saami conference in Utsjoki in 1983.

In Norway, efforts to codify the Saami language began in the north and somewhat later (in the 18th century) than was the case in Sweden. Thus the **North Saami** dialects (belonging to **Central Saami**) were the focus of interest. A grammar and

a dictionary were published in 1748 and 1781 by the priest Knud Leem. From work between 1932-1962 came another Saami-Norwegian-English dictionary in five volumes. The main author of this dictionary, Konrad Nielsen, also published the three-volume manual *Laerebok i Lappisk* in 1926-29. In 1948 Sweden and Norway agreed upon a common North Saami orthography. New textbooks and a grammar were published. The author of the grammar is the Saami Israel Ruong.

In 1979 Sweden, Norway, and Finland agreed upon a common orthography for North Saami, one which was slightly revised in 1983. In the same period, **Inari Saami** and **Skolt Saami** in Finland were codified. **Kola Saami** has two competing Cyrillic orthographies.



Figure 72. First ever translation of the New Testament into the Lule Saami handed over to the Lule Saami people in Norway, Tysfjord, Oct. 2000 Photo: Andrzej Szmaj

In the 1947 peace treaty between Finland and the Soviet Union, the Saamis in the Petsamo corridor, which had been Finnish territory from World War II, were allowed to choose between staying in the Soviet Union or moving to Finland. Some villages chose to move, others stayed. Even though the people of these villages are speakers of the same language, today they have problems understanding each other due to the influence from Finnish on one side, and Russian on the other.

The history of the Saami languages' codification is a history of interference from the outside. The Saami languages have usually been codified by priests or by non-Saami linguists. There have been many orthographical projects, and the Saami languages have been written, and are currently being written, both with the Latin and the Cyrillic alphabets. Only in the post-World War II period have the Saamis themselves had some influence on the codification of their own languages.

4. Finnish

When Finland became a Grand Duchy of Russia in 1809 it had been a part of Sweden for about 600 years. The official language of Finland was Swedish, while Finnish was used mostly in the religious sphere. Most of the area's leading people were also Swedes. Due to the annexation by Russia, the Swedes became a minority in Finland, though Swedish was preserved in the country as the language of administration during most of the 19th century. This century also saw a large number of authors writing in Swedish, among them Finland's national poet, Johan Ludvig Runeberg. This was a result of the promises made by the Russian tsar Alexander I that the country be governed according to the laws from the Swedish period.

The Finnish language, however, eventually gained more status. A very important step forward for the Finnish literary language was the publication by Elias Lönnrot of the Finnish folk epos *Kalevala* in 1835 and in the final version in 1849. But still, a decree was published in 1850 that forbade the publication of literature in Finnish except for religious and some economic literature. The striving for a more Finnish Finland, however, had been already awakened, and the more liberal tsar Alexander II yielded to these efforts. In 1863 came the so-called language rescript which stated that within 20 years Finnish would be equal to Swedish in the courts and in administration. However, full equality between Swedish and Finnish in administration was not gained until 1902. The second half of the 19th century also witnessed a rise in the number of authors writing in Finnish. Aleksis Kivi is probably the most important.

The Russification efforts came late to Finland, in the 1890s. Though the 1905 revolution meant a short break in these efforts, they were soon resumed with the ultimate goal of making Finland a totally integrated part of Russia. The revolution and Finland's independence furthered the use of the Finnish language but in 1919 Finnish and Swedish became the official languages of Finland, except for the Åland islands, which became a neutralized monolingual Swedish area according to international agreements, the first of which was signed in 1921.

The position of Finnish and Swedish in Finland caused a heated struggle between so-called

Fennomans and Suecomans in the second half of the 19th century. Such struggles have flared up now and then in Finland but with diminishing intensity after World War II. The most recent discussions of the issue occurred in the 1990s and concerned the status of the Swedish language in the Finnish school system.

The situation in Finland has also caused the Finns in Sweden, the overwhelming majority of whom are post-War work migrants, to demand recognition as a national minority and, at least partly, the same rights as the Swedes in Finland. At present the approximately 300,000 Swedish-speaking persons (about 6% of the population in Finland) have extensive rights and a strong culture. As to identity, they belong to Finland. Finland's municipalities are officially defined as either monolingual or bilingual. A munic-



Figure 73. Illustration to *Kalevala*, the Finnish folk epos. Ill.: Małgorzata Sheiki-Bińkowska

ipality is deemed bilingual if more than 8% of the population or more than 3000 people primarily speak a language other than that of the majority. If the number of non-majority language speakers is below these cut-off points, the municipality is officially monolingual. For example, the municipalities of Åbo (Turku), Vasa (Vaasa), and Helsingfors (Helsinki) are considered bilingual since the Swedish-speaking minority numbers more than 3000 persons. In all bilingual municipalities as well as in the state administration, all administrative personnel must be bilingual.

The experience of Finland shows that it is possible to create a functional system of state bilingualism and to integrate the members of an earlier dominant group into the society.

5. Estonian

The high languages of the Estonian part of the Russian empire were German and Russian. The use of Estonian, which has had two written languages since the 17th century, a northern Estonian and a southern Estonian variant, was reduced mostly to the religious and judicial spheres. In the 19th century, the northern variant became the basis for a modern literary language. In the 1850s, an Estonian cultural life got a start, which even the Russification efforts in the late 19th century could not stop. When Estonia became independent after the revolution, Estonian became the national language, and the language was modernized as well. At the same time the minorities, Russians, Germans, Jews, Swedes, and Latvians got extensive rights which were regulated in the Law on Cultural Autonomy of 1925.

The Soviet occupation in 1940 changed the situation considerably. In the post-war period the population balance changed through extensive immigration from other republics. While the Estonians in 1934 comprised 92% of the population, they amounted to only 61.5% in the 1989 census. The corresponding figures for Russians are 4.4% and 30.3%. Regarding language, the percentage of people with Russian as their mother tongue was higher than these figures indicate, due to the fact that many of the other Soviet nationalities claimed Russian as their mother tongue—for example, 54.5% of the Ukrainians, 67.1% of the Belarusians, 78.3% of the Jews, 56.5% of the Germans, and 29.1% of the Latvians. The Estonians, however, were very true to their native language: only 1.1% claimed Russian as their mother tongue.

Demographic changes, together with the Russification efforts especially from the seventies, made the linguistic situation in Estonia a diglossic one, with Russian as the dominant language in most official spheres of life. The reaction against the Russification, however, was strong and became more pronounced in the more liberal climate in the late eighties. In 1989 the Language Law was passed which gave Estonian the status of official language in the republic. This law does not intrude very much on the rights of the Russian-speaking population. Instead, it is better seen as a way to protect Estonian. After independence in 1991 the role of Estonian has been enhanced, and the role of Russian consequently diminished. But the Russian speakers still have, in regard to their language, all the minority rights spelled out in international documents.

Karelian

Since the early Middle Ages, the Karelian area has been a bone of contention, an area divided between East Slavic states and Sweden-Finland. At present most of the Karelian area is a republic in Russia. In the 1989 census only 10% (78,910) of the population in Karelia was Karelian, whereas Russians constituted the majority (73.6%). Of the Karelians in Karelia, only 51.5% claimed Karelian as their mother tongue. The number of Karelian speakers diminished sharply in the younger age groups.

Even though the first written text in Karelian are dated back to the 13th century (a birch bark letter from Novgorod) and the 16th century (some runic texts), the first attempts to codify the Karelian language came in the early 19th century (a catechism in Cyrillic script). The 1930s saw an attempt to create a literary language with Latin script for the Karelians in the Tver region. These are descendants of Orthodox refugees from Swedish Karelia who fled the harsh Swedish Lutheranization policy in the 17th century.

In Soviet Karelia, Finnish was the main language but in 1937 it was banned, and in its place a Karelian-Russian mixed literary language was created. This language, however, existed for only a short period. In the post-World-War-II period Finnish and Russian were used, and only in recent years has Karelian undergone a renaissance. Some schoolbooks and at least one journal have been published; the language is taught in some schools; Karelian and Vepsian are studied at the university in Petrozavodsk.



Figure 74. The oldest known Karelian inscription on birch-bark from 13th century. It reads: Gods arrow (lightning) ten are your names. This arrow is God's own. God, the Judge, leads it! Ill.: Małgorzata Sheiki-Bińkowska



Map 25. Minority Fenno-Ugric Peoples. Ill.: Karin Hallgren

Vepsian

In the 1989 census the number of people declaring themselves as Veps in Russia amounted to 12,176 people. Of these only about 6000 spoke Vepsian. The main bulk lived south of Karelia in the Vologda and Leningrad region, using Russian as their first language. The Veps language was codified in the 1930s (with Latin script); this form is also used in the present-day attempts to revive the Veps language. The Veps have demanded an autonomous Veps region.

Ingrian

The speakers of Ingrian today comprise probably fewer than a hundred people. The Orthodox Ingrians are descendants of a group of Karelians who migrated southward along the Izhora

river. The Ingrians settled in Ingermanland, that is what is now the Leningrad region. An attempt to codify the Ingrian language was made in the 1930s, but the language was used for the most part only in schoolbooks.

When Ingermanland became Swedish in the Peace of Stolbova, 1617, the Swedes tried to convert the Ingrians to the Lutheran faith. As a result, many of the Ingrians fled to Russia. To replace them, the Swedish authorities encouraged the immigration of Lutheran Finns, who are called Ingermanlandians. Descendants of these immigrants are still found in the area, although their number has declined considerably due to emigration and assimilation. In the last few years a Finnish revival has taken place in the area. The number of Ingrians has also fallen drastically, a result of the area's very troubled history and of assimilation by the Russian population.

Minority Fenno-Ugric languages

Votian

Closely related to the Estonians linguistically, the Votes also settled in the Ingermanland area. The number of Votian speakers is probably fewer than 20. The decline of the Orthodox Vote group is a result of assimilation by the surrounding Russians. Votian has, as far as has been possible to establish, never been used as a written language.



Figure 75. Livonian inscription carved on a grave. Photo: Alfred F. Majewicz

Livonian

The Livonian language has been spoken on the shores of the gulf of Riga in Latvia up to the present. How many Livonian-speaking people there are left is not clear, but estimates place their total at fewer than fifty. The number of Livonians has dwindled in this century due to assimilation to the Latvians and to forced migrations from the area in connexion with the two world wars. As a written language, Livonian was used in the second half of the 19th century and up to World War II. The few publications in Livonian were reading-books, song-books, calendars, and a journal (Livli 1931-39). A small-scale Livonian renaissance has been underway in recent years.



Saami languages

The Saami dialects are usually divided into three main groups, East Saami, Central Saami and South Saami. The great differences in pronunciation, morphology and vocabulary, as well as the geographical distribution of speakers, explains why there are as many as six Saami standards, the South Saami in Sweden and Norway, the Lule Saami in Sweden and Norway, the North Saami in Norway, Sweden and Finland, the Inari Saami and the Skolt Saami in Finland, as well as the Kola Saami on the Kola peninsula in Russia.

Map 26. Saami languages. Ill.: Radosław Przebitkowski

Meänkieli – the youngest language of the Baltic region

Birger Winsa

Meänkieli is one of the five officially recognized minority languages in Sweden, beside Finnish (Suomi), Romani Chib, Saami and Yiddish. It has its roots in a Finnish dialect, spoken in the Torne River valley in the northern part of Sweden since the eleventh century. There are about 30,000 speakers of Meänkieli.

Until April 2000 Meänkieli was considered a Finnish dialect in the Torne (Tornio) valley, but since then it is a recognised language on the west side of the Torne river. On the Finnish side of the Torne valley the local variety is a dialect in a subordinated relation to Standard Finnish.

The concession of the Swedish Riksdag recognizing Meänkieli was preceded by a debate when some Finnish politicians in Sweden argued in the late 1990s that Meänkieli was a Finnish dialect. One reason for some resistance was that if Meänkieli were recognised, Finnish would have no territorial basis of its own, i.e. some 200,000 Finns in Sweden would be excluded from territorial status. The Torne valley is the natural territory for Finnish and/or Meänkieli. Hence, political, economic and strategic reasons affected resistance.

Furthermore, it is naive to compare the variety spoken on the Finnish side with the variety spoken on the west side of the border. In linguistic and social terms these varieties were comparable some 150 years ago. Today the ecologies of these varieties vary greatly. The Finnish Tornedalians are dominantly monolinguals, are all entirely literate in Finnish and are associated with the majority group. The Swedish Tornedalians, associated with a minority group, are only literate in Swedish and often speak two or even three languages (Saami). These social differences leave an impact on ethnicity, identity, language planning, and on the attitudes toward the respective spoken varieties. In their physical appearance the varieties are fairly similar, whereas the social aspects differ. However, any definition carried out by a linguist should precede from the perspective of revitalisation of a variety, and hence terms such as ‘language’ and ‘dialect’ may be considered from the language planning perspective.

It was, furthermore, not due to purely linguistic or ethnic matters that affected the term Meänkieli (*Meän kieli* ‘Our language’, *Meänkieli* ‘Torne valley Finnish’). Even the terms Meänkieli and “Torne valley Finnish” have political implications, which the minority activists began to reflect in the mid 1990s. If we name Meänkieli as “Torne valley Finnish” there is an obvious risk that various forces in society and in the Nordic countries subordinate the term under Standard Finnish, according to local activists. Obviously, the term as such attracts this form of categorisation. One activist claims that Meänkieli exists in a context of strategies and is one attempt to transfer influence to the minority group so that their voice can be heard in the Swedish Parliament, and hence release resources to the revitalisation of the spoken variety, and says this is an important reason for the term. The language resources would otherwise risk

being invested only in southern Sweden, according to Tornedalian activists.

The strategy already does seem to indicate positive results. Municipalities on the Swedish side, which have supported Meänkieli and Saami, have better development in cultural domains. The municipalities Pajala and Kiruna have more amateur theatricals, more songs and more literature in Meänkieli, Saami, and Swedish, as compared to Haparanda (Övertorneå) and Gällivare. Hence, institutionalisation of the local language seemingly promotes also cultural development of the majority language, whereas the neglect of the minority languages results in weak cultural development.

The term Meänkieli has, however, received better response in the Finnish part of Torne valley, whereas Meänkieli in Sweden and somewhat in southern Finland is sometimes ridiculed and used in a deprecatory context by politicians, researchers and administrative staff. In the Finnish Torne valley, terms such as *Meän koulu* ‘Our school, a particular school’, *Meän maa* ‘Our land, i.e. Swedish and Finnish Torne valleys’, *Meän markkinat* ‘Our fair’, *Meän talo* ‘Our house’ etc are used to mark the common heritage of the Tornedalians. The term Meänkieli seemingly promotes regionalisation and focuses attention on the common heritage of the Tornedalians (“We Finnish and Swedish Tornedalians have a common language/dia-



Map 27. Meänkieli territory in northern Sweden
Ill.: Radosław Przebitkowski

Meänkieli – the youngest language of the Baltic region

lect and culture”), which should not be underestimated, although the political connotations of the term are probably of greater importance.

Table 7c. Finno-Ugric languages

Finno-Ugric	Territory	Majorities	Minorities	Earliest written records	Cross-ethnic usage
Finnic (Balto-Finnish)					
Finnish	Finland	5,000,000	Russia, Sweden, Norway	16th c.	Finnish-Karelian-Ingrian Finnish
Meänkieli	Sweden	–	30,000	20th c.	
Karelian incl. Olonetsian	Russia	+ Karelia (R.)	70,000	16th c.	
!Ludian (Ludic)	Russia	–	5,000	?	East Slavic (diglossia)
!Vepsian		–	6,000	?	
!Ingrian	Russia	–	300	?	
Estonian	Estonia	1,000,000	+	17th c.	Finnish-Estonian
?Võro	S. Estonia	–	?	?	Estonian
!Votian	Russia	–	?20	?	
!Livonian	Latvia	–	?50		di- or triglossia, Latvian and East Slavic
Saami				18th c.	
!Akkala (Babinian)	Norway, Sweden,	–	very few		diglossia, Nordic, Finnish or East Slavic communities
!Inari Kemi † 19th century	Finland, Russia		400		
!Kildin			1,000		
!Lule			2,000		
!Northern (incl. Torne and Sea Saami)			30,000		
!Pite			100		
!Skolt			500		
!Southern Saami			500		
!Ter			20		
!Ume			20		

17 Baltic and East Slavic languages; Yiddish

Sven Gustavsson

1. Language policies in the Russian Empire

In the middle of the 17th century, when the Russian Empire had recovered from political unrest, it directed its expansionist efforts towards the west and southwest, towards the Swedish and the Polish-Lithuanian states. This expansion was completed with the Congress of Vienna in 1815. The situation only changed with the revolution in 1917 and the end of World War I. Then Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland became independent states. Poland also won back parts of its former possessions in Belarus and Ukraine. With World War II, the Soviet Union restored many of the former borders of the Russian empire, recapturing Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Polish parts of Ukraine and Belarus and also incorporating most of Eastern Prussia. The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 following the August coup reduced the empire's area once again.

Clearly, the history and the language policy of the Russian empire has had a great impact on the history of many of the languages and peoples in the Baltic area. A short overview is therefore appropriate here. Russification has been a part of Russian policy from the beginning. After Mazepa's cooperation with the Swedish king Charles XII, all traces of Ukrainian autonomy promised in the Treaty of Perejaslavl of 1654 vanished. In 1720, even the printing of Ukrainian works was forbidden. In the Estonian and Latvian areas taken from Sweden in the Great Nordic War at the beginning of the 18th century, the Tsar, however, relied on the mostly German nobility who got extensive privileges. The same policy was used in the eastern parts of Poland, accomplished through the divisions of Poland. The Polish-speaking nobility was allowed to keep its status, as was the Polish language as the medium of education and administration. The role of Polish even increased in the first decades of the century. This policy changed after the Polish uprising in 1831 and especially after the uprising in 1863 when Polish was exchanged for Russian in education, administration, and the courts. The second half of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th witnessed a period of deliberate Russification broken only for a short period of more liberal thinking after the 1905 revolution. Nevertheless, this period also witnessed the birth and rebirth of many languages. The situation in the Russian empire was thus a typical diglossic situation with Russian as the dominant language. To have any possibility of "rising through the ranks", a non-Russian had to master Russian.

2. Soviet policy and Russification

The Soviet Union's policy of the 1920s attempted both to appease local and national interests and to integrate them. The policy could be formulated as a slogan: "Socialist in form but nationalist in content". This policy resulted in a period of blossoming for non-Russian languages and cultures. In the 1920s and partly into the 1930s, huge efforts were also directed towards giving many of the Soviet Union's peoples and nationalities, most for the first time, literary languages of their own. The five-year plan with its subsequent industrialization and collectivization, together with Stalin's purges, put an end to this policy. Most peoples and nationalities then lost both the national Communist leaders of the 1920s and the newborn national intelligentsia. The changes also severely affected the minorities and their languages, though the major name-giving nations of the republics, such as Belarus, could keep their languages and a somewhat superficial national culture. The slogan was "nationalist in form, but Socialist in content".

The development in the thirties also meant Russification. Russians filled the posts emptied by the purges, and official linguistic policy aimed at bringing the languages closer together. A result was that many languages which in the 1920s or 1930s had received Latin alphabets later got Cyrillic ones.

In 1938 Russian became compulsory in all schools. This step was taken rather suddenly because Moscow realized that the development in the republics in the 1920s and the 1930s had caused Russian to lose its role as the *lingua franca*. Most measures taken in the post-war Soviet Union were aimed at restoring the role of Russian language and culture in the Soviet empire. The Russification policy, very typical of both the Khrushchev and Brezhnev regimes was, however, clothed in Socialist terminology. The 1977 Soviet constitution postulated a new entity, the Soviet people or nation which was supposed to differ from a bourgeois or socialist nation. It was a further step towards Communism, and a result of the presumed rapprochement and melding of nations in Socialism. The new nation was to be characterized by a common socialist culture, which in many respects had Russian characteristics, and a common language, the language of international communication, that was Russian. To promote this language, a policy of bilingualism was put forward, which in reality meant that all non-Russians should learn to speak Russian from a very young age, whereas Russians were not obliged to learn non-Russian languages. The result was a typical diglossic situation, with Russian as the high language and an increasingly diminishing area of influence and use for both the republics' languages and the languages of the nationalities and ethnic groups.

The Russification policy and the resistance it provoked were among the main reasons for the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

3. The Development of Latvian

Latvian and Lithuanian are the two remaining Baltic languages. An extinct Baltic language is the above-mentioned Old Prussian. Before the 19th century, as in the case of Estonian, the Latvian language was mostly used in the religious and judicial spheres. The Latvian area has changed rulers many times with Germans, Poles, Swedes, and Russians having competed for influence. In the 16th century the area was mainly Polish; later, it became divided between Sweden and Poland and in the 18th century between Russia and Poland. From the divisions of Poland to the end of World War I it was a part of the Russian empire. This has made the area

Von den Geschlechtern und Verwandtschaften.		O Rodzaju Látách y Pokrewności.	
Sm Elächte och Elydskab.		Mō Jittim un Kādēem.	
Der Mann	Mān	Zonā	Za Secwa
Das Weib	Winnna	Chlopis	Zas Dūfens
Der Knab	Wäfer Pile	Dziawczki	Za Weittne
Das Mägdelein	Pija	Młodzieniactek	Za Seltis
Der Jüngling	Jungling	Panna	Za Jūmratna
Die Jungfrau	Jungfrau	Starzec	Za Węzajō Widyre
Der alte Mann	Wannmal Wan	Okulary	Za Wezza Secwa
Die Heill	Wußigon	Bibi	Zas Wezz; Lehw
Das alte Weib	Wāing	Dziad	Zawez; Wakte
Der Groß Vater	Wafar; Woorfar	Babla	Zas Lehw
Die Groß Mutter	Wormer; Wornoder	Ociec	Za Wakte
Der Vater	Wader	Mārka	Zas Wehls
Die Mutter	Woder	Syn	Za Weitta
Der Sohn	Wen	Brā	Zas Wablis
Die Tochter	Wetras	Siostrā	Zas Wabfa
Der Bruder	Wroder	Owczym	Zas Watehw
Die Schwester	Wrofer	Maochā	Za Wamakte
Der Stieff Vater	Wroffader		
Die Stieff Mutter	Wroffoder		
Der Stieff Sohn	Wroffson		
Die Stieff Tochter	Wrofftofer		
		Pāferb	Zas Watehls
		Patierbia	Za Wameita
	Dv	Bj	Stryi

Figure 76. Depkins Dictionary. The dictionary published in Riga 1705 by Liborius Depkin, a Latvian pastor of German background, contains four languages: (from left) German, Swedish, Polish and Latvian. It is a unique manifestation of the need for not only the dominant German language in multicultural Riga in the early 18th century. Also today there is a need to know not only the lingua franca such as English Russian and German, but also some of the smaller national languages in the region. Photo: Sven Gustavsson

religiously heterogeneous and ethnically heterogeneous (before World War I Latvians constituted only about 60% of the population).

Expression of national feelings on a wider scale is a phenomenon of the early 19th century. 1822 saw the first Latvian newspaper, and in 1824 the first Latvian literary society was formed. One reason for this relatively early national build-up is probably the high rate of literacy, especially in Livonia where 2/3 of the population in the countryside was already literate in 1800. The development accelerated with the school reforms of 1817/19, which made Latvian the language of instruction in the lower and German in the upper grades. In 1881, the rate of illiteracy in Livonia was only 5% illiterates, whilst it was 78% in Russia.

The Latvian national movement was especially strong in the middle of

the century, though problems developed with the harsh Russification campaign which began in 1881. The language of instruction then became Russian. Liberalization after the 1905 revolution gave the national forces more space. The World War I years were especially harsh for the Latvian area but with post-war independence Latvian became the official language of the new-born Latvia. Minorities, however, had extensive rights at least in the beginning of the inter-war period. The language was also modernized. The percentage of Latvians rose in the period between the World Wars. In the 1935 census, 75.5% of the population were Latvians compared to around 60% just before World War I.

The Soviet occupation of the area; the persecutions and deportations; World War II, which vastly devastated the area; the postwar industrialization and the accompanying mass immigration have all reduced the number of Latvians to around 52%. In the capital, Riga, the Latvians are a minority (36.5% compared to 47.3% Russians). The industrialization and subsequent immigration of large groups of Slavs (not only Russians but also Ukrainians and Belarusians, who as in Estonia, are often Russian-speaking) are usually seen as a part of the Russification or Sovietization policy in the post-war period, but they can also be seen as a result of the negligence of the technocrats in the Moscow centre who did not pay any regard to demographic or environmental questions.

4. The Latvian language today

The ideological Russification in the 1970s and the 1980s made the Latvian language lose most of its functions in official communication, but nevertheless the Latvians were true to their mother tongue. Only 3% of the Latvians regard Russian as their first language. Russian

is, however, the first language for more than half of the Ukrainians, Poles and Belarusians. Also in everyday communication the Latvian-speakers were very often forced to use Russian because few Russian speakers knew Latvian. The policy of bilingualism has led to a situation where the majority of the Latvians can speak Russian. The knowledge of Latvian among the Russians is still much lower.

The national renaissance in the late 1980s led to the Law on the Language of the Latvian SSR of 1989. Latvian was then declared the official (or national language) of the republic. Published when the country still was a republic in the Soviet Union, it legalized a Russian-Latvian parallelism in the use of the languages in documents, state affairs, etc. After independence, a subsequent document of 1992 abandoned this parallelism. The use of Latvian on the official level is thus increasing, as is bilingualism among employees of state offices, enterprises, firms and organizations, but the use of languages in everyday life has not changed much.

5. Lithuanian

The first real belletristic work in Lithuanian came in the 18th century, Kristijonas Donelaitis' *Metai* (The Seasons). It was, however, not printed until 1818. Until then the Lithuanian written texts were usually connected with the religious sphere. In the relatively liberal political climate of the Russian empire in the beginning of the 19th century, the university in Vilnius played a great role in the awakening of Lithuanian national feelings. A secondary school was founded, and private schools were opened. The uprising in 1831 led to the closing of the university and the secondary school as well as to harsh measures against the Catholic church, an important national institution for both Poles and Lithuanians.

The 1863 uprising led to even harsher Russification measures, and the Lithuanian national build-up was based, as in the Polish and Ukrainian cases, to a great extent on activities outside the Russian empire. In Little Lithuania, that is in East Prussia, some influential journals such as *Auszra* were published, and the emigré Lithuanians in America also played an important role. The Russian-Japanese War and the 1905 revolution meant a liberalization in Russia. The religious prohibitions were cancelled, and Lithuanian books and journals were allowed to be published. Private Lithuanian schools were again allowed. The German occupation of Lithuania in 1915 left more space for Lithuanian national strivings. A Lithuanian school system was then built up.

The creation of a Lithuanian republic after World War I made the Lithuanian language a national one. The Lithuanians amounted to more than 80% of the population. The Jews were the next most numerous minority, followed by Poles, Russians, Germans, Latvians and others. In spite of the demographic changes connected with the Soviet annexation, the German occupation, World War II, the renewed Soviet occupation, the changing borders, as well as immigration in the post-war period, the Lithuanians are still the majority in the independent republic (around 80%). In 1989, the Russians were the most numerous minority (9.4%) followed by Poles, Belarusians, and Ukrainians.

To a certain extent, the Lithuanians' clear majority position reduced the impact of the post-war Russification, but nevertheless Russian had a dominant position in many spheres of life. The Language Law of 1989 had as its main goal, as in Estonia and Latvia, to give Lithuanian the position of an official language. The rights of the minorities to use their languages were established in a minority law in the same year. In this context it must be pointed out that Lithuania was the only Soviet republic in the post-war Soviet Union where the Poles had some

minority rights, including the right to education in Polish. There was, however, an increasing tendency among the Poles to send their children to the Russian-language schools. At the end of the eighties about 65% of the Polish children got their education in such schools. The independence of Lithuania has naturally strengthened the status of Lithuanian, and the position of Lithuanian as a national language must now be considered the most “normal” in the former Soviet republics in the Baltic area.

Table 7d. The Baltic languages

Baltic	Country	Number of speakers	Earliest written records
Lithuanian	Lithuania	2,800,000	16th c.
Latvian	Latvia	1,400,000	16th c.
† Kur (ext. 17th c.), † Old Prussian (ext. 18th c.), † Yatving (ext. 16th c.),			

6. Belarusian – early development

The Belarusian literary language is essentially a product of the 20th century. This explains the fact that the Belarusian standard is much nearer to the popular language than Russian and that it has far fewer Church-Slavonicisms. The role of Old Belarusian in Polish-Lithuanian society had been reduced to a minimum already in the 17th century, and all continuity was broken after the divisions of Poland. The uprising in 1831 meant, as it did in all other areas, a Russification which became stronger after the 1863 uprising. In the 1830s, the Uniate church, which must be considered the most national of the three main churches in the area, was forbidden. The late 19th century saw the first signs of a national consciousness.

The towns in the area were inhabited mostly by non-Belarusians, while the countryside contained the overwhelming majority of the Belarusian population, which was poor, mostly illiterate, and usually had local identities. The fact that more than five million people in the area in the 1897 census claimed Belarusian as their language should probably not be seen as a sign of a clear national consciousness. The 1905 revolution led to the recognition of the Belarusian language, which had previously been considered a Russian dialect and to the creation of a Belarusian national movement.



Figure 77. Francisk Skaryna's Bible translation into Belarusian (printed in Prag, 1517-19)

The newspaper *Nasha Niva* was also a prominent medium for the Belarusian national strivings.

The 1921 Treaty of Riga divided the Belarusian area between Poland, the Belarusian SSR, and Russia. Later, Russia returned parts of the Belarusian territories, with the exception of the Smolensk region. In the Belarusian republic a fast Belarusification started: Belarusian institutions of various kinds were created and the language normalized and developed to a full-fledged literary language used in administration, education, and culture. The minorities and their languages, however, had extensive rights. Belarus got four official languages: Belarusian, Russian, Yiddish, and Polish. The minorities had their own soviets and a Polish province was established.

The thirties saw the same experiences for Belarusian as had been experienced by other nations and nationalities in the Soviet Union. However, the language and the more superficial symbols of the nation survived not only the purges but also the changes due to industrialization, collectivization, etc. The dismantling of minority rights started earlier and led as a consequence to a rapid decline in the use of minority languages. The changes in the 1930s, however, also affected the Belarusian literary language. The orthographical reform of 1934 aimed at bringing the written language closer to Russian. The new orthography, the so-called *narkomauka*, replaced the *tarashkevica*, the orthography of the 1920s which had been created by Branislau Tarashkevich. The changes were, however, not far-reaching. The *narkomauka* is still extremely phonetic. At present, both orthographies are used in Belarus, the *tarashkevicha* mostly by the opposition. The changes in policy in the 1930s also influenced the vocabulary which from that time became more and more open to borrowings from or deliberate adaptation to Russian.

In Polish Belarus the policy of strong Polonization elicited pro-Soviet sentiments in the Belarusian population, sentiments which however died quickly after the Soviet annexation of the area in 1939.



Map 28. Two alphabets of the Baltic Sea region. Ill.: Radosław Przebitkowski

7. World War II and Post-War development in Belarus

World War II, which passed through the area twice, the purges in western Belarus, the German occupation and the partisan war, and the renewed purges after the Soviet victory all ravaged the area. Most of the industry, towns and cities, as well as the villages, were in ruins; one quarter of the population perished, among them 80% of the Jews. The rebuilding of the country also brought about very important social changes. The Belarusian population which before

the war was mostly rural (before the War the towns and cities were still to a great extent non-Belarusian) became urban very rapidly.

The post-war period also brought a strong Russification of the republic, perhaps the most far-reaching in any Soviet republic. The reasons for this are many: (1) There was not a fully developed national consciousness. The results of the short period of Belarusification in the 1920s were countermanded by the purges in the 1930s and the war, during which most of the new-born Belarusian intelligentsia perished; (2) Before World War II, Belarus was still mostly a rural society whereas the towns were inhabited by a majority of non-Belarusians. The towns and their culture were thus by tradition non-Belarusian. The post-war urbanization of the Belarusians took place in a period when Russification was intensified. The towns thus became Russian-speaking; (3) Some kind of feeling of kinship between Belarusians and Russians and the close relationship between the two languages paved the way for Russification; (4) It is probable that the Belarusians, when moving into the towns, viewed the relation between their spoken language and the Russian language as a relation between dialects and a high language. Knowledge of Russian gave prestige and became a means for social advancement.

In the 1980s the results of Russification were conspicuous. The administration, politics, party, and higher education were almost totally Russian. In lower education almost all schools in towns and cities were Russian; the mass-media were to a great extent Russian; in 1984, around 95% of the printed pages of belletristic works were in Russian; only 3 out of 15 theatres used Belarusian, etc. The stronghold of Belarusian education was the rural schools, but even there Belarusian was often exchanged for Russian as the language of administration, medical service, etc. The spoken Belarusian language in the countryside was usually the local dialect, not a spoken variant of Standard Belarusian. In many places the spoken language was a mixed Belarusian-Russian, the so-called *Trasjanka*, a term literally meaning “mixed cattle-food.”

The Belarusian language was thus in a clear minority position, even though the Belarusians constituted the majority population in the republic, and Russian the dominant language, so dominant that many feared the extinction of Belarusian as a literary language. Russian was also dominant among the minorities who had no minority rights at all in the post-war period. Outside the home, only Polish had a position as the language of service in the very circumscribed Catholic church. The fear for the extinction of the Belarusian language was strongly expressed by the intelligentsia and the opposition, eventually leading to the Language Law of January 1990 in which Belarusian was declared the state language of the republic. Russian was, however, given ample space and its free use was guaranteed as well. Rights for the minorities were later expressed in the minority law of 1992.

In the language law, a process of re-Belarusification taking from three to ten years was foreseen, the goal being to make Belarusian functionally adequate in all spheres of public life. The realization of the language law met hindrances in spite of the declaration of Independence in 1991. Demands for making Russian a second state language, however, met strong resistance in the beginning from the Belarusian opposition and the intelligentsia. The changes were most evident in the school system. During the school year 1992/93, 68.5% of the first-grade pupils were taught in Belarusian compared to only 28.9% two years previously. Some changes were also to be seen in the mass media, but Russian-language newspapers and journals still had a relatively dominant position, as is also the case with Russian-language television.

In 1995, however, the law underwent remarkable changes: as a result of a referendum, Russian gained back its official status by the side of Belarusian. The process of re-Belarusification has lost its previous impetus. During the school year 1999/2000, only 25% of first-grade pupils got their education in Belarusian.

Linguistic rights of minorities in Belarus

Alena Korshuk

The most comprehensive set of **Belarusian laws concerning language minorities** are the Laws of the Republic of Belarus “On National Minorities in the Republic of Belarus” from November 11 1992, “On Culture in the Republic of Belarus”, “On Education in the Republic of Belarus” (October 29, 1991) and on the “Law on Languages in the Republic of Belarus” passed on January 26, 1990 with June 1998 amendments. The comparative analysis of the Belarusian legislative acts and the International legal norms has shown that the Law on Languages, passed earlier than the respective European Charter, guarantees the inhabitants of Belarus practically all the linguistic rights required by the international community.

There are two basic differences between international law and Belarusian law. First, the European Charter is much more specific and detailed in its provisions, whereas the Belarusian law, though all-embracing, is too general. Other laws and acts refer to the Law on Languages. Second, the EU is much more demanding. It requires the governments of the parties to provide a lot of material, financial and logistic support to the representatives of the regional or national minority languages. There is but one document in the Belarusian legislation to this scope – Постановление “О дополнительных мерах по государственной поддержке культуры” от 1 апреля 1996 г. Н. 229” (“Resolution on additional measures of state support of culture” of 1 April 1996).

Belarusian law “does not regulate the use of languages in unofficial settings”, whereas the Charter suggests that the parties shall base their policies, legislation and practice on “the facilitation and/or encouragement of the use of regional or minority languages, in speech and writing, in public and private life” (Part II, Art.7.1). As the words “to facilitate” and “to encourage” are devoid of the meaning “to impose”, the discourse of the Charter actually broadens and specifies the rights of minority language speakers on the one hand and determines the duties of the state, on the other. Part III of the Charter – “Measures to promote the use of regional and minority languages in public life in accordance with the undertakings entered into under Article 2, paragraph 2” – starts with Article 8 – Education. It is composed of 2 paragraphs, the first of which has no less than 25 further sub-divisions.

The 1990 Belarusian law also required that the state should undertake to “ensure that representatives of other nationalities resident in the Republic have the right to receive upbringing and education in their native language” (Law, Part III, Art.22). The “number of users” criterion is applied to the provision of groups studying minority languages. The Law is less precise in respect to the undertakings of the state (cf. The Charter, “to make available”, “to provide”, “to encourage”, “to facilitate”, “to arrange”, “to offer”, “to favor”, “to set up”, etc.). Nothing is said either about the teaching of the culture and the history which is reflected by the regional or minority languages, or about providing the basic and further training of the teachers.

In the part of Belarusian law that concerns administrative authorities and public services, **certain discrepancies can be observed**. Whereas Article 5 of Part 1 clearly states that “any privileges or discrimination on language grounds are inadmissible” Article 4 of Part 1 says that “heads and employees of administrative, Soviet or trade union bodies, public organizations and enterprises shall have the command of Belarusian or Russian to allow them to carry out their responsibilities. Governmental and administrative bodies, and also institutions, enterprises and organizations shall accept and process applications submitted by the citizens in Russian or in Belarusian”. No other languages are mentioned at all. In this case, how does the state ensure the provision of Article 3 of Part 1 stating that “citizens of the Republic of Belarus are guaranteed the right to use their national language...” when they only have “the right to submit an application to State and Party bodies, enterprises, institutions and public organizations in Belarusian, Russian or some other mutually acceptable language”. One can only be punished for “denial of an authority to accept and process an application of a citizen in the state language, in the language of international communication or in the working language of the given body solely on the grounds of the language”. What language can possibly be used for “international communication” today, when both Belarusian and Russian have become state languages? Is it to be English?

The current economic situation in Belarus can hardly allow for the implementation or even the legislative provision of adequate response to the cultural needs of the minorities as far as all the court written translations or publication of national materials is concerned, etc.

All in all, Belarusian law meets international requirements, and if the Belarusians take more responsibility and initiative into their own hands, the language rights of the minorities can be maintained at a good level.

8. Ukrainian in the Russian Empire

In spite of the continuous efforts to make the area Russian, the 19th century and Romanticism brought a national awakening to the Ukrainians. Actions designed to create a national consciousness have gone through periodic revivals and declines. Even the most famous of the Ukrainian authors from this century, Taras Shevchenko, the national poet of Ukraine, suffered severely for his engagement in a Ukrainian national organization and his poetic activities. A modern Ukrainian language was created, a language which was based on the popular language and thus not so full of Church Slavonicisms as Russian. As a result of the division of the Ukrainian-speaking area between Russia and the Austro-Hungarian empire, the language appeared under various names: Little Russian and Ruthenian. Ukrainian was, however, the name chosen by the Ukrainian patriots.

The constant pressure of Russification made it hard for the Ukrainian movement to work in the Russian part of Ukraine. In the Austrian part of the Ukrainian area, Galicia, the inhabitants had greater opportunities despite Polish pressure. Lemberg (Lvov, Lviv) also became a centre for the development of the language. With the beginning of the 20th century, Russian pressure lessened somewhat and Ukrainian organizations were able to work again in Russian Ukraine.

In 1905 Ukrainian was recognized as a separate language and Ukrainian newspapers began to be published. The counter-reaction in Russia was soon apparent, especially after the beginning of World War I when all appearances of national life were oppressed. This oppression against Ukrainians was also very severe in Galicia, most notably when it was occupied by the Russian army in 1914. A consequence of this oppression was that leading Ukrainians set as their goal the creation of an independent Ukrainian republic. The republic which existed for about two years after the War could not, however, withstand the troops of the Bolsheviks, and Ukraine became integrated in the Soviet Union as the Ukrainian SSR. The Ukraine's western parts once again became Polish territory. In the beginning of the 1920s oppression from Moscow was still very harsh, but in 1924 the policy changed and the Ukrainians got, within the Socialist framework, another opportunity to develop a Ukrainian republic and to Ukrainianize the administration, the mass media, and the education system.

9. Ukrainian in the Soviet Union; the independence

The 1920s were thus a flourishing period for Ukraine. But the 1930s brought especially harsh repressions, most notably the Great Famine in 1932-33, which was inflicted upon the collectivized peasants to break their resistance and the national spirit of the Ukrainians. As a result of the Famine probably more than five million people died. At the same time the Ukrainian intelligentsia, the national Communists, and the churches were persecuted and purged, and their members to a large extent killed or deported. Taken together, these were tremendous blows to the Ukrainian national spirit. The annexation of Polish Ukraine and the subsequent purges, the War, the German occupation, the partisan struggles, and the renewed Soviet purges after the defeat of the Germans reduced the number of Ukrainians further, and it took some years after the war to reach the same number of Ukrainians as in 1926, even though Ukraine was considerably enlarged after World War II.

The post-war period also brought a growing number of Russians to Ukraine. From 1959 to 1989 the percentage of Russians rose from 16.9 to 22.1% of the overall population of

Ukraine. During the same period the percentage of Ukrainians fell from 76.8 to 72.7%. To some extent these figures may be a result of assimilation. In the 1989 census nearly 12% of the Ukrainians claimed Russian as their first language. As linguistic assimilation is an important step towards total assimilation, these figures point to such a possibility.

The post-war period, especially the 1970s and the 1980s, meant in Ukraine as in all other Soviet republics an ongoing Russification. As a result, the Ukrainian language lost ground in all areas of public life. The number of schools with Ukrainian as the language of instruction fell and the number of schools with Russian rose. The so-called Ukrainian-Russian schools became more and more Russian. This was also the case in higher education, and the language of administration and party activities was almost exclusively Russian. The Ukrainian language was increasingly relegated more and more to a home language and a rural language, with Ukrainian culture becoming more and more a folkloristic reserve.

The Chernobyl catastrophe in 1986 was the spark for the political and national mobilization in Ukraine. Even if the ecological question was in the foreground in the beginning, the position of the Ukrainian language and culture quickly served as a new focus. As in the other republics these strivings led to a law which made Ukrainian the state language in 1989. This law was followed up in 1991 by a plan for the linguistic and cultural “re-Ukrainization” of Ukraine, which was expected to be completed in the year 2000.

In spite of gaining independence in 1991, re-Ukrainization is slow except in the western parts of the country and encounters resistance in many areas, especially in the eastern and southern part of the country where the largest concentrations of Russians and Russian-speakers live. The number of schools with Ukrainian as the primary language rose only 2% in the first three years of the existence of the language law. In early 1993 the number of Russian schools comprised 50% and Ukrainian schools 49.3%. In Crimea there were no schools at all with Ukrainian as the language of instruction. Odessa, with 1.1 million inhabitants and 48% Ukrainians, had only two schools with Ukrainian as the language of instruction.

The position of Russian in Ukraine is thus not that of a minority language. The right to use Russian is provided for both in the language law and in subsequent documents. The minority law of 1992 also gives ample space for linguistic and cultural autonomy for minorities.

10. Yiddish

For a relatively long period the Jews found a sanctuary in Poland-Lithuania, and as a result the number of Jews and the number of speakers of the eastern Slavicized variants of Yiddish grew quickly. In time the situation changed for the worse. The greatest outbreak of violence against the Jews came with Bohdan Khmielnicky's rebellion against the Poles when, according to some estimates, tens of thousands of Jews perished. Before that, the eastern variant of the language had already made an impact in the West, but the persecutions increased the stream of refugees and migrants towards Western Europe, consequently increasing the influence of the Eastern variant.

There were relatively few Jews in Russia before the divisions of Poland. The number of Jews in the empire increased considerably with the incorporation of the Polish Jewish settlement areas. The situation of the Jews in the Russian empire was far from good. They were isolated to a few *gouvernements* and often persecuted. But the xenophobic sentiments after the murder of Tsar Alexander II in 1881 led to even worse persecutions and horrendous pogroms in 1881-82, which were renewed at the beginning of the 20th century. This led to a stream of

refugees to Western Europe and further to the United States which, in the years 1882-1914, received 2.75 million Jews. The Eastern variant of Yiddish thus spread all over the world. The situation in Western Europe in the 19th century was better for the Jews but it took a long time for them to become accepted as citizens with full rights. In Denmark, for example, they got full political rights in 1849, in Sweden in 1870. The accomplishment of full political rights facilitated the change of languages. It is reported that it took the Jews of Denmark only one decade to change from Yiddish to Danish.

11. Yiddish culture and literature

The literature in Yiddish up to the end of the 18th century was almost exclusively written in the Western dialect. A popular literature in Yiddish, however, came into existence in Eastern Europe as a reaction against the demands that the Jews in the German-speaking areas speak German and not Yiddish. An influential writer in (Eastern) Yiddish of the 19th century was Sholem Aleichem. At a conference in Bukovina in 1908, Yiddish gained the status of the Jewish national language. Yiddish got a more uniform orthography in the 1920s.

The period between the World Wars was the heyday for the Yiddish language and literature both in Poland, the United States, and the Soviet Union. As an example can be mentioned the Belarusian SSR where, in 1926, 91% of the 407,000 Jews had Yiddish as their mother tongue. The new authorities were opposed to the Jewish religious and cultural traditions (including the use of Hebrew) but promoted the creation of a secular and Socialist Jewishness including the use of Yiddish. Yiddish became one of the four official languages in the republic, newspapers and journals were published, new libraries were opened, a Jewish state theatre was established, books were published etc.

An important centre for the study of Jewish culture was the Jewish section of the Institute of Belarusian culture at the Belarusian Academy of Sciences. It later became reorganized to the Institute for Jewish Culture. The Institute had, among others, the task of creating an academic dictionary and an atlas of the Yiddish language. The most important means for the creation of a Socialist Jewishness were the schools. As late as in 1936 more than 36,000 children were taught in Jewish schools (60% of the Jewish children). By the end of the 1930s, however, nearly all Jewish institutions had been abolished, and the schools were in a state of rapid disintegration. Another example is Poland, where more than 200 journals and newspapers in Yiddish were published in this period.

Before World War II about two thirds of the world's Jews, that is, about 11 million people, were Yiddish-speaking. The only competing Jewish language, Modern Hebrew, which was developed in the late 19th century, was confined mostly to Palestine. The Holocaust reduced the number of Yiddish speakers to about 5 million after the World War II. With the adoption of Modern Hebrew as the official language of Israel, the role of Yiddish was much reduced.

In the Soviet Union the official anti-Zionist and partly anti-Semitic policy after the war reduced Yiddish to what was at best a home language, while the main group of Jews exchanged Yiddish for the dominant language, Russian. In the 1989 census, only 7.6% of the Jews in Belarus claimed Yiddish as the mother tongue while 90% mentioned Russian. In Ukraine the figures were about the same. In Estonia, 12.3% had Yiddish as the mother tongue, 78.3% Russian, and 8.4% Estonian. The Yiddish-speaking group counts mostly people of old age. In most countries outside Israel the number of Yiddish-speakers has been reduced due to voluntary conversion to other languages. Even though Yiddish is still not a

dead language, especially in the United States and even in Israel, the Jewish renaissance in the ex-Soviet republics includes a revival of Yiddish only to a very limited extent. The language studied in the numerous language circles is almost exclusively Modern Hebrew. Yiddish seems thus to be a historical remnant in the Baltic area.

The origin of Yiddish

According to the most accepted theories, Yiddish was first a Judaized German spoken in the Rhineland by Jews who had immigrated from northern France and Italy. From the very beginning this language had a Hebrew-Aramaic component associated with the Jewish religion. During the 11th and 12th centuries the Jews spread to other parts of the German area. The German component of the language then became High German. In the migrations eastward the Jews came into contact with Slavs and Slavic-speaking Jews, meetings which account for the Early Slavic component of Yiddish. This western Yiddish is the foundation for one of the main dialects of Yiddish, which is now nearly extinct as a spoken and written language. The eastern dialect, which is much more Slavicized than the western dialect, developed as a result of the mass flight of Jews in the 13th-16th centuries to the religiously more liberal Poland-Lithuania and Hungary; these Jews were persecuted in the west in connection with the crusades as well as with the appearance of the black death. In this period a relatively uniform literary language was already developed.

מאַני לייכ—יידיש	Mani Leyb – Yidish
(...)	(...)
און יידן — ריידן יידיש	Un yidn – reydn yidish
אין אַלע עקן וועלט	In ale ekn velt.
ווי נאָר אַ ייד אין פֿרידן	Vu nor a yid in fridn
שטעל־אויף זײַן רו־געצעלט	Shtel-oif zayn ru-getselt
און יידן ריידן יידיש	Un yidn reydn yidysh
און יידיש איז דאָך שײַן.	un yidish in dokh sheyn.
און גרינג אַ צווייטן יידן	Un gring a tsveytn yidn
פֿאַרשטיין ווי זיך אַליין.	Farshteyn vi zikh aleyn.

Figure 78. Mani Leyb – Yiddish

18 Polish, Kashubian and Sorbian

Sven Gustavsson

1. Polish

Even though Poland was divided in the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries between three countries, the Polish language flourished during this period. The Polish language became a refined cultural instrument in the hands of the many great authors who worked both in Poland and in emigration, writers such as the Romantic poets Adam Mickiewicz, Zygmunt Krasiński, and Juliusz Słowacki, the comedy writer Aleksander Fredro, and prose writers Eliza Orzeszkowa, Aleksander Głowacki (Prus), Henryk Sienkiewicz, Stefan Żeromski, and Władysław Reymont. The Polish language and the Catholic church were the cement which united the divided Polish nation.

The Polish state between the two World Wars was not monoethnic. About one third of the population was non-Polish, including Ukrainians, Germans, Jews, etc. In the beginning, the minorities were promised extensive rights, but the actual policy took another form, especially in the eastern parts where the policy favoured Polonization. This policy met with resistance. As an outcome of World War II, the Holocaust, and the driving out of the Germans, the population transfers with the neighbouring Soviet republics, and later emigration of Germans and Jews, Socialist Poland became a national state. The number of people belonging to minorities was for a long time estimated to be rather small but especially in recent years the growing number of people who state that they are Germans has added to the number of non-Poles.

The status of the Polish language was undisputed in post-war Poland. The minorities, Slovaks, Poles, Czechs, Ukrainians, Belarusians, and Lithuanians, eventually got the right to use their language in education, to form organizations and to publish journals and the like. In spite of the fact that Poland was a part of the Socialist bloc, the role and status of Russian was rather low in society. Russian was, it is true, obligatory as the first foreign language in the Polish schools but the results of this teaching were poor due to the lack of interest and resistance among the pupils. Of course, Russian had an impact on some spheres of life, especially on the language of politics, and was a source of influence on the official newspeak, the so-called *nowomowa*. Russian has now lost its position in the Polish school system and been exchanged for Western European languages such as English and German. At the same time, the negative attitude towards the use of Russian seems to have diminished in Polish society.

2. Kashubian

The Kashubian area, which today stretches from the Baltic Sea northwest of Gdansk about 80 kilometres southward but which earlier had a larger extension, has passed from hand to

bo Pón Bóg mǎze świécǎł nad nima
i bǎdǎ królowlé na wieczi wieków.
6 I rzekł mie:
„Ne słowa są wórtne wiaré i pró-
wdzévé,
a Pón, Bóg dǎchów, proroków,
wésłól swojego aniola,
żebé swojim slégóm ukazac, co są
wnetka muszi stac.
7 A hewo wnetka przǎidę.
Błogosławiony, chto strzeże słów
proroctwa ny knédzi!”
8 To prawie jǎ, Jan,
czéjé i widzę ne rzeczę.
A czéj jem uczul i uzdrzól,
upódl jem, żebé zložéć poklón
przed stopama aniola, jaczi mie je
ukózól.
9 Na to rzekł do mie:
„Czǎ le, nie róć tego,
bo jǎ jem pospólslégǎ twojim
i twojich bracyńów, proroków,
i ných, co strzeżǎ słów ti knédzi.
Bogu samému zložéć poklón!”
10 Ponemu rzekł do mie:

„Nie kładzǎ pieczćé na słowa pro-
roctwa ny knédzi,
bo szǎrk sǎ zbliżǎ*.
11 Chto krziwdzǎ, niech jesz krziwdzǎ
wérzǎdzy,
é plégóć niech sǎ jesz barzi splé-
gawi,
a sprawidléwi niech jesz barzi spra-
widléwie postépuje,
a swięti niech sǎ jesz uswićcy!
12 Hewo wnetka [jǎ] przǎidę,
a moja zóplata je ze mǎg,
żebé kóždému tak odpłacéć, jakǎ je
jego robota.
13 Jǎ jem Alfa i Ómega,
Pierwszi é Slédny,
Zǎczǎtk é Kucif.
14 Błogosławiony [jǎ], chtërny pló-
czǎ swaje ruchna*, żebé moglé pano-
wac nad drzewiécǎ żécǎgo
é żebé wehdéleć do Miasta wierze-
jama.
15 Buten [za murǎ miasta] sǎ psǎ*,
gusłórze, rozpustnikowie, mordórze,
téczele bóków
é kózi, chto miluje leż i w ni żéje.

ZAKUŃCZENIE

16 Jǎ, Jezés, posłól jem mojego
aniola,
żebé wama zaswiadczeć o tim, co są
tikǎ Koscolów.
Jǎ jem *Odnoga i Ród Dawida*,
*Gwiózdǎ jǎsnǎ, poréczénǎ***.
17 A Duch* i Oblubienica* mówǎjǎ:
„Przǎidzǎ!”*

A chto czéje, niech powié:
„Przǎidzǎ!”
I chto mó prǎgnǎczǎkǎ, niech przǎi-
dze,
chto chce, niech wodé żécǎgo za
darmo nabierze.
18 Jǎ swiódzczę
kóždému, chto sléchǎ słów proroct-

22.10 Przǎr. 1.3.
22.14 Symból úwǎnianǎ sakramentalnych
spósobów oczǎszczeniú dǎszé – zastrzódzǎ przǎ-
wstǎpie do Niebiesczǎgo Jeruzalem, miastǎ
niesmiertelnych.

22.15 Gwésno przǎgǎdka do téch, co grǎszǎ
seksualnymǎ nadzórcama (przǎr. Pwt 23,18b).
22.16 Iz 11,1; 10; Rz 1,3; Lb 24,17.
22.17 „Duch” = trzeci Osoba Boskǎ; „Ob-
lubienica” = Kosob; „przǎidzǎ” – liturgiczne
Marana tha! (przǎr. 1 Kor 16,22; Flp 4,5).

Figure 80. The New Testament in Kashubian, translated by Eugeniusz Gołábk, 1993. Photo: Witold Maciejewski

very important. Kashubian Masses are now held in the churches and the Bible is being translated. The Kashubian literary language has thus broadened its functions in society in the last few years, a change which will probably increase its prestige among the Kashubers themselves.

3. Upper and Lower Sorbian

It is hard to tell how many Sorbs there are today. According to estimates made by a Sorbian research institute in 1987, the number of Sorbian speakers was 67,000, but the number of people with a Sorbian ethnic consciousness was lower, 45,000. Less than 20% percent of the Sorbs are Lower Sorbs. The number of Sorbs has shrunk considerably the last century as well as the extension of their settlement area. In 1880-84, their number was estimated to be 166,000 people.

The Thirty Years War devastated the Sorbian area. Perhaps half of the Sorbian population perished in this war. The population losses were, however, regained in the next century, and it is estimated that the number of Sorbians amounted to 250,000 by the end of the 18th century. The Congress of Vienna in 1815 gave most of the Lusatian area to Prussia, and from the beginning of the 1900s one can witness an increase in the Germanization pressure. This led to a rising assimilation tempo, and the number of Sorbs was sharply reduced. According to estimates in St-Petersburg in 1849, only 142,000 Sorbs were left. At the same time, Romanticism and pan-Slavism caused a reaction among educated Sorbs. Protestant Sorbs usually studied at German universities where they formed Sorbian organizations, where-

In spite of the restricted possibilities, Socialist Poland saw the publication both of books in Kashubian and books about the Kashubers and the Kashubian area. The work on the codification of the Kashubian literary language continued. In this connexion one of the problems was, and is, that the dialectal diversity makes it hard to find a common denominator which could be accepted by all Kashubian speakers.

In the last few years, both before and after 1989, cultural activities among the Kashubers have increased considerably. Knowledge about Kashubian culture, history, and language are included in some school curricula, Kashubian matters have gained a more prominent place in the mass media, and more Kashubian books have been published. The changed attitude of the Catholic church towards the Kashubian language is of utmost importance for the attitudes towards the language among the Kashubers themselves. In this context, the Pope's visit in May 1987, during which he appealed to the Kashubers to preserve their traditional values including their language, was

as Catholics since the beginning of the 18th century had their most intimate connexions with Prague.

Originally, the writings in Sorbian were dialectally quite diverse. But the efforts to codify the language soon became concentrated around the Budyšin and Chošebuz dialects. By the end of the 17th century, the Diet of Upper Lusatia had created a commission which had as its task the standardization of the Upper Sorbian Protestant language. In the 19th century one can talk about three standards: the Lower Sorbian, the Upper Sorbian Catholic, and the Upper Sorbian Protestant standards. After World War II a new spelling system became obligatory for the whole Sorbian language area.

After World War I, the Sorbs tried to get independence, but their efforts did not meet with any success. In the Weimar Republic, however, they had more hopeful possibilities. The organizations *Domowina* and *Sokol* were formed, and the *Mašica Serbska* continued its activities. In Nazi Germany these organizations were forbidden, as was the public use of Sorbian. The Germans also had plans to deport the Sorbs to Ukraine.

4. The Sorbian languages today

To the Sorbs, post-World-War-II development has been both advantageous and disastrous. On one hand the Sorbs were guaranteed extensive rights in Socialist Germany and got rather good financial support for their cultural activities. At the same time, the possibilities to act freely in the GDR were circumscribed, and the activities of the revived *Domowina* were governed by the Party. The huge social changes were also negative for the Sorbs. The influx of displaced Germans, the continued and intensified brown coal mining in the area which destroyed many Sorbian villages, and the collectivization which broke down the traditional village life were all disastrous for Sorbian national coherence. The German-Sorbian bilingualism which was widespread before became even more pronounced and, as a result, the use of Sorbian shrunk both in public and in the families. The German language is dominant in many spheres of life, and it is reported that the majority of the Sorbs know German better than their own language.

Many Sorbs have lost Sorbian totally. The official language of the GDR, with its propaganda of Socialist and Communist values became, of course, a model also for the Sorbian official language(s), to the extent that official Sorbian was like a calque on the German prototype. Lower Sorbian was most affected by these changes and today has very few truly native speakers in the younger generations. Campaigns for the use of the language and for intensified teaching of the language in the schools to young Lower Sorbs did not yield any conspicuous results. The language they studied was to a great extent a foreign language for them. At the same time the post-War period has seen amazing activity in the field of Sorbaistics. The two Sorbian languages got their full normalization and codification in this period.

In the short period after the unification of Germany, the Sorbs have met with new problems. The position of the Sorbs in the united Germany was unclear in the beginning. It is more regulated now, and the Sorbs have the same rights as the other minorities in Germany, the Frisians and the Danes, and cooperate with them. The Sorbian culture is supported by a foundation financed by the Bonn government and by the Bundesländer where the Sorbs live, i.e. Saxony and Brandenburg. In 1993 this foundation had 41 million German marks at its disposal. This has meant that it has been possible to support most parts of Sorbian cultural life, although in some cases on a diminished scale. The economic situation in the area is bad, however, and unemployment has risen enormously.

The Sorbs



Map 30. Sorbian territory in east Germany. Ill.: Radosław Przebitkowski

The Sorbs live today in a relatively small area to the west of the river Neisse/Nysa, in Luzica/Łużyce (Lusatia, Lausitz). The Sorbian language area is divided into Lower Sorbian dialects around the central area for the Lower Sorbs Chošebuz (Cottbus) and Upper Sorbian dialects with the centre in Budyšin (Bautzen). Between the two main dialect groups there is a belt of transitional dialects stretching from east of Běła Woda (Weisswasser) to west of Wójerca (Hoyerswerda). The Sorbian dialect area is now divided due to immigration of Germans and to the intense mining of brown coal, which has devastated a huge part of the Sorbian living space. The most compact settlement of Sorbian speakers is the Upper Sorbian Catholic area between Kamjenc (Kamenz) and Budyšin (Bautzen) with about 15,000 inhabitants. It is estimated that about 2/3 of the people who actively use Sorbian live in this area.

Figure 81. The age-old Upper Sorbian Catholic tradition of Eastern Ride (*jutrowne jachanje*). On Easter Sunday the procession travels from village to village to announce the resurrection of Christ. However, Sorbian culture is, more than folklore, a political work to develop the national institutions, not the least education in the Sorbian language



Table 7e. Non classified languages (pidgins) of the BSR

“Tuteyshy” (Prosta mova, Po-prostu) (Slavic, Polish-Belarusian)	Lithuania, Belarus
Surzhyk (Ukrainian-Russian)	Belarus, Ukraine
Trasianka (Russian-Belarusian)	Belarus
• Tattare Romani (Nordic-Romani)	Norway, ?Sweden
Scandinavian (samnordiska)	The Nordic countries
†Nuckó (Swedish-Estonian)	Estonia

Table 7f. Slavic languages of the BSR

Slavic	Territory	Majority l.	Minority languages	Earliest written record	Regional usage
West Slavic:					
Kashubian († Slovincian included)	North-Western Poland	–	‡50,000 – 150,000	16th c.	Slavic “Rokytno” Community, Western branch
Polish	Poland	39,000,000	1,000,000 Eastern Baltic region	14th c.	
Sorbian (2 languages, Upper and • Lower Sorbian)	South-Eastern Germany	–	70,000	16th c.	
East Slavic:					
Russian	Eastern Baltic region	+	+	17th c. (11th c.)	East Slavic (Russian) community
Belarusian	Belarus	6–7,000,000	Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania	16th c.	Slavic “Rokytno”, Eastern branch and East Slavic communities
Ukrainian	Ukraine	‡30,000,000 – 45,000,000	+	14th c.	
Lemko (Rusyn, †Ruthenian)	Poland, Slovakia, Ukraine	–	About 70,000 in all countries	19th c.	Polyglossia

Table 7g. Remaining languages of the Baltic Sea region

Others:
Extern Baltic region: Czech, Slovak, Old minorities: Old Believers, Russian, Greek, Georgian, Armenian
Church languages: Class. Arabic, Grabar (Old Armenian), Hebrew, Latin, Church Slavonic

Explanations

† – extinct language

! – endangered language. According to a general, socio-linguistic rule of thumb, a language is endangered if there are less than twenty thousand speakers and/or the transmission of it to the young generation encounters difficulties. The safe level for survival of a language is reached with more than six hundred thousand users.

<(number of speakers) – less than ...

The linguistic communities of the Baltic Sea region

Witold Maciejewski

In view of the general aims of the Baltic University Programme the Baltic region (and, possibly, all the other similar regions) can be treated as a **linguistic structure** composed of three levels:

- The **level of ethnic languages**, such as German, Polish, Russian, Swedish or Ukrainian. There are about 50 languages in usage in the entire region, as registered in Table 7.
- The **level of local languages**, used also as languages of **cross-ethnic communication**. Some of the ethnic languages are spoken outside of their main territories by bilingual and multilingual populations. Besides Russian and German, there are also Polish, Swedish, Finnish and, in a smaller scale, Danish, which occupy this position. Similarities among different languages, derived from their common origin and history, means that several of the “Baltic” languages are, to some extent, mutually intelligible in a “natural” way, i.e. with no aware linguistic training. It is possible to cross the linguistic divisions. Television also plays an important role in the training of passive competence in foreign languages. It is necessary to stress that cross-linguistic natural communication depends on the medium. Generally, the standard languages are more distant from each other, whereas oral communication within a closely related linguistic group is quite a common phenomenon. The cultural discrimination between the standard Slavic languages is evident at first sight considering the different alphabets in use. On the other hand, the relations among some Nordic languages (Danish and Swedish) are directly opposite: the written languages are mutually intelligible to a higher degree than the spoken ones. This property is consciously strengthened by the Nordic authorities (Nordiska Rådet) by means of a common linguistic policy.

Besides that, there are mixed languages (pidgins) in use in direct spoken communication. Languages of this kind do not have their own native speakers, are more or less ephemeral and not protected by law. Pidgins are usually treated as “unclean”, less prestigious means of communication. The so-called Scandinavian (samnordiska), Surzhyk, Tattare Romani, Trasjanka and Tuteyshy are examples from the Baltic region.

- The **level of languages of pan-regional usage** – in this particular case English, the language of global usage, is the only language which may function as the “Baltic” language. English has taken its regional function after the fall of the Soviet Union. The fact that none of the local languages can compete with English as a cross-ethnic tool of communication may be interpreted as a sign of the power of ethnicity in the Baltic region. The national standard languages are probably seen as national symbols or as value-media and that is why none of them can unanimously be accepted in the international role.

Languages of cross-ethnic use constitute **communicative communities** stretching themselves outside the national (and state) barriers. Communication, although often defective, is frequently restricted to trade, tourism and everyday matters. The communities can be distinguished by heterogeneous criteria:

- Some of them exist without any help of a third, consciously acquired language. It refers to a part of the Slavic (“Rokytno”) languages, all the Nordic and some of the Ugrofennic languages. The criterion is mutual (or, in one particular case, asymmetric) **intelligibility**.
- Some other communities use a **third language**, which may be a “natural” construct (a “mixed” language of indigenous origin) or a “foreign” language, as in the case of Russian as the common language of every-day use in the Baltic countries (Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia).
- The third kind of communities are a result of **diglossia**. This is generally true when referring to the ethnic minorities.

The pure linguistic criteria, related to structural similarities and differences among languages, seem to be less important in the context of inter-ethnic communication. Some of the communities are strongly dependent on the communicative willingness of participants, or the political and economic state of affairs. It is quite easy to show examples of communities that are reluctant to use their natural competence (the Balkans, the Iberian Peninsula and so on).

According to above-mentioned criteria and with respect to data collected by linguistic geography the following inter-ethnic communities can be distinguished in the Baltic region:

1. The **Nordic community**, which includes all the languages of the Nordic branch. The core of this community is composed of Swedish, Danish and the two Norwegian languages with their dialects. Several of the Nordic dialects are also recognised by some of their speakers and by linguists as separate languages (this is the case of Gotlandish, Bornholmian and Älvdalian). The Nordic community is possibly the most distinct of all; its existence is consciously supported by political means. The local languages dominate English in every-day communication among the inhabitants of the Scandinavian Peninsula, although almost all of them speak English. Mixed forms of languages are willingly accepted and several attempts to create a Common-Nordic (samnordiska) have been undertaken. About 17 million people belong to this community.

The linguistic communities of the Baltic Sea region

2. The **Slavic community**, so-called “Rokytno” (the term of Gyula Décsy) is the most populous. Rokytno, a city in Ukraine, is situated at the very centre of the community (see Table 7). The community includes spoken languages classified into three branches: 1. The western branch, composed of Kashubian, Polish, two Sorbian languages (esp. Low Sorbian) and extinct Slovinian, 2. The eastern branch includes Belarusian, Lemk (= Ruthenian, Rusinian), Ukrainian, “Tuteyshy”, extinct Ruski (Old Belarusian, the language of the Great Duchy of Lithuania), Surzhyk (a Russian-Ukrainian pidgin), 3. Outside the Baltic region: Czech and Slovak). Speakers of Polish and Ukrainian are the most numerous groups.



Figure 82. A ‘tuteyshy’ (‘local’) boy in Lithuania. Photo: Alfred F. Majewicz

The territory of the “Rokytno” community is covered in its eastern part by a competing,

Russian speaking community. The notion of “creolized Russian” refers to Russian-speaking minorities in Belarus, Ukraine and the Baltic republics. Russian is their first language irrespective of their ethnic background.

3. An asymmetric **Finnish-Estonian community** has been created by the Finnish TV, and was received in some parts of Estonia during the Soviet period. Those parts of Estonia not covered by the Finnish broadcasting do not belong to the community; Finnish is not intelligible there. From 1990 the community has been strengthened by tourism and business.

4. **Finnish, Karelian, Vepsian and Ingrian** are closely related to each other. The number of Karelian speakers is decreasing as a result of emigration to Finland. Finnish is the main language of this group.

5. **Estonian and Votian** are close to each other. Both are members of the so-called (Décsy 1973) “Pejpus League”.

6. The three so-called **Baltic states** are traditionally considered to form a political and cultural unity. Still, linguistic differences between Latvian, Lithuanian and Estonian are considerable and no direct interethnic communication is possible. Russian is the “tool of communication” used by middle-aged and elderly people in this group.




Figure 83. Interdependence among linguistic communities of the Baltic region. III.: Witold Maciejewski

5 Case Chapter

The Karaim community in Lithuania

Éva Ágnes Csató

Karaims have been living in Lithuania for about six centuries and are considered 'original inhabitants' of the country (see National Minorities in Lithuania. Vilnius: Centre of National Researches of Lithuania, 1992). The Karaim group, which is an officially acknowledged reli-



Figure 84. Karaim symbols. Ill: Éva Á. Csató

gious community, gets support from the state for the development of its culture. Its religious and administrative leader is the so-called Ullu Hazzan, a title now held by Jozef Firkovich. The Karaim Religious Society is the main administrative organ of the community and the legal owner of the community properties. The Lithuanian Karaim Cultural Society is responsible for taking care of the cultural heritage.

The community has about 250 members. There are other Karaim communities, namely in Russia, in the Ukraine, both in the Crimea and in Halich, and in Poland. Most of the Lithuanian Karaims live in Vilnius, Trakai.

The most important task of the Karaim communities today is the revitalisation of community life. The Karaim organisations make efforts to create opportunities for young Karaims to learn their history, religion, language and traditions

1. The Karaim national identity

Karaims consider themselves to be descendants of Kipchak Turkic tribes who once lived in the tribal union of the Khazar empire between the

Caspian Sea and the Dnieper estuary. They were later divided into three main groups. One group remained in the Crimea. Another group moved to Galicia, and a third group left for Trakai at the end of the fourteenth century. The three groups developed their own dialects.

By the end of the 17th century there were about 30 Karaim communities in eastern Central Europe. Their number was, however, drastically reduced as a result of epidemics and wars in the 18th century. Karaims gained support from the administrative and political authorities of their respective countries. They were given privileges, and their independent status as a religious community was acknowledged.

The shifting political map of Europe shaped the fate of the Karaim people. The Crimean communities belonged to Tsarist Russia and later to the Soviet Union. Halich was a part of Galicia, which belonged to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, but after World War I it came under Polish rule, as did Trakai and Vilnius.

World War II changed the political situation again. The Karaims became citizens of the Soviet state, a change which had serious consequences for them. The traditional Karaim settlements were weakened. Many Karaims left for Poland or countries in the West. The collapse of the Soviet Union has again created



Figure 85. Karaim inscription on a gravestone in Trakai, Lithuania, Photo: Alfred F. Majewicz

a chance for the scattered communities to revitalise their activities.

2. The Karaim religion

Karaims are believers of the Old Testament. Their religion does not recognise the post-biblical tradition incorporated in the Talmud and the later rabbinical works. The beginnings of this religious movement can be traced back to the 8th-11th centuries. Today there are two main groups of believers: the Turkic (= European) Karaims on the one side and the Oriental (= Non-Turkic) Karaites on the other side. Turkic-speaking Karaims differ from Oriental Karaites with respect to their ethnic and cultural identity.

The Karaim house of worship is called *kenesa*. There are today two functioning *kenesas* in Lithuania, one in Vilnius and one in Trakai.

3. The Karaim language

Karaim is a Kipchak Turkic language. Elements of folklore and material culture such as tales, proverbs, riddles, folk-poetry, and names of dishes also remind us of the Turkic origin of the Karaims.

Karaim is today an endangered language. The only community that has preserved its language up to now is the one in Lithuania. There are about 50 people who can still use it in everyday conversation.

The maintenance of their mother tongue is the most urgent task facing the Karaims today. The former Ullu Hazzan, Mykolas Firkovich (1924-2000), published a textbook containing a grammar and texts for children. A project aiming at the documentation of the spoken language has been carried out with the financial help of the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft. A multimedia CD has been published by the Tokyo University of Foreign Studies to help young Karaims to learn about their language.

Until the 20th century Karaim literacy was based on the knowledge of Hebrew, the holy language. Hebrew characters were also used for writing Karaim. In the later period, the orthography was based on the writing systems of the countries in which the Karaims lived, i.e. Polish in Poland, and Russian in Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union. After Lithuania gained its inde-




Figure 86. Karaim sanctuary (*kenessah*) in Trakai, Lithuania. Photo: Alfred F. Majewicz

pendence in 1990, the Karaims adopted a new orthography based on the Lithuanian one. The best dictionary is written in Cyrillic, with Polish and Russian equivalents. The only comprehensive grammar is in Russian. The most important religious texts have recently been published by Mykolas Firkovich in Lithuanian orthography.

4. Swedish-Karaim contacts

European Protestants took an early interest in the Karaim belief. A number of western scholars visited the Karaims in order to discuss questions of religion. In 1690, the Swedish professor Gustaf Peringer was sent by king Charles XI to the Karaims in Lithuania and Poland. In his work *Epistola de karaitis Lithuaniae*, he commented upon the Karaim language and quoted as a sample the first verses of Genesis.

5. Karaim literature

A significant secular literature started to develop in the 19th century. The inter-war period was for the Karaims, just as for the other Baltic nations, a time of national upheaval, also with

Table 7h. Turkic minority languages of the BSR

Turkic	Territory	Number speakers	Earliest written records	Cross-ethnic communication
! Karaim	Lithuania, Poland, Ukraine	1,000	16th c.	di- or triglossia, Turkic and/or Slavic communities
(†) Tatar	Belarus	+	17th c.	
† Khazar (6th–10th c.)	Ukraine, ?Poland			

regard to the conscious cultivation of their mother tongues. Karaim intellectuals became aware of the necessity to develop a literary language and published periodicals in Karaim. There are still some Karaims writing literary works in their language. A new theatre play written in Karaim was performed in 1997 in Trakai.

Sample of a manuscript of the Karaim Bible (Ps 83: 15–16)

Henryk Jankowski

Translated into the north-western or Troki/Trakai dialect of Karaim.




Figure 87. Sample of a manuscript of the Karaim Bible (Ps 83: 15–16). Photo: Henryk Jankowski

(The manuscript is kept in the private collection of Ms Mariola Abkowicz in Poland).

English translation (King James’s Bible 1611/1769):

- [1–2] So persecute them with thy tempest, and make them afraid with thy storm.
- [3–5] Fill their faces with shame; that they may seek thy name, O LORD [forever].

Transcription:

- [1] Alej kuvhun alarny tavuluj byla, da vichoruj
- [2] byla alhasatkyn alarny. Tolturhun južliariń
- [3] jeńgilliktiań, da kolsunlar Šemijni, ey H!
- [1] אַלײ קױבֿהױן אַלרנױ טאַױלױזױ בױלױה דאַױױחורױזױ
- [2] בױלױה אַלגֿסטױן אַלרנױ. טױלטורגױן יױזלירױן
- [3] נגֿגױללױכטױן דאַ קױלסױנלר שױמױני אױי ה
- [4] אױיטלױ בױלסױנלר דאַלגֿסנױנלר דױנױגאַ
- [5] דױיין[...]

(for technical reasons, two dashes above two *gimels*, marking a fricative [ɣ], were disregarded)

Selected, transcribed and rewritten in formal Hebrew characters by Henryk Jankowski

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Part

B

THE POLITICAL LANDSCAPE:

*DEMOCRACY,
MULTI-ETHNICITY
AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS*



Section IV

DEMOCRACY

Figure 88. One of the main questions the Baltic democracies are facing is how to reach equality of both sexes. Photo: Katarzyna Skalska

IV

Section

DEMOCRACY

Editor: *Li Bennich-Björkman*

Chapters 19 – 22 have been written by:

*Jan Assarson
and Axel Hadenius*

updated by

Li Bennich-Björkman

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INTRODUCTION

Li Bennich-Björkman

When the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, the entire political science community was taken by surprise. Few things were less expected at the time than the demise of Communist power in Europe and the subsequent devolution of the Soviet Union. More than a decade has passed, bringing tremendous political, economic and social changes to many of the countries in the Baltic region. For Russia, Belarus, Poland and the three Baltic states the previous decade has brought with it electoral democracy and market economic reforms. For Germany it meant the reunion of its eastern and western parts after nearly fifty years of separation. For the democratically mature Scandinavian countries, Sweden, Denmark and Finland, the 1990s paradoxically witnessed a galloping decrease of support for the representative democratic institutions, which have constituted the major pillars of political life during the 20th century. This growing public scepticism towards societal institutions and political life is not an isolated Scandinavian trend. Public confidence in political and public institutions like the parliament, the government, the army and the bureaucracy is dropping steadily in all the trilateral countries (i.e. Western Europe, Japan, US and Canada). Political parties have rapidly lost members and failed to attract new ones during the 1990s, giving fuel to an academic and public debate envisaging a future democracy without political parties. Hence, the 1990s offered a political scenery filled with contrasts in the Baltic region.

Establishing the institutions by which popular rule is exercised is but one step, however necessary and crucial, towards democratic government. This institutional transition has by now been completed in most of the new democratic states of the Baltic regions. Visualising democratic institutions, the basic concern lies with designing efficient processes by which individual preferences – votes – are translated into collective outcomes. Free and fair elections, open competition and political rights are all necessary preconditions to uphold popular rule. Several of the new democracies around the Baltic Sea – the Baltic States, Poland, the former Eastern Germany and more hesitantly Russia – fulfil these criteria after little more than a decade as democratic states. Using the terminology of the political scientist Larry Diamond, *electoral* democracies have been established.

In the comprehensive overview by Assarsson and Hadenius in chapters 19-22, the various forms of constitutional frameworks within which democratic rule could be realised are presented and discussed. Hence, an important conclusion to be drawn from their presentation is that in the democratic states of the world, as they have developed through the first, second and third wave of democratisation during the 20th century, various constitutional routes to democratic government have been chosen. Therefore we can also find a constantly ongoing debate on issues of constitutional design, for example in relation to Eastern Europe, asking whether certain choices, such as presidentialism or parliamentarism and proportional or majoritarian systems, are the most beneficial. The yardstick often used to measure success is, then, the time of democratic endurance.

However, often we expect more from democratic rule than just a formal adherence to established procedures. That is also the case in the new democracies of the Baltic region, where the generally low levels of public confidence in political institutions clearly indicate a far from satisfying situation. As citizens we want guarantees that political rights are truly respected and protected, that participation is encouraged and spread among the population and that the popularly elected government is in genuine control of state affairs and not just a puppet in the hands of other, non-elected, actors. Extending the meaning of democracy likewise leads us over to the

concept of *liberal* democracy. In a liberal democracy, and the Scandinavian countries certainly belong to this category, the main “actors”: political leaders and parties, popular organisations and non-governmental interest groups, together with the citizenry at large, are committed to democratic principles and procedures. In other words, a process of internalisation has taken place so that individuals and collectives respect and believe in the basic principles of popular rule, like equality and the independence of the state. Hence, they adjust their own behaviour and even develop a will to defend democratic ideas in the face of threats. While the “first” transition to democratic government concerns setting up an institutional framework and making it work, this “second” transition embraces the coming into existence of a democratic political culture. Attitudes, beliefs and perceptions that support democracy in the longer run need to spread, if institutions are to work well. The tricky thing is that the rise of such a supportive political culture – once termed the “civic culture” by political scientists Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba – is highly dependent on the performance of the democratic governments. For new democracies in particular the pitfalls are manifold, and in the case of dual transitions the task of manoeuvring both a newborn market economy while being inexperienced in democratic practice have sometimes proved almost overwhelming, as in Russia.

Thus, establishing democratic institutions is no guarantee that these institutions behave as they are expected to. The step to a liberal democracy is definitely a large one, and one often not taken at all. For various reasons, discussed and explored in the chapters by Zboron and Bennich-Björkman, malfeasance, political corruption and the distortion of popular influence in favour of private interest government is consistent with upholding an electoral democracy, but not with a liberal one. In particular for the newly established democracies in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, finding acceptable ways of organising the relations between state institutions and powerful economic interests outside government which grow as a result of the economic transition is crucial in order to preserve the necessary autonomy for action for the state. In a market economy, which most countries in the Baltic region now are, independent economic players intending to influence political decisions are bound to exist. Finding a *modus vivendi* that suits both parts, like the corporatist arrangements structuring political life in Scandinavia for several decades, is a way of accepting facts. Establishing a rule of law, presented by Edelstam in Chapter 23, on the other hand, aims at protecting the rights of citizens against the intrusion of the state. A democratic state is in other words an intricate web of both formal and informal checks and balances on different powers: the state is basically controlled by the rule of law laying down political and civil rights for the citizens. Economic powers are controlled by the state – in liberal democracies – while at the same time being supported by the state and its capability to enforce the legislation without which the market economy could not function.

How can democracy be justified? Basically, in democratic theory it is possible to find two lines of argument, one materialistic and one idealistic. The idealist argument concentrates on the inherent value of self-government, which is believed to be a basic human aspiration. Democratic government is the best option since it is built on the very principal of equal self-government for all (adult) individuals. The materialist argument instead suggests that democracy is the best-known government since it promotes the public interest, i.e. public welfare better than all other systems. While politicians seek re-election and the maximising of political power, the ultimate tool to ensure power is to spread goods to as many potential voters as possible. In no other political regime, the inherent logic of the system makes public welfare coincide with the very egoistic self-interest of the political power holders. Clearly, this is a Hobbesian argument grounded in the presumption of the narrow self-interest as the predominant human motivation force.

In order for the first argument to be valid, governments however must have something to spend on their presumptive voters. It is a crucial but often neglected fact that the democratic

government must have “incomes” to transform into programs for public welfare like education, health care, social security and infrastructure. Hans Aage in Chapter 24 illuminates the relations between market economy and the democratic state by focusing on the various ways of collecting state revenues.

The era of the nation-state is definitely drawing to an end in Europe. The expansion and expected enlargement of the European Union to the post-communist states of Europe will once more reunite East and West while also putting questions of democratic deficit and citizen control on the European agenda. For the candidate countries in the Baltic region, the three Baltic states and Poland, their candidacy has meant intense efforts to adapt national legislation to the *acquis communautaire*. And while the enlargement seems to have been brought one step closer to realisation after the conclusion of the Swedish presidency in the summer of 2001, Poland with its large agricultural sector and key position among the candidate countries is still a hard nut to crack. In case Chapter 7, the complex problem of citizenship and inclusion in Estonia and Latvia is focused in relation to a future membership. Could the ethnic situation in these countries result in an EU torn by ethnic conflicts at its eastern borders?

Key concepts of democracy

Political democracy. When we talk about democracy here we are primarily referring to political democracy, which in a general sense is a matter of how the vital organs of the state are governed. The basic meaning of democracy is rule by the people. Thus, in a political democracy the organs of the state should be directed by and be responsible to the will of the people. More concretely, in keeping with the liberal tradition, the notion of government by the people can be traced back to two general sets of ideas: The principles of (i) popular sovereignty and (ii) political liberties.

Popular sovereignty. The first principle spells out the right – that is the equal right – for all citizens to rule (the particular problem of defining what constitutes a “people” – ethnic kinship or geographical unity? – is sometimes a controversial matter). Due to a number of practical limitations as to how popular power can be exerted (the complexity of the decision-making process, lack of time etc), we normally have to confine ourselves to a somewhat diluted form of rule by the people. This implies that the kind of influence exercised by the people is normally indirect (representative) in character, and that it is also, with regard to its content, of a fairly broad character. The standard form of influence is exerted through regularly held elections. The primary role of the voters in this process is to select certain representatives and, at the same time, to express some general preferences concerning the design of public policy. In order for the election process to function as a channel for popular opinions, all kind of views and corresponding candidates must be able to emerge and offer alternatives to the electorate, and the execution of the electoral proceedings must be carried out in a fair and correct manner.

Political liberties. The second set of principles, the political liberties, are meant to guarantee that it is the free and uninhibited will of the people that is expressed in the decision-making process. To this end, a number of fundamental political freedoms must be upheld. These pertain to the right of all individuals to voice their opinions openly, in speech, in writing and in various media; to organise political parties and other associations and without hindrance to engage in political activities such as meetings, demonstrations, strikes etc. To guarantee that these conditions are being maintained, the rights at issue should be protected (in an actual sense) by legally enforceable regulations. This implies that no institution in society is empowered to act outside the law. Accordingly, the democratic mode of government requires the existence of a *Rechtsstaat* – a state governed by law.

19 The historical breakthrough of democracy

1. The First and the Second Wave of Democratisation

The dismantlement of authoritarian forms of government and the installation of democratic institutions is a fairly modern phenomenon. This transformation has its spiritual roots in the American and French revolutions, which stated the principles of popular sovereignty, political equality and respect for political freedoms. In concrete terms, however, the first international wave of democratisation started in the latter part of the nineteenth century, and it spread at an increasing speed up to the end of the First World War. After the war a number of democracies came into being and by 1920, some 30 states had introduced democratic modes of government.

Soon, however, a tendency in the opposite direction became evident. During the decades that followed, the 1920s and the 1930s, there were far-reaching democratic setbacks. In a way, it had all started in Petrograd 1917 when the Bolsheviks seized power. But the event that has come to stand out as starting the trend was the Fascists' assumption of power in Italy in 1923. In the years that followed, up to the beginning of the Second World War, democratic governments were abolished in many European countries. This reverse wave was particularly strong in Southern Europe and in Central and Eastern Europe; of the 12 states in the latter area (including Germany and Austria), all but one, Czecho-Slovakia, turned to some kind of authoritarian rule. The anti-democratic movement was considerable in Latin America too. In the 1930s military regimes were installed in all countries on the continent except in Columbia. Japan also followed the trend. All in all, two out of three states which had been democratic at the start of this period turned to authoritarian government. Accordingly, at the beginning of the 1940s there were only some 10 democratic states in the world.

By the end of the Second World War there was again a distinctive change of the trend. This was the starting point of a second wave of democratisation. Democratic rule was re-established in the defeated countries – Japan, Italy and West Germany – and in the states in Western Europe that had been under German occupation. Restoration of civic and popular institutions, and the introduction of new democracies, soon occurred in many places in Latin America. Democratic modes of government emerged in some countries in the Middle East as well, in part as a result of the process of decolonisation, which had then started. As we all know, this process affected Asian countries too – for example, India, the Philippines, and Ceylon (Sri Lanka), where democratic institutions were simultaneously installed. On the whole, this wave of democratisation continued in the subsequent decades. As a result, in the early 1960s some 50 states in the world could be classified as essentially democratic.

But fairly soon a process of unmistakable retrogression occurred. In the mid and late 1960s, military power again started to occupy the corridors of power in Latin America. The

process began with a military take-over in Brazil and was followed by similar events in, for example, Peru, Uruguay and Chile. In Europe there was the military coup in Greece, and in Africa the democratic procedures, which had recently been installed, were abolished just a year or two after independence. They were replaced by one-party rule and military government. A similar tendency manifested itself in Asia, with the resulting turn to authoritarian modes of government in several countries.

This period – the late 1960s and the early 1970s – can be seen in retrospect as the heyday of the view that is referred to as the “developmental dictatorship approach”, i.e. the belief that social and economic progress can be more effectively accomplished through authoritarian forms of government. Not least the promising developments that had taken place (as it was assumed) in the Communist world – especially in Castro’s Cuba – were often held up as encouraging examples.

2. The Third Wave

Nevertheless, since the middle of the 1970s we have witnessed an increasingly positive trend for democracy. This third wave of democratisation reaches up to our time and has been far more comprehensive than the ones before. The winds of change first affected, and then overthrew, the remaining authoritarian regimes in Southern Europe. It started in Portugal, with the fall of the old Salazar regime in 1974. The same year, the military junta in Greece had to resign, and in the following year, after the death of Franco, the dismantlement of the fascist dictatorship in Spain was initiated. A similar development could soon be seen in Latin America. The authoritarian model, which had so heavily dominated the region, is really the exception today. Cuba and some Central American States, Guatemala for instance, could be mentioned as remaining non-democracies.

The wave of political change hit Eastern Europe more rapidly. The election in Poland in the spring of 1989, which resulted in an overwhelming victory for the opposition, indicated that a new development was under way. During the next autumn and the following year the Communist one-party regimes fell like dominos, from the Baltic area in the north to the Balkans in the south. This was certainly one of the most radical – and unpredicted – political changes in modern times. However, there is still some way to go to meet democratic standards in some countries; and in some places this path has been troublesome indeed because of strong internal conflicts and even civil war (as in the former Yugoslavia and Georgia).

Nowadays, there are question marks regarding development not only in Belarus and the Central Asian republics of Uzbekistan, Kirgistan and Kazakhstan but even in Russia and Ukraine, where development has come to a halt in crucial areas. Yet, the fall of Communist rule – taking place in what had been seen by outside observers as the heartland of modern authoritarianism – certainly sent an encouraging message to fighters for democratic reforms all over the world.

Soon after this, a movement towards political pluralism started in Africa. The democratic states that existed at this time (such as Botswana and Gambia) could easily be counted. Yet, inspired in part by the events in Eastern Europe, a comprehensive dismantling of one-party rule has come about, affecting military regimes as well. But again, the backlash has been considerable as feelings of national unity have had a hard time taking root, while regional and clan identities have reemerged as the dominant ones. The future democratic development in sub-Saharan Africa in particular is today under threat

again, hampered by an amount of political corruption hard to imagine. Tendencies similar to the African ones have been noticed in Asia. Countries such as the Philippines, South Korea and Pakistan have reintroduced democratic practices, and “new” states (which were not involved in any earlier wave of democratisation), such as Singapore and Taiwan, have recently joined the democratic family. At the same time, however, it should be noted that several countries, for example such important ones as China and Indonesia, still cling to the authoritarian mode of government. It is also worth recalling that the current wave of democratisation has only marginally affected the countries of the Middle East.

All the same, in terms of democracy the world of today is essentially different from the one twenty years ago. At that time a clear minority, some 25 percent, of the states in the world were democratic, whereas today the number of democracies has increased considerably, though regressions have surely taken place.

3. Democratisation of the Baltic Region

Except for the occupation of Denmark and Norway during World War II, the Scandinavian countries have been under democratic rule since the first wave of democratisation. This wave also reached the Eastern shores of the Baltic Sea, bringing democratic government to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, as well as Poland. None of these states, however, survived the democratic setback during the interwar period. And when Communist rule swept over the region, democracy was kept out in the dark for more than fifty years.

However, the Soviet Bloc was not always as monolithic as was often assumed. During certain periods there were times of thaw, when political control over the societies in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe was loosened. One such period occurred during the reign of Nikita Khrushchev. Towards the end of the 1950s policies of destalinisation and peaceful coexistence with the West were introduced. The 1956 revolt in Poland was tolerated by the Soviet authorities, while the insurrection the same year in Hungary, which had a wider scope, was crushed by military force from the Warsaw Pact.

After 1956, several rebellions were instigated against the Communist authorities in Poland, which paved the way for the Solidarity revolution in 1980–81. The uprising in Poland was led by workers, although other groups of society also joined force. The free trade union *Solidarność*, with its leader Lech Wałęsa and his intellectual supporters Jacek Kuroń and Adam Michnik, more or less dominated the opposition. When *Solidarność* was at the height of its influence it counted over ten million members. The brief period of relative freedom was ended when martial law was imposed in 1981. No doubt, the real decision was taken in Moscow. The development in Poland could be described as “Soviet non-intervention”. It ended the democratisation process – with a minimum of violence – for a period of almost ten years.



Figure 89. Administration of Valdas Adamkus' presidential oath outside the Cathedral in Vilnius, Lithuania, in 1998. Photo: Alfred F. Majewicz

Three waves of democratisation


The first wave of democratisation. Democracies in our sense of the word developed during the last century. When the European empires dissolved and new states emerged after the First World War several of them adopted democratic forms of government. By 1920 some 30 states were democratic.

First Setback. The 1920s and 30s saw serious setbacks for democracy. Communism in Russia, fascism in Italy and nazism in Germany and later Japan was part of this development. In Western Europe only UK, Finland, Sweden and Switzerland stayed democratic. By 1940 barely 10 states were democratic out of a total of 50.

A second wave of democratisation started after the Second World War. Democracy was reinstalled in the defeated and occupied countries. The Latin American continent also developed democratic rule. As decolonisation in Africa and Asia started around 1960 democratic rule was introduced in e.g. Tanzania, India and the Philippines. By the early 1960s some 50 states were democratic. With decolonisation the number of states in the world increased significantly.

Second Setback. In the middle and late 1960s the military regained power in many countries in Latin America. Military regimes also took power in several newly independent states in Africa. By 1975 some 20 of the previously democratic states were under authoritarian rule, while 30 remained democratic.

A third wave of democratisation emerged in the middle of the 1970s with the fall of the juntas in Portugal and Greece in 1974. Latin American countries, one after the other, changed. Remaining non-democratic countries are Cuba and Guatemala.



The national consciousness of the Baltic peoples had been raised during the relative loosening of political control during the preceding decades. Such national consciousness had been in existence during the whole period of Soviet rule, although the possibilities of expressing national feelings had been restricted. In Estonia, a number of societies for the preservation of ancient monuments had been created which later were united into the Estonian Heritage Society. These seemingly non-political organisations were of great importance for the rediscovery of Estonian history and culture, as well as for political institutions after independence (see chapter 26). But even more important for the Baltic awakening was the environmental question. Popular protests were voiced against the deterioration of the environment in all Baltic republics. Of course, the Chernobyl catastrophe speeded up the process. But there were also many internal sources of environmental discontent.

The most important factor, however, in explaining the return to independence of the Baltic States and Eastern Europe was Mikhail Gorbachev's policy of "demokratizatsia". Gorbachev envisaged a revitalised socialist society with elements of democracy and pluralism. The democratisation process was to be limited, however. It was only to take place within the framework of the socialist society and its one-party system. Although Gorbachev's reforms were inadequate for democracy in the Western sense, it had an unexpected result. The democratisation process led to increasing demands for autonomy in the Soviet republics and – eventually – to the break-up of the Soviet Union.

In 1989 – 200 years after the French Revolution – the peoples of Eastern Europe were finally in a position to decide their own fate. The revolutions in the East European countries took place at an ever-increasing pace. After the 1989 revolutions the political changes returned to a quieter phase, during which the transition from authoritarian to democratic rule started. Many setbacks occurred in the process, but by the beginning of the 1990s all East European countries had experienced at least one comparatively democratic election which could provide the basis for further political transformation. As a result of these elections, the beginnings of new party systems could be discerned.

However, in the Baltic States it was not the resistance movements that decided the outcome of the independence struggle but rather the ill-fated 1991 *coup d'état* in Moscow. Yanayev and his collaborators wanted to restore the glory of the Soviet Union, but the result of the coup was the demise of Soviet power. Only after this event could the historical return of democracy to the Baltic States be completed. The first fully democratic elections since the interwar period were held (for those who had received citizenship), beginning in Estonia and Lithuania in 1992, shortly followed by Latvia in 1993. The key question of citizenship has remained controversial in Estonia and Latvia, having large minorities of Russian immigrants. While these countries today look forward to being accepted in the EU in the first wave, ethnic integration and citizenship policies could constitute a major hurdle. Determining the nature and stability of democracy in Russia is still a delicate matter. But after the 1991 presidential election, and the parliamentary elections of December 1993, democratic rule must be said to be under way.

Many states in central and eastern Europe regained or achieved independence and arranged elections with Poland being the first in 1989. Likewise, the end of the Cold War has made it possible for internationally controlled elections to be held in several African and Asian states.

20 The structures of representative government

1. The Institutional Design

The crucial role played by political institutions in upholding a democratic government was acknowledged as early as in the 18th century by the French philosopher Montesquieu (1689-1755). Ever since Montesquieu, great attention has been paid to institutional, rather than social, economic or cultural, explanations of political results. For example, the electoral system's great impact on the number and types of political parties has been proven by extensive research. Of course, institutional design does not explain all of the workings of democratic government. Real power is often vested in hands that are not fully restricted by formal rules; however, this taken into account, institutions certainly do matter.

Since there exists no single formula of how a democratic political system should be structured, the specific institutional design of each of the world's democracies varies. Some institutions, however, are common to all democracies. They all hold elections, for example, although the electoral system can be quite different in character. All democracies also need some kind of representative bodies, normally a legislative and an executive assembly – but there is no given answer to the question whether the representative system should be parliamentary or presidential. There are also different kinds of power distribution between centre and locality; there are federations and there are unitary states, the latter being divided into systems of relatively autonomous local self-government and of fused central and local authorities. The object of this and the following chapter is to give a brief survey of these institutional variations in the Baltic region, in democratic theory, as well as in practice.

2. Electoral Systems

The free and fair election is a cornerstone of every democracy. The design of electoral systems and electoral laws can vary immensely and different systems have different effects on politics and party structures. The most basic distinction is the difference between plurality elections and proportional representation. The plurality system is based on territorial representation, and the candidate that receives the majority of the votes becomes the representative of that constituency. Notable examples of this system are Great Britain and the USA, where the leading candidate is elected on the first and only ballot (the so called “first past the post” system).

The major virtue of the plurality method is that it normally produces clear-cut majorities in parliament and, by this, strong and stable governments. This in turn is believed to promote general political stability. Due to the fact that the plurality vote tends to give a distinct out-

come in terms of winners and losers, elections normally have a direct impact on the formation of government and what policies are to be pursued. Accordingly, in the case of widespread disappointment with the incumbent government's performance among the citizens, they can easily vote the party in power out of office. This way the plurality formula strengthens political accountability.

The basic premise of proportional representation is that the diversity of opinions in society should be reflected in the key political bodies. The system uses different techniques to allocate seats in proportion to the number of votes that the contesting parties or candidates receive. A common procedure is that the vote is cast for a party's list of candidates, the so-called list system. In most cases the voter can also express support for individual candidates on the party list, but since it takes a majority to change the ranking order this seldom has any effect.

Examples of this method are found in Denmark, Norway and Sweden, while in the Finnish list system, the voter can influence the selection of party candidates a great deal since the vote is cast for a specific candidate. Estonia and Latvia also used the proportional list-system in their general elections in 1992 and 1993. Lithuania used a mixed system, adopted from Germany: 70 of the 141 members of parliament were selected through the proportional formula, while the other half (71 members) was elected by a majority vote in single-member constituencies. The new parliament in Russia was elected in late 1993 with a mixed method similar to the one in Lithuania. Half of the members in the *Duma* (the lower chamber) were elected from party lists on the proportional basis, and the remaining 225 were elected by the majority formula in single-seat constituencies.

The parliaments of the Baltic States have a 5 (Estonia) or 4 (Latvia and Lithuania) percent threshold to keep small parties out. This is a common feature to prevent deadlock and weak assemblies under the proportional system. In Poland, the electoral system has been changed several times since the elections of 1989. An extremely proportional method was used in 1991 and the result was fragmentation of the Polish parliament, resulting in 29 parties and coalitions. A 5 percent threshold for parties, and 8 for election coalitions, was introduced a few months ahead of the elections to the lower chamber, the *Sejm*, in September 1993. In the elections to the upper chamber, the *Senat*, the majority formula was used.

With the proportional formula, all political inter-

The Plurality System


(Winner takes all in single-member constituencies.)

In each constituency the candidate belonging to the party receiving the highest number of votes gets elected. For example, if Party A gets 60% of the votes, Party B 25% and Party C 15%, the candidate belonging to Party A gets elected in that constituency.

Party A

Party B

Party C



Constituency


The Proportional System

Each party gets seats in the parliament in proportional to their share of the total number of votes. For example, if Party A gets 46% of the votes in a country, and there are 100 seats in parliament, that party gets 46 seats.

Party A

Party B

Party C



Each party's share of the total number of votes

Figure 90. Two basic forms of electoral systems. Ill.: Karin Hallgren




Figure 91. Three basic forms of democratic power distribution. Ill.: Karin Hallgren

ests and corresponding parties, small and large alike, are given the same chance of being represented in relation to the votes they have received. This greater fairness (in terms of equal opportunity) is presumed to contribute to the legitimacy of the democratic process. However, compared to the plurality system proportional representation certainly exhibits some obvious drawbacks. Proportional elections are usually less decisive with respect to forming a government. With many relatively small parties represented, the formation of a cabinet often becomes a hazardous business, where the game of inter-party bargaining may be more crucial than the electoral “message” from the voters. For the same reason, governments are overall weaker and far less long-lived under the proportional formula. On the other hand, the advocates of proportional representation can point to a number of merits of this system. Providing good prospects of representation also for minority groups and new political tendencies, the system is more inclusive

and responsive in a broader sense than the plurality method. Thus, it is believed to reduce potential conflicts and turmoil in society and to enhance political order. Furthermore, electoral turnout is generally higher under proportional representation. The reason is that this formula makes it possible to present a broader range of real alternatives to the voters, which increases the incentives to take part. In a more fragmented party system, which tends to come with proportional representation, the ties between parties and various groups in society in general are closer which makes people feel greater identity with one of the parties that are running.

3. Presidential vs. Parliamentary Government

The parliamentary and the presidential systems are two alternative forms of representative government in a democracy. The former is characterised by the unity of legislative and executive powers, the latter by an institutional “separation of powers”. In parliamentarism, governmental power is grounded on legislative power; the chief executive of that power is the prime minister together with his cabinet colleagues, who must enjoy the support of parliament. In a presidential government the head of the government is the president, who is elected by the people for a fixed term. In the United States of America, the best example of an ideal-type presidential system, the members of the cabinet are chosen by the president and are politically responsible to him only.

To characterise the distinctive features of the presidential system as being a “separation of legislative and executive power” is rather misleading, however. In parliamentary systems, too, there exists an institutional separation of responsibilities between the legislative assembly and the executive. This separation varies of course from one democracy to another, some hav-

ing more active and influential assemblies, others having parliaments of more reactive and responding nature – to give just one example of existing differences. But some general characteristics of the functions of the assembly and those of the executive might still be outlined. One of the main features of the elected assembly in a democracy is its representative function: the parliament “stands for” the people, and acts for them. Furthermore, the elected assembly is often called “the legislature”, thus indicating its authority to make laws; the assembly generally determines the size of tax revenues and public spending. Finally, it plays a decisive role in the scrutiny of the exercise of power. The executive, on the other hand, can be characterised as the main seat of authoritative power in society. It provides broad direction of national policy, and supervises the policy implementation.

4. Executives in the Baltic Region

The predominant type of executive in the old democracies of Western Europe is the parliamentary system. In the Baltic Region, this is best exemplified by Sweden, Norway and Denmark. The relation between the parliament and the executive in these countries is simple and clear-cut: the executive is subject to parliamentary confidence, yet has the power to dissolve the parliament. In Finland, the situation is somewhat more complex. Finland is something of a special case in the Scandinavian context, in that it combines elements of both presidential and parliamentary government in a unique, balanced fashion. The Finnish president is elected by direct vote of the people for a six-year term. He commands considerable constitutional power, more so than any other elected head of state in Western Europe. For the purpose of “general government” the country has a cabinet, called the Council of State, which, according to the express provision contained in the constitution, must enjoy the support and confidence of the parliament. Headed by the prime minister, the members of the cabinet are normally selected from amongst the majority parties in parliament. Thus, the Finnish mode of democratic government, including both a popularly elected president who presides for a fixed term and an executive subject to parliamentary confidence, might be described as a “semi-presidential” system.

A similarly mixed system is laid down in the Lithuanian constitution of 1992. The Lithuanian citizens elect their president directly, for a five-year term. Therefore, he or she has far greater authority than his or her colleagues in Latvia and Estonia. Unlike the Finnish president, however, the Lithuanian president is restricted in power by the possibility of a newly elected Seimas (the Lithuanian parliament) dismissing the president; such a decision, however, must be taken by a three-fifths majority within 30 days of the parliament’s first session.

Another example of semi-presidentialism is the Russian constitution adopted in late 1993, seemingly lending the former president Boris Yeltsin the most extensive presidential powers in the region. He appointed the cabinet, and could dissolve the parliament – however, not until a year after parlia-



Figure 92. Prominent Lithuanian politicians (from the right): Valdas Adamkus, Algirdas Brazauskas, Vytautas Landsbergis. Photo: Alfred F. Majewicz

mentary elections. Furthermore, the power of the Russian parliament to remove the cabinet was circumscribed by a complicated procedure of non-confidence voting, and the president's authority to govern by decree seemed to be far-reaching. The constitution is, however, utterly vague in some aspects, and it is still difficult to predict what the future of Russian semi-presidentialism holds in store. In the 1990s, the power of the Russian regions and their governors has been strengthened, but the power of the president undoubtedly remains extensive.

The presidents of Estonia and Latvia, as mentioned above, lack the extensive authorities of their neighbouring counterparts. They are not popularly elected, but appointed by the parliament. The first Estonian president after independence was, however, supposed to be popularly elected in 1992. But since no candidate received an absolute majority of the votes, the decision was handed over to parliament. The parliamentary system in Latvia and Estonia is similar to the one in Germany, where the president, as head of state, mainly performs formal and ceremonial duties. However, this does not necessarily imply that the presidents in these countries lack political importance entirely. In Germany, for example, the struggle to be elected president can be both harsh and competitive, as the high symbolic prestige of the office goes to the party with the winning candidate. In particular the role of Lennart Meri, Estonian president until 2001, has often been considered to be more important than could be expected from his constitutional obligations alone.

5. Pro and Contra Presidentialism

Assessing the advantages and drawbacks of presidential and parliamentary systems is a matter of great dispute among scholars. Strong sides, as well as main flaws, of both systems have been pointed out. In favour of presidentialism one usually points to the ability of this system to make the executive directly accountable to the people. Presidential systems tend to maximise the connection between the choices made by the electorate at the ballot box and the ability of the policy-makers to meet the voters' expectations, whereas the voter in a parliamentary system (especially if proportional representation is being used) has a rather vague idea as to what kind of government will be formed after the election. Also, presidential systems lend themselves more easily than parliamentary ones to crisis leadership.

The other side of this argument, however, is the difficulty to remove an incapable or unpopular government in the presidential systems, due to the fixed term of election. With the option of a no-confidence vote, the parliamentary system provides for a more flexible institutional means of executive replacement. The rigidity, which comes with the fixed term, entails the risk of getting a majority of the legislature representing a political opinion opposed to the president, thus creating political stalemate and an institutional rivalry between the executive and the legislature. In popular presidential elections, one could argue further against presidentialism, the winning candidate gains all power and prestige, while the loser is left empty-handed. Under such circumstances the political life may become a zero-sum game, marked by hard polarisation and destabilisation of the government. In the worst scenario, the president, taking advantage of the personalisation of the power vested in his mandate, may slide into authoritarian habits.

Thus the proponents of the parliamentary system argue that presidentialism endangers democratic stability – or even that it has proved to be the detriment of democracy. If this turns out to be true, the future of a number of reborn East European democracies is at stake. However, in a comprehensive work on the subject, two scholars strongly refute this stand. They argue, first, that when looking at history, there is no discernible pattern as to whether presidential or parliamentary systems promote stable democracy. An examination of all the cases of democratic breakdown during the 20th century shows that there are numerous

examples of both regime types deteriorating into authoritarian rule. Second, the arguments against pure presidentialism do not necessarily hold true for the mixed systems of semi-presidentialism. When, for example, the executive is subject to parliamentary – not presidential – confidence, the temporal rigidity and the potential for an institutional conflict between the executive and parliament could be avoided (Shugart&Carey 1992). Accordingly, in systems like for example the Lithuanian or Polish one, the shortcomings of presidential rule could be mitigated.

The Finnish Presidency

Jaakko Nousiainen

During eighty years, from 1919 to 2000 Finland was governed within the framework of a mixed constitution that combined strong presidency and party-based parliamentary government. In political practice, there was considerable fluctuation over time in the relative weight of presidential vs. parliamentary power. As a general rule, the prime minister and his cabinet were responsible for the day-to-day management of the country, but the president, by virtue of the enormous prestige he traditionally enjoyed, had supreme authority.

Since the early 1980s government stability has increased considerably: broad majority coalitions remain in power for the life of the parliament (four years between general elections), and the premiership has developed into a real and effective leadership role. Political diffusion has been supplanted by a strong sense of consensus, and the Finnish sort of parliamentarism has become the most stable among the Nordic countries, at least in its external aspects. With this development pressures increased, especially in the parliament, for a constitutional reform and a 'redistribution' of power within the state. Subsequently, the preparation of the reform proceeded very quickly and in a most consensual atmosphere. Parliament approved Finland's new constitution almost unanimously, and the president ratified it to come into force on 1 March 2000.

The central elements of the reform, as far as the position of the head of state is concerned, can be summed as follows:

- In the process of government formation the president becomes a secondary actor, because parliament now elects the prime minister after discussions among the various parliamentary groups.
- The president no longer 'determines the relations of Finland with foreign powers', but the president shall exercise foreign policy leadership in close association with the government. European affairs belong basically to the cabinet's and prime minister's jurisdiction.
- The power to issue decrees is transferred mainly to the cabinet. The government drafts the bills submitted to parliament for approval, and the president's right to refuse ratification has been restricted.
- The president of the republic appoints only a small number of top civil servants.
- The president makes his or her decisions, with very few exceptions, in the council of state (cabinet meeting) and on the cabinet's proposition. The president is more strictly than before tied to the cabinet's position.

The new constitution will act as a buffer, preventing the reoccurrence of the presidential activism of the 1960s and 1970s, and the political climate is amenable to the further development of the parliamentary modes of operation. It is a natural expectation that the strengthening of the parliament-government axis and the reduction of the president's powers will distance the head of state from the everyday policy-making and emphasise his or her role as a support of the sitting government, a moderator in conflicts and a mirror of the popular opinion.

The new president Social Democrat Tarja Halonen took office simultaneously with the new constitution coming into force. She recently characterized her role by saying that as a head of state she will be 'constitutional, firm and cooperative'. This can be taken as an allusion that she will not refrain from using her constitutional powers independently in specific situations, but at the same time she acknowledges the intensified role of the prime minister and the cabinet in national decision-making.

21 Territorial power distribution

1. Federations, Confederations and Unitary States

The most clarifying usage of the word “federalism”, as we see it, is to let it denote the *general idea* of organised co-operation between states. The word “federation” could then be reserved for the notion of a *constitutional structure* of a particular kind. When we let the word “federalism” denote the general idea of international co-operation, most peoples of the world seem to be oriented towards federalism as a general attitude. “Federation” in the strict sense of constitutional law is much less common. Most states in the world take part in all sorts of international co-operation, but only some fifteen of them are “federations”, in the sense of Germany or the USA, for example.

Comparing a *federation* with the alternative constitutional constructs of a *unitary state* on the one side, and that of a *confederation* on the other, is a way of illuminating the fundamental issues. By comparison, the different constructs are looked upon in the perspective of alternative solutions to the same problem. A *unitary state* as one basic alternative, however decentralised it may be, is so organised that every piece of legislation and taxation at the central level has a direct effect, together with the fact that every citizen gets equal representation. Countries like Denmark, Finland, France, Norway and Sweden are clear examples of unitary states. A *confederative* structure, as the other basic alternative, is so organised that every piece of legislation and taxation has to be confirmed and transformed into national law and taxation by the legislature of the member-state. Furthermore, another important aspect of a confederative structure is that the basic representative principle is one-state-one-vote and not one-man-one-vote. In practice this means that very little can be achieved by all the member-states in common action. In practice all confederative structures give veto powers to each of their member states. An example of a confederative structure is The League of Nations between 1919 and 1939.

A *federation* has mainly three characteristic traits. The first is that central government can legislate and tax with *direct effect* on the citizens of the member-states. The second characteristic trait is the element of *primacy* of federal legislation in cases where it comes into collision with the legislation of a member-state. The third characteristic is the standardised *representational compromise* between the idea of one-man-one-vote in the lower chamber of the national parliament, on the one hand, and the idea of one-state-one-vote in the upper chamber, on the other.

The Federal Republic of Germany works fairly close to the ideal type of a federation. A bicameral assembly ensures representation in the legislature for the member states. In the lower chamber, the *Bundestag*, the principle of representation is strictly one-man-one-vote, while in the upper chamber, the *Bundesrat*, the principle of one-state-one-vote is applied, although somewhat modified. Less populous member states like Hamburg

or Mecklenburg-Schwerin are being favoured compared to heavily populated states like Bavaria or Nordrhein-Westphalia, but not up to the point of equality. Russia is the second example of a federation in the Baltic region, with an upper chamber, the *Council of Federation*, consisting of two representatives from each of the federal units. However, the Russian constitution is unclear regarding the appointment of these representatives, and the federal structure of the country as a whole is as yet rather ambiguous, even though the regions have developed into stronger entities.

From the point of view of a strictly one-man-one-vote representational and unitary state, the construct of a federation means a constitutionally fixed over-representation of the less populated member-states. Politically speaking, that is part of the basic bargain. For historical reasons the smaller states demand and are guaranteed over-representation in order to stay loyal to the constitutional idea that legislation and taxation can be accomplished with majority rule at the federal level, have direct effect in relation to the citizens of the member-states, and primacy in relation to their legislation. Realistically speaking, the balance of power and initiative between a federation and its member-states depends heavily upon the smooth running of the revenue-raising powers and redistributing capabilities within the constitutional structure as a whole. Redistributing resources is the means by which constitutional cohesion and adherence is achieved.

2. Local Self-Government

The local government plays a very important role in a modern state. In many societies it provides numerous services essential for welfare policies. In a democracy, the basic difference in local government is between *dual* and *fused* systems. Under a dual system, local government operates separately from the centre. In a fused system, on the other hand, the central and local government are joined in one office – such as the prefect, a central appointee who is charged with overseeing the administration of a particular locality. France is the most influential example of a fused, centralised system of prefects. All of the countries of the Baltic region either have, or are moving towards, the dual system with local units of self-government.

As regards the history of local government, however, we must divide the Baltic Region in two parts: the West-Baltic (Scandinavia and Germany), with a history of local self-government going way back in history, and the East-Baltic (Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Russia), with democratic local government implemented only a few years ago. This difference is rooted much further back in history than the legacy of Communist rule. Even long before the years of Communism, the territorial systems of a major part of Poland, as well as the three Baltic States, were strongly influenced by the centralist traditions of the Russian empire.

But still, it is important to remember that local self-government systems were impossibilities during the Communist regime. According to the socialist model, local authorities were regulated in accordance with the doctrine of “homogenous state power”. This doctrine assumed that systems of local self-government, being sensitive to the interests of the locality, might divide the country. Egoistic or particularistic local interests were seen as harmful to the process of satisfying “the needs of the whole working class”. These “needs” could only be met by the policies of the Communist Party and central authorities. Consequently, local decision-making was to be responsive to central policies rather than the local electorate. As a result, local self-government became a chimera.

The size of the local units of government has a crucial impact on local politics and economic life. With some simplification one could say that arguments for both sides regard political and economic size. On the one hand, units large enough to imply economy of scale in service administration are needed. On the other hand, both theoretical and practical evidence suggest that the smaller the size of the unit, the better the citizen satisfaction and participation in public life. The trade-offs between these arguments generally result in some kind of compromise. With the exception of Germany, the municipalities of the Baltic Region are relatively big. This is the effect of an amalgamation process in several of the countries during the last 25 years.

The Scandinavian countries have highly consolidated systems of local self-government. The scope of their local functions is very broad, and the municipalities and counties play a decisive role in implementing public policies. In the East-Baltic countries, the systems of local government are still developing. Typical municipal functions in the Baltic region include: child-care, pre-school and primary education, basic health service, public utilities (gas, water supply, sewage, street cleaning, waste collection), and public transport. As a rule, the counties are responsible for higher education, hospital and planning. There are of course exceptions to these general characteristics.

3. Local elections

Generally speaking, only municipalities enjoy autonomous self-governmental structures (Sweden and Denmark being exceptions, however, even with self-governmental units at the county level). The most obvious way for local citizens to participate is to vote in local elections. In Scandinavia the local electoral systems are proportional, while in Germany and Poland the systems are mixed. In Poland, for example, the small municipalities use the majority system, while cities with over 40,000 of population use the proportional formula. The rationale for this division is that contacts between voters and politicians are closer in small rural areas, thus working in favour of a system allowing the choice of an individual candidate, while the more informal contacts in cities make proportional party elections more suitable. The highest authority in the municipality is the local council. Its size varies from 10 to 101 elected representatives, depending on the size of the local unit. A common feature in the Baltic Region is the relatively weak position of the mayor, who is generally elected indirectly. Local politics in Scandinavia, as well as in Germany, are essentially party dominated. After the Second World War, about 60-65% of the local representatives were elected on a partisan basis, but now this figure is 90% or higher. However, this does not necessarily imply a highly polarised political situation, because there is a tradition of local consensus deeply rooted in the area. The activity level of political parties in the new democracies has developed since independence, even though party organisation is weak. As local elections were introduced, the participants in local elections have been equal to those in national elections. However, a demanding, while at the same time passive, attitude of the citizens – accustomed to a




Figure 93. Three basic forms of territorial power distribution. Ill.: Karin Hallgren

centralised and strongly hierarchical political system – is one of the most important problems facing local governments in post-communist countries today, in combination with corruption, which has followed in the footsteps of privatisation of land and industries.

Citizenship and suffrage in Estonia

Priit Järve

In a democratic state, there is a very clear link between suffrage and citizenship. An individual without citizenship usually also has no right to vote. Thus, non-citizens are generally assigned to the same category of non-voters as children, criminals and the mentally incompetent. In most democracies, this category is fairly small – although, historically speaking, the nearly “universal” suffrage is a relatively modern phenomenon.

Citizenship and suffrage in Estonia has been an internationally debated issue since 1992 – in addition to the political discussions at home – due to the large Russian-speaking minority residing in the country. According to the population census of 2000, this minority makes up almost 30 percent of the population of 1,37 million, or more than 400,000 people. The majority of these Russian-speakers were not granted Estonian citizenship under the citizenship legislation of 1992 because they or their parents were not citizens of the pre-1940 Estonian Republic.

The rules that now apply, under the new Citizenship law of 1995, prescribe that non-citizens can acquire Estonian citizenship through a “naturalisation” process, i.e., a language and constitution test, a loyalty oath sworn to the state of Estonia, and permanent residency of five years (plus one year for the process of application). Some 30 percent of the non-citizens have acquired Estonian citizenship since 1992, while approximately the same amount, or almost 100,000 people have applied for and received the citizenship of the Russian Federation instead. However, the remaining 200,000 Russian-speakers reside in Estonia with the right to vote only in local (not national) elections and without the right to run for political office. The same applies to the citizens of Russia living in Estonia.

Basically, there are two conflicting approaches to the issue of suffrage and citizenship in Estonia. They can be described as the historic and the contemporary approach respectively. The first approach, more characteristic of the Estonian side, draws heavily on history and underlines the changes claimed to be negative or dangerous for the survival of the Estonian nation. Here the rapid change in ethnic composition of the Estonian population comes to the fore with the share of Estonians falling from 90% to almost 60% during one generation (from 1944 to 1989). Rejection of the so-called zero-option, i.e., refusal to grant Estonian citizenship to all applicants automatically, and establishing certain requirements for those seeking citizenship instead, is generally believed to be an appropriate reaction to what has happened to the Estonian population during the Soviet years.

There is also another argument supporting this view: comparisons with citizenship laws in other countries show that the Estonian requirements for citizenship are quite liberal by current international standards. Hence, the Estonian side maintains that, from a legal point of view, there is no problem with the country’s citizenship legislation.

The second approach, clearly that of the Russian-speaking minority and of many of the international bodies, maintains that history and nation do not matter as much as the Estonians think they do. Rather, one should start with the present multi-ethnic situation and think about individuals. As a characteristic example of this view, the Helsinki Watch has pointed out that it “rejects the argument that all those who came to Estonia after 1940 did so illegally and therefore were never citizens. Their residency was legally established under the applicable law at the time they entered the territory of Estonia. Those who settled in Estonia after 1940 must be treated as individuals, not as instruments of state policy, however reprehensible that policy may have been”. (Helsinki Watch, “Integrating Estonia’s Non-Citizen Minority”, October 1993, vol. 5, Issue 20, p. 14.)

According to the proponents of this view, a large number of people without citizenship is a security risk for Estonia, since the interests of these individuals are not properly represented at the state level, and their behaviour can be unpredictable. The underlying implication of this argument is usually that Estonia should grant citizenship more generously by further simplifying its conditions, especially the language requirements. Yet, the two largest language communities (Russians and Estonians) are facing each other with different interpretations of what is going on.

In the context of the accession to the European Union, the Estonian Government set the course in 1998 to integrate Estonian society, i.e. to lower barriers, which interfere with the naturalisation of Russian-speakers and their full participation in life. If this effort is successful, Estonia will make an important step towards being a fully democratic society.

22 The civil society: parties and associations

1. The Impact of Civil Society

The main theme in Montesquieu's theory of government was that in order to prevent the abuse of political power it must be met by counter-power. This should be accomplished through institutional pluralism, by checks and balances. A similar argument, but not primarily applied to the formal institutions of the state, was pursued by Alexis de Tocqueville (1805-59). In his studies of the early American democracy, he points out social pluralism, in the form of a multitude of strong popular organisations, as a crucial factor. He maintained that it was through these independent associations the citizens had been able to create an active civil society, which would obstruct a mounting state domination and a development towards dictatorial modes of government.

Civil society can be likened to a filter between the people and the state. Organisations of civil society represent their members in contact with the state. Also, the state contacts organisations of civil society in its efforts to communicate with representatives of the people. Examples of organisations of civil society are political parties and popular movements. These organisations are the basis of political democracy. They provide forums for the people to come together to debate common problems; they help people express their political desires and needs in an organised and orderly fashion. Their presence is evidence that the people have basic democratic rights and that the state cannot decide for them. This chapter is devoted to the exploration of these parties and organisations – in the “old” democracies of Scandinavia as well as in the “new” ones in the East-Baltic – together with a third link between the state and the people of crucial importance in a modern society: the mass media.

2. Parties and Party Systems in Scandinavia

There are many different kinds of party systems. There is the Soviet type of one-party system and the Anglo-Saxon kind of two-party system. With four or five major parties and a number of minor parties, the Scandinavian party systems are definitely of the multi-party variety. Countries practicing proportional representation tend to have multi-party systems. But all multi-party systems are not alike. There are large differences between the multi-party system such as it is in Sweden and that of the new democracies in Eastern Europe; and there are important differences even among the basically homogeneous Scandinavian countries.

The Scandinavian party systems have a simple conflict structure in the sense that they are dominated by a class-related left/right divide. There are, of course, other divides

at work, including religion, centre/periphery and even ethnicity (particularly in Finland), but left/right nevertheless accounts for the lion's share of the variance to be explained. The four or five major parties are easily identified in terms of the traditional left/right divide. There are communist and social democratic parties representing the working-class; there are conservative and liberal parties representing the upper and centre strata, and there are centre parties representing the rural and agricultural strata. The voters agree almost unanimously that the communist party is located on the extreme left and that the conservative party is a party of the right. Most voters would be inclined to locate the social democrats to the right of the communists or left-socialists, but there is no general consensus about where to locate the parties of the centre. In countries with strong social democratic parties, like Sweden and Norway, there is in fact a certain competition among the parties of the centre for the politically lucrative position as next-door neighbour to the social democrats.

There are a few other differences worth mentioning in this context. In Denmark and Sweden there is little evidence of divides other than left/right, while in Finland and Norway there is strong evidence of stable secondary divides. In Norway the parties of the centre – the Centre Party, the Christian People's Party and the now defunct Liberal Party – have traditionally been riding on what may be referred to as a set of strongly inter-correlated counter-cultural dimensions, rural vs. urban, periphery vs. centre, Free Churches vs. the Evangelical-Lutheran State Church, temperance vs. urban drinking habits and, last but not least, New vs. Standard Norwegian (the two main language-groups in Norway).

Finland also has a number of secondary divides. There is a conspicuous centre/periphery or urban/rural dimension of conflict which defines the Centre and Rural parties and cuts right through the strong communist or left-socialist party. There is an equally clear communist/anti-communist divide which dates back to the civil war in Finland in the wake of the Russian Revolution of 1917; and there is considerably more than a residue of the ethnic strife between Finnish speakers and Swedish speakers that marked Finnish politics in the 1920s and 1930s. On the face of it, this does not seem to be much compared to the complexity of Norwegian politics. But Finland does in fact have a more complex divide structure by virtue of the low inter-correlations among the secondary divides.

The Scandinavian party systems have their historical and ideological roots in the early part of this century. However, the political parties are no strangers to fundamental ideological change. The social democratic parties have gradually dissociated themselves from the Marxist rhetoric of the 1920s and 1930s. Yesterday's hibernating Stalinists and neo-Stalinists have transformed themselves into today's reformed communists or left-socialists. The conservatives, who were once mobilised into political action in support of the old pre-democratic order, are now counted among the most fervent supporters of political democracy. Of course, further examples of ideological party change could be given.

Parties change policies and re-interpret their ideological heritage for a variety of reasons, including self-interest. Parties are there to mobilise the vote; and if they cannot do this any more, they either reconcile themselves to fading away or modifying their electoral platforms so as to make them more palatable to the voters. When interpreted in this light, the arrival of new competitors may be seen as an indication that the old and established political parties have failed to adapt to the demands of the political market. There have been several such indications in Scandinavian politics over the past two decades. The process in Finland started with the landslide victory (from 1% to 10.5%) of the Finnish Rural Party – an agrarian splinter movement with a distinct populist appeal – in the parliamentary elections of 1970, and it culminated in 1973 with the roaring success (15.9%) of the Progressive Party – a neo-liberal

party with a pronounced populist appeal. In the Norwegian elections of 1973, a similar protest party – then known as Anders Lange’s Party and now known as the Progressive Party – polled an impressive 5% of the votes cast.

Sweden long stood out as a haven for the five old and established political parties by virtue of the 4 percent clause introduced in 1970 as an explicit safeguard against parliamentary fragmentation. But not so any more. Parties like the Greens (established in 1981) and the Christian-Democrats have made their way into the parliamentary arena during the 1990s. Local parties have become more frequent and successful in many Swedish communities and regions during the previous decade, altogether leading to a more fragmented party picture.

3. Popular Movements in Scandinavia

It is common to analyse the numerous popular movements in Scandinavia in terms of organisational waves of development. The first wave included religious organisations (Free Churches) and the temperance, women’s, labour and peace movements. These popular movements began to appear in the mid-1800s. They fought for basic civil rights and against privileges acquired by certain groups in society. An important issue in this period was universal suffrage.

The second organisational wave is dated from the 1880s to the 1920s. Labour unions, farmer, consumer, and housing cooperatives are examples here. These groups fought for economic rights. Women organised themselves in unions to fight for better working conditions. Employer associations were created in this wave as well. Many of the first and second wave organisations threatened the political establishment of that time. Free Church members and teetotallers were harassed by politicians, clergymen, and the police. Labour unions, for instance, found it difficult to rent meeting halls, which explains the high number of outdoor meetings held during this period. By the 1930s, however, most first and second wave organisations were accepted as legitimate representatives of the people.

In the third wave of organisational development, popular movements for citizen empowerment gained ground. These “adult education societies” dedicated themselves to educating the people. They offered programs including courses on the rights and duties of Swedish citizens, courses on political democracy, and classes in debating techniques and rules of procedure for conducting meetings for supporters of popular movements. One important reason for the weak hold of fascism in Scandinavia in the 1930s and 1940s was the presence of popular movements which supported political democracy.

The fourth wave of organisational development began in the late 1950s. It concerned the struggle for personal integrity and respect. Organisations for peace, the environment, human rights, and women struggled against destruction, whether it was in terms of environmental pollution, wars, or discrimination against specific individuals and groups. There are interesting similarities between the first and fourth waves of organisational development.

An important characteristic of Scandinavian political culture is corporatism. Corporatism is the integration of the organisations of civil society with the state. Roots of corporatism go back far in Swedish history. The Swedish model was a model of corporatism based on close collaboration between the state and the largest labour market organisations as well as collaboration between the state and other large and important organisations, for instance those for consumers and farmers. Corporatism meant that civil society became less separated from the state, no longer in opposition but in co-operation, and the state began to regard many popular movements as legitimate and important participants in the political process. Many of these

movements had previously fought against the political order, but in this period they began to cooperate with it. Negotiations between organisational elites and state officials replaced street demonstrations. Corporatism proved to be a successful method for political decision-making for developing the welfare state. Organisations of civil society took public responsibility for their actions. Scandinavia became internationally known for progressive politics and Sweden in particular for labour peace.

Later, changes in the economic, social, and political landscape made it difficult to reach corporatist agreements and maintain corporatist relationships. Popular movements – and particularly labour market organisations – started to function more as special interest groups. Government reports questioned the integration of civil society and the state. Politicians and experts recommended decorporatisation. Scandinavian popular movements in the 1980s and 1990s have begun to assume a new and different kind of public responsibility. They are filling in gaps in the welfare state and even taking over tasks which were once the responsibility of government. Meanwhile, the established popular movements today struggle with problems of decreasing membership and a crisis of legitimacy in the eyes of the people. The younger generation, however, has turned away from traditional popular movements towards collective forms of organisation, requiring less long-term commitment and more ‘action’ and visible results. Examples of these new forms of popular participation are associations for animal rights (both militant and non-militant ones), Greenpeace for the protection of the global environment, and the recently formed ‘global’ network against world-trade and capitalism, ATTACK.

4. Parties and Organisations in the New Democracies

One could characterise the political situation in Eastern Europe after the fall of Communism somewhat facetiously with the words: “the party is over”. With the demise of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the transformation of the East European communist parties into post-communist movements, much of the ground for large national political organisations has disappeared. In fact, the word party – which equalled Communist party – was met with severe scepticism by the people. Many political organisations preferred to be called fronts or movements in order to avoid the negative connotation of the term party.

However, Western experience shows that parties are normally the most suitable structures for aggregating and articulating the interests of the people. In his



Figure 97. Prime ministers of post-communist Poland (from the left): Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Hanna Suchocka, Jan Olszewski, Waldemar Pawlak. In the middle, the chairman of the session. Photo: Alfred F. Majewicz

well-known study of parties and party systems, Giovanni Sartori proposed a simple definition of political parties:

A party is any political group identified by an official label that presents at elections, and is capable of placing through elections (free or non-free), candidates in public office (Sartori 1976, p. 63).

Sartori's broad definition is especially suited for Eastern Europe. Here, not only organisations that label themselves parties are components of the political system, but also broader movements, uniting several parties and looser political groups as well as trade unions, participate in central politics.

It is possible to distinguish between four stages in the development of new party systems in Eastern Europe. First came the dissolution of the Communist parties. Then the popular fronts appeared which were broad coalitions against Communist rule, e.g., the popular fronts in



Figure 95. Political gathering of communists in St Petersburg, in 1999.
Photo: Alfred F. Majewicz

the Baltic States, Solidarity in Poland and Democratic Russia. The third stage was characterised by the dissolution of these popular fronts. In the fourth stage – which is now approaching its end – political parties in the Western sense are being created. But most parties are still small in comparison to parties in Western Europe.

As is the case with political parties, other social organisations are still underdeveloped in Eastern Europe. The trade unions are in the process of being reorganised and revitalised.

A number of industrial associations have appeared. The Catholic Church has resumed quite an important role in Polish and Lithuanian politics, while the Orthodox Church has strengthened its position in Russia. But in general, there is only a rudimentary structure of civil society.

Although much progress has been made, the current development of political democracy in the East European states contains elements of a possible future breakdown. Most of the stable democracies of Western Europe, like Britain, Germany and the Scandinavian countries, have a long-standing tradition of what Sartori (1976) would call *moderate pluralism*. However, most of the unstable democracies during the 20th century – the German Weimar Republic (1919-33), the French third and fourth republics, Spain before and immediately after Franco, Italy before and after the second world war etc. – were plagued by what Sartori refers to as *extreme pluralism*. The current situation in the new democracies of the Baltic region could be characterised as *polarised pluralism*, i.e., somewhere in between the other two extremes. The question is if these countries will develop moderate pluralism as in the Nordic countries or extreme pluralism as in Weimar Germany or Italy of the 1920s and 1930s. In conclusion, the parties and party systems in the Baltic region – as well as civil society on the whole – are still too undeveloped to guarantee democracy. On the other hand, in Poland, as well as in the Baltic States, there are no apparent signs of non-democratic mobilisation taking place. Even

though the parties revolve around charismatic personalities rather than on firm ideological foundations, there is a commitment to the democratic rules of the game, which has survived three national elections well.

5. Democracy and the Mass Media

The concept of democracy is closely related to the free formation of public opinion. Democratic decision-making is founded on the existence of public dialogue and the right to criticism. All interests of society must be able to find channels for their expression. Consequently, a free press, radio and television should be seen as prerequisites of democracy and the process of democratisation itself. The mass media is an embodiment of the right to freedom of expression. From the people's perspective, the media is a fundamental channel of influence as well as information.

In a general sense, freedom of the press is best defined as the right of the media to be free from control, to collect information, and to comment freely on issues and events. In a wider definition, freedom of the press could also imply participation of the people in the media, as well as accessibility of the media to the general public. Regardless of what description is preferred, a difficult problem might arise in any democracy when it comes to the realisation of the freedom of expression. On the one hand, the safeguarding of this principle requires extensive legislation, but, on the other hand, unrestricted freedom of the press could run counter to the individual's right to privacy and protection from the public sphere.



Figure 96. The former Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme, assassinated in 1986, very skillfully used modern mass media to reach his audience. Photo: Bert Mattsson/Pressens Bild

The justification of democracy

Why Democracy? Having reached the end of our exploration of democratic government, we still have not touched upon the most fundamental of all problems of democracy: why have it? How can we justify democracy, as opposed to other alternative forms of government? This is of course a grand subject in literature, and here we restrict ourselves by presenting, in short summary, some of the main arguments in defence of democracy.

The first argument maintains that democracy is the only mode of government capable of realising the principles of liberty and equality. Democratic decision-making is the only way of giving an equal say to all individuals, while – at the same time – protecting and promoting their freedom. A second argument values democracy because it develops the potential of the individuals to become fully rounded human beings. It maintains that, through participation in public life, the human being perfects his or her inherent capabilities of fraternity and compassion, and makes him/her publicly spirited. Furthermore, one could assert that the democratic process is the best way of managing conflict. Democracy functions as a safety valve against violent social strife by letting the sources of disagreement be expressed; democracy facilitates the peaceful resolution of conflicts.

In justifying democracy, it is important to take into consideration the plausible alternatives. Although there are many other forms of government, theoretically speaking, when referring to history one could, with some over-simplification, speak of one ferocious opponent of democracy: authoritarian rule. When referring to authoritarianism, we denote regimes where political power is restricted to the hands of a small elite, whether this elite is but one person (like despotic tyranny) or a group of persons, like in some military dictatorships – or, not to say the least, Communism as practised in the Soviet-type systems.

In the post-communist countries of Eastern Europe democracy is still contested in some circles, among those who hope for some kind of authoritarian rule instead, though such views seem to be decreasing among the establishment. Two kinds of arguments are usually put forward in favour of this stand. First, that the peoples of the region lack democratic traditions, and that the rapid introduction of democracy may result in anarchy. Second, that in the post-communist states, unlike in Southern Europe or Latin America for example, the political transition is accompanied, if not dominated, by the economic one: from a command to a market economy. In order to accomplish this transition, it is maintained, authoritarian principles of government must be applied.

The first argument is by no means new in the history of democratic thought. Throughout the 20th century the contention has been heard that the historical and cultural backgrounds of the countries in the Third World are very different from the West, and therefore unsuitable for democracy. As an underlining of the specific problems pertaining to the democratisation of countries lacking the “Western” traditions of individualism and liberty, this is certainly an important point to be made. But as a claim of the impossibility of democracy in such countries, it is simply untrue. Democracies do exist in the Third World, and countries lacking liberal traditions have been able to inaugurate democratic forms of government – the massive examples of India and Japan perhaps being the most notable. So, fact kicks back on those maintaining this kind of “cultural determinism” argument.

As to the second, economic argument, one might as well assert that instead of being a hindrance to economic reform, democratic institutions are a means of enhancing the tolerance in society for the harsh measures that need to be taken. Popular involvement in the process of change is not naturally an obstacle to resolute action. By increasing the legitimacy of the regime, it may indeed facilitate the accomplishment of reform programs.

A Long-Term Strategy. But perhaps the knockdown argument for democracy is the negative assertion once put forward by the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill: “It has been said that democracy is the worst form of government except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time”. Thus, taking all the weaknesses of democracy into account, one still has to admit that there exists no better alternative. What is then asserted is that the crucial merit of democracy is its inherent capacity of self-control, its resistance to the tendency of complete social destruction which authoritarian forms of government have in so many instances demonstrated – by the enforcement of extensive genocides or through gigantic militarism or an uncontrolled economic decay.

With regard to its achievements, democracy can be said to represent a cautious political orientation. Through the institutionalised channels for popular control and by upholding a wide range of the citizens’ rights, which serve to restrict the exertion of power, democracy is not the form of government that enables great leaps in the reconstruction of society. What it makes possible, on the whole, is only a fairly modest, reformist way of social change. But by the same token, it is the sort of regime that has the ability, better than any else, of obstructing a development towards political barbarism, and a subsequent societal disaster.

It is precisely this – the superiority of democracy as a long-term strategy – that has tended to take some time to recognise. For in these matters one cannot always rely on others’ experiences.

Apparently the media plays a crucial role in every healthy democracy. It provides a forum where public debate can take place, and when the media is permitted to function autonomously it can act as a watchdog on political and economic power. There are, however, several problems facing the media in young democracies. When a one-party system is replaced with democratic institutions, the political leaders might still oppose the freedom of the press and try to use the media as their mouthpiece as soon as a critical situation occurs. Secondly, the journalists themselves can find it hard to fully grasp the role of the media in a democracy. They are used to working as the propaganda tools of the party in power, and they often lack practical knowledge of investigative journalism. Thirdly, both the print and broadcasting media are expensive ventures and private alternatives, as well as the existing media, will easily get into financial troubles – especially if most parts of the economy have been controlled by the government. Finally, in order for the mass media to attain full effect, the people must be literate and rather well educated. This is not always the case in a nascent democracy.

Of course, even in a mature democracy, the relation between the mass media and democratic principles can be controversial. One problem relates to the power over the media. Who controls the radio, the TV and the press: the journalists, the state or private owners? A second problem relates to the actual power of the media. The question is whether the media is merely an instrument in the hands of the people and the power-holders, or a source of political influence itself.

“It has been said that democracy is the worst form of government except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time”.

British Prime Minister Winston Churchill

23 The rule of law

Gunilla Edelstam

Democracy is not a guarantee for good government in a state. The power that the state has over its citizens can be used in wrongful ways. The democratic state must therefore, within its legal system, protect the individual against the state itself, i.e. against the power of the state. This is where the rule of law fits into a legal system. It concerns the restriction of power. The rule of law can be said to be an idea concerning the protection of citizens against the state.

The rule of law does not have an exact definition. My intention in this article is to give it a definition. With this definition I want to create a starting point for anyone who wants to study aspects of his own system in terms of the rule of law.

The idea of the rule of law is based on two fundamentals. One fundamental consists of human rights and the other fundamental consists of the division of power. Human rights and the division of power are the basic fundamentals of the rule of law. Within the concept of human rights as well as within the division of power lies the restrictions of power that characterise the rule of law.

The basic fundamentals are not sufficient to define the rule of law as they do not say how human rights shall be protected by the legislature and the courts or the executive. The legal rules are created by the legislature and they are applied to individual cases by the courts and the executive. It is within these bodies that the rule of law must be taken into consideration and made part of the legal system. It is within this part of the legal system that different principles that upholds the rule of law must exist. My intention is to give the rule of law a definition by describing some main principles that should be upheld in the practical daily work of the legislature, the courts and the executive. Even though the abovementioned fundamentals are the same, the rule of law must have different features when it is applied to the daily work of the legislature than when it is applied to the daily work of the courts or executive. I will describe some important principles concerning upholding the rule of law in the legislative process and some important principles that are needed to uphold the rule of law in the decision-making that takes place in the courts and in the executive bodies.

Special instruments in form of legal bodies and legal limitations are needed to check that the rule of law is taken in consideration by the legislature, the courts and the executive when these bodies make or apply laws. The existence of such instruments is very important for upholding the rule of law.

Application of the rule of law

Lars Rydén

Rule of law and democracy. States have been ruled by law since earliest times. Using the phrase “rule of law” only to point this out is trivial. In this chapter the author will thus deepen and qualify the concept far beyond the mere existence of laws.

States, where the law only serves to codify or legitimise the unlimited power of a ruler, a single person or a small group, is not considered to abide by the rule of law. For example Nazi Germany, where the Führer had unlimited power, was not considered to abide by the rule of law, even if the Nazi party came to power through a democratic election. It is thus not enough to have just any kind of law but the laws need to codify and protect a division of power. In brief the “rule of law” should follow the principles of democracy – that the representatives of the people, the electorate, decides which laws are valid in the state. In a democracy the assembly, the parliament, has as a main function to make laws.

But this is still not sufficient. The laws and the institutions that implement the laws, the courts and the sanctioning system, need to have an independence from the other power holders in the state, in particular the executive power, the government, to allow the state to qualify as a state with the rule of law. The other power holders should not have a legitimate means to influence and manipulate the application of the laws. This is not always the case even today. There are several examples in the book on how this is done even today in the Baltic Sea Region.

Individual and the state. It is only in this kind of system that the individual may defend him- or herself against the state in case of a dispute. Disputes between public authorities and individuals are common in any society. The authorities may for instance have decided to build a railway which may require a number of privately owned houses to be taken down. The house owners may not agree. More sensitive cases are decisions to remove a child from a parent that is not considered able to take care of his or her child, or the denial of a person to execute certain professions for security reasons.

There are many states where all these formal requirements are met, but one would still hesitate to call them states “ruled by law”. The rules must also be applied. The rules may not be applied properly because of traditions. Differences between theory and practice exist in all societies but in some they are certainly larger than in others. We may mention some of the main flaws in the application of the rule of law.

Flaws in applying the rule of law. The writing of laws itself may be flawed. E.g. in Latvia after independence some taxes (which are laws) were introduced and applied to the situation before they were valid. The State desperately needed money and used unlawful means. Laws may also be contradictory to basic principles. In Sweden critics have pointed out recently that certain laws are contradictory to the Convention on children’s rights that was recently passed.

During Soviet times the courts in Soviet Union were certainly politically manipulated. The verdicts of the courts were decided after consultation with a proper political body. There are countless numbers of descriptions of this situation. This can be seen in literature on the early years of the Soviet State. “Night in the middle of the Day” by Arthur Köstler on the courts from the 1930’s is one of the classics in this area. The Kafka trials express the same thing.

Being equal before the law. It is also obvious today that not everyone is equal before justice as the rule of law requires. Women are weaker than men, high officials have advantages, children have fewer rights. The norms codified in law are not the same as the norms society applies. An abused woman will have difficulty when accusing her husband and an abused child will often not even be listened to. This is noticeable in the Nordic countries and appears to be a major flaw in the societies of central and eastern Europe, although research would be needed to show exactly the extent of this situation.

In many societies the courts are influenced improperly. Bribery may be unnecessary. There are many other kinds of corruption. The service offered by a corrupt judge may also take many forms, not necessarily that the verdict is changed. Witnesses may not be asked to come, proofs may be hidden, or a court case may simply be postponed over and over again. Such manipulations are difficult to discern except for those who are directly involved. Extreme cases of bribery or corruption may be more obvious, such as in a major affair in Poland two years ago for example.

Even if the chapter on the rule of law focuses on how it should be one needs to keep in mind that the application is equally important.

This article will hence describe the basic fundamentals of the rule of law. It will also describe important principles that must be followed in order to uphold the rule of law in the work of the legislature, the courts and the administrative bodies and it will describe the different ways of controlling the legislature, the courts and the administration.

When one discusses the rule of law it has to be taken into consideration that this idea concerns the relationship between the individual and the state. Problem of consistency with the rule of law exists especially within the field of public law where the state exercises public authority over the individual. My article concerns especially such legislation and interpretation that exist within the public law.

In the article some examples will be given. They are chosen at random and taken from my country, Sweden. They are meant merely to illustrate the legal problems described and hopefully to make the article easier to read and to understand.

1. The power of the state

A state consists of a territory, people and a state organisation. Within its organisation a state must have legislative, executive and judicial bodies. The organisation of a democracy consists of the parliament, the courts and the government with its authorities, like the police authorities and an environment-protectorate. The power of the state is executed through these institutions, which fulfil the following functions:

Protecting citizens from dangers. Citizens need protection from other citizens and from different dangers. A democratic state must give the citizen protection against crime and it must give protection to the free market. Protection is given through laws and through courts that apply the laws to individual cases. Protection against crimes is given through the criminal laws. Protection for the free market is given through contract law and other civil laws. Protection must also be given in other areas such as, for example, the health of the people and the environment. This is mainly done through different administrative laws, for example food laws, alcohol laws and environment laws. Then there must, of course, also be authorities that supervise that these rules are followed.

Protecting the citizens from the state. The bodies of the state can be very powerful in relation to individuals and private enterprises. The experience of totalitarian dictatorship shows that the state can be used for very ugly purposes. The persecution of individuals because of their race, class background, ethnic origin, political or religious convictions in this century has had the support of an all-powerful state. In particular, the police can be used for such kind of repression. People have been deported to concentration camps simply because of their race or class background. For this reason, the exercise of public power must have clear limits and be circumscribed. The citizens need protection from the state.

The idea of protection against the state might seem strange for the democratic state. It is supposed to exist for the benefit of the people. Therefore some people think that in a democracy it should be enough that a majority of the people can vote against the politicians in power and have them replaced with others when they do not act for the benefit of the people.

The reality is more complicated. What is favourable for a majority can be unfavourable for a minority. People in charge of power might act in the purpose of defending their own interest and they may also be careless or ignorant. The democratic state must protect the individual against

the misuse of the legal system that might be caused by the state itself i.e., against the power of the state that is in the hands of those who make the laws and who execute the laws, such as the parliament, the courts and the government and its authorities. The important question is therefore what protection should be given to the individual.

- Are there or should there be limits as to what the legislative power is allowed to do through the legal system, in relationship to an individual? How far shall the power of the legislature reach?
- How is a correct and just procedure guaranteed in the legal system when the judicial authorities take decisions which mean interference in the life of an individual?
- How is power controlled, i.e. who can monitor that the legislative power does not go beyond its limitations and who can control that the procedures are handled in a correct way by the courts?

These questions will be commented on in this article.

2. The fundamentals of the rule of law

The idea that citizens need protection against the state is in the legal literature mentioned as the rule of law.” One must separate “state” and its basic functions from “state ruled by law” A state is defined as consisting of a territory, a people and state organisation. A state ruled by law is something else. Though sometimes when the rule of law is mentioned one merely means the existence of laws. From this point of view, every state is ruled by law. A legal order is a part of every state. A democratic state must definitely have laws. The people vote on delegates for the parliament and the main function of the parliament is to make laws. Society is governed through these laws. The rule of law in a more narrow sense includes that there must be support under the law for the action that the court or administrative authority takes. There may hence be no sanction without legal support for this sanction and the person or persons within the court or administration that decide must, according to the law, have that power. But this has little to do with the debate about the rule of law. The debate is partly about how this can be obtained but it is more about the limitations and the control of the power of the state in a wider sense. If one sees the role of the state just as an obligation to counteract criminality amongst the people, this point of view might seem strange. Then the criminal laws, the police force, the courts and the prosecutors are the guarantors for law and order. But even though these are important they do not necessarily protect the people from the state itself. The main idea of the rule of law is that there are limitations regarding the power of the state, i.e. limitations according to which the legislature must act and limitations according to which the courts and the administration as well as the government must act. There must also be controls so that the limitations are observed by the powerful institutions of the state. There is no clear definition of the rule of law. This article points out criteria that serve the rule of law in a state. The basic fundamentals of the idea of the rule of law are the right of freedoms, the division of power and equal treatment of the citizens, but there are also other criteria concerning the rule of law.

Respects for rights of freedom. The essence of the idea of “rule of law” is that the human being is free and has rights of freedoms against the State. The rights of freedoms are, for example, rights to property, rights surrounding family life such as raising ones children, rights surrounding opinions such as freedom of demonstration and freedom of speech. There are also freedoms

like the right to life and the right not to be tortured. Another kind of freedom is equal rights according to which different persons shall not be discriminated by the state.

The rights of freedom are considered to be an invention from the West. These individual rights have validity even in opposition to the state. They have their origin in the idea that there are natural rights that are above the law that human beings have created. This idea is firmly rooted in the Christian theology of creation; it puts the interests of the individual ahead of those of the state, in a way that is unknown to the Eastern state ideology of the Soviet era. But the idea is not only based on Christianity, it can also be explained by the fact that the opposite solution, “power is law”, means that there are no limits for the legislature. It can make any law that it desires. As is pointed out above, the idea of “the rule of law” does not only mean that the law that is written shall be followed. It stipulates that there are limits as to what the legislature can do and how the courts and the administration may act. This means that the idea of “the rule of law” and the idea of “natural rights” are closely connected.

Rights of freedoms are often included in the constitution of a democratic state. More important, though, is the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). It has become important to the citizens of these European States that are members of the Council of Europe. The reason why the ECHR is more important is that the citizens of these countries that have ratified the convention have the possibility of applying to the European court i.e. it is a supra-national legal system. This is not the case with the Declaration of Human Rights from the United Nations. This declaration has political importance more than legal as there is no jurisdiction connected to it. The constitutions of different democratic states generally include a possibility for the citizens to go to court with the question of whether a decision or a law is in accordance with the constitution and this possibility can be very strong in some countries, for example in Germany, but it can also be rather weak as it is in Sweden. It is a sensible thing for the politicians because the possibility of going to court with such questions can make it difficult for the politicians to govern. If the possibility does not exist it might be easier to govern the country but it might undermine democracy as the individuals might find that the state is too strong in some areas, leaving no freedom for the individual.

The ECHR is not necessarily superior – in a formal way – to the constitution of a state that has ratified it. It might, as it is in Sweden, be incorporated into the legal system through an ordinary law, which means that formally the constitution, with its rights of freedom, is superior to the ECHR. But the fact that a citizen can apply to the European Court on Human Rights when he has no more legal possibilities within his own country, makes the convention superior to the constitutions of the member-countries.

The rights of freedoms exist in relationship to the State. The legislature must be careful not to interfere too much in these freedoms. The idea is not that this is totally forbidden, but there is a limit as to how far the legislature can go. When the legislature interferes in these freedoms it can only do this through laws. In individual cases where interference in these freedoms are necessary, the courts need support from the law. This means that these freedoms are basic in a democracy and the state can, to some extent, interfere, but only through laws. The question of how far the state can go is of course very delicate; consider, for example, the laws on abortion in different European countries and the debates surrounding them. Of basic importance is that the state – when it does interfere, has to interfere in these freedoms through laws. This means that there is basically in democracies an acceptance for these rights. They do exist but they can be limited to an extent through laws from the parliament.

Rights and politics are not always in harmony with each other when it comes to human rights. It can be seen in cases where the question might seem small and without significant

importance, but behind this question lies another question concerning human rights. The human right question is not always obvious. If there is a question of whether banks that are owned by private persons shall be taken over by the state by force then it is obvious for most people that this involves the right to property. But if there is a Christian cross hanging in a class room, it might be more difficult to see that this has something to do with freedom of religion, especially for those of us who are used to seeing such crosses on walls. For non-Christians though, it might be more difficult to accept that their children can be influenced by another God than the one in which they believe. They might see the respect for their religion as a human right.

Even if a state has a constitution that includes protection for human rights, this, as is mentioned above, does not imply that it is totally forbidden to diminish the rights and the freedoms of citizens. It is possible for the legislature to do that. In many of the articles of the ECHR it is written that the state may circumscribe human rights through laws when this is necessary in a democratic society. This is where the difficulties arise. When is it necessary and when is it not? This can be answered by the European Court, but it must also be possible to have an answer within the legal system of the state.

The rights of social welfare. One must make a separation between rights of freedom and rights of social welfare. With the rights to social welfare, the situation is completely different. These rights concern social subsidies and benefits from the state. These rights can only exist in a democratic state if there is a law that gives these rights to the citizens. For example, different kinds of allowances for children and elderly people exist because the parliament has made such laws. It is also necessary – in contradiction to the rights of freedoms – that there are economic resources. Without economic resources there can be no social welfare rights.

Social welfare rights are not included in the ECHR and they are generally not included in the constitutions of democratic countries. If they exist in a country it is through normal laws. Whether such a right is a strong right in the sense that those who need it get it depends on whether the person can apply to the court and complain if he did not receive it from the social welfare authority and whether there are enough resources to give it to him.

It should also be mentioned that the right to work and the right to education have two sides. They can be both freedom rights and social welfare rights. It depends on whether the right is something that is offered from the state or whether it is something that the state cannot prevent the individual from doing. If schools are free of charge and paid for by the state, then this is a welfare right for the citizens. If a person wants to study in order to reach a profession he shall not be stopped from doing this by the state if he has the qualifications needed. This is a freedom right.

The division of power. The organisations of democratic countries are all – more or less – built on the division of powers. The basic idea is that there shall be different bodies for the making of law, the application of law and the execution of law. Through this separation power is meant to be less concentrated and this is considered to ensure transparency and hence the rule of law but above all it makes the law itself a powerful factor that is not under the influence of the other powers. The judicial system is to be protected from the other branches of the power system. The executive power may not interfere in the acting of the judicial power, i.e. the government may not control the courts or administrative authorities by telling them how an actual individual case is to be solved. The government or its administrative body shall not arrange courses for the judges on how to interpret a law. It must also be forbidden for the judges to ask persons in the

government or in the parliament how the law shall be understood. The legislative power makes laws but it may not interfere thereafter in how these laws are applied to individual cases.

Courts must be independent from other parts of the state organisation. The greater the independence, the better is the possibility of having the rule of law. Therefore the judges must be irremovable. In small countries many of the different lawyers of the courts work for the government from time to time. They help, for example, the governments in preparing new legislation. This might to some extent make them less objective and it can therefore be a factor that weakens the rule of law.

Equality before the law. This is a fundamental right that stands out as very important in the legal system. Equal treatment must be considered as a basic fundamental for the rule of law. It is something for the legislature as well as for the courts to observe. This means that there has to be, for example, consistency in how a certain law is interpreted by the courts and that the legislature may not discriminate against anybody due to, for example, language, race or sex. Objectivity and impartiality also has to do with equal treatment.

3. The rule of law in the daily work of the legislature and courts.

The rights of freedoms, the division of power and equal treatment are fundamental to the rule of law. The rights of freedoms circumscribe the legislative power and the division of power makes it possible for the law to be a powerful factor in itself, free from legislature. Equal treatment means that there has to be a consistency as to how laws are applied and that there shall be no discrimination. There are also other criteria that serve the rule of law. One can distinguish between the criteria that must be observed in the legislation of the state and the criteria that must be observed in the procedure of the courts. Other criteria concern the control of state power.

The rule of law concerns how laws are made and what laws can be made. Clear legal rules are of importance and these legal rules must be general. A stable order with few changes in the existing laws serves the rule of law. In addition to this, laws, that include obligations for the citizens and hence interfere in their rights of freedom, must be made by the parliament in a democracy and this legislative power may not be delegated to governments or authorities. Openness towards the citizens about the legal system must also be observed by those in power.

General rules. A rule is by definition general. If it is not general but particular in pointing out one case it is not a rule. If a legal text is written in such a way that it is clear that it shall be applied in only one special case, then this is not a general legal rule. The legislature is not allowed to write such a law. If it does, it is illegal because it is beyond the power of the legislature to write such a law. It may not be applied by the court or the administrative body. But if the law-text is generally applicable but applied in only one case, this is acceptable.

Clear rules. Clear legal rules serve the rule of law. The more exact the legal rules are, the higher is the rule of law but legal rules must cover many different situations and it can be necessary to write them in such a way that they need interpretation in order to be understood. There are different methods of interpretation to be used. Sometimes, though, in the field of administrative law, the parliament makes laws where an administrative authority can choose between different interpretations of the law. This means that it is a very unclear rule. An example of

this is a rule concerning the environment of work places in Sweden. According to that rule there shall be satisfactory security at the work place. In this way the parliament gives a frame and delegates to the government or to lower bodies of the government to decide the more exact content of this legal text in their statutes. But the court and the administrative bodies that are to apply the law to individual cases need to know what “satisfying security” means. Sometimes it is the courts that have to decide the more exact content when such a case comes to court, but in many cases these kinds of decisions cannot be taken to court. Instead it is an administrative regional or governmental body that decides. A citizen or a company that has a case might discover that the administrative body or the court has understood the law in a completely different way than he has i.e. it is rather difficult to foresee the application of such a law. There is also a deficiency concerning the division of power in such cases if the authorities can make statutes and at the same time be the body that applies the statute in individual cases. This certainly does not serve the rule of law.

Law-making which interferes in rights of freedoms. Laws that include obligations for the citizens must, as is mentioned above, be made by the parliament in a democracy and it may not be delegated to governments or authorities to make such laws. It is necessary to delegate the power to make statutes to government and its authorities but this may not be done with laws concerning obligations for the citizens where burdens like prohibitions, fees without equivalent return or taxes or penalties are required of the citizens. These are burdens that interfere in the rights of freedom and such freedoms can only be circumscribed by the parliament that was chosen by the people in a democratic election.

Minimal change to rules Of course changes have to be made over time when a law does not serve its purpose, but a stable order with few changes in the existing legal texts is something good in itself and it serves the rule of law. The fewer changes to a legal text the better, this is the rule of law. Unpredictable changes do not serve the rule of law. In Sweden companies complain from time to time about the frequent changes in parts of the Swedish tax laws that concern them. The changes make it difficult for them to plan their businesses.

Openness concerning legislation. The legislature may not act in secret. There may be no secret laws. They must all be published. All laws shall be published and made available to the citizens. Laws should be in the libraries and the internet is of course also a very good way to publish them. When it concerns statutes from lower administrative bodies, it can sometimes be more difficult to get hold of them, which of course is not good.

There must be openness towards the citizens and an open discussion around the changes in the legal system. Important parts of this openness are that it must be possible for the citizen to foresee the consequences of an action or non-action. Therefore there is a prohibition towards retroactive legislation at least concerning penal laws. There is also a lack of openness around laws that are not clear enough. If a law is unclear, it can be difficult to foresee the consequences of such a law.

When burdens, like taxes or different kinds of administrative sanctions, are placed upon the citizens through laws, they should be dealt with openly. Information to the citizens about legislation work that is going on is important. This promotes a free discussion, basic in a democratic society. There is especially a need for discussion in public about burdens that are put on the citizens as such legislation often interferes in the rights of freedom. The citizens shall not be taken by surprise by new laws and there should be possibilities for having an open discussion. It is good for the system if there is an open process from the side of the legislature

before a law is made, where suggestions are published and sent to different organisations and institutions for comments.

4. The procedure in the courts and in the administrative bodies

There are restrictions as to what sources may be used when interpreting the law. The demonstration and the sifting of evidence must be reliable. The possibilities for the citizen to have legal aid serve the rule of law. Proportionality regarding what sanction is given to the individual in relationship to what he has done as far as criminality is involved must be upheld. This is also true in relationship to how the state benefits when it concerns a public law case. It is also a basic tenet that the courts' decisions are founded on facts and that the courts' observe impartiality.

Legal sources. All democratic systems are built on the principle that power is limited and bound by the law. Therefore one important question is what sources one may use to solve a case. This also concerns the source of laws, which to use and how to use them: can only the written and promulgated text in the book of law be used as a source when the law is applied in a case or can other sources also be used? Everybody knows that other sources can be used, but what are those sources? The question is important because the court cannot deny solving a legal problem only because there is no clear law on how to solve it. The law and the precedents are the main legal sources but there can be others. The court ought to tell what sources have been used in the judgement.

Reliable demonstration and sifting of evidence. This concerns the proofs and the burden of proof. The burden of proof is of importance in unclear situations where it is difficult to say what is wrong and what is right, i.e. in cases of uncertainty. The decision of the court or of the governmental body must then be made through the burden of proof. In order to take a decision according to the burden of proof in cases of uncertainty one must know who has the burden of proof and one must also know how valuable the proofs are when considered together. In a criminal case this is not so difficult. It is always the prosecutor who has the burden of proof and he must prove that it is beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has done what he has been accused of. In administrative cases, though, this can be more complicated. First of all it does not have to be proven beyond reasonable doubt that the citizen has the right to have the allowance that he has asked for or that the state has the right to require some kind of burden as, for example, a fee from him. A lower value of proofs is acceptable. It is not always clear who has the burden of proof even if it is often said that the citizen has the burden of proof if he asks for an allowance from the state. The question, who has the burden of proof, is rarely expressed in the laws. It is something that has to be considered in practice, but it sometimes happens that the legislature decides on who has the burden of proof. An example of how the burden of proof can be used can be seen in the EU-legislation on gender equality. The difficulties for the employee in proving discrimination and the clear aim of the EU to carry the gender equality through, has led to an EU-directive (97/80) according to which it shall be for the respondent (i.e. the employer) to prove that there has been no breach of the principle of equal treatment. A woman, who considers herself wronged, must establish facts before the court from which it may be presumed that there has been discrimination, but after that the burden of proof is on the employer. He has to

show that he has not broken the principle of equal treatment. If he cannot show this, he has to pay damages to the employee.

It can be vital to the individual where the court, the governmental or the regional body places the burden of proof. Therefore this is also an important issue concerning the rule of law. The right to be heard is also a vital part of the demonstration and sifting of evidence. Every piece of information that is not in favour of a party must be told to him and he must have the right to give his opinion to the court.

Still another important question is what evidences can be brought to the court and how they shall be valued. In Sweden a party is free to bring whatever evidence he thinks might benefit his case and the court is free with regard to how to value the evidence. This means that there are no special rules concerning what evidence can be brought to the court and no legal rules as to what is good evidence. Certainly there might be laws concerning which evidence is of value but if a party cannot give such evidence he is free to try to prove his case any other way that he can. Then the court is free to value the information in the way that according to their knowledge and experience is the right way. In administrative cases there can be a tendency to value more highly information that comes from an authority than information that comes from an individual. Such a habit from the decision-maker can weaken the rule of law.

An important part of the reliable demonstration of evidence is the word-of-mouth procedure. This is considered to be much more reliable than a written demonstration and it is used in criminal and civil procedures. The procedure in administrative cases has in general been a written procedure, in the administrative bodies and in the administrative courts in Sweden. The written demonstration in administrative cases is supposed to be more efficient and cost less and this is probably true, but the rule of law is not so strong during the administrative procedure where the demonstration and sifting of evidence is not based on word of mouth. In many cases this probably does not matter. Many administrative cases are simple and without complications, but some are not and when the complication concerns a question of evidence, a written procedure can make it more difficult for the individual to prove his case. A written procedure in such a case weakens the rule of law.

Impartiality. Impartiality shall be observed by courts. That is the reason for their existence. For example if an expert has given a statement during a trial in court and also given his opinion on how the court should judge, it is important that the court declares that it is the court that decides how to judge.

This should of course also be observed when it concerns the administrative bodies. These bodies also have the obligation to give a report for the interest of the state when they make decisions in individual cases. In order to obtain impartiality the civil servants may not accept favours or gifts from persons or companies. A minister may not accept an apartment that is offered by a company who owns it, if this means that this minister gets a favour, as this might lead to impartiality in future decisions by the minister. Any conference which the bank-inspectorate holds for its employees may not be sponsored by banks for the same reason. An impartial judgement is considered as one basic human right according to the ECHR article 6.

Legal aid. As it is often difficult for the citizen to argue on legal questions in front of the court or state body, legal aid is important. Needless to say, this is expensive for the state and can hardly be paid by the taxpayers in all cases. If the state does not pay, then the individual has to pay himself, which means that in such cases there might be no possibility for a poor person to claim his or her right. This is not in accordance with the rule of law.

Proportionality. According to the rule of law there must also be some proportionality regarding what punishment is given to the individual in relationship to what he has done. In the administrative field where the interest of the state is always involved when there is a burden put on an individual, the burden must be in proportion to what benefits there are for the state. Proportionality is a basic principle in the practice of the European court and it is also a basic principle in EU-legislation.

Openness concerning the procedure. The judgements must be public as well as the court procedure so that there can be a free discussion if needed. The need for this openness in a democratic country of course makes it important that the court gives the reason for the judgement and accounts for it in a satisfactory way – how the legal sources have been used and how the evidence has been valued. A written administrative procedure is less open than the oral procedure of the ordinary courts.

5. Different ways of controlling the legislature and the courts

Institutional control of power also serves the rule of law. There must be legal remedies so that it is possible for an individual to complain about a decision or a judgement. But it must also be possible to punish a civil servant who commits a malfeasance and to pay damages from the state when an individual loses money due to a wrongful decision from the state. There should also be possibilities for checking whether laws from the parliament are in accordance with the constitution. Still another special way of checking is the monitoring from an ombudsman.

Control by higher courts. The most fundamental control is that which the citizen is entitled to when he applies to a higher court. In Sweden many administrative cases where the interest of the state (which can be in the interest of the majority of the citizen) is at stake can only be taken to higher administrative bodies. Some administrative cases cannot be taken to any higher authorities at all. This has been an old Swedish tradition where there is little division of power in the field of administrative law. Such a tradition does not serve the rule of law and the Swedish state has been taken to the European court for this reason. Such a case was the Sporrang-Lönnroth case where the owners of two houses received decisions from an administrative body that their houses should be taken over by the state because the land was needed for public use (for example roads and hospitals). But the state did not fulfil this decision to expropriate the houses, so the owners were still owners but with very restricted access to their properties since they could not sell or let it to people and there was no possibility for the owners to appeal to a higher court within the Swedish system. The European court found that this was not in accordance with the ECHR. Sweden has changed its system due to this judgement and now there is a special possibility in which one can take all administrative cases concerning civil rights to a Swedish court when one has exhausted the possibilities within the administrative bodies. Sweden has also restricted the time during which a decision of expropriation may last. Before this judgement from the European court there was no time limit.

Constitutional control over the legislation. Constitutional courts oversee that the legislation on lower levels is in accordance with the constitution. This means that they can monitor whether the law from the government is in accordance with the constitution, but they can also check whether statutes from lower administrative bodies are in accordance with the constitution. A constitutional court is not really necessary for this. Another way to do this monitoring is, for

example, to make it an obligation for the ordinary courts to check whether it is in accordance with the constitution. Still another way of checking the legislature is to have a special body that assesses the laws before they are promulgated.

Many countries in Europe have constitutional control. The constitutional court of Germany is very strong. There are also constitutional courts in the Baltic countries but Sweden does not have a constitutional court. The constitutional control in Sweden can be made by the ordinary courts during a process of an individual case but only if it is “obvious” that a law from the parliament is not in accordance with the constitution. This is almost never obvious when it concerns questions on rights of freedoms. Such things are hard to see and these questions are rather complicated. Therefore it is difficult for the citizens to obtain such a control in Sweden. Control is a sensitive issue. The parliaments and the governments are not too enthusiastic to be controlled by courts. They can feel that it makes their task difficult. Uncertainty can, of course, arise about the legal situation and this might also be bad for the system. This happens from time to time in Germany when the constitutional court in Karlsruhe takes decisions.

It should also be mentioned that in the United States the constitutional control is very strong as it is the duty of every lawyer to check whether a case has been handled in accordance with the constitution.

The European Court on Human Rights is a kind of constitutional court. It is within the jurisdiction of this court to decide whether a judgement from a court, a law from the parliament, a statute from the government or from an administrative body, in a country belonging to the European council, is in accordance with human rights.

Economic responsibility for the state. In those cases where the citizen suffers an economic loss due to a wrongful decision by a court or from a governmental or regional body, the state should take the responsibility for paying damages. Such damages must be decided by court and the procedure, that precedes such a decision, can be an important way of telling the bodies mentioned how they must fulfil their tasks.

Criminal responsibility for the civil servant in charge. It must be possible to condemn a person who has committed an intentional malfeasance when in his work he used the power of the state that was in his hand. This can also be an important way to tell the administrative bodies how they must fulfil their tasks. For example, there was a case where a German boy was beaten to death by his parents while they stayed in Sweden. Neighbours and a nurse made the child abuse known to the social services of the region. The woman in charge did nothing about it. She was condemned for having committed malfeasance as it was her duty to investigate such a case with priority. The court trial has pointed out that such an investigation must be handled with priority.

The Ombudsman. The ombudsman can be another form of monitoring but the ombudsman cannot change a court’s decision. This institution can, in most cases that come to its knowledge, only inform the parliament about the wrongdoing. The ombudsman is an institution under the parliament and its role is to monitor how the laws that are made by the parliament are applied. The ombudsman makes statements that are published and they can be very important as they tell the administration how to act in the future. Especially important is the control by the ombudsman over the actions of the administration.

The role of the ombudsman is sometimes misunderstood by people in the Baltic states and in other east European countries. Some people believe that they can go to the ombudsman if they do not have enough money for housing or for support of their families. This is only partly

true. If there is a law that says that the state has to give a person a certain sum of money, for example, for housing and the government or its administrative body does not fulfil its obligation according to this law, then the person can turn to the ombudsman. The ombudsman must then investigate whether the administrative body has not fulfilled its legal obligations. But if there is no legal obligation the ombudsman cannot help the person.

In some east European countries there is also a Human Rights Office. Its role is also often misunderstood. The official who works there can in cases concerning social aid only tell a person the telephone number and the address of the administration or the voluntary organisation that can help the person if there is such help. But they cannot take such a case to the European Court on Human Rights, as there are no rights of social welfare in the ECHR.

6. A legitimate legal system

The above has concerned the protection of citizens against the power of the state. I have described situations where the power is executed through a decision concerning individual citizens. Especially the decisions that come from the governmental and the regional administrations and the administrative courts are of interest when the rule of law is discussed. It is especially within the administrative bodies that a conflict between the interest of the state and the interest of the individual citizen can lead to wrongful use of power.

In a way, one can say that if you want the citizen to accept the law it is necessary that the state – in respect for the individual – accepts the limitation of its power and acts according to the rule of law. If the citizens feel that the state has respect for them they will in turn have respect for the state. Legitimacy for the legal system exists if the citizens find the legal system acceptable. The rule of law means that the legislature has limited power, that the courts must follow certain rules of procedure and that there must exist a division of power and people must be treated equally. There must also be openness from the legislature and the courts according to the rule of law. An important step in reaching legitimacy is that the legislature, the courts and the administrative bodies act according to the rule of law. The rule of law is not something static that exists or does not exist. It is a complex idea that has to be kept in mind. This is an aim that has to be strived for over and over again in the daily work of the parliament, the courts, the government and the administrative bodies.

7. Protecting the democracy from the people

Though this article is about the protection of citizens against the state it must also be said that the state needs protection against the people in order to protect democracy. All violence from individuals can of course be punished by the state, but when citizens act with violence in order to disturb or destroy the upholding of democracy, there can be a need for special protection for the state and its organisation. It should be pointed out that this protection can be of such importance that during certain circumstances it might be important for the state to take such actions that the citizens are not as protected against the state as they normally are in a state ruled by law. This issue raises delicate questions because a democracy is by definition committed to such values as liberty, equality and freedom of speech. But it might be necessary for the state to interfere in such freedoms in such a way that they disappear. The reason why the state might have this power in certain circumstances is that, if it does not have it, the



Figure 97. Stockholm. The crown is a salient symbol of the Swedish state. Photo: Katarzyna Skalska

base for democracy disappears. It is complicated due to the contradiction between these two interests. One could see this complicated question raised during the meeting of the leaders of the European Union in Gothenburg in June 2001 during the Swedish presidency. Many people demonstrated against the European Union. Some of them threw stones at policemen who had to withdraw. They damaged property heavily in the centre of Gothenburg. Their aim was to destroy the meeting of the EU-leaders. The policemen could not handle the situation. Many of the people who took part in the demonstrations were masked, which meant that those who were not caught could not be identified when they later started to damage property and commit violence towards the policemen. Such demonstrations can lead to EU-leaders having difficulties in meeting each other, which is a threat to open democracy. It was discussed in the media whether it might be possible to unmask and to arrest these people before the violence started. If this could be possible it would be in conflict with the basic fundamentals of a democracy: the freedom of opinion and hence to demonstrate. However if it is not possible, we may lose the type of democracy where the meetings of politicians are open and can be discussed.

24 The state: economic policy and democracy

Hans Aage

1. Economics and democracy: a conceptual framework

Economics is concerned with institutions for the coordination of decisions for resource allocation. Given individual preferences, technological possibilities and initial resources, the basic theoretical problem in economics is to analyse how the problem of optimal allocation is solved or not solved, when decisions are governed by incentives inherent in various types of institutions, i.e. patterns of behaviour regulated by formal and informal rules. By far the most extensively investigated economic institution is the market, but there are many others, including enterprises, planned economies, corporations, labour unions, labour-managed firms, the family, the feudal economy, slavery.

As in economic theory, the point of departure for democracy is individual preferences – and conflicts between them. Generally speaking democracy means that the individual is able to influence his own life as well as social life and that institutions exist through which conflicts of interest can be confronted and mediated in equal terms. This simple definition requires a few remarks. Firstly, it does not imply admiration for narrow selfishness, let alone the repudiation of morality or altruism, but it disregards a social interest above the individual as found in traditional societies. Secondly, any suppression of individual freedom of action requires justification which is, however, often obvious as most actions influence the freedom of action for fellow members of society. Thus minority rights are essential for democracy as opposed to mob rule. Thirdly, there is a close affinity between democracy and equality, the degree of which is a distinguishing feature of various democratic institutions.

One very potent mechanism of democracy is the market, where preferences are expressed in terms of money. The demonstration of the optimality of individual market decisions under certain conditions is a major achievement of economics. As in principle nothing but quantity and price is bargained this leaves much freedom for the individual.

Concerning equality of influence, another democratic institution takes the lead, namely voting in the political process. Whenever the very strict conditions for market optimality are not met, the market will need the help of a visible, collective government hand.

Other mechanisms than rule by money and rule by people could be considered as well. A third type is self-management, which distributes power according to active participation, energy and talent. An important example is labour-managed enterprises, which exist in small numbers in western market economies and have had a more prominent role in some transition economies, e.g. in Poland. It is essential in libertarian socialism and anarchism, in the former Yugoslav social theory of participatory market socialism, and in various contemporary proposals for economic democracy.

Finally, it is remarkable that democratic institutions sometimes renounce their power, not only concerning purely technical matters, but also in relation to decisions that involve political preferences. Instead, power is entrusted to independent bodies which enjoy confidence and are subject to strict regulations. This professionalisation typically happens when short-sighted political decision-makers are tempted to abuse their power and neglect long-term harmful effects or when decisions are so painful that compromise is excluded. Examples are independent courts of justice and the power of the medical profession when deciding the allocation of scarce resources. In the economic sphere the paramount example is the independence of monetary authorities.

The characteristics of these four democratic institutions can be summarised as follows (cf. Aage, 1998):

Market	Individual influence according to economic capacity;
Government	Collective influence mediated by politicians through the political process and voting;
Self-management	Influence depending upon active participation;
Professionalisation	Legitimacy depends entirely upon confidence in the judgement and honesty of the body entrusted with decision making power.

2. The basic dilemma

Any economic system faces the problem of striking a balance between market democracy and government democracy, between public sector involvement and private activity, or to put it in more tangible terms: the problem is how to collect taxes. The policies of marketisation, privatisation and liberalisation of foreign trade inflict a serious dilemma upon economic policy options in transition economies. On the one hand it is the only way forward towards wealth and democracy, or at least the only one perceived and the only one accepted by foreign creditors and the IMF (The International Monetary Fund). On the other hand these policies by necessity impose severe strains upon public finances and impair the government budget balance in two ways: the demands on public expenditure increase, and public revenues decrease.

The recession of 1990-1993, with GDPs collapsing cumulatively by 18% in Poland, 36% in Estonia, 49% in Latvia, 46% in Lithuania, 44% in Russia and 37% in Belarus, bottomed out, and positive real growth rates resumed in Poland in 1992 and in Russia in 1999, but especially in Russia, Latvia and Lithuania GDP (Gross Domestic Product, a measure for total production in the economy) is still considerably below the 1989 level, cf. Table 9. This creates an urgent need for a governmental social policy including unemployment allowances, although rates of registered unemployment are not extreme by Western European standards, in 1999 between 7% in Estonia and 13% in Poland where it has subsequently decreased, and in Belarus only 2% (ECE, 2000:160, 165).

The closing down of unprofitable production hopefully means that workers are laid off. Progress in this direction has been slow, but new and tighter bankruptcy laws have given some improvement. Privatised firms lay off redundant workers, and they no longer fulfill their former social policy functions, like providing workers with cheap meals, housing, health care, leisure activities, holidays and income, and this also applies for non-productive workers. The

government must carry out some of these activities or establish separate insurance schemes for social security.

The recession furthermore erodes the tax base. Tax payments from remaining state owned enterprises decline; although this decline is partly offset by the elimination of government subsidies – in some Eastern European countries they are more than offset, so that net profit taxes have increased after 1990 computed as a percentage of GDP – the sharp drop in output levels nevertheless reduces the tax-paying ability of state-owned enterprises. Privatised firms deliberately avoid paying taxes, especially if the private sector is an unrecorded cash-economy, and success in privatisation means further erosion of the tax base.

The old system had one important advantage, which is understood now that it is gone: it could collect taxes efficiently. Unfortunately, it did so by means of wage and price controls and the blocking of enterprise “account money“ so that there was little codification of tax rules or administrations which could be carried over into the new system. The former socialist states were owner states rather than tax states, and in 1989 the bulk of tax revenues, 70-85%, was appropriated from state enterprises as residual profits, turnover taxes with a multitude of rates, in addition to some social security taxes and modest taxes on land and capital assets, cf. Table 8. The state bank was the only intermediary between enterprises and the state budget, which made tax collection a relatively simple task. Personal income taxes were small; in the USSR the maximum marginal tax rate was 13% for ordinary wage income, although certain private incomes and foreign income were taxed at much higher, even extreme, rates exceeding 80%. Total government revenues amounted to about 50% of GDP, 5-10% higher than the OECD average.

Table 8. Composition of central government tax revenue 1998 in various countries (per cent of GDP)

	Total	Personal and Corporate	VAT excises	Trade taxes	Social security	Property
Russia	19	2	8	2	8	–
Belarus	31	3	12	2	11	–
Estonia	32	6	13	0	11	0
Latvia	34	4	14	1	11	0
Lithuania	27	4	13	1	8	0
Poland	35	9	12	1	11	–
Finland	32	9	14	0	3	–
Sweden	38	5	11	0	13	–
Denmark	39	14	16	0	2	–
USSR, 1989	45	22	12	6	4	0
USA, 1987	18	11	1	0	7	0
Developing countries	18	5	5	5	1	1
Industrial countries	31	11	9	1	6	1

Notes: The data differ from those of Table 9 because of the exclusion of local government budgets.

Sources: World Bank: World Development Indicators 2001; Comparative data for USSR, USA, developing countries and industrial countries are from Hussain & Stern, 1993:68–69; Aage, 1997:97.

Expenditures in the planned economies until 1989 can be roughly divided into purchases of goods and services (on average 35%), subsidies to state enterprises (25%), transfers to households (20%) and other items. During the 1980s the share of enterprise subsidies declined in several countries, whereas social expenditures, including health care and education, increased.

Budget deficits should be avoidable or manageable in a planned economy given the vast political powers of government to control prices, wages and enterprise payments. But for political reasons there was a tendency for real income to increase more than output, creating moderate deficits of 2-3% of GDP. In the USSR budgetary problems were aggravated during Gorbachev's perestroika; one example was the anti-alcohol campaign where a 50% cut in alcohol production in 1985-1987 caused a significant drop in government turnover tax revenues; the impending budgetary dangers were, however, largely neglected, not only by the Gorbachev government, but also by western observers. Only later, when the deficit reached 9% of GDP in 1989, was it recognised that automatic inflationary financing of deficits was easy through the printing of more money, but contributed seriously to the acute economic crisis.

Thus, the depression inflicted severe limitations upon government expenditures, and the economic transition necessitated a radical reconstruction of taxation and expenditure. On the other hand, budgetary cuts also contributed to the recession because of macroeconomic effects and the need to curb inflation (Kołodko, 2000:256-269).

3. Reconsidering the role of the state

In relation to taxation, the contrast between public and private ownership could easily be too sharp and simplified. Ownership of capital goods is composed of different property rights which can be separated, principally into the following three: 1) the right to manage and utilise property, 2) the right of access to income and profits originating from capital, and 3) the right to trade and disposition of capital value (Gregory & Stuart, 1992:20-21).

Confidence in the right to future incomes from capital is essential for private investment and a well-functioning market economy. Taxation and regulation are related to these ownership rights and to the mix of government and market democracy. Thus, a 50% profit tax with full loss offset corresponds to 50% state ownership concerning the right to income. A tax on capital gains is similarly the equivalent of state ownership of part of the right to the capital value (cf. Hussain & Stern, 1993:65-66).

Private ownership can be restricted in a number of ways, and different types of state interference in economic activity constitute a spectrum of forms of regulation, from one extreme of complete state ownership and disposition to various intermediate forms like specific regulations of branches and enterprises through laws, franchises and leases as well as specific taxes and subsidies. At the other end of the spectrum are the very general types of civil and criminal law, common taxes and macroeconomic policies.

Table 9. General government revenue and expenditure 1999 (per cent of GDP)

	Government revenue	Government expenditure	Government balance	Government debt	Expenditure on health and education	GDP 1999 1989=100
Russia	35	36	-1.0	13	7	57
Belarus	42	48	-5.6	5	11	80
Estonia	37	42	-4.6	7	12	77
Latvia	43	47	-4.2	14	11	60
Lithuania	32	41	-8.6	28	8	62
Poland	41	45	-3.3	43	10	122
Finland	49	47	2.3	57	13	117
Sweden	58	56	1.7	66	15	115
Denmark	58	55	2.9	46	15	123

Notes: General government includes central and local government and some extra-budget funds, but definitions may differ between countries.

Sources: EBRD, 2000:65, 126-229; EIU country reports and country profiles; ECE, 2000:149, 160; World Bank: World Development Indicators 2001; OECD: Economic Surveys, Finland (July 2000).

Restoring government activity, particularly in relation to taxation and public expenditure, and establishing an efficient mix of various forms of government instruments, is crucial for future economic development in general, not only concerning the public deficit and macroeconomic stabilisation. The basic functions, which must be performed by the state because private institutions, including the market, are unable to do it, include the provision of the following prerequisites for the market economy: legal foundations, macroeconomic policy, investments in human capital and infrastructure, a social safety net, and environmental policy (World Bank, 1997).

Although this does not mean detailed state interference in economic activity, there are in fact increasingly strong reasons for emphasising the role of active government policy for fostering economic growth, the ultimate aim of transition; and because this involves expenditures, as state activities usually do, it will also put additional strain on public budgets.

4. Government revenue

The long-term goal of establishing a western type tax system implies the substitution of the former taxation of enterprise residual income with a system of personal and corporate income taxes, social insurance contributions, VAT and excises, trade taxes and property taxes. Industrial countries typically have a larger tax share of GDP and a lower share of import and export duties than developing countries, but the variability is also large among industrial countries, cf. Table 8.

New tax systems were introduced in the Baltic countries in 1991 after the decline of the volume transferred to the USSR in 1990. Before the transition, most revenues were transferred to Moscow and allocated under an all-Union plan. Following the economic reform the ties with Moscow were severed, and the economic activities of enterprises were gradually separated from the government budget, whereas social expenditures and other expenditures

like defence and security formerly financed from Moscow had to be financed from national revenues. Initially, the discontinuation of payments to the central budget in Moscow contributed to the fiscal surpluses in 1991 of 3-6%, but this does not necessarily imply that the Baltic countries were net contributors to the all-Union budget; if subsidies are taken into account, the Baltic countries, like almost all other Soviet republics probably received positive net transfers from Russia, mainly in the form of cheap energy. However, the total economic impact of fifty years of Soviet rule is of course a much more complicated question.

A sharp drop in the absolute size of government budgets occurred after 1991. Total revenue as a per cent of GDP declined slightly in Estonia and in Latvia and considerably in Lithuania. Taking into account the dramatic decline in real GDP, this means that government revenue in constant prices decreased from 1991 to 1994 by some 40-50% in Estonia and Latvia and by 75% in Lithuania. Even if the figures overestimate the declines in real GDP, they do not overestimate the decline of real government revenue (Aage, 1997:105-107). The shares of government budgets have increased, cf. Table 9, and this also applies in Russia. The highest levels of government expenditure are in Poland, Latvia and Belarus.

The composition of government revenue has changed. There has been a decrease in the share of corporate taxes, an increase in payroll and social security taxes, and an increase in taxes on goods and services. In the Baltic states turnover taxes or VAT were introduced in the early 1990s, and now all three countries have 18% VAT, with some exemptions, together with a flat personal income tax rate of 25% (Latvia), 26% (Estonia) and 33% (Lithuania) for income above a certain threshold. Besides, there are payroll social insurance contributions. Taxation of corporate profits has been reduced, and in Estonia they were eliminated in 2000.

Similar tax reforms were introduced in Poland in the early 1990s, also including very high tax rates on wage increases exceeding allowed levels, the so-called *popiwek*, which was also introduced in Latvia. A major tax reform in 2000 will gradually reduce corporate income tax rates from 34% to 22% and extend VAT to agricultural products at a reduced 3% rate. Belarus also introduced a VAT, like Russia, but as 80% of GDP is still produced in the public sector, it is possible to rely on traditional methods of tax collection. In Russia privatisation requires new methods of taxation which have proved very difficult to implement, but recently tax collection has improved considerably. A tax reform in 2000 introduced a flat 13% personal income tax rate (the same as the old Soviet maximum tax rate), reduced and unified the social security contributions and reduced turnover taxes.

5. Tax collection during transition

The new tax systems are ambitious attempts at the fast introduction of western type systems, and they compare reasonably well with generally accepted principles of optimal taxation, which can be briefly summarised as follows (Hussain & Stern, 1993:72-76):

Indirect taxes should not be levied on intermediate goods (a VAT fulfils this requirement); high rates should be applied to goods generating negative externalities (like environmental damage) and goods with a high degree of complementarity with leisure; tax rates should be for imported and domestic goods.

Direct taxes should have a global tax base; marginal rates should first rise and then fall (this is not observed in western tax systems); corporate income should only be taxed as it accrues to persons, apart from the case of monopoly rents, foreign recipients, and, probably, capital gains.

Property taxes are normally of limited importance in western countries, cf. Table 8, although they have attractive properties with respect to distribution, efficiency, potential revenue and collection, as supply elasticities of property are low, tax evasion difficult, and the tax base fairly easy to measure as it is related to wealth.

The main problem is to avoid distortionary effects of taxes. A poll tax or lump-sum tax, i.e. that every taxpayer pays the same absolute amount of tax, fulfils this requirement, but is unacceptable for evident reasons. But full taxation of pure resource rents also fulfils it, and appropriation of revenue from resource extraction is a convenient type of taxation often recommended in developing countries.

However, during the period of transition when government revenue is desperately needed and the possibility of collecting takes on an overwhelming priority, there can well be reasons for deviating from these general principles. Also, adverse changes in the distribution of income may imply that deviations from the rules of optimal taxation are warranted. Considerable tariffs may well be justified for reasons of collection, distributional effects as well as the protection of domestic producers.

In accordance with these rules it is very important to widen the tax base, and there are strong arguments for the payroll tax. A tax on profits is difficult to collect, and adverse incentive effects is an argument for abolishing them altogether. Property taxes, on the other hand, could be an important source of revenue, and the most efficient way to collect these taxes is that government retains ownership rights and leases e.g. land, buildings and housing to the public. Giving property away for free and thus sacrificing future incomes seems to be very problematic from a taxation point of view (Hussain & Stern, 1993:76-80).

Establishing efficient systems of tax collection from the private sector poses serious problems in all transition countries. Tax administration and control mechanisms are not effective in preventing tax avoidance, especially with respect to new enterprises in the private sector where payments are often made as unrecorded cash payments, partly because efficient payment systems are still lacking in some countries. The black economy is estimated to have increased to about 20% of GDP or more. Tax arrears are substantial, and according to some estimates they amount to 2-3% of GDP and in some cases even more, thus in Latvia nearly 5% in February 2000.

6. Government expenditure

Generally, the level of expenditure has decreased dramatically due to the recession and the structure has changed, as subsidies were more or less eliminated as part of the introduction of the new systems of taxation. Information available is not very detailed and not readily comparable between countries, and for the former Soviet republics detailed comparisons with expenditure structures before 1990 are even more difficult because of the complex transactions with the all-Union budget in Moscow. Thus, social expenditures as well as all-Union enterprises were financed largely by the central budget.

All countries except Poland are experiencing severe pressure because of the shrinking real value of budgets. A major source of pressure is social expenditures needed for health care, unemployment allowances and old-age pensions for the increasing number of retired people, who already constitute about one quarter of the population.

The Baltic countries and Poland are all reforming their pension systems in similar directions. The present tax-funded systems will be partly and gradually replaced by funded pension insurance schemes, and in most cases this will be followed by increases in the retirement age, typically from very low levels of 55-60 years towards 62 years. In Poland a pension reform along these lines in 1999 was broadly accepted, but an attempt at health care reform also in 1999, which partly replaced taxation by insurance, generated great concern and bitter pro-

tests. In Russia the health care system has suffered from budgetary cuts similar to other public services; government expenditure on health care as a share of GDP has increased from 2.5% in 1992 to 4% in 1999, which is not sufficient to prevent deterioration of quality. Private health care payments, also known in the Soviet era, have probably increased to 10-15% of the total.

Another source of pressure on government expenditure is the demand for subsidies, from state enterprises where employees press for wage increases, and from farmers who have been able to obtain some protection against competition, even in very liberalistic Estonia. Still, heavier pressure on expenditure can be expected in the future, because the stimulation of economic growth requires that the state spends vast sums on improving infrastructure and human capital. Expenditure on environmental policy has been small, but is also likely to increase, especially in countries applying for EU membership.

One way of relieving the pressure on public expenditure is to privatise public enterprises and public utilities and to introduce payment for public services, especially health care. Estonia has the most comprehensive privatisation programme, including the selling of public utilities, telecommunications, the Tallinn Port, oil shale mining companies, and railways. Privatisation may provide an immediate revenue; it could save future expenditures, but it could also entail the foregoing of future budgetary incomes.

Payment for health care may be unavoidable, given the scarcity of public revenues, but it is a last resort to have to use a tax on diseases. Of course it broadens the tax base, and it overcomes problems of the willingness, although not necessarily the ability, to pay. Private health care is not necessarily more efficient than public health care. Thus in Denmark health care, mainly public, accounts for about 7% of GDP, as compared to about 14% in the USA, where health care is mainly private, and an important part of the explanation is huge administration costs in the USA (cf. Aage, 1997).

7. Macroeconomic policy

In Russia and Belarus, annual inflation rates were still very high in 1999, 86% and 294% respectively, although they have decreased considerably since 1999. But Poland and the Baltic states have achieved impressive stabilisation, with inflation rates about 5% or even lower. This is the result of restrictive fiscal policies and the repeated pruning of budgets, as well as non-inflationary financing of deficits including successful treasury bill programmes, supported by tight institutional arrangements. In Estonia and Lithuania, currency board systems prohibit deficit financing by the central bank, as the issue of money must be fully backed by foreign currency reserves, and in Estonia a budget balance requirement is written into the constitution.

Policies of external and internal liberalisation restrict the use of monetary policy and exchange rate policy, so that a major burden of macroeconomic stabilisation must be carried by budgetary policy. And external imbalances with significant trade balance and current account deficits require tight fiscal policies in a situation with large demand for government expenditure from the citizens in terms of pensions and other social payments and from the outside, as EU memberships presupposes infrastructure investments, including environmental policy outlays, amounting to perhaps 5-10% of GDP annually.

The scope for taxation is limited, because of a lack of administrative capability and because of attempts at stimulating new activity with generous tax rules. Therefore, demand has been

restricted by expenditure cuts, including very low real wages for state sector employees and low real values of government transfers.

The lessons from reform policies so far are that they have turned out very differently, with Poland as an exception from some general lessons, namely that reform policies are difficult to implement, that they take time, that long-term beneficial effects are uncertain, and that they cause severe short-term hardships. There is a danger that this may pave the way for social disintegration, the withering away of the state, the privatisation of tax collection by organised criminals extorting protection money, the impoverishment of large segments of the population, and the disappearance of any confidence in the institutions of society.

8. The state and the market

The theory of transition raises the difficult issue of the interrelations between transition, economic growth, and the various mechanisms of democracy. Historically, there are no examples of planned economies with political democracy, and democracy is not a precondition for economic growth.

But efficient decision-making is inescapable and preferably it should be democratic. There is a great danger that transition, particularly of the Russian type, may spoil the potential for *government* collective decisions without creating the necessary conditions for individual decisions in the *market*.

Transition and liberalisation in Russia have reduced the decision-making power of government by creating strong, politically and criminally infected ownership interests. And without the reconstruction of government the necessary conditions for individual decisions in the market cannot be created, in particular price stability and contract enforcement by law.

Privatisation alleviates the incentive problems of the planned economy related to the ratchet effect and the soft budget constraints. But this advantage is obtained at a cost, namely that the government also becomes incapable of fulfilling its contract enforcement functions.

Liberalisation and smaller government is often regarded as an important precondition for economic growth. This trend is just another expression of a widespread view of society as driven by economic incentives which are considered the only possible ones, even the only ones permissible. This theoretical predilection for narrow, particularly economic incentives has had a growing impact upon the social sciences, even outside economics.

“The government must stop restricting and directly controlling private commercial activity” was the message of the World Development Report in 1996 (World Bank, 1996:110), but the report of 1997 had a much more balanced view and recommended “matching the state’s role to its capability”, together with efforts to “raise state capability by reinvigorating public institutions” (World Bank, 1997:3). The very simplistic recommendations of the early 1990s are now changing.

Creating some form of *self-management* democracy was among the intentions of insider-privatisation in many transition countries, besides the obvious purpose of buying the support of economic reforms from employees and directors. But self-management did not materialise, and it would most likely not have contributed positively to the transition due to well-known, empirically and theoretically documented problems related to self-management. On the contrary, the wide and partly spontaneous diffusion of employee ownership rights in several Eastern European countries during the 1980s was mainly a source of obstacles for restructuring and commercialisation.

Privatisation has effectively eliminated political control from central planning, and at the same time it endangers market control, because it threatens the collection of taxes and therefore also the necessary functions of government. If the simple solution of just cutting public expenditure to match dwindling tax revenues is not possible, the most important task for stabilisation and for successful reform as well, is to establish effective taxation for the private sector, even if this brings with it adverse incentive effects for entrepreneurial activity.

An efficient type of taxation, which could be more fully utilised, is the taxation of income from the ownership of natural resources. Thus the Russian gas monopoly, Gazprom, which is among the largest concentrations of wealth in the world, with reserves of natural gas worth an estimated 700 billion dollars in the mid 1990s, is partly privatised, and political control has been partly lifted, so that it has proved difficult to collect taxes from Gazprom.

Natural resources and the environment are areas where democracy cannot rely on the market. Maybe it cannot rely on government either because of the danger of short-sighted abuses at the expense of future generations. Thus, as in monetary policy, there is a case for delegating power by means of *professionalisation*. The extreme form for independence of monetary authorities is the system of “currency boards” which are more independent of the government than central banks, but subject to very strict rules; it was first introduced in a number of former British colonies, and now used in a number of countries, including Estonia and Lithuania. A similar system could be necessary to manage resources and the environment, and various forms of “fisheries boards” and “environment boards” have been proposed. Recently, similar institutions have been proposed for financial policy as well (cf. *The Economist*, 27 November 1999, p 100; Aage, 1998).

It is repeated again and again that “there is no middle way between capitalism and communism” (*The Economist*, 28 October 1995, p 15). The obvious truth is that there exists nothing but third ways. The relationship between individual decisions in the market and collective decisions in the political process is complicated. Often, the metaphor of a referee in a football game is invoked to describe the proper role of government in the economy, but maybe another metaphor would be more incisive. In a lecture in 1992 on transition in Russia and Eastern Europe the late Wassily Leontief described the economy as a sailing-ship; the wind is the incentives of the market, and it gives the speed without which it is impossible to steer the ship. If the crew sets all sails, and then goes down to the cabin for drinks, the ship will certainly go fast, but in unknown direction. However, a clever government at the rudder could exploit the wind and the powers of the market to beat up against the wind and advance in the opposite and desired direction.



Fig. 98. Symbols of transition. One of the streets in Rzeszów, Poland. Photo: Alfred F. Majewicz

How to falsify an election?

A short instruction for dictators, based on field work done by B.

The following text is a pastiche, composed by Witold Maciejewski of real reports from some countries in the Baltic Sea region

1. If you obtained your power in accordance with any democratic constitution of your country, **violate the constitution**. In order to sanction your power, give out a lot of ukazes and decrees. For instance, a decree “*On indispensable means of fighting against terrorism and other particularly dangerous crimes with the use of violence*” can be very useful. This decree can include any kind of oppositional activity, any activity of an unwanted citizen. Treat the term “terrorism” very widely with all its aspects.
2. Do not forget to **modify the constitution** as the next step. Introduce desirable laws and call them “Changes and complements” instead of dictating a new constitution.
3. **Encourage denunciators**.
4. **Create special sub-units** meant to fight against the people who think in another way. As the next step, strengthen the position of military structures. They would obey you.
5. Your special units have to take care on democratic opposition. It is recommendable and efficient to **get some of your opponents to disappear** and others to leave your country. The western countries are used to swallowing the disappearance of 3 – 4 people at one time quite easily.
6. Put mass media under your control. It’s easy, you do know how to do that. But, please, do not exaggerate and leave 3 or 4 newspapers relatively independent.
7. **Prepare all elections** right down to the smallest details. Let the administrative organs do the preparatory job. Let them order all key managers of enterprises, institutions, education and others to recommend the composition of the regional electoral committee. These should be made exclusively of people who are loyal to you and ready to do anything to give the percentage needed in the general results of the elections. Special attention shall be paid to the choice of reliable presidents of committees. If the presidents have not fulfilled the requirements, they could immediately be dismissed and fired from their jobs. Afterwards, in order to prevent members of various parties taking part in the proceedings, introduce your people to the regional electoral committees. This is how to create the base of electing only this person, whose candidacy was agreed upon by your top personnel advisers.
8. In order to secure the election of the people needed, introduce a so-called “**voting ahead of time**”. Its aim is to assure that the electors attend in great numbers (even though it may appear as a violation of rights). Force the people to attend the elections, put pressure on the presence of the inhabitants of the electoral district, workers, students, people living in boarding schools, etc. Bring pressure on the administration of enterprises, which in turn shall be pressured by the regional administration. In practice, various governmental organs have to assemble leaders of a lower level and threaten them continuously. Talks “**between you and me**” are recommendable, they are proved to be efficient. As result, a great deal of the population would give their votes. Put particular pressure on students.
9. Then a new moment to demonstrate responsibility arises for your lackeys. Call in representatives of regional electoral committees to the regional administration once more. They have to take the **properly-filled-in voting cards** and put them into the ballot boxes late on Saturday night, that is before the last day of the elections – Sunday. Police or militiamen on duty are to be asked to leave the rooms where the ballot boxes are located. Then the committee members (cf. 7 above) have to quickly throw out all the cards that have been filled in by the voters and put in the cards filled in by the regional administration. Though the rest of the electors would vote on the Sunday, the task is fulfilled. The victory of the proper candidate is guaranteed. The major part of the electoral committee members and observers from other countries would not even suspect what had happened on the previous day. And on the next day reporters, commentators, leaders of different levels, including yourself, should talk with pride about the will of the nation.
10. Do not forget to **be proud** of your country when you announce the results. Stress that democracy is the only way for your people.

25 Malfeasance in contemporary democratic societies

Halina Zboroń

1. Factors contributing to political and economic malfeasance

The transition to democracy and a market economy. The collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 symbolically ushered in a new era in Europe's history. Since 1961, the Wall had divided not only East and West Berlin, but also the German nation and, in fact, the whole European continent. The Wall's physical demolition set off a process of far-reaching political and economic transformations. These changes were an expression of spontaneous popular support for a civilisation based on the liberal model of an open civic society (in terms of the political order) and capitalist market economy (in terms of economics). In 1989, Central and Eastern Europe turned to the West and the West opened up to the East.

For many opponents of Communism, the event epitomises the triumph of modern liberal democracy. The resulting substantial rise in the influence of the liberal approach to politics (democracy) and to economics (capitalism) was certainly warmly welcomed by its proponents. Paradoxically, however, the situation not only failed to put an end to discussions on democracy but made the debate even more heated. This is true, naturally, for those societies that had been subject to socio-economic transitions. The construction of a democratic political order and a capitalistic market economy, after all, is not limited to legislative changes (and the replacement of the most fundamental legal instruments: the Constitution). Rather, it involves the gradual acceptance by a society of the principles of democratic life and the rules governing market economies. In other words, the building of public awareness, attitudes, and ways of thinking, and the acceptance of and conformity to democratic standards are all of equal importance. In conclusions, Central and Eastern European societies, including those of the Baltic states, are learning the rules of democracy.

Factors behind malfeasant behaviour. The process of political and economic readjustment toward the Western European model of civilisation is not free of the difficult and complex problem of malfeasance that accompanies such changes. Social lawbreaking, especially those plaguing political and economic systems, can obviously also be found in societies with much longer democratic traditions. A case in point is the numerous financial and political scandals over inappropriate support extended to political parties in Germany, Italy and France (e.g. the German CDU of the 1980s, the so-called "Flick scandals", and the "secret accounts" affair involving the former Chancellor Kohl). Democratic institutions, especially those established to protect the transparency of public life (equality under the law, openness, social regulation of political and economic activities) fall short of efficiently preventing undesirable and destructive behaviour. Needless to say, law enforcement in societies that have only begun to

build their democracies presents much more of a challenge than in societies that have become politically and economically stable. This is due to a number of reasons.

First, any reform of a legal system leads to transitional states and the emergence of numerous loopholes that encourage circumvention of the law. Second, post-communist societies have not yet sufficiently embraced democratic standards and principles. The principle of respect for the law is yet to take root. Problems with abiding by the law are a legacy of communism, where the law was an instrument of control and repression of society. Furthermore, institutions set up to monitor and enforce the law are still largely ineffective. The main reason for the escalation of lawbreaking (observed not only in countries that have recently begun building their democratic orders) lies in the condition of the state, ungovernability in general, or the inefficacy and inefficiency of the governing process. The primary problem is the dishonesty of the state representatives and its apparatus of power. Political scandals involving corruption of state officials, abuse, favouritism, dealings with organised crime, etc., all contribute to undermining the social order. The responsibility of state officials and politicians extends beyond the immediate effects of their actions. The symptoms of malfeasance observed in governmental and political circles have a strong impact on social life overall. First of all, they severely undermine the social credibility of political elites. Further, numerous examples of abuse of the law in political spheres provide an excuse for indulging in similar practices in other areas of social (and economic) life. The illegal and unethical ways of ruling politicians weaken the will to respect the ethical and legal principles of democracy in the remaining areas of social life.

Needless to say, the ungovernability of the state in general is the main cause of malfeasance, and specifically of corruption, in all types of societies. Political and economic lawbreaking should therefore be seen as a symptom of a diseased state. Their chief causes are flaws in the political and economic system and low ethical standards in politics.

2. The meaning and scope of malfeasance

The most common association of malfeasance is with crime. Such an association, however, is incorrect. Crime encompasses all acts committed in violation of the law. By definition, such acts are considered to be acts of malfeasance. The notion of malfeasance, however, is much broader. It comprises actions violating socially sanctioned and generally respected rules of participation in public, i.e. political and economic life. Malfeasance encroaches upon the established social order, which, obviously, rests on the law, violations of which are punishable. Yet, the social order is not limited to the rule of law. It also includes customary and ethical principles not governed by law. The legal, ethical and customary principles upheld by a given society determine the choice of aims (and means of meeting such aims) to be realised by actions taken in the public interest. In other words, these principles indicate what types of behaviours on the part of participants in the public life will be socially approved and which will be viewed as improper, reprehensible or harmful.

A prerequisite to participation in the collective life of a democratic society is adherence to at least the most important social rules and standards (especially ethical ones). We can thus speak of a mutual social responsibility, as the principles of social co-existence rest on the assumption and expectation that they will be generally respected.

The rise of malfeasant behaviour, the regular infringement upon those social standards and principles considered to be of particular importance, may lead to anomie, a disintegration of

the social order and especially of standard behaviour. The lack of respect for the most important and socially recognised values leads to a rise in reprehensible actions (as seen from the point of view of social interests) designed to promote the interests of an individual or group at the expense of (violating or restricting) the rights of other participants in collective life of society. By the same token, the rise of phenomena considered to be a malfeasance contributes to a gradual erosion of specific standards and principles. The mechanism here is that, as a result of increasingly common violations of rules, actions that conform to the rules in force become ineffective. In such a situation, success in achieving one's goals becomes contingent upon an ability to adjust one's behaviour to the ways of other participants in social life. An individual faced with choosing the means for achieving his or her goals will have to choose between honesty and effectiveness. In some countries in which state officials are especially corrupt, unofficial price lists are prepared of fees charged for specific favours. As a consequence, all persons refusing to give bribes must brace themselves for a long wait for a decision and uncertainty as to its outcome. An example of this is the operation of customs offices in many post-communist countries. Having one's goods expeditiously passed through customs often requires bribing customs officers, whose working speed depends directly on the amount of bribes they have received.

As mentioned earlier, malfeasant behaviour violates the social principles of participation in public life. Such behaviour undermines the system of social standards and principles and, as such, is anti-social (also in the sense that particular benefits are obtained by some at the expense of other participants in social life). In defining the concept of malfeasance, one should add certain qualification, as not all departures from standard behaviour meet the criteria of being malfeasance. Let us consider three fundamental issues.

First, the notion of malfeasance refers to violations of particularly important standards. These include legal and ethical standards, especially those at the foundation of the democratic order, both political and economic, and social life in the broad sense of the word.

Second, we should consider the extent of the social harm: material damage, the sense of harm resulting from infringements upon one's personal property, a sense of unfair and inequitable treatment, the lack of access to social institutions, the resulting failure on the part of the state to perform its obligations to its citizens, e.g., from the foot dragging of officials, the inaccessibility of welfare, inadequate health care, violations of civic rights, etc.

Third, we should consider the scale of the phenomenon. Common violations of and disregard for particular rules are likely to qualify as malfeasance. Minor isolated incidents of fraud, abuse, embezzlement, petty bribes, concealment of essential information, etc., do not have a significant impact on the life of society at large. On the other hand, one could metaphorically compare the problem to an infectious disease, which, if contracted by a large proportion of the population, even if the virus is not particularly vicious, creates a problem whose extent qualifies it as malfeasance.

In conclusion, in view of the above observations, we may define malfeasance as actions taken by participants in social life that undermine important, socially sanctioned and recognised behavioural standards and principles; the commonness of the malfeasance and the extent of the resulting social harm may qualify such actions as particularly detrimental. It is worth noting that this definition needs to be set in a specific cultural context, as local and historical differences result in different views on the significance of a specific state of affairs. These views do not refer to official statements confirming the need to uphold certain values but rather to actual attitudes. A good example illustrating this issue is views on the equality of the genders. Despite the constitutionally imposed equality in the rights of men and women (e.g. in the labour market), until recently such equality was only theoretical in many democracies

(and is to this day in candidates for accession to the European Union). The principle of equal pay for equal work, as expressed in the European Social Charter, Convention No. 100 of the International Labour Organisation, and art. 119 of the Maastricht Treaty of 1991, is not respected. Only recently has popular opinion conceded that sex discrimination constitutes malfeasance. It is therefore through social discourse that the line between what does and does not constitute malfeasance is defined.

Despite a certain confusion over the definition of malfeasance, it is possible to point to phenomena that definitely qualify as malfeasance. These include corruption, favouritism (and its special-case variety: nepotism), white-collar crime, the so-called “grey zone”, organised crime, and various forms of discrimination, especially on the grounds of sex, age, ethnic origin, sexual orientation, and religious and other beliefs.

3. Corruption

It is commonly believed that corruption (from Lat. *corruptio*, depravity, bribery) is one of the most dangerous social diseases. Corruption is difficult to detect and eliminate, as both parties have a vital interest in concealing the matter. All participants give a high priority to maintaining confidentiality and taking any precautions necessary. The fundamental difficulty with exposing an instance of corruption lies in the fact that its victims: individuals, institutions, competing companies, or the public at large, are usually unaware that such an abuse has taken place. The victim, therefore, makes no attempts to prosecute a claim, the incident is undetected, and any countermeasures are greatly obstructed.

The most common definition of corruption as the taking advantage of public office for personal, partisan or other political interests, does not include some important aspects. The definition is too broad as it applies to situations in which specific persons use their posts to achieve personal benefits (use the company car for personal matters, have employees of a construction company in which they are directors refurbish their apartments free of charge, etc.). Although harmful to the company, actions of this type do not meet the description of corruption.

In defining corruption, several issues should be taken into account. The central attribute of corruption is a secretive understanding between two participating parties wherein one (the corruptee) agrees to commit an act of abuse for a specified compensation, whereas the other (the corruptor) stands to gain benefits at the expense of other individuals and entities. The corrupted party commits acts of abuse by using its post in a state agency, a political party, association, foundation, financial institution (e.g. a bank, insurance company), competing company, etc. Most frequently, such abuse involves a violation of legal, moral or customary standards, company regulations or the non-performance of a contract or obligations.

An important element of corruption is its ability to spread fast and unchecked. Corruption is often likened to a cancer that systematically destroys healthy tissues, symbolising a specified aspect of social life. In a “disease-ridden” social organism, nothing works the way it should.

Corruption may assume various forms. We commonly speak of bribery, i.e. a situation in which payment for a favour takes the form of a material benefit (money, gifts, services). In European law, both those giving and accepting bribes are deemed to constitute an offence. Corruption seen as an understanding assumes two aspects, active and passive, which correspond to the roles assumed by the parties to such an understanding. Passive corruption is the acceptance of a bribe, whereas active corruption is perpetrated by persons who sidestep

legal (moral, regulatory, customary) procedures in pursuit of specific benefits (such as scarce resources or a position) at the expense of others.

Can corruption be classified as malfeasance? As mentioned earlier, malfeasance encompasses actions contributing to the abrogation of certain social standards and principles. Hence, malfeasance takes place whenever participants in social life pursue certain (desired) results in a manner that constitutes a gross violation of socially recognised principles. Any escalation of corruption impairs the effectiveness of actions in adherence to such principles. In other words, each successive infringement upon the legal, moral and customary standards of honest conduct undermines (i.e. results in breaking or avoiding) such standards. Corruption, therefore, may justifiably be described as malfeasance, as it is based on negating the socially significant values of equality, freedom, and fair competition, and, by spreading fast, may cause fears of having safety and law and order compromised in a given state.

“Corruption takes many forms and is a universal cancer”, said Peter Eigen, Chairman of Transparency International (TI), the world’s leading anti-corruption organisation. The disease spreads both in politics and in the economy. Economic corruption violates the principles of equal opportunity and fair competition. If, for example, contracts in tenders are awarded to a company that had curried favour with the decision-maker, the quality of the offers and guarantees of performance are no longer a consideration. The resulting decision may compromise the company’s interests or, in the case of governmental procurement, the public good. While insistence on increasing competition among other market players leads to higher profits, a corruptive environment effectively frustrates this purpose of competition, as the principles of competition are replaced with the rule of connections.

High corruption rates are commonly noted at the point of contact between the world of politics and business. This is where lobbying takes place. Lobbying can be defined as the formal use of people or groups to represent the interests of companies, capital groups and professional associations to political, governmental, judicial and local authorities so that influence is exerted to obtain favourable legislative solutions and specific decisions. The extent of such influence and the methods of exerting it follow clearly defined rules. Lobbying has become a means for increasing the participation of broader social groups in the governing of a state. Lobbying provides organised groups of citizens with a voice in the political discourse. Seen in this light, lobbying may be viewed as an instrument for strengthening democracy.

The countries of Central and Eastern Europe have only recently set off on their way to creating the legal foundations for lobbying. In the absence of experience, traditions and most importantly, legal frameworks to support and accommodate lobbying, such actions are often corrupt. Most attempts at influencing decision-makers are made by handing over cash, sponsoring foreign travel, exchanging favours, offering posts on boards of directors, and giving valuable gifts. Interest groups finance individuals or political parties in exchange for promises to pass favourable legislation or to have certain regulations adopted by state administration agencies.

Corruption in political circles is believed to pose a particular threat to democracy. Representatives of the legislative and executive branches of government should remain independent, because only then will they be capable of reaching autonomous and sovereign decisions in the best interest of society at large. In reality, however, especially in Poland, political elites are increasingly distrusted. Such a lack of public trust is due not only to the popular perception of politicians as highly corrupt. It has been justified by high-profile cases of ties discovered between politicians and the criminal underworld. Poland is a particularly disgraceful example of this, as within a period of just a few weeks in late April and early May of 2001, two government officials were found to have maintained relations with

organised crime. One of them was a member of the legislature (a former senator), the other, a member of the executive branch and, until recently, the Minister.

Corruption is continuously monitored by the international organisation Transparency International, established in 1993 as a global coalition for combating corruption. TI maintains National Offices in 77 countries of the world. Its International Secretariat is located in Berlin. In 1995, TI presented its first Corruption Perception Index (CPI), which constitutes a ranking of countries in terms of the perception of corruption therein by public sector officials and politicians. Recently published ranking for 2000 was prepared on the basis of 16 surveys conducted by 8 independent institutions. The surveys provide insights into the degree of corruption as perceived by business people, the general public and corruption specialists. TI is well aware that the CPI is limited to describing passive corruption. In 2001, TI has launched a comprehensive study of forms of bribery (active corruption). As a result, the Bribe Payers Index (BPI) was established to supplement the CPI. In addition, TI has begun preparing a Global Corruption Report.

Table 10. The Corruption Perception Index for the Baltic States as of 2000. The ranking shows countries in the order from least to most affected by the corruption problem (1 indicates a low level of corruption and 87 a high one).

Country	Corruption Perception Index
Finland	1
Denmark	2
Sweden	4
Norway	6
Germany	1
Estonia	27
Czech Republic	42
Belarus	43
Lithuania	43
Poland	43
Latvia	57
Russia	82
Ukraine	87

4. Counteracting corruption

Counteracting corruption requires action in at least three areas: prevention, education, and disclosure and elimination of corruptive practices. Prevention involves the removal of sources of corruption, especially by passing good laws and promoting effective initiatives by state governments, central and local administration and non-governmental organisations. The goal is to clean up laws, regulations and procedures that encourage corruptive dealings. It is essential to eliminate legal loopholes, ambiguous regulations and situations in which officials are given complete discretion in their decisions. The public sector formula needs to be scrutinised by introducing a uniform system for public procurement and by restoring controls over the work of state officials. Anti-corruption legislation needs to be supported with unambiguous executive regulations. New regulations are needed to govern conflicts of interest involving state officials and their families. The criminal code needs to provide for the option of procurement and other operational methods in all cases of suspected corruption. A transparent act on partisan finance is required to ensure tighter controls over the sources of financing for political activities. Streamlining is needed in state agencies

and offices to eliminate cases where feet dragging and poor work organisation keeps clerks from handling their responsibilities in a timely fashion, causing many customers to resort to bribery to expedite their cases.

Another way of combating corruption, namely through public education, is a form of prevention. The idea behind educational efforts is to influence citizens' behaviour by building citizen responsibility, spreading moral standards, promoting respect for the law and fostering the principles of harmonious social co-existence. Deeply-rooted moral convictions, high standards of

political ethics, an awareness of threats related to corruption, respect for democratic principles, and a sense of solidarity and shared responsibility are all fundamental values whose popularisation in a given society is likely to lead to success in eliminating corruption.

A key element of such public education is a discipline that is relatively new, namely business ethics. Business ethicists reflect economic environments in terms of moral beliefs. By demonstrating that economies are arenas of interplay of values that are not only economic but also ethical, business ethicists demonstrate that the accountability of participants in economic practices is broader than previously believed. In addition to economic accountability, which extends mainly to the financial standings of companies, such participants have a social responsibility for all stakeholders, i.e. all persons affected in any way by the business activities of their companies. Such stakeholders include employees, shareholders, managers, customers, competitors, suppliers, local communities, local authorities, financial institutions, social organisations, and the natural environment. Companies are responsible to all such groups for acting fairly and in accordance with binding legal and ethical principles. Further, business ethicists reveal flaws in the business environment, highlighting the harmful social effects of abuse, embezzlement, tax fraud, white collar crime, especially in the insurance and banking sectors, and raising issues related to the "grey zone" in the market. Inclusion of business ethics in school and college curricula may greatly help raise public awareness in terms of such issues.

A third area for combating corruption is the disclosure and elimination of corruptive practices. The key to the success of such efforts is ineffective justice system, strong tax and customs police, and efficient supervisory bodies. It should be noted, however, that institutions established to curb crime often fall victim to the very problem they were intended to remedy. A case in point is the Russian or Polish police, whose susceptibility to corruption and various forms of abuse and ties with organised crime are a well-known fact.

5. Favouritism and protection

Another form of corruption is patronage and protection extended in exchange for money (Lat. *protection* cover, defence, aid, support extended by influential individuals). One form of corruption involves attempts to cajole an influential person to extend preferential care to a protégé in return for financial benefits and the consent to such practices. The subject matter



Figure 99. The Nordic countries are least affected by corruption. A central street in the city of Stockholm. Photo: Katarzyna Skalska

of a transaction is care (e.g. the furthering of a political or professional career) provided to a person regardless of his/her qualifications, potentials, abilities, etc. The notion of corruption does not apply to favouritism and patronage provided free of charge. In such a case, the reason for extending care to a given individual is not financial gain but rather appreciation of such an individual's qualifications, personality and other strengths. A belief that a person has earned recognition and should be placed in a position suited to his/her qualifications may, of course, result from an uncritical view of a protégé's personal qualities. Such actions involve improper and groundless favouring of a protégé at the expense of others, e.g. other candidates for a given position. Whereas protection may take the form of a small favour, it is always a way of treating selected persons in a preferential manner.

Favouritism that does not involve a monetary payment sometimes takes the form of an exchange of favours (where the persons involved exchange benefits accessible to them by virtue of their respective posts, social positions, capacities, etc.). Such exchanges often take the form of what is commonly known as "connections". The term accurately describes situations where a person receives preferential treatment merely due to having his case processed by a friend or a relative who is "in the right place". Such protection may involve a long chain of connections between friends and relatives who pass on requests for patronage. In such a case, the person choosing to favour a requesting party does it because of his or her ties with the protégé.

At times, influential people take to promoting their own family members. This type of patronage is referred to as *nepotism* (Lat. *nepos*, nephew, grandchild). Such practices are particularly common in small family operations. Family relations within a company may be resented both by employees, who often come to believe that relatives of an executive or an owner go unsupervised and violate rules with impunity while other personnel are discriminated against (e.g. by being barred from promotions to positions set aside for relatives). Nepotism within a company is likely to affect it in a negative way.

Favouritism (in the context of the society at large) is malfeasance in the case of appointments to public office. Two types of charges may be brought here: first, the charge of extending preferential treatment to certain individuals; and, second, the charge of creating a so-called "protective umbrella", which impedes control over the performance of responsibilities entrusted by the public to an official. In such a case, the social effects of appointing unqualified individuals to public offices of high responsibility, e.g. in state administration, may be especially harmful. Such situations take place every time a state government is replaced. The political group that wins an election replaces the ruling elite based primarily on partisan affiliations rather than competence. Frequently, then, excellent officials with an impeccable record of success in management end up removed from office for purely political reasons. Moreover, if power is assumed not by the winning party but rather a coalition, the factions involved engage in struggle over the distribution of posts in the government. They negotiate and often fight fiercely over access to power and influence over various aspects of social life, especially the economy. Any disclosures of such behind-the-scenes dealings result in a negative perception of political elites. The fact that the principle of favouritism is commonly practised by political groups justifies, to a certain extent, public distrust toward the ruling circles.

6. Discrimination

The equality of all citizens under the law is a fundamental principle of democracy. Thus, a democracy will not be complete as long as one social group or another is denied access to its

basic rights. Modern-day democracies formally guarantee equality for all citizens within the provisions of a primary legal instrument: the constitution. As mentioned earlier, when discussing negative elements in modern-day democracies, we need to focus primarily on the actual level of lawfulness. Consequently, we should take a particular interest in democracies' ability to sanction and enforce a constitutional right to equality. Why do such great differences exist between legislative provisions and the actual state of affairs in some countries?

One should take note here of two crucial questions. One regards, in particular, countries undergoing systemic transitions in which one of the aspects of democratising social life is the elimination of differences in the treatment extended to their citizens. In many cases, such a process applies not only to legislative reforms but also to financing efforts aimed at removing actual barriers to equal access to social institutions.

A dramatic example here is the situation of disabled people. The legacy of communism includes architectural barriers to individuals with disabilities, denying them access to participation in social life: moving along streets, using public transport and entering cultural institutions, offices, clinics, schools, universities, etc. A separate and very important issue is the inability of disabled people to perform work due to an insufficient number of workplaces suited to accommodate them. In view of the commonly accepted belief in the value of work, we should realise that people with disabilities are kept from achieving the satisfaction of pursuing their professions or vocations, participating in the collective effort of contributing to the common good and enjoying personal independence.

The key obstacle in the above case is undoubtedly the financing of projects designed to remove the above-mentioned barriers. As few repair programs are being launched and the amount of funds in the budget allocated to social projects is being increasingly curtailed, such inequalities are becoming even more pronounced and entrenched.

The state's financial inability to counteract social inequality can also be seen in such other areas as social care extended to the families of persons employed at restructured state enterprises and counteracting the impoverishment of populations in areas of high unemployment. The central responsibility here is to recognise the extent of a state's responsibility toward citizens and formulate an adequate social policy.

In addition to problems with financing programs aimed at limiting inequalities, there is another important reason for which some citizens are treated differently than others. This applies especially to discrimination on the grounds of sex, opinions, ethnic origin, sexual orientation and age. Differences in the treatment received by representatives of such groups stem from such attitudes such as sexism, xenophobia and intolerance. Improvements in the actual situation of the affected groups depend primarily on successfully changing opinions, which usually occurs very slowly (the issue of public education!). Additionally, proper regulations are needed to ensure that frequently violated laws are properly enforced. Constitutional guarantees of equality should be translated into executive orders. The case of Sweden whose laws protect sign language is worth noting here.

A number of other detailed laws protecting equality have also been passed in member countries of the European Union. Once candidate countries ratify such laws as required, inequalities will certainly be reduced. They will not, however, be fully removed, as can be seen in the case of women in the European Union labour market. EU women are commonly employers' second choice; they receive less pay, are promoted slower and dismissed more often, and are more likely to work part time. This also refers to countries where much of the female population is well educated.

7. Economic malfeasance – corporate crime

Corporate crime is against the law. The European Union has created a whole catalogue of corporate crime. These include cartel crime, fraudulent practices, illegal profiting by multinational companies from differences between rules in specific countries, abuses in the supply of goods and in connection with domestic and international subsidies, computer crime, formation of fictitious companies, falsifying balance sheets and other accounting records and reports, financial market fraud, violations of safety regulations and jeopardising employee health by companies, crimes against consumers, unfair competition and advertising, tax crime, counterfeiting of money and securities, banking and stock exchange crime, and crime against the natural environment.

Business crime can be found in all countries and is unlikely ever to be fully eradicated. Prevention of business crime involves the use of methods similar to those used in counteracting corruption. Well prepared laws that are free of loopholes, clear and precise executive regulations, and effective justice systems are the principal weapons in the fight against crime. An important role is also played by business ethics, which supports legal regulations. It should be noted that business ethics is becoming increasingly important. More and more companies, especially reputable ones, are committing themselves to adhere to the principles of honesty and fair competition. Ethical programs and vocational codes are being developed, and international projects aimed at regulating business conduct are being drawn up. The global trend towards scrutinising business operations in terms of ethics is symptomatic of certain changes in the views of politicians and business people.

Firstly, there is an increasing recognition of the threats posed by corporate crime. As the world's economies become more globalised and domestic economies become more integrated, rising business crime rates in a particular region are no longer a local problem. Thus, crime needs to be combated simultaneously at the national and international level.

Secondly, economies have become the most important area of social life. Since the bulk of civilisational changes take place in the economy, the economic sphere is more responsible for the future shape of the world. Today's economies shape cultures, as the value systems, attitudes, rules of conduct and principles of operation applied in the corporate world trickle into other areas of social life. In effect, the weaknesses and malfeasance of the corporate world become the weaknesses and malfeasance of modern-day societies.

Thirdly, it has become more and more obvious that economic and legal regulations applied in the economy are an inadequate tool for counteracting unethical and illegal practices.

Organised crime. In discussing threats posed by business crimes, particular attention should be given to organised crime. Crime organisations are commonly involved in smuggling, drug trafficking, prostitution and extortion. They use the latest electronic equipment, transportation and highly qualified experts (specialising in a range of "useful" fields from chemistry to banking and law). One of their common practices is to establish relations with the highest-ranking officials in ministries, the police, customs offices and municipal authorities. Such contacts are an insurance policy for the members of crime organisations, especially the ringleaders. Corrupt state officials not only help commit crimes by pointing out criminal opportunities, concealing evidence, and establishing contacts, but also by warning criminals of planned police operations or inspections. Organisations that have expanded widely and built up extensive networks of connections with the world of business and politics are referred to as states within a state. As to the extent of financial losses that states incur as a result of such illegal operations, only ballpark estimates can be provided.

The grey zone. Another form of malfeasance takes place in the so-called “grey zone”, i.e. the area of economic practice where companies operate on the peripheries of lawfulness, posing as legal organisations but using (illegally and unethically) opportunities not to perform their financial obligations to the state. The most common examples of grey zone crime are tax fraud, customs duty evasion, operating on the black market for labour, and abuse (extortions) targeted at insurance companies (with reference to mandatory employee insurance). The common feature of all such acts is perpetrators’ maintenance of appearances of legality. Companies, for instance, pay their federal taxes but use all available loopholes to reduce their tax liability. In the case of evading import duties, the value of goods is commonly underestimated by declaring lower-than-actual quantities or untrue types of goods (in the latter case, also by taking advantage of differences in tariffs on particular goods). Employment crimes include fictitious contracts with employees showing lower-than-actual amounts of compensation and stating working time as part-time in the case of full-time workers. Such falsifications allow employers to save on mandatory social insurance premiums, which are reduced if lower pay is reported. Abuse aimed at insurance companies includes cases of false worker’s compensation claims for employees falsely reported as incapable of working. The larger the grey zone, the larger a state’s financial losses in connection with such forms of abuse. Yet, both the extent of the problem and the size of such losses are difficult to estimate.

What is the European Union?

Sverker Gustavsson, updated by Li Bennich-Björkman

The European Union, consisting of fifteen member countries in Western and Southern Europe, is an interesting example of a constitutional construct that does not fit into any of the three categories of con-federal, federal or unitary-state systems. It is far more effective regarding direct effect than most con-federative structures. But it is not at all as strongly organised in terms of representational compromise as a federation that would allow for revenue raising and revenue-redistribution on a European scale. And it is extremely far from the characteristics of a unitary-state. The following is an outline of the constitutional construct of the European Union:

Member countries: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Great Britain, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Finland and Austria.

Summit meetings. The European Council, consisting of the Prime Ministers, meets twice a year on an inter-governmental basis. Decisions in that context require unanimity.

The major legislator, **the European Council of Ministers**, consists of one minister from each member country. Decisions are taken sector by sector according to a supra-national principle, i.e., a mix of unanimity and qualified majority according to a modified one-state-one-vote scale ranging from 10 votes for the largest countries to 2 votes for the smallest countries. The meetings are headed by a minister from the chair country.

Independent Source of Initiatives: 20 commissioners with their staffs are at the administrative heart of the Union. The five larger countries have two commissioners each, and the ten smaller countries have one each.

General Assembly: the 626 members of the European Parliament are directly elected. The legislative powers of the Parliament have grown considerably during the 1990s and the Parliament functions today as a co-legislator with the Council of Ministers in at least 25% of the decisions. The changing role of the Parliament is the single most important transformation of the EU institutional infrastructure that has taken place over the last decade.

Rule-adjudicator. The European Court of Justice in Luxemburg consists of 15 judges each of whom is appointed for a six-year term of office.

Budget about 1.2 % of the total GNP of the member countries. The revenue is primarily used for agricultural and regional policies. The percentage should be compared with the 40 to 60 % tax level in each of the member states. For the time being it is an open question, whether the European Union will develop in the direction of a federation marked by majority rule and a truly representational compromise as its solid political foundation and thus able to redistribute with direct effect. It may also develop, although it is probably less likely, in the direction of a more loosely organised confederative structure with a corresponding weakening of the principle of direct effect. Obviously, that has to do with the number of member-states. At present, an enlargement of the Union involving the Baltic States, Poland and other Eastern European countries appears to be truly underway. The summit meeting in Gothenburg in June 2001 gave some hope for those awaiting the first wave of admittance in 2004. Not only will a future EU membership impact the candidate countries. The consequences of the enlargement on the decision-making procedures within the Union is a hot topic and generates suggestions for major reforms, including flexible integration, and "a Europe á la carte", the aim of which is to enlarge the variation in the speed by which member countries integrate politically and economically. Meanwhile, the Union is slowly moving in a direction that strengthens federalism. The growing importance of the Parliament and the expansion of the realm for majority decisions in the Council of Ministers are among such steps.

26 State capture in the Baltics: Identity, International Role Models and Network Formation

Li Bennich-Björkman

1. Estonia and Latvia take different paths


In recent years, the two Baltic countries Estonia and Latvia have developed in diverging directions, while initially moving together for great part of the 1990s. Estonia has taken a lead among the former Communist countries, both economically and politically, while Latvia lags behind, although still performing better than most other former Soviet republics. Latvia performs worse economically but in particular struggles with great political problems of corruption and malpractice (Hall & Wijkman, 2001, Bennich-Björkman, 2001).

In its analysis of the European ‘transition economies’, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) points out that Estonia has a clear lead over Latvia and the third Baltic country Lithuania in several economic areas, among which structural market economic reforms to facilitate large scale privatisation and reforms of the banking sector are among the most important. Milken Institute, an American think-tank, reaches the same conclusion in its index measuring the availability of risk-willing capital for new entrepreneurs. Of the ninety-one countries in the world analysed, the institute shows Estonia ranking number eight – in fact ahead of the European average – while Latvia ranks number thirty-nine (Hall & Wijkman, 2001).

2. State capture vs. administrative corruption

In recent reports on the level of corruption in the 22 transition economies of the former Communist world, the World Bank confirms furthermore that the two countries deviate. Measuring development in the countries after democracy and market economy were introduced a mere ten years ago, the World Bank concludes that while Latvia along with countries like Russia and some other former Soviet republics is highly plagued by political corruption, Estonia has practically escaped such distortions of the new democratic institutions (World Bank, 2000).

Launching the term “state capture”, defined as the predominantly illegal impact of powerful economic interests on the formation of laws, regulations and decrees, as distinct from the presumably less devastating “administrative corruption”, where bending the implementation of




The thin line at the top of each bar represents the statistical margin of error (based on a single standard deviation) calculated for each country within the sample. Source: Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann (2000a).

Figure 100. State capture index. Ill.: Li Bennich-Björkman

laws and regulations are in focus, the World Bank contributes to refining the vocabulary of corrupt practices. While the term “state capture” identifies a situation of more outright political corruption “through distorting the basic legal and regulatory framework with potentially enormous losses for the society at large” (Anticorruption in transition, 2000, xvi), administrative corruption, although detrimental, could have less sweeping consequences politically and economically. Among the 22 “Eastern” transition economies investigated in the report, approximately half have managed to stay pretty clean politically, i.e. are “low capture” countries, while the other half expose patterns which place them in the category of “high capture” countries. Among the states in the broadly defined Baltic region, Latvia and Russia belong to the latter group, while Estonia, Lithuania, and Poland are among the countries in the first, low capture, group.

How should the concept of “state capture” be understood? State capture includes, for example, the sale of votes in the parliament and presidential decrees to private interests, illegal contributions by private actors to political parties and the sale of civil and criminal court decisions to private interests as well as corrupt mishandling of central bank funds. In some of the transition economies, every one of the political institutions suffer from the disease of being “captured” from outside while in others certain institutions have escaped that fate as for example the Central Bank in Latvia. In every political system, it is of course true that private interests try to influence politics through various channels, including highly crucial methods such as private contacts and personal networks. The difference between state capture and other forms of formal and informal interaction between the state and powerful but non-governmental interest groups, like lobbying or corporatist arrangements, lies in that state capture “occurs through the illicit provision of private gains to public officials via informal, non-transparent, and highly preferential channels of access” (Anticorruption in transition, 2000, 3). However, it is evident that the line between what should be regarded as acceptable, necessary and even beneficial relations between state institutions and economic interests – like the strongly formalised corporatist arrangements that for decades were considered as an attri-



The thin line at the top of each bar represents the statistical margin of error (based on a single standard deviation) calculated for each country within the sample. Source: BEEPS.

Figure 101. Administrative corruption. Ill.: Li Bennich-Björkman

bute of the Scandinavian democracies – and those relations that fall within the category of ‘state capture’ is not always crystal clear. It basically boils down to identifying situations where the autonomy of state institutions radically decreases below the point where it is meaningful to speak about an independent political system. Hence the term ‘capture’. The lesson learned from Eastern Europe is that one of the most crucial priorities for new democratic states is to deliberately plan how to organise its relations to the always existing powerful interests outside government, be they as in the Baltic and Eastern European economies or as in the African and Latin American military.

The World Bank concludes that around half of the transition economies fall within the category of “high capture states” while the other half is what the Bank calls “low capture states” (World Bank report, 2001). Figure 100 shows that among the low capture states highly underdeveloped economies which have hardly began moving in the direction of market economy can be found, like Armenia or Kazakhstan, together with some of the best performing economies in the group, Slovenia, Hungary – and Estonia. In the high capture group, countries like Russia and Azerbaijan are found but also, which makes the comparison even more interesting, Latvia. Regarding the other form of malpractice, administrative corruption, figure 101 shows that Estonia and Latvia perform fairly well in this respect, which further strengthens the impression that the difference between the two lies in more outright political performance, and not for example in deviating cultural traditions regarding rule of law. While the World Bank’s state capture index presented below in Table 11 shows that the Estonian legislative process, including the parliament, the president’s office and the political parties, is fairly uninfluenced by payments from corporations and enterprises, the opposite is true of Latvia. Only one of the six institutions investigated, the Central Bank, is believed to be unaffected by state capture. But it is consistent with the tradition of legal respect in Latvia that it is the pure political institutions like the parliament, the presidential office and the political parties that fare the worst, while both criminal and commercial courts are less strongly affected by capture.

The state capture index

consists of six dimensions, including the legislature, the executive, the judiciary and regulatory agencies like privatisation agencies. The Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) is a firm-level survey of more than 3,000 enterprise owners and senior managers, and provide information of corruption from the point of view of the firms.

In focus here is the large difference between Estonia and Latvia in state capture, i.e. the comparatively large incapacity of the Latvian public institutions to avoid being invaded by private interests, which is presented in greater detail in Table 11. Informants in Latvia, regardless of political belonging, unanimously describe the situation in the country using the term “oligarchic” (cf. Nissinen, 1999), leaving a few powerful economic groupings in control of the political and legislative process by heavy financial support to political parties as well as payments to individual parliamentarians and officials in central positions. For example, the powerful oil transit group Ventspils, generally considered as one of the main economic players, allegedly finances political parties from right to left, which means that they have full control.

Table 11. Share of firms affected by different forms of state capture

Country	Parliamentary Legislation	Presidential Decrees	Central Bank	Criminal Courts	Commercial Courts	Political Party Finance	State Capture Index
Albania	12	7	8	22	20	25	16
Armenia	10	7	14	5	6	1	7
Azerbaijan	41	48	39	44	40	35	41
Bulgaria	28	26	28	28	19	42	28
Croatia	18	24	30	29	29	30	27
Czech Rep.	18	11	12	9	9	6	11
Estonia	14	7	8	8	8	17	10
Georgia	29	24	32	18	20	21	24
Hungary	12	7	8	5	5	4	7
Kazakhstan	13	10	19	14	14	6	12
Kyrgyz Rep.	18	16	59	26	30	27	29
Latvia	40	49	8	21	26	35	30
Lithuania	15	7	9	11	14	13	11
Moldova	43	30	40	33	34	42	37
Poland	13	10	6	12	18	10	12
Romania	22	20	26	14	17	27	21
Russia	35	32	47	24	27	24	32
Slovak Rep.	20	12	37	29	25	20	24
Slovenia	8	5	4	6	6	11	7
Ukraine	44	37	37	21	26	29	32
Overall	24	21	25	18	20	20	21

Source: Hellman, Jones and Kaufmann (2000a)

Ten years of democracy and market economy have obviously pushed the two Baltic countries in opposing directions when state autonomy is concerned. This is all the more surprising, since Estonia and Latvia politically, historically, culturally and demographically show strong resemblance. How can the difference in state-building and political autonomy be explained? Even though Latvia's high concentration of economic power and the geographical location on the east-west trade and energy transit routes is pointed out by the World Bank as strongly contributing factors to the country's current state of capture, this process is not predetermined. We must assume that history could have taken an alternative route, especially since it is simultaneously stated that the country "benefits from a historical legacy of the rule of law and well-developed public administrations associated with previous, pre-communist regimes" (*Anticorruption in transition*, 2000, xxvii). By interviews with Latvian top politicians like Guntars Krasts, Andris Skele, former politicians like Mialis Gailis, Jannis Kinna and the president Ulmanis, the picture of a political system plagued by strong economic dictates is supported. Why did the Latvian institutions, built as they are on a beneficial historical legacy similar to the Estonian one, not manage in the years of independence in the 1990s to develop into a genuinely autonomous structure?

The aim of the essay is to discuss three alternative hypotheses providing explanations to this puzzle. The first one focuses on differences between the two countries in the sense of national identity, the second on the importance for Estonia of the close international role model of the Nordic countries, primarily Finland. The third hypothesis differs from the other two in that it adopts a truly political perspective, based on differences in the formation of political networks at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, which strengthened political autonomy in Estonia.

3. Estonia and Latvia share a common history

While differences today are plentiful, as discussed above, the comparison from a theoretical perspective becomes more illuminating by pointing out the many similarities uniting these two countries, similarities which otherwise could have been possible explanatory factors to the difference in political development after independence. Historically and culturally, Estonia and Latvia bear strong resemblance to each other.

Estonia and Latvia share the common fate of Soviet occupation. While under Soviet control, the Baltic countries all ranked among the top states in the union, as the most modernised, industrialised, urbanised and westernised (Misiunas & Taagepera, 1996). In particular Estonia moreover enjoyed a growing amount of western contacts during the 1970s and 80s, as a result of its geographical proximity to Finland and the large body of exile Estonians living in close-by Sweden. Since independence in 1991, both states have furthermore "made it" through the democratic transition phase: three national elections have been held and an alternation in power has been achieved, more clearly so in Estonia than in Latvia. No organised political actors openly defy the democratic procedures (cf. Linz & Stepan, 1996, Diamond, 1999, 67). Estonia and Latvia, like the Nordic states, have chosen election systems based on proportional representation, resulting in a fragmented multiparty system. Interestingly, the choice of election system has been shown to have a direct causal relation with levels of corruption (Persson et al 2000). Countries with majoritarian systems in one-member constituencies generally display less corruption than do countries with proportional systems with multi-member constituencies. The mechanism linking election system to corruption may be individual visibility

of the elected politician. This finding is fairly interesting, but does not shed any further light over the inquiry, since both Estonia and Latvia adopted proportional systems.

When Estonia and Latvia regained independence and installed democratic governments in the beginning of the 1990s the countries had undergone radical demographic transformations. Both countries had been subjected to a forceful process – perhaps both deliberate and spontaneous – of Russification, leaving them with a large minority of primarily Russian origin. Before World War II, ethnic Estonians constituted 89% of the population and Russians 8%, while at independence the balance had shifted to 61.5% Estonians and 30% Russians. For Latvia, the respective pre-war figures are 75.5% ethnic Latvians and 10.5% Russians, while in 1989 the number of ethnic Latvians had been reduced to a mere 52%, while inhabitants of Russian origin amount to 34% (Linz & Stepan, 1996, 403). The Russian and Russian-speaking population has a pattern of settlement in Estonia, where they are mainly concentrated to the capital Tallinn (50%) and the north-eastern border region of Ida-Virumaa where an overwhelming majority has Russian roots. In Latvia the Russian-speakers are spread more evenly, constituting the majority in all the major cities. The Russian impact may therefore be stronger and more visible in Latvia, except in the countryside where ethnic Latvians reside.

However, it should be pointed out that Estonia and Latvia never have been totally homogenous areas. During the tsarist reign and the first independence period in 1920-1940, the countries demonstrated an ethnic mix, Latvia more prominently so than Estonia (Norgaard 1994, 49pp, von Rauch 1970). Adopting what was considered as interwar Europe's perhaps most liberal and tolerant constitutional guarantees for cultural autonomy, the two states managed to implement a decent minority policy. The proportional imbalance which has arisen in the post-war decades between the ethnic groups as a consequence of intra-Soviet migration – reducing the Estonians and particularly the Latvians to what is sometimes described as minorities in their own countries – has probably created the present tension between a nation-building logic and a democratic one (Linz & Stepan, 1996) rather than any primordial ethnic differences.

By a quick glance, problems of political turbulence appear most accentuated in Latvia, which in May 2000 got its eighth cabinet in seven years time. But the Latvian instability is not as great as it seems; it is also true that the party Latvia's Way has been in government in various constellations since 1993. In Estonia, the government parties have changed more genuinely. The political systems in Estonia and Latvia, again more markedly so in Latvia, are resurrections of the pre-war constitutions but avoiding the built-in democratic traps of those days by introducing voting thresholds to avoid the proportional system leading to weak executives lacking decision-making abilities. The inter-war constitutions were much more modelled on the German Weimar constitution than on the Nordic ones at the time, with the strive for pure proportional representation and quite dominant powers for the legislative body in relation to the executive, the government. The lack of political capacity also contributed to decrease public confidence in political institutions, both in the Weimar republic and in Estonia and Latvia, paving way for anti-democratic alternatives.

In conclusion, both countries are characterised by religious Protestantism, are influenced by individualism and share a Weberian legal-rational socio-political ideal. It is thus not the case that Latvia, because of profound differences in perceptions of legitimate power, has other norms for setting the boundaries between private and public domains, a situation that often explains political corruption in Africa (cf. Chabal & Daloz 1999).

4. A difference in national identity?

Let us start by investigating some of the potentials of the claim that the more robust state-autonomy in Estonia is a question of “culture” and cultural traditions. Scholars such as Norgaard (1994) and Lieven (1993) both return to the presumption that in particular Latvia among the three Baltic countries has a less developed national identity, despite the fact that the policies regarding citizenship and language laws have been considered harsh internationally. Lieven suggests that Estonia should be singled out as marked by a more puritanical tradition than Latvia (and Lithuania) and that “the connection between nationalism and honest effort is not as apparent in the other two republics” (Lieven, 1993, 318). Norgaard instead chooses to highlight the strength of the North-European cultural legacy in Estonia, as compared to Latvia (Norgaard, 1994, 47-50). But still, they both agree that the sense of national identity is more poorly developed in Latvia than in Estonia.

Trying to pin down the admittedly rather non-precise arguments regarding culture, the claim is that Latvian institutions as a result of weaker national identity more easily would succumb to rule-bending and difficulties upholding ethics among politicians and officials not held together by the common “mission” that a strong sense of nationalism provides. The difference between the way Estonian and Latvian political and elite level actors define community and the way they identify themselves (cf. Monroe, 1996, 1995), hence should account for at least some of the variation which we found in state autonomy. Is there any evidence to support such an interpretation? Anton Steen shows that the Estonian power elite after independence has been more homogenous, both ethnically and ideologically. There were more ethnic Russians among the Latvian elite, both in the parliament and in the bureaucracy, and there were, in parliament, more former Communists (Steen, 1997). The homogeneity of the Estonian elite is one factor which could have contributed to stronger feelings of loyalty to “Estonia” as a nation.

At least the existing differences in ethnicity among the power elite between the two could be traced back to the predominant situation in Estonia and Latvia during Soviet rule. It has been claimed (Misiunas & Taagepera, 1996), that among the three Baltic states, Latvia was the one to suffer most, in the meaning of repression, purges and oppression of national identity (Misiunas & Taagepera, 1996, 245). Considering the governing bodies of the state, the Communist party and the state bureaucracy, that tendency is most clearly shown by the low degree of “nativisation”, i.e. of allowing home-grown Latvians into powerful positions. While Estonia was also subjected to an administration and party bureaucracy to a considerable degree dominated by non-natives, Latvia was still the country mostly affected. “Estonia continued to have fewer native top administrators than Lithuania, but many more than Latvia” (Misiunas & Taagepera, 1996, 207).

Following the great purge in 1959-60, when most native Latvian party officials and top administrators were evacuated from their positions (Misiunas & Taagepera, 1996, 140 pp), the Latvian party and the state apparatus were densely populated by Russians and Russian-born Latvians, and continued to be so for the decades to come. Latvia constituted something of an exception in the Soviet Union in this respect, and definitely in relation to Estonia suffered a harder fate nationally. The variance in native dominance between the two states suggests that Estonia at the time of transition entered independence with a stronger and less broken national feeling at the elite level than did Latvia, subjected as the country had been to a tougher oppression of nationalism.

It should also be pointed out, that even though the demography of both countries changed dramatically over the post-war decades, Latvia’s profile changed most radical-

ly, and in all major cities Russians today are in majority, while Latvians dominate in the smaller cities and in the countryside. In Riga, around 80% of the population are Russian-speakers. That the process of demographic transformation has been more radical in Latvia does not mean however that it has created profound problems at the micro-level, between the ethnic groups. On the contrary, in spite of the political rhetoric by some parties like *For fatherland and freedom*, ethnic tensions do not seem prevalent in Latvia.

Is there evidence from other parts of the world suggesting that national identity may play a crucial part in the success or failure of state building? The determinate impact of a distinct national identity and the presumed commitment to national objectives rather than fractional ones created thereby has indeed been pointed out before in discussions on state building. The extreme difficulties facing many African countries in creating functioning state apparatuses and “independent” political societies, causing scholars to characterise the African state as an “empty shell” (Chabal & Daloz, 1999, 95), are to a great extent attributed to the pronounced lack of national identity. Both Davidson (1992) and Decalo (1998) stress the lack of nationalist perspective among African elite state actors. However, that should not be taken as a lack of general feelings of commitment, only as an indication that African political actors are committed on other grounds than national ones: usually it is the clan, maybe the ethnic group or the geographical area that foster loyalty (Chabal & Daloz, 1999, Ekholm-Friedman 1994). In the aftermath of colonial rule, many of the emerging states were furthermore nothing but artificial constructions, embracing citizens with loyalties primarily based on regional and clan identities. Leaders dedicated to increasing feelings of nationalism have been rare on the African continent, while leaders bringing with them into power regional, clan or ethnic identities have been the rule. To some extent, these conditions are used as an explanation of the present situation of weak state institutions.

While present-day Africa accordingly provides a compelling example of a lack of national identity, it is likewise pointed out that elite actors in the successfully industrialising East Asian dragons during the 1940s, 50s, and 60s clearly were highly committed to national interests, i.e. identifying the nation (and not particular sub-groups, interests or personal connections) as the foremost object of loyalty (Vogel, 1990). No doubt, this nationalist commitment contributed to the successful economic development, in combination with institutional and cultural factors imbuing strong incentives not to enrich personally in the process.

5. A difference in the presence of a Nordic role model?

Let us proceed to the second hypothesis, based on the presumed importance played by international role models for the process of successful state-formation, regardless of whether it is done through adaptation, copying, or imitation. The idea that “state-builders” also look to “role models” is supported by historic and current examples. The former president of Taiwan, Lee Tenghui, has for example stated how important the USA was as a model for Taiwan’s development and the shaping of its reform process. In the process of the active state-building experienced by Estonia and Latvia after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, it could well be argued that the “images of the state” which the political actors had close at hand influenced reflections on possibilities and desired outcomes of the state-building process, together with norms and codes of conduct. It has been claimed as an explanation of Estonia’s fast development, that the country belongs clearly to the “successful” Nordic sphere by historical reasons and as a result of the linguistic ties to Finland. If valid, the Nordic coun-

tries with their specific political culture of honesty and cleanness among political and public actors, of corporatist arrangements as a way of mediating interests, and of an internationally exceptional transparency and openness of the political processes, should then have served more apparently as role models for Estonia than for Latvia. This process of transferring political norms and codes of conduct could have helped the Estonian political elite to establish more acceptable and “clean” relations to interests outside government.

Historically, it is a gross simplification to claim that Estonia has been orienting itself in a more Nordic direction than Latvia. As discussed earlier the Estonian and Latvian trajectories follow each other quite closely, which also goes for international influences. It is correct that during the period of national awakening in the last decades of the 19th century, the efforts of the growing nationalist movement in Estonia to create popular movements built on education and adult education coincided closely with similar developments in the Nordic countries. Furthermore, the agricultural economy in the first Estonian republic, based to a large extent on co-operative practices, must have been inspired to some extent by the Scandinavian example. But that goes also for Latvia, a country that to a much higher extent than Estonia resembled the Nordic countries in its political profile. The predominance of the commercial city of Riga turned Latvia into a more industrialised country than Estonia, with the labour movement playing a more prominent role in political life. The political scenery in Estonia, on the contrary, did never witness the rise of a Social Democratic party of any significance, as was the case in the Nordic countries – and in Latvia.

At the first period of independence 1920-40, when Estonia and Latvia started to build new states on the ruins of the dissolved tsarist empire, the inspiration came to a great extent from Germany. The Weimar constitution was closely adopted, including the built-in perils coming with the almighty legislative and a very weak executive power. The more informal ways of organising parties, associations and corporations were also a blueprint of German organisations: hierarchically structured and closed (cf. Berman, 1998). The “image of the state”, both to the Estonian and the Latvian political actors at the time, was continental Europe rather than the Nordic region, and the German law tradition continues to influence the countries the most even today (Nerep, 2001, 62). The sometimes rather pronounced identification with the Nordic countries in Estonia is obviously of a more recent date, and not something lying particularly close at hand for the former tsarist provinces of Estonia and Latvia.

Today, at least for Estonia, the “Nordic model” (rather than the Scandinavian model which usually does



Figure 102. Old Estonian house. Open air museum near Tallinn. Photo: Katarzyna Skalska

not include Finland) has however come to play a distinct role in the official rhetoric, maybe also in the mentalities of the public. That is not to say that this recognition has been born out of “primordial” feelings of belonging, which the previous discussion on the earlier continental influence shows. Instrumental reasons surely may have guided elite actors to emphasise what is sometimes described today as the “natural” belonging of Estonia to a Nordic sphere. A recent survey for example shows that 34% of Estonians regard Scandinavia as a role model (Noreén, undated). In response to the question of which country could best serve as a role model for Estonia, a rather large portion of the Estonians mentioned Sweden and Finland (UNDP, 1999). Statements made by Estonia’s foreign minister Toomas Hendrik Ilves are representative of the tendency to attach Estonia to the Nordic concept. Recently, Latvian and Lithuanian businessmen were enraged by statements by Estonian representatives of Estonia being a Nordic country, implying that the other two were not. The birth of the image of Estonia as a Nordic country has been an interactive process involving actors in the Nordic countries as well as Estonian ones, through intense contacts on lower and higher levels (cf. Ugglä et al, 2000, cf. Jubulis, 1996, 60). It may have contributed positively that Estonia has a large exile community in Sweden, while Latvians in exile are more numerous in for example Germany. Language is another crucial factor, and the linguistic ties between Finland and Estonia played a role before independence as well, since the possibility to watch Finnish television provided Estonians with a window towards Europe which was denied to the Latvian nation.

By which mechanisms could the constructed Nordic identity be linked to the more successful state-building efforts in Estonia? The importance lies primarily in the creation of a political culture among elite actors emphasising strongly the norms of political conduct predominating in the Nordic countries, preferably Finland, of honesty, transparency and openness as significant of political and legislative processes. Such norms do not only affect political actors, but also those outside the political arena like business interests and economic actors. As pointed out elsewhere, political culture guides behaviour and “in some European countries like Sweden or the Netherlands, social and cultural constraints go against the devotion to personal enrichment. In such settings, the revelation of the slightest venal misdeed is fatal to the career of politicians” (Chabal & Daloz, 1999, 106). Chabal & Daloz’s observation is supported by the recent figures from *Transparency International* on perceptions of corruption. Finland is, according to these figures, the least corrupt state in the World, followed by Denmark, New Zealand, Sweden, Canada, Iceland and Norway (CPI, 2000, compare chapter 25). The construction of a Nordic identity in Estonia, which probably started out as a strategic move to gain material benefits and financial support, may simultaneously have influenced the Estonian elite actors into thinking of legitimacy and public behaviour in a more “Nordic” way than their Latvian counterparts. The basically rhetorical process has given birth to an image of the state which is modelled on the “Nordic model” when it comes to crucial aspects of the limits for public behaviour.

But why did not Latvia, a nation also claiming to have ties to the Nordic countries, deliberately try to associate itself with the “Nordic model”? Again, one objective difference is the closer linguistic ties between Estonia and Finland. Latvian is closely related to the Lithuanian language, but is not understood through the help of any Nordic languages. One answer to the above question may be that the choice was never Latvia’s but that particularly Finland but also Sweden did not take the opportunity to make their state models accessible to the Latvian politicians and civil servants to nearly the same extent as was done in Estonia. Contacts, development projects and various forms of aid in the form of training and education have been directed more heavily towards Estonia. A figure on party support indicates

that financial help to the Estonian political parties has been overwhelming in relation to that going to Latvia (Uggla et al, 2000). The approximately 30 000 Swedish inhabitants with Estonian roots, compared to the 5000 of Latvian origin, have actively helped to promote projects of aid and twinning which further have increased mutual feelings of identification and proximity.

If identification through international role models is constructed rather than primordial, exposure is crucial. But exposure to the Nordic model can be achieved in other ways than through contacts between political and administrative actors, most prominently by commercial contacts. For economic interests in Estonia and Latvia, it is not without importance if trading partners and co-owners originate from cultures plagued by traditions of corruption or cleanness. Dealing with entrepreneurs from the Nordic states, could also be a way to become confronted with the Nordic rules of behaviour discussed earlier, including openness and transparency. Figures clearly show that the amount of foreign direct investment is much higher in Estonia than in Latvia, 217.17 US dollars per capita in Estonia compared to 131.64 in Latvia (Hall & Wijkman, 2001, 27). That means, that Estonian businessmen and officials probably come in contact with economic actors from other cultures (including for example Finland which is a large investor in Estonia) more frequently than is the case in Latvia.

Positive international role models have not been present in the Latvian context nearly to same extent as in Estonia, either in the political arenas or in the economic sphere. In explaining that vacuum on the Latvian side, intentions and deliberations among key political actors have to be considered. That brings us to the third, and final, hypothesis to be investigated.

6. A difference in network formation?

The third hypothesis shifts the perspective from psychological processes of identity and identification to the particular conditions by which new political leaders and networks emerged in Estonia and Latvia. In the vast literature on transitions to democracy, political leaders and ideas are often attributed a determinate impact on the outcome (cf. O'Donnell & Schmitter, Lauristin & Vihalemm, 1997, 77). Not least how the relations to the old regime are handled by the new leaders is considered crucial, but often problematic. Did Estonia and Latvia enter the period of independence and democratic rule with different political preconditions, which could contribute to explain the present lack of political autonomy in Latvia? Focusing not on the similarities in the countries transition processes, there existed at least two differences of importance to notice. Firstly, in Estonia, new intellectually trained leaders emerged already in the years of popular mobilisation, associated for example with the cultural organisation the Estonian Heritage Society (Lieven, 1993, 220) and guided both by ideas and commitment, while in Latvia, the period of transition was characterised more by ambivalence. It was a continuance of representatives of the Communist regime allying themselves with new forces, and a lack of powerful alternatives. Secondly, as Lauristin & Vihalemm (1997) point out, the popular movements in Estonia and Latvia organised differently. In Estonia, the movement split into two, Popular Front and Estonian Citizens' Movement, united by the will to struggle for Estonian independence, but advocating different routes. The Citizens' movement mobilised quite nationalist forces like Estonian dissidents, who wanted to build the new republic on the bases of the first republic, while Popular Front appealed to broader

layers of the population, including Russians, and proposed a referendum on the question of independence. Lauristin & Vihalemm claim that the parallel organisations allowed for different interests and opinions to form in a pluralist fashion which resembled democratic practices, and discussions were open on how to move forward. In Latvia, the Popular Front *Tautas Fronte* stayed an umbrella organisation for various interest groups and NGO:s, embracing both highly nationalist groups and others, but not giving room for clearly formulated alternatives to form as openly as in Estonia.

Thus, from the very first steps on the road to independence, Estonians were invited to make a choice between two options with similar political outcomes but with very different means and legal consequences. This moment of rational choice was an important feature of Estonia's new democratic development (Lauristin & Vihalemm, 1997, 89).

Returning to the difference in composition of the future leaders, the networks forming in Estonia had broad connections to academic life and student organisations, while in Latvia they were more based on a blend of old power networks, business and politics. Tartu as a focal point of political formation appears as significant of the Estonian experience. Why? In answering this question a brief review of the Soviet experience is warranted.

7. The phase of informal mobilisation in Estonia

According to Misiunas and Taagepera (1996), there was one special experience unique to Estonia. At the time of independence Estonia contained the core of a national leadership which had indirectly been fostered, despite Soviet rule, within an influential but informal organisation called EÜE, the Estonian Students Building Troops. Over a period of many years, starting in the 1960s, for two months during the summer, handpicked students met at construction camps to repair and build communal farms – the *kolkhozes* – that dominated the rural landscape. These months were not only filled with work but also provided ample opportunity for socialising. Close friendships that started at the camps subsequently became the hub of influential social networks under the process of independence and after. The Communist party probably saw these camps as a fortunate combination of labour and ideological education, and as a way of realising goals of tearing down differences between intellectual and manual work. In practice – which is what is relevant to our discussion – the camps however functioned as effective schools in leadership for a great number of Estonian students while allowing them also to form close bonds of friendship. Many in today's political and economic elites have testified to this central importance of the camps, the last of which took place in the last summers of the 1980s. The student construction troops hence functioned as a vehicle for training the Estonian youth in leadership and responsibility, and for creating networks among mainly the male students that adhered to notions of mutual obligation and trust. In one of his articles, Anders Åslund argues that Estonian civil society was better prepared than in any other country to assume the political leadership at the time of independence. It is probable that the EÜE contributed by forging the kind of personal networks that research on state building has shown to be of crucial importance (cf. Easter, 1996). There existed building troops also in Latvia, but according to for example Inese Voika, in Latvia they had no importance for the building of networks after independence.

The Estonians Students Building Troops was but one element in a larger pattern of creating a soil for future leadership based predominantly in academia and intellectual circles, highly significant of the Estonian but not of the Latvian political transition. The other

crucial ingredient was the formation of a group of students of history and journalism in Tartu in the last years of the 1980s, calling themselves Noor Tartu, Young Tartu. Among them was the future prime minister Mart Laar, and some of the persons forming the first government under independence 1992-1994. Marju Lauristin, a professor in Tartu, who became minister of social affairs in the same government and currently holds a position as member of parliament, recalls that the group formed an informal seminar meeting at the premises of the history department in the last years of the 1980s. Discussions on social science literature, political alternatives of liberalism and social democracy, and economic theory (although none was a trained economist) predominated, laying a platform for the future government once the time came. The *Noor Tartu* group also formed the core of the Estonian Citizens' Movement, and clearly took on the role of young political leaders during the period preceding independence. They were also active in the environmental protests against phosphorite that started popular protests against Moscow in 1987. The group was as Lauristin describes it, a team. Mart Laar was team leader, listening and holding the group together, while not being really what could be called an ideological leader. "He was very open-minded, very democratic and he listened" (Interview Lauristin, 1.3 2001). The group formed the Pro Patria party in 1990, with nationalist and liberal (or socially conservative) ideas.

Clearly, the EÜE and the Noor Tartu group were crucial in that they assembled and gave opportunities for domestic, young leaders to come forward who, at the time of independence, could initiate reform processes guided by norms and ideas other than those dominating during Soviet rule (cf. Higley, Kullberg & Paluski, 1996). When Mart Laar, the first prime minister of an independent Estonia at the age of 32 (1992), describes the Estonian reform process his analysis is contextualised within a comparative perspective with similar processes in other countries, and a general understanding of the importance of the administration and other political institutions. "In contrast to the reformist ex-communists, Edgar Savisaar and Tiit Vähi, who headed the initial post-communist governments, the September 1992 elections brought to power a new political generation, led by the youthful Prime Minister Mart Laar (b 1960), and one which with few exceptions was free of any communist past" (Raun, 2001, 23-24).

Of particular importance was the idealistic and ideologically oriented profile of the young government; it was based on ideas and not on money, as Lauristin puts it, which in the situation of dual transition became even more important than otherwise. Secondly, the persons in the government knew each other quite well, with a few exceptions, and could rely on each other's loyalty. The group was not representing vested interests, but were academics. They had ideas for Estonia, but were not embedded in a web of former loyalties, as was the case in Latvia. The radical political reforms launched by the Laar government, based on shock therapy, have been contributed a part in the success story of Estonian economy. But it is as crucial to clarify the preconditions making such reform politics possible in Estonia but not in Latvia, where ideas of the kind certainly also circulated.

8. The formation phase of Latvian political life

In Latvia, the steps of early political formation looked different. For one thing, ideological differences and interests were not linked into open alternatives, but kept together as Lauristin and Vihalemm claim. As a result, clear ideological political alternatives were never allowed to form,

making democratic Latvian politics from the start less of an arena for ideological struggle than a search for political power. The Communists behaved differently in Latvia than in Estonia, not withdrawing from political power like did Valjas and Indrek Toome in Estonia, but continued to influence political life, like Godmanis, Gorbunovs and Birkavs. The Popular Front in Latvia became a bridge over to democratic politics for influential Communists like Gorbunovs, since it helped the ‘old elite’ into the new system. That break was much more radical in Estonia. “The government of Ivars Godmanis also endured considerably longer than those in either Lithuania or Estonia, but once again partly for negative reasons: there was very little chance of any other faction being able to replace it. In 1991-92 however, the government and Popular Front appeared rather like a decomposing whale, preyed on by sluggish sharks until only the head – the government of Godmanis – remained” (Lieven, 1993, 290).

The successor of the Popular Front, the all-embracing party *Latvija’s Cels* (Latvia’s Way), was founded in 1993 and has been in government ever since, changing its coalition partners but staying in power. Uniting various interests, also with connections to powerful economic groupings like the earlier mentioned Ventspils, the party has been described as a kind of political machine, enrolling individuals keen on power (Lieven, 1993, 301), rather than motivated out of national or ideological commitments. Anatol Lieven described the party in 1993 as “a bouillabaisse of both radicals and moderates from the PF, moderate Latvian émigrés under the leader of the World Federation of Free Latvians, Gunars Meierovics, and former leaders of the Communist establishment. What strengthened it above all was its acquisition of Anatolijs

Gorbunovs, still the most popular Latvian politician” (Lieven, 1993, 301, cf. Nissinen, 1999, 130). The significant feature of Latvia’s Way was the lack of ideological profile, it was an electoral platform, and functioned as a bridge between different political groups as well as economic actors. The idea behind Latvia’s Way was not to present a clear political alternative but to unite elite actors under one umbrella. Nissinen speaks about “the great diversity of LC’s membership” as an asset for the party in the 1993 elections: in the party men from the Communist party and the Soviet Latvian government were found, as well nationalists and exile anti-Communist leaders (Nissinen, 1999, 130).

Clearly, the formation process of Latvia’s Way and the links leading over from the Popular Front is a key process in explaining the way Latvian politics has developed, with its close connections between politics and economics. While the influential political forces in Estonia at the time of the first elections in 1992 had its informal roots in the student movement, EÜE and *Noor Tartu*, the stage appears to have been set quite differently in Latvia when elections took place in 1993.



Figure 103. Latvian unity symbolized. Photo: Piotr Grablunas

As always in Latvia, rumours flourish and information has to be treated with caution. Several of the informants, most occupying political or professional top positions in the state, demands to remain unidentified or will otherwise not talk frankly, and some of them return to the fact that the information they volunteer has to be treated with caution, since they want to “live tomorrow too”. As Nissinen also noticed, the most sensitive information concerns business flows and naming people connected with the vast fabric of economic and political networks.

It seems however clear that the formal formation of Latvia’s Way was preceded, as in Estonia, by an informal phase which to a great extent determined the political possibilities later. Discussions among a loosely knit, rather large, group of people, meeting more or less regularly in what was called “Club 21” (cf. Nissinen, 1999, 130, interviews Gunars Meierovich, Janis Naglis, Mairis Gailits, October, 2000) started in 1991 (in Estonia the group around Laar began to form already in 1988-89). It also turned out that in the first Latvian Way government, at least half of the ministers were members of the club 21. Trying to grasp the organisation and the function of this closed and elite-dominated formation is not easy, and it is not easy to fully evaluate the impact of Club 21. According to Marja Nissinen, Club 21 was founded by 21 individuals sharing political and economic interests. “The club is considered as highly elitist and it is compared to the Masonic Lounge. New members can join the club only on invitation and the members must approve their candidacy. What is said at the meetings of the club is not publicised” (Nissinen, 1999, 130). Others describe the Club 21 as merely an informal arena for discussions, as the powerful head of Latvia’s privatisation agency, Janis Naglis (Interview Naglis, 24.10.2000). “In Club 21, the ideas of forming the party that became Latvia’s Way took shape. Members of Club 21 were less than 100 but more than 20-30 I think – and an economic and political network was created”, tells Naglis.

Besides functioning as an arena for different Latvian groups to meet and build alliances in front of the new society approaching, Club 21 seems to have worked as a place for “learning” through international experiences. West diplomats were invited to the meetings, for reasons as to gain access to advice – and maybe also money.

The way Club 21 formed in 1991 is important to understand the way that politics developed in Latvia, and the importance lies in the profile of the political alliances and networks founded then, which in 1993 lead to the creation of the political party Latvia’s Way. As one informant puts it: “This was a way for the old elite left over like Gorbunovs, to secure their position in what was coming. People who had been politically and economically influential came together in Club 21 it was the elite clique formed there – and sure enough look who were in the LC government then and today: they are still there”.

To conclude, while the first democratically elected government in the crucial early years of transition in Estonia was the ideologically united “team” of Mart Laar, who were personally acquainted with each other, and shared a base in the student movement in Tartu, its counterpart in Latvia was a broad spectrum of allies gathered under the umbrella of one party, Latvia’s Way. Although economic reform was on the agenda, the government had too many built-in obstacles of an economic and ideological nature to be able to act as efficiently as the Laar government. How to reform economy was clearly the most crucial issue on the agenda in both countries, but while the discussions on economic reform in Estonia had started already in the informal seminar in Tartu, it seems as if it was the broadly composed Club 21 that served as an arena for such conversations between 1991 and 1993 in Latvia. Ideas were not as clearly liberal as in Estonia, which is understandable since former Communist party members and representatives of the old Soviet Latvian elite were part of the broad ‘coalition’.

“Up till 1993 we had different approaches to economic transition than Estonia (Estonia was more unanimous). In beginning 1990s among the Latvian politicians there were some ideas about a transition building on the Soviet model and how to control it. One of the roots of early corruption. It was the idea of creating maybe one or two larger companies which should be the driving force for the whole economy” (Interview Krasts, 17.10.2000), explains Guntars Krasts, former Latvian minister of economy and prime minister 1997-98 with reference to these early discussions.

The formation of a political sphere in Estonia and Latvia during the early years of transition developed distinctly different in at least three aspects. Firstly, the motivation for political power in the first elected governments, in Estonia 1992-1994, and in Latvia 1993-95, strongly deviated. The Mart Laar government was based in student circles in Tartu, with an idealistically grounded strive to change society. The government of V. Birkavs, based on a coalition between Latvia’s Way and the Farmer’s Union, emerged out of the attempts started in Club 21 to find a common ground in ruling the new state of persons representing the old regime, economic interests and political entrepreneurs. Ideas were not the main driving force, but the need to consolidate an elite constellation in the new society. But thereby, Latvia’s Way also reduced radically its possibilities of conducting an economic reform policy bound to clash with certain of those interests

Secondly, the ties between economic life and politics, today the most significant feature of Latvian political life, were built into the party system already through the formation of Club 21, with its aim of creating a joint political and economic network. In Estonia, any alliance between politics and economy at that stage was not visible, and again the Laar government was not connected to business interests.

Thirdly, while the Estonian process of political formation openly reflected controversies through the parallel organisation of Popular Front and Estonian Citizen’s Movement, the Latvian formation on the contrary strove to erase ideological controversies and consolidating through closed and highly non-transparent forms one elite of business and politics. The consequences in the Latvian case has been profound political stability, in the sense that Latvia’s Way have been in government ever since its creation in 1993, while in Estonia government parties have shifted since 1992. Separation of political and economic power was taking place in Estonia, while integration of these powers occurred in Latvia. The results are visible today.

6 Are the Baltic States ready to join the EU?

Li Bennich-Björkman

Today the three Baltic States are involved in intense negotiations for membership in the EU. A future membership in the EU is increasingly dominating the political agenda in these countries, with reforms underway to harmonise national jurisdiction with the *acquis communautaire* that involves the whole state apparatus. One can rightfully ask, however, whether all the Baltic States are ready to join the EU. The Copenhagen Criteria require member countries to meet three demands: they must be market economies, they must uphold the rule of law and they must, finally, be functioning democracies. Further, they must be able to fulfil the duties implied by membership, one of which is to adjust national legislation to that of the EU. The additional demand – as stated by the Madrid Criteria – that member countries must have well functioning public administrative institutions, is equally important, and follows the Copenhagen Criteria closely. How do the three Baltic States relate to these criteria? Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia all satisfy the criteria in the formal sense, but differences remain between the states in their practical realisation of democracy, the rule of law and effective administrations. These differences will be explored in this article, providing an answer to the question of whether the Baltic States are ready for EU membership.

1. Economics, Democracy and Civil Society

Estonia gained status as candidate country together with Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Cyprus in the first round of enlargement, and started actual negotiations in 1998 with a good chance of gaining membership in 2004. Both Lithuania and Latvia were, however, excluded from this group of countries – something that drew much criticism in the two countries – and began negotiations in 1999, together with other post-communist countries such as Bulgaria, Rumania and Slovakia.

In its analyses of the European so-called ‘transition economies’, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) points out that Estonia has a clear lead over Lithuania and Latvia in several areas, amongst which structural market economic reforms to facilitate large scale privatisation and reforms of the banking sector, are the more important. The Milken Institute, an American think-tank, comes to the same conclusion in its index measuring of the availability of risk capital for new entrepreneurs. Of the ninety-one countries in the world analysed, the institute shows Estonia ranking number eight – ahead of the European average – while Latvia and Lithuania rank numbers thirty-nine and forty-five respectively. Hall and Wijkman are correct in concluding that Estonia has a great advantage over the bigger countries, Lithuania and Latvia, irrespective of whether the Copenhagen Criteria, the four freedoms or the new economy are used as measurement indicators.

There is a tendency in political debate to treat the three Baltic States as one region – one often refers to the Baltics. To group the countries like this is relevant in some respects but highly misrepresentative in others, as differences in economic development show most clearly. While there are plenty of crucial differences, as will be discussed below, let us anyhow start discussing what the countries still have in common. All three countries were previously independent states (1918-1940) that were occupied by the Soviet Union for almost fifty years. While under Soviet control they all ranked among the top states in the Union, as the most modernised, industrialised, urbanised and westernised (Raun, 1997). This was true to a lesser extent for Lithuania which, unlike the other two, retained the character of an agricultural society even after the Second World War. Enjoying relatively privileged positions among the Soviet States, especially with regard to the economy and education, has naturally contributed to creating more conducive con-

ditions for EU membership than is the case in other former Soviet republics.

Since gaining independence in 1991 the three countries also share the experience of having successfully made the transition from totalitarianism to democracy. The countries have also chosen a fairly similar institutional and constitutional framework. The combination of a presidency with a proportional electoral system has led to a multiparty system that, at least initially, showed numerous parties in competition for the relatively few parliamentary seats. The exception is Lithuania, where a more semi-presidential system was put into place (Pettai & Kreutzer, 1999). Furthermore, institutional features have been adopted from the constitutions that were in place during independence, 1918-1940, with adequate precaution being taken against repeating past mistakes. Previously legislative assemblies were considerably more powerful in relation to the governments, a situation that directly assisted in undermining and subsequently defeating democracy – in Lithuania as early as 1926, and in Estonia and Latvia in 1934.

Anders Åslund argues that the many shifts in government during the 1990s should be regarded as a strength in a transitional process since it prevents particular interest lobbies from entrenching themselves in positions of power. However, in the Baltic context it is crucial to differentiate between shifts in government and shifts in the governing parties. In Latvia, the broad alliance of interests in “Latvia’s Way” (*Latvijas Cels*), has been in government in coalition with, in particular, the Farmers Union and “For fatherland and Freedom” (TB/LNNK) since 1993. In Estonia, on the other hand, governing parties have been changed. Gradual tendencies of an emerging political stabilisation have been noticeable recently, especially in Estonia. One example is that so-called ‘electoral coalitions’ or ‘apparentements’, were prohibited just before the 1999 parliamentary elections, a prior practice that enabled blatant political opportunism, instability and unpredictability.

The Freedom House, which annually measures the degree of respect for political and civil rights in most of the world’s countries, gives all three countries favourable rankings. Judging the countries’ real performance records in terms of respecting citizens’ freedoms, they get a ‘1’ on political freedoms (on a scale where 1

is total freedom and 10 is total lack thereof), and a ‘2’ on civil freedoms. These figures are most encouraging, placing the Baltic States on a par with the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary. None of the other states that were previously part of the Soviet Union perform as well: the Ukraine, Georgia, Belarus, Azerbaijan, and not least of all Russia, fare much worse in the Freedom House ranking. Thus, after hardly a decade as democracies, the Baltic States clearly fulfil the criteria implied by one of the two fundamental pillars of democracy (cf. Dahl, 1971) – making real political competition possible by guaranteeing extensive freedoms and rights.

The other pillar – that all those affected by decisions also have influence on their formulation, i.e. an inclusive citizenship – is, however, a cause for concern. Both Estonia and Latvia fall short in this regard as many Russians and Russian-speakers were disenfranchised by legislation imposed at independence. While those with status as full citizens enjoy all political freedoms, the deficiency in this regard is that many of the Russian-speakers who are subject to the law cannot influence it through the franchise. Lithuania, on the other hand, does not have a minority problem of that kind, and thus has an inclusive citizenship, extending political rights to the 350,000 Russians and 300,000 Poles inhabiting Lithuanian territory. This democratic problem is one of the central differences between the countries that will be discussed further below – it is a situation which is likely to be affected by a future EU membership.

While the democratic transition has been successful in all three countries, this comes with the rider that large ethnic and linguistic minorities are left without direct political influence through the vote. However, a democracy needs more than entrenched and formal political freedoms. If it is to flourish, democracy also needs an active citizenry capable of organising collectively. The fact that, on the whole, all three states lack such a civil society is an important but negative similarity between them. There is a serious dearth of organisations that formulate demands from their grassroots membership and thus realise collective action separate and independent from the state (Pettai & Kreutzer, 1999, 159, cf. *Estonian Human Development Report*, 1999). Citizens are left with very few channels, apart from elections,

to influence politics either directly or indirectly. A growth in the number of NGOs (Non-Governmental Organisations) has been noted in the last few years, but these are seldom more than 'paper-tigers', far from the ideal of an organisation of active members. While this situation is much the same in the three countries, indications point to it being worst in Estonia. According to the 1999 UNDP Report, Estonia is trailing behind the other two countries with regard to citizens' activity and organisation, a situation that is clearly problematic in the long run: "Estonia has lagged behind several other Central and Eastern European countries in the development of a civil society". Even if Estonia is more successful economically, Latvia is a more 'political' society in that more people take an active interest in politics, although trust in political institutions as well as in fellow citizens is very low.

The culture of alienation and non-participation is one that the Baltic States share with most other post-communist countries, although both Poland and the Ukraine have relatively strong social organisations. A lack of trust among citizens' and their distrust of political and public institutions is very common in the post-communist countries – a situation that is partly explained by the system of informants and the double standards of Soviet society. This relatively recent historical legacy is compounded by a history common to the Baltic States of a great distance between the rulers and their subjects. Power was always vested in a foreign ruler – of German, Russian or Swedish descent – that left the Baltic peasant societies without any channels of influence. Language differences also prevented any direct communication: Latvians and Estonians remained illiterate, subject to their foreign masters. Lithuania, once more, has a slightly different history as a formerly independent great power and ally of Poland.

The lack of grassroots activity and the inability to form interest groups will become more problematic as a future EU membership becomes all the more realistic. The three societies' relative lack of experience in organising around certain interests will prevent them from making effective use of the informal lobbying that organisations use in the EU to argue for preferential treatment for various national and regional interests. The consequence of this ineffective representation of their interests may

be a rising degree of disappointment among citizens of the Baltic States, a sentiment that is likely to bring public distrust and a lack of legitimacy for the EU in a vicious circle.

The transition from communist dictatorship to democracy has forced fundamental reforms not only in the political sphere, but demands have also been made for effectiveness in administration and strength of institutions unheard of during Soviet rule. Where government is bound by law – i.e. a *Rechtsstaat* – the public sphere must uphold the rule of law and guarantee a well-functioning and transparent system of governance. Research increasingly points to the decisive importance of effective institutions in generating economic growth and making democracy sustainable. The international and independent organisation, *Transparency International*, conducts annual surveys (for the Baltic States since 1998) through which it seeks to research the level of corruption by interviewing financial analysts, businessmen and women, as well as the public. This research shows that the Baltic States differ greatly in this regard. While Estonia is seen as one of the least corrupt countries among those in the post-communist block (including East and Central Europe), the other two countries are seen as problematic – Latvia even ranks as poorly as Russia and some of the most corrupt African states. A general and obvious pattern is thus that all ex-Soviet Republics experience a high degree of corruption, a situation that can be equalled to a lack of effective administrative and legal institutions – the exception being Estonia. In 1998 Latvia was ranked as number 71 on a list of 85 countries (the higher the number, the higher the degree of corruption), while Estonia was in 26th place (5.7). This difference remains in the 1999 and 2000 surveys: Estonia is ranked close to Japan, Slovenia and Taiwan, while Latvia is grouped with notoriously corrupt countries such as China and Senegal. Lithuania comes out only slightly better than Latvia. It is thus not surprising that the Estonian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Toomas Hendrik Ilves, has been quick to point out that Estonia is less corrupt than EU countries such as Belgium (5.3), Greece (4.9) and Italy (4.7). The Nordic countries cluster between 9-10 while in the bottom of the list are countries such as Cameroon, Niger and Tanzania.

A clear dividing line thus separate Estonia from Latvia and, albeit to a lesser degree, also Lithuania. While the former has managed relatively well in establishing state institutions of fairly autonomous standing, the latter two approximate the average poor performance of countries in the former communist block. A particularly interesting comparison in this regard is that between Estonia and Latvia – two countries with otherwise similar characteristics – since the latter is so clearly marked by a dysfunctional state apparatus. This issue merits great attention and is addressed in the chapter on “state capture” in this section.

After this brief review of similarities between the three Baltic States we will return to discrepancies. The first is truly political in nature and concerns ethnic relations and the issue of citizenship: Estonia and Latvia are having to grapple with similar problems while Lithuania does not. With regard to the second main difference, which concerns the autonomy of state institutions, Estonia does remarkably well while Latvia and Lithuania face severe problems. In the following section the analysis will mainly explore further the problems of ethnic relations in Estonia and Latvia.

2. Will EU membership lead to ethnic mobilisation?

A large minority of mainly ethnic Russians are today excluded from Estonian and Latvian citizenship. In negotiations the Union has, at least in its official rhetoric, emphasised the need for a faster integration of this Russian minority. Estonia grants non-citizens some political rights in that they can vote in local elections, but Latvia also excludes them from such participation. Both countries thus allow the desire for nation-building to conflict with what is known as the second fundamental principle of liberal democracy – to make the demos include all those affected by collective decisions (cf. Kolstoe, 1995, Linz & Stepan, 1996, Pettai & Kreuzer, 1999).

The factors that created this situation in the two countries are both historical and political in nature. There was, historically, a large emigration of ethnic Russians to Estonia and Latvia during the Soviet era, attracted by the strong industrialisation and relative wealth of the two republics. This influx was so large that the demographic profile of the two countries

changed drastically compared to the pre-Soviet era. Prior to the Second World War, there were 89 percent Estonians and 8 percent Russians in Estonia while, in 1991, the numbers had changed to 61.5 and 30 percent respectively. Latvia was more ethnically heterogeneous even before the war, with 75.5 percent Latvians and 10.5 percent Russians (with other minorities forming the remaining 14 percent). Upon independence the Latvians barely comprised the majority with 52 percent, with Russians making up 34 percent of the population. The numbers clearly display how a process of “Russification” had substantially changed demographic profiles, although in retrospect neither of the countries has been truly homogeneous ethnically. The relatively poor agrarian Lithuanian society never attracted such numbers of immigrants from other republics and has therefore not had to deal with the same problem. For this reason, Lithuania was able to choose a so-called “zero-solution” which awarded Lithuanian citizenship to all those working in the country at the time of independence. Estonia and Latvia, on the other hand, chose a “blood-principle”, which meant that only those who had citizenship prior to 1940, and their descendants – thereby also including Estonians and Latvians living in exile – automatically gained citizenship. All those who had immigrated to the country subsequent to this year, including those born in the countries, had their citizenship mainly conditioned on passing a language test. These citizenship laws are still in effect, albeit in somewhat less strict formulations after severe international criticism, especially in the course of negotiations with the EU. In more recent years, both Estonia and Latvia have balanced the laws by creating an educational infrastructure for dealing with issues relating to integration such as separate ministries, national programmes and other constructive actions. These efforts to facilitate integration, mainly through language programmes for ethnic minorities, have received international support from the Nordic countries, the Swedish Institute, UNDP, SOROS Foundation and the EU’s Phare Programme.

Contrary to what is sometimes argued, nothing is obvious in the countries’ choice of non-inclusive policies in the citizenship issue, except that both countries were subjected to an extensive process of “Russification”. There is little evidence, despite immigration, of there

having been ethnic hostilities at the time of independence. On the contrary, there are analyses from the time of independence which suggest that the preconditions for finding amicable solutions to the national-cum-ethnic issue were particularly favourable in the Baltic States since it was “widely believed that no one in the former Soviet Union would be better able to tackle it than the Baltic populations” (Kolstoe, 1995, 105). Only a few years later, however, the analyst Paul Kolstoe concluded that the level of ethnic confrontation had reached “appalling levels”.

It could be argued that, in the main, the formulation and adoption of the citizenship legislation was not a natural consequence of a situation fraught with ethnic hostility, but a political route consciously chosen by Estonian and Latvian politicians at independence – a choice that may, however, give rise to increasing ethnic hostility over time. One reason for these politicians choosing confrontation over coexistence is that some of them had previous careers in the Soviet system. By acting like ethnic hard-liners, they pre-empted any accusations of being pro-Russian, an accusation that would have brought up their suspect past and reduced their legitimacy. Attitudes towards Russia and the Russians are also contradictory among the establishments. Steen states that 81 percent see Russia as a threat, while, at the same time, 73 to 83 percent regard Russia as a very important partner for co-operation (Steen, 1997, 86-87).

Issues relating to the ethnic minority have also remained politicised only at the level of the establishment and not among citizens. At its core, the problem is one of language. Since language is viewed as the “marker” of ethnic identity, any compromises on the issue are seen as compromising that identity. In both Estonia and Latvia politicians therefore hold the issue almost as sacred across the political spectrum. The language issue has therefore, at this establishment level, created its own political logic, inspiring the creation of strongly nationalistic parties such as *Isamaaliit* and *Tvzemei un brīvībai* (For the Fatherland and Freedom). Given the symbolic power of the issue, and the decisions already taken, it is now almost impossible for any politician, assuming the will to do so, to retract and try to defuse the issue to what it was at independence. Thereby Estonia and Latvia are, then, good illustrations of a mobili-

sation of ethnicity on the basis of instrumentalist reasons.

In contrast to the establishment level, there is little to suggest that ethnicity causes tension among the citizens at large, as noted by the researcher Paul Kolstoe (1995). One indicator of ethnic co-existence is the number of cross-ethnic marriages. Such marriages are not infrequent in either Latvia or Estonia, although the numbers are much higher in Latvia. Although



Figure 104. Contemporary Estonian identity has been formed in contradiction to the Soviet past. Photo: Katarzyna Skalska

they date back a few years, figures state that as many as 19 percent of Latvians married outside their ethnic group, while the rate in Estonia is reported to be approximately ten percent (Dreifelds, 1996, 161-163). This could be attributed to living patterns. While Russians in Estonia mainly live in two areas, the capital Tallinn and the north-east region of Ida-Virumaa, the Russians in Latvia form majorities in most major cities and are thus in much more direct contact with the other population groups. In a 1998 survey conducted in Latvia, focussing on issues of citizenship, a

vast majority (82%) agreed with the statement that children born in the country should be granted citizenship, irrespective of the origin or legal status of the parents. Not surprisingly, a full 95% of the non-citizens supported the statement. Majorities of both citizens and non-citizens (83 and 74 percent respectively) did not feel there were differences between them in every-day life. However, many non-citizens stated in the same survey that their lack of citizenship had a negative psychological effect on them and led to them being discriminated against professionally. It should be noted that a very recent survey also found that the main incentive for Russians learning Estonian is the desire to strengthen their position in the labour market, not to be integrated politically. Thus, while we find that ordinary lives at mass level are not severely affected by ethnic tensions, history shows us that such tensions can be whipped up very quickly by the actions of political players.

In relation to a future EU membership, the important question to pose is what abiding by the EU's demand for extending the citizenship, mainly to the Russians, might lead to in terms of ethnic relations. Today the features of the political system are not really caused by explicit ethnic mobilisation. Nevertheless, we are left with a situation that is problematic from a democratic point of view. This is because, for natural reasons, most parties direct their attention to the enfranchised Estonian and Latvian sections of the populations. The parties that address issues of priority for the ethnic minorities, mainly the Russians, are far fewer in number, although such parties are stronger in Latvia than in Estonia. Today there could be, however, signs of an increasing "ethnification" of the political thinking of the populations, in that different groups state their inability to consider voting for a party that, in the main, is supported by another group. The strength in such a sentiment is very hard to assess, but in a situation where the previously excluded group of Russians would gain full citizenship, leading possibly to parties focussing exclusively on them, a general increase in ethnic mobilisation among the public may be the result. This party political development has been identified as a main cause behind the emergence of ethnic conflicts.

Based on the Yugoslavian situation, and many other cases of ethnic conflict, research

shows that the cause of ethnic conflict is seldom found in clashes between communities' or individuals' primordial ethnic identities, but rather in political processes where the establishments make use of ethnic identities for mass mobilisation. Given their sensitive regional position – with both Estonia and Latvia bordering on Russia – an increase in ethnic tensions could have grave consequences.

The discussion so far can only lead to one paradoxical conclusion. While an extension of full citizenship and increased political integration would undoubtedly be favourable from a democratic perspective, those very reforms *may* induce ethnic polarisation and regional political instability if unmatched by political elites showing restraint and responsibility for maintaining good ethnic relations. The solution should not be for the EU to demand anything less than liberal democracy should replace the "ethnic democracy" that characterises the region today. The strategy should instead be to encourage and facilitate cross-ethnic co-operation at the establishment level by giving incentives to local political establishments to always engage in communication and co-operation with other parties. Such active and constructive work with politico-cultural integration would undermine any efforts to gear the party system towards increasing mobilisation on the basis of ethnic identities.

3. EU Membership and Political Opinion

Finally, we need to ask how the populations in the Baltic States are receiving the prospect of EU membership. The preference at the establishment level can be easily concluded: it is the top priority in all three Baltic States. The reasons for this are not only matters of security politics or economics, the issue of membership has also taken on great symbolic significance. Membership of the EU would be final confirmation that Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania now belong to Europe and the European cultural sphere, a symbolism that also plays on the strings of national pride. After having been forcefully estranged for 50 years from their European "home", membership would complete the circle and have these countries return to their original cultural sphere. Thus we see strong expressions from politicians and civil servants of their commitments to accede to the EU's demands and recommendations.

This manifests itself in a comprehensive institutional infrastructure running numerous programmes and offices that are all geared towards a process of integration with the EU.

Since the support at the establishment level is so dominant, there is little room for debating the possible consequences of a future membership, such as what the ongoing process of strengthening the federal aspects of the EU implies for the Baltic States. The support for the EU is far less evident among the general public who, to a much larger degree, maintain a rather sceptical view. In 1999, when Latvia had begun its negotiations with the EU, surveys showed that a slight majority (51%) supported EU membership, while 29% were against and 20% had not yet formed an opinion. This tendency of opposition to EU membership has become even more pronounced in Estonia during the years since negotiations for joining have commenced. There are figures indicating that in November 1998, only 25% of ethnic Estonians would have voted yes in a referendum on the issue of membership, compared with 35% the year before. As in the case of many member-countries, public opinion in Estonia follows clear social and economic divides. Young and well-educated civil servants are over represented among those favourable to joining, while an older and less educated rural population is among those most sceptical. Referring to data from Latvia, as many as 69% of those with a higher education, while only 34% of those with a lower education, would vote yes in a referendum on EU membership. The change to a market economy in the Baltic States has broadened economic and social divides among citizens. These problematic class divides would be accentuated even further if those less well off remain negative to EU membership.

Against the backdrop of international discussions on the situation of the Russian minorities in Estonia and Latvia, it is interesting to note that younger Russians and Russian-speakers are, on the whole, more favourably disposed to EU membership than their equivalent groups among Estonians and Latvians. Data from 1996/97 show that 78% of Russians living in Estonia, and 66% of Russians living in Latvia, would vote yes in a referendum. The

corresponding figures were 59% of Estonians and 52% of Latvians – certainly a considerable difference. Richard Rose argues that the reason why Russians are so supportive of membership is that they greatly aspire to the freedom of movement within the EU. After all, and at least in theory, membership could considerably improve the living conditions of these groups. Their present situation is characterised, more than anything, by unemployment and an inability to compete successfully on the domestic work market.

4. Conclusions

Are the Baltic States ready to join the EU? The discussion above has shown the futility in treating the three states as one entity. It is instead fairly important to point out the differences in political and economic development since that provide us with a clearer picture of eventual problems facing the countries in joining the European Union. It is clear that Estonia is the one of the three which demonstrates the best “performance records”, regardless of whether we look at economy, politics or the rule of law.

The discussion above has centred on the two so-called Copenhagen Criteria. Concerning democracy it is obvious that the transition with regard to political rights has progressed without problems. Right now, however, Estonia and Latvia are not liberal democracies with an inclusive franchise – problems relating to political minorities are still very much alive. While Estonia meets the demand for the rule of law relatively well, the problems in this context are considerable in Lithuania and, even more so, in Latvia. The countries lack strong and autonomous state institutions, as well as – with the possible exception of Latvia – a vital ‘civil society’ of organised collective action. At the same time it is necessary to consider the time frames. In less than ten years, the three Baltic States have had the onerous task of implementing fundamental and complex reforms. The attraction of EU membership contributes by hastening this process, unfortunately by widening the gap between the establishment and the general public.

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Section V

MAJORITY AND MINORITY CULTURES

Figure 105. A Saami camp. Ill.: Uppsala University Library



Section

MAJORITY AND MINORITY CULTURES

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INTRODUCTION:

The cultural diversity of the Baltic Sea Region

Harald Runblom

Cultural diversity is a keyword for characterising the Baltic Sea Region. Culture is a loose concept and includes a variety of human activities, including religion and life-styles. From a political point of view, the status of languages and the right to use one's own idiom is a measure of tolerance to cultural diversity. Some twenty-five languages with official status or considerable state protection are spoken in the region. To this number one could add several minority languages with lower status plus many tongues of recent immigrants from other European and non-European countries. The region lacks a natural *lingua franca*, but English is constantly gaining ground as a common means of communication in business, science, and other fields. There is, indeed, a fear in many countries that English will take over important domains from the national languages, but on the other hand one can now note an ongoing revitalisation of languages which had lost ground during the last century. In this age of so-called globalisation, there are actually many developments that reflect the vitality of local cultures and languages. One good example is the Barents Region (*Nordkalotten*) in the north with ambitions to use regional languages: the *Kven* language in northernmost Norway; *Meänkieli*, i.e. Tornedalian Finnish, in the border areas between northern Sweden and northern Finland; and several *Saami* languages. There is a growing literature in these languages.

Nowadays, representatives of governments and inter-governmental bodies declare that diversity is the richness of Europe. The European Council and the European Union strongly support the ideas that minority cultures and languages should be protected and supported. Hence, much has happened in the last three or four decades both on the grassroots level and on the highest political levels. One should add the many international conventions in support of minorities and the strong development in the sphere of human rights, especially since the mid-1990s. Human rights law normally supports individuals, not groups, but indirectly this field of international law also tends to strengthen cultural and language minorities.

Most countries display diversity within their borders, and many countries are bilingual or multilingual. Some have large population groups who do not belong to the titular nation. In Estonia and Latvia the conditions and rights of the Russian-speaking minorities were burning questions during the first decade of regained statehood after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989. Both countries have large Russian populations, and many Russians felt alienated within the state and with the new rulers, but after the turn of the millennium it is clear that the integration of Russian minorities in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania for that matter, is improving. Germany and the Scandinavian countries have become increasingly multi-ethnic. First labour migrants, mainly from central and south European countries, and thereafter refugees from non-European countries have altered the composition of population, and the natives have had to face new cultural encounters. As was envisaged during the 1990s this can lead to deep scars in society if newcomers and their children are not integrated. Western and South European countries are performing a delicate balancing act. On the one hand, their ambition is to



Map 32. Peoples of the Baltic. The number of individuals in each group varies greatly from a few hundred to many millions. Their name marks the approximate centre of the region or country in which they live. Many people appear both as a majority culture in one country and as a minority elsewhere. Ill.: Karin Fallgren

- FINNS** – majority cultures
- INGRIANS** – territorial and other minorities with a long history in the region
- ITALIANS** – recent immigration group

show a human face to those newcomers who have the right, according to international law, to seek asylum abroad. On the other hand they are safeguarding social stability by not letting everybody in who wants to seek a brighter future in this rich part of the world. The political turbulence surrounding the Schengen Protocol, reflects this ambivalence. The picture is even more complicated since many European countries now have a weak demographic structure with low reproduction rates. In the long run, many European states are dependent on newcomers who can make an addition to the shrinking labour force.

If we want to derive advantage from the region's cultural diversity we have to learn more about our neighbours, their culture and traditions. This chapters treats the phenomenon of cultural diversity mainly by focussing on the relation between majorities and minorities.

27 The challenges of diversity

Harald Runblom

One aspect of diversity concerns the very size of countries in the Baltic Sea Region. Population-wise there are large countries like Poland and small ones like Estonia and Latvia, and one may ask whether the prospects for majority and minority cultures are different in large and small countries. Relatively speaking, there are ethnically homogeneous countries like Denmark (since most of the population consists of ethnic Danes who speak Danish) and heterogeneous ones like Latvia and Belarus with large minority groups. The diversity of the region can only be understood if one sees today's situation from a historical perspective. There are at least two reasons for this. First, the population mix of the area is the result of processes and events in the past. Secondly, history is used, and often abused, by majority and minority groups to defend certain standpoints when struggling to improve their social and cultural conditions. There is a battle about the past. Often the question is: who lived first in an area and thus who has the right to live in the area? We recognise this question from the celebrations of Columbus in 1992 and the current issue of American Indians' rights to their forefathers' land in the United States. Did Columbus discover America? Or did the native Americans, the Indians, "discover the discoverers"? This leads to legal and moral questions. Do the Europeans and their descendants have a stronger claim on the land than the Indians do? In some cases even religion may be used to defend the right to land: a standpoint used by some Israelis today is that God once gave the land to Israel and therefore this land cannot be given away to the Palestinians.

There are similar controversies in the Baltic Sea Region. In northern Scandinavia, for example, there is a tug-of-war concerning land rights between the Saami, which may be labelled an indigenous population, and the majority populations in Norway and Sweden. The majority population is often represented by the state. Does the state have the legal or moral right to build dams and construct hydroelectric plants on the rivers if vital pasture lands are destroyed, where the Saami by tradition keep their reindeers?

There are other parallels. The population turnover in the former Soviet Union has led to questions about the right of "immigrants" to stay and live and to buy land and acquire citizenship outside their home republics. Do descendants of Estonians have more right to live in Estonia and Latvia than Russian immigrants and their children? When does an immigrant stop being an immigrant? These issues have been hot stuff in the debates about citizenship in the Baltic republics, and the question of the immigrants' status is also burning in other immigration countries, for example Germany, Sweden and Denmark.

In order to understand the region's specific cultural, linguistic and ethnic character, it is also necessary to note its peripheral position in relation to central and southern Europe. The Baltic Sea Region received much of its culture and ideas from the south, all via different routes through Europe. The region thus became a meeting place, and to a certain extent a melting

pot, of diverse linguistic, religious, and cultural impulses. Some of the cities in the region bear witness to this like Viborg/Viipuri, Königsberg/Kaliningrad, Riga, and Vilnius. The region has always been a recipient of cultural influences. During the last decades there has been a tendency to even greater diversity, caused mainly by immigration from Asia, Africa and Latin America to Germany and the Scandinavian countries.

In today's shrinking world, communication and transportation tend to be quicker and more efficient, and people can move more easily and change their place of residence, as long as borders are open. Population mobility is a distinctive feature of the Baltic Sea region. During the last 150 years population exchange has occurred largely with places far away. Millions of people went overseas during the latter part of the 19th and the early part of the 20th century, primarily to the United States but also to Canada, South America and Australia.

Industrialisation, which meant a break-up of traditional production patterns, led to the growth of large cities and caused the adoption of new lifestyles. Soviet economic and population policy forced many to move. There are calculations that seven million Soviet citizens passed in and out of Estonia from 1946 to 1988. Intolerance and persecution also caused mobility outwards from the region.

In the western part of the Baltic Sea Region especially population movements have mainly fluctuated with business cycles. Migration issues are crucial in those parts of Europe that are integrated in the European Union (EU); the population pressure from the Third World is obvious and sometimes seen as a threat to stability. On the other hand, free movement of labour between the member countries is one of the main principles.

A most important question is: how will people live and act together in the neighbourhood, workplace, school, city and in society at large, when they come from different backgrounds, speak different languages and belong to various churches? Is cultural diversity a conflict factor? Are there prospects for peace in the area, given the bad record of the region: anti-Semitism, prosecution, deportations, world wars, and totalitarian regimes? In other words, can enemies become friends? There are, indeed, signs of hope. Historically speaking, Danes and Swedes were arch enemies – a Danish historian has counted 137 years of war between Denmark and Sweden – but patterns have changed. If hate has not shifted to love, it has at least transformed into respect and cooperation. Given the increased cultural diversity of the region, you may ask if there are models for rational and peaceful coexistence? Can the Baltic Sea Region learn a lesson from other parts of the world, for example Canada or the United States, countries whose entire history is made up of the forging of people with different backgrounds? Not least Canada's multicultural policy seems to be a source of inspiration for some countries in the Baltic Sea Region.

1. Culture and ethnicity: terminology

There are several terms for characterising societies of diverse cultures. A multiethnic society contains several ethnic groups, whether they exist under similar or different conditions. Multiethnic is hence a descriptive term. The term *multicultural* is vaguer and can either be used to describe a society or in a normative sense: a multicultural society is one where diverse groups co-exist, and the society as such encourages groups and individuals to preserve and develop their distinctive features. While *multi-ethnic* refers more narrowly to ethnic aspects, multicultural refers to a broader spectrum of cultures.

Since the Baltic Sea Region is multi-ethnic, the majority-minority relations are crucial. A little terminological exercise is necessary, not least because terms and words differ between the languages in the region. Here we try to follow as closely as possible a terminology that seems to be fairly standardised in the English language. *Ethnic group* is a key term. The members of an ethnic group refer to common origin, history, language or religion. Ethnic groups are not constant; they

can appear and disappear, grow and diminish. An interesting example from outside the region is the great increase of American Indians in the latest U.S. population censuses, which cannot be explained by demographic factors. This is because social and economic factors explain why it has become fashionable to label oneself as American Indian. To turn to our region, the authorities in Latvia have recently found an unexpected increase in the number of Latvians in the country; the best explanation to this phenomenon is that some people, who, during the Soviet period registered as Russians (in order to get access to jobs or positions or to avoid harassment), now register as (and most probably also identify as) Latvians. The German element in Poland is another example. After the unification of East and West Germany in 1990, people in Poland who identify themselves as Germans have increased. Part of the explanation is that the Poles have changed their minority policy and that relations between Germany and Poland have improved. The real motives behind this change of identity could of course be discussed.

Ethnic groups are based on *collective identities* as opposed to personal identity. Identity is a complex term. An individual's identity can be mixed. If we relate individuals to territory, which is of interest here, a person can identify with a city (Aarhus), a region (Jutland), a country (Denmark) and a larger area (Scandinavia, perhaps Europe), all at the same time. In a certain context he can act as a Jute (from Jutland), in another context as a Dane or Scandinavian. A person's identity can change during his life course. Polish Jews who fled from Poland in the late 1960s and early 1970s and ended up in Sweden arrived with a strong Polish identity, but after some years in Sweden they rather identified as Jews, while their Polishness was less pronounced than before the migration.

The members of an ethnic group refer to a common basis of values and cultural traits. In order to build and maintain this basis, the group protects its cultural heritage. This means promoting the history of one's own group, recalling the life and deeds of its heroes, raising monuments and creating symbols, paying attention to the language, and keeping up traditions. Researchers tend to talk about *invented traditions* when a culture of tradition has been developed.

The aim of the ethnic group is to protect its culture and its position in society. If the goal is to establish a state, we talk of a *nation*. A nation is a group of people who identifies with a state, whether this state exists, has existed in the past or could possibly exist in the future. The relation between nation and state is important. It could be asked which emerged first, the



Figure 106. The Muslim crescent outside a Tatar homestead in eastern Poland signals the owners' denomination. Photo: Alfred F. Majewicz

nation or the state. If we look around in Europe we find that the answers differ. The Baltic Sea Region also displays a variety of combinations of nation and state. Sweden is an old state, established during the Middle Ages, long before the people in this area had any strong feeling of togetherness. The creation of a Swedish nation was a long process, protracted through several centuries and perhaps not yet concluded; by the end of the 19th century there was a definite congruence between state and nation. The states of Denmark and Russia also existed before Danish and Russian nations were formed. In other cases, there was a nation before the state was established. Finland, Estonia and Latvia are states that were created as a result of national movements: the nations pre-dated the states. The Soviet Union was a federal multinational state with a very complicated pattern of republics and nations (peoples), some of which had their own republics (Russians, the Russian federal republic; Estonians, the republic of Estonia), while others had not (Jews, Germans). The nationality principle was accepted, but the aim was to create a Soviet supranationality. However, *homo sovieticus* never materialised. Also, the goal was to construct a Soviet cultural unity, mainly with Russian ingredients, while much of the local and ethnic culture that was allowed had more of a folkloristic character.

The process of nation-building has been less complicated in Western Europe than in Eastern Europe, where the ethnic patterns have been more complex.

2. The force of ethnicity

Charles Westin

In the current restructuring of Eastern Europe since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the issue of ethnicity has grown increasingly important. It affects the Baltic region, particularly when it comes to relations between Russians on the one hand and Balts, Ukrainians and Belarusians on the other, in the three Baltic states, Ukraine and Belarus. These nations, which gained independence in 1991, refer to their distinctiveness in terms of language, history, culture and ethnicity. So, one question of importance that needs to be considered is what we mean by ethnicity, or ethnic identity.

No established definition of ethnicity seems to exist that is universally accepted. This is due to the fact that ethnicity is a complex phenomenon, which involves several factors or criteria. Thus, certain criteria may be highly relevant for one particular group, whereas other criteria mainly apply for another group. In a very general sense, ethnicity refers to people's sense of belonging to a group, in particular to a group that is self-reproductive. This means that marriages as a rule take place within the group (*endogamy*). In some cases it is an explicit requirement. Consequently, members of an ethnic group usually have, or at least believe they have, similar phenotypical characteristics. Common language, culture, religion, beliefs and territory are other criteria that apply in varying degrees.

The term *ethnicity* has its etymological origin in the Greek word *ethnos* meaning people. Ethnicity is an umbrella concept referring to 'ethnic phenomena' such as identities, categories, groups, collectives, relations etc. '*Ethnic identity*' refers to the specific quality characteristic of a people's perception of itself as a people. It may be defined as a collective, individually experienced, emotionally significant, cognitively meaningful and, as a rule, identity acknowledged or attributed by others. The term '*ethnic category*' does not have the connotations of an individual's self-awareness as belonging to a specific group or a specific people. It is more of an external classification.

One might put it that ethnicity is the collective identity common to an ethnic group. In English there is no noun to denote the category of people about whom the adjective ethnic may be applied. The term '*ethnic group*' is often used, but the term 'group' has the disadvantage of underestimating numerical size. Groups are often conceived of as less extensive than collectives. Neither is 'ethnic collective' satisfactory as it misses the sense of belonging and commitment that are seen to characterise people's ethnic awareness and solidarity. An important distinction is between ethnicity as a self-conception and self-attribution on the one hand and ethnicity as an attribution imposed on an individual or group by external observers.

The concept of ethnicity was brought to the centre of the social sciences in three different ways. First of all it was introduced through social anthropological studies of non-European cultures. Some anthropologists used it to replace the concept of tribe. Fredrik Barth (1969) pointed out that ethnicity manifests itself in boundary regions between different peoples. He also stressed that boundaries between ethnic groups are permeable. Ethnic identity becomes salient in encounters, which explains why boundary regions have always been significant when ethnicities are enacted.

A second approach to ethnicity has been through studies of societies of immigration. In contacts between majority populations and (recent) migrant groups, ethnicities are acted out and contrasted. The famous Chicago School of urban studies in the 1920s and 1930s played a major role in developing means to analyse urban conditions and migrant minorities. Inspired by the American Civil Rights movement in the 1960s, many Americans started to take an interest in their own ethnic roots. This movement was referred to as the *new ethnicity*. The sociologist Nathan Glaser (1963) argued that the American melting-pot had in fact not erased people's sense of their ethnic origins, but rather that many Americans in certain circumstances were prepared to reactivate dormant ethnic identities and loyalties.

The third field of studies in which ethnicity has been of central concern is in the context of political mobilisation, nation building, nationalism and nation-state formation. Ethnic sentiments were expressed in 19th century national romanticism in the arts and literature. However, ethnic solidarity was also exploited for political purposes for the subjugation of minorities. In its most destructive forms it could ultimately lead to genocide. The sociologist Anthony D. Smith (1986) represents a school of thought that identifies the roots of the modern nation state in the ethnic phenomenon. Ernest Gellner (1983) presents a very different view on the origins of the nation and the forces behind nation state formation, linking it to industrialisation, mass education and modernity, not to ethnicity.

Ethnic identity is about belonging to an in-group. Most ethnic groups view themselves as special in some way, in some cases as having some historic mission or as guardians of a sacred tradition, as the rightful occupants of a specific territory or as a chosen people and, in some instances, as representing the only really genuine human beings. Although not always explicitly stated, other groups may be regarded as morally or culturally inferior. For example, the Roma people (Gypsies) refer to themselves as "Rom", which in their language literally means human being. Non-Gypsies are referred to as "Gadje", that is to say, people who are not clean, people who are polluted. A parallel distinction exists among the Jews, and the ancient Greek distinction between Hellenes and Barbarians is also an instance of the same idea.

One universal criterion of ethnic identity is almost always mentioned when people are required to define what is special about their sense of ethnicity. This is the conception of a common origin, which is a belief that is seldom based on veridical historical facts. Usually it is a mythological construction. The vital point is that people believe that members of their ethnic group descend from common ancestors.

Territory is an important criterion in many definitions of ethnicity. Not all ethnic groups, however, place importance on territory. Common culture is another criterion. Religion is often quoted as a central criterion, as well as a common language. Religion is a broad category that normally encompasses many different ethnic groups. Thus it can serve as a necessary but not sufficient criterion of a specific ethnicity. For example, Polishness is strongly associated with Catholicism. This does not mean that all Catholics are Poles, but it does mean that Polishness is hard to reconcile with religions other than Catholicism, say, Shintoism and Taoism.

Many ethnic groups speak a specific language that they regard as their own. But we also find numerous cases where different ethnic groups share a common language. In some instances, languages that are regarded as separate tongues from a national and political point of view, should rather be classified as different dialects from a linguistic point of view. When differences are important politically, markers of distinctiveness will be attributed great significance. Some ethnic groups have world languages as their tongue, but speak it in a distinct dialect. Pronunciation and dialect thus serve as markers of ethnicity and provide information about native versus non-native speakers. A criterion of significance is external recognition, that is to say, that other groups recognise and acknowledge the ethnic identity of a given group.

Several if not all of these *criteria* need to be met if we are to speak of an ethnic group:

- Common territory
- Common culture
- Common religion
- Common (often exclusive) language
- External recognition
- Belief in a common origin

Why is ethnicity such a powerful social force? The answer is more or less apparent in the combination of several of the criteria listed above. Each individual criterion represents in itself the foundation of all-encompassing and lasting collective identities. Ethnicity is about the aggregated effect. Yet a different answer is given in the literature on ethnicity. Ethnicity is a unique phenomenon in that no other collective identity appears to have the capacity to elicit such a powerful and unconditional sense of solidarity. Sociobiologists explain this force of ethnicity as a result of mankind's innate disposition to further the survival of 'kin' (in an extended metaphoric sense). It goes without saying that this is a highly controversial position. An alternative interpretation points to the fact that ethnicity is closely linked with a person's first language. Learning one's first language in early childhood lays the foundation of a unique emotional and cognitive sense of community with other speakers of that language. According to this theory, ethnic identity is an extension of linguistic identity with all its emotional connotations acquired in early socialisation. Spoken language thus serves as a salient marker of ethnic belonging, since certain distinctive features of pronunciation cannot be acquired by those who learn the language after childhood.

Both these views regard ethnicity as a primordial force that is inherent to man. This view of ethnicity is defended – on different grounds – by sociobiologists, psychologists and linguists. An entirely different *constructivist*, *situationist* or *instrumentalist* view on ethnicity is proposed by many social anthropologists, sociologists and political scientists. Ethnicity, they say, is not an individual trait but a mode of categorisation that is brought out in situations where various parties interact and negotiate. People may emphasise their ethnicity or hold it back. Ethnic markers may be used to either emphasise or conceal identities, depending on the situation at hand. Whatever they do in this respect, they do so for specific reasons and with particular

objectives in mind. According to this view, ethnicity may be used in a broader context as an instrument for political mobilisation.

The term 'ethnic cleansing' was coined in conjunction with the war in Bosnia. The Bosnian tragedy was about how Serbian nationalists who controlled political and military power set out to transform a complex multicultural community into an ethnically one-dimensional society where people were classified according to mutually exclusive categorisations. Ethnic friction exists in the states of the eastern Baltic region. This is particularly evident in Russia in its conflict with separatist Chechnya. But certain tension is also evident between Russian minorities in Latvia and Estonia and the majority populations in these states. Nobody in the Baltic region wants to witness the tragic consequences of an ethnicity out of control as has been the case in Bosnia, Kosovo, Chechnya and other parts of the Caucasus.

3. Majorities and minorities

The terms *majority* and *minority* refer primarily to numerical relations. A population group that consists of more than half of the population in a state is a majority; a minority is less than half. Since, according to the last census of 1989, Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians made up more than 50% in their respective republics they are by definition *majority populations*. Before this date they were regarded as minorities in the Soviet Union, although they were, of course, numerically superior in smaller units (socialist republics). You can therefore say that they have transformed from minority to majority populations. The term minority also has another connotation: it refers to disadvantaged groups, whether they are economic, political or have limited access to the services of society, for example, education. (In western terminology we also speak of handicapped, homosexuals, etc. as "minorities".)

Demography is very important; with this we mean the size of the population groups. How many are they? What is their age structure and sex composition? Some population groups reproduce faster than others do. A lower marrying age and a higher marriage rate can simply lead to more children per family, on average, and hence an increase of population. When there is a constant trend you may even call it "demographic behaviour". The German population pyramid clearly illustrates how war and large-scale migration can affect the age and sex structure of an entire people in the long run. The great population losses, especially among males, during the First and the Second World War, transmit themselves to later generations. The titles of two of Heinrich Böll's early novels, *Wo warst Du, Adam?* (1951) och *Haus ohne Hüter* (1954) illustrate this problem. The fathers and the potential fathers were killed or had been absent. Population groups can increase and decrease in number, and this can also affect the relative numerical balance between majorities and minorities. All this means that one group can outnumber another group in the long run. Minorities or majorities that feel threatened one way or another, are very observant on these phenomena. In the former Soviet Union different nationalities had very different demographic patterns. Islamic nationalities had a much faster growth than non-Islamic ones.

In many cases it is very difficult to obtain relevant statistics about minorities and ethnic groups. For example, numbers of the Saami population in northern Scandinavia vary. In Sweden there is no official statistical figure on the Saami population. The Swedish Saami have repeatedly asked the authorities for a special census regarding the Saami, but the answer has been negative, one reason being that it is hard to find useful criteria of who is a Saami. Thus,

in the official literature, the numbers of Saami vary. Normally, representatives of an ethnic group present higher figures than the government or representatives of a majority group. But this is not always the case. In order to show that a minority is a threat or a potential threat, the number may rise. In Sweden in the 1930s, a period of insidious anti-Semitism, exaggerated numbers of Jews circulated among the majority population.

Numerical figures are important. Many groups want to show their strength. This is natural and in many cases reflects a power struggle. Estonians have made a great effort to count the population and especially the many losses that they suffered during the Stalin era when deportation to Russia took a heavy toll.

Homogenous societies are only found in small isolated areas, such as islands. Multicultural societies are the norm around the world. In Europe, the Baltic Sea Region is one of the more diverse, and stands comparison together with the Balkans and the Caucasus.

4. Classification of minorities

Minorities vary in character and are considered as such on many different grounds. There is no ideal way of classifying them and there is much overlapping. Present international conventions on the protection of minority rights are fairly vague on this point and generally give the undersigned states much leeway to decide which groups should be considered minorities. It is important to stress that minorities stem from different historic processes, and some are the result of the fusion and dissolution of states. Others are minorities because of historic migratory processes, some of which have been very complex and drawn-out in time. Finland's Swedish-speakers are hard to classify. Parts of today's Finland were "colonised" by Swedes in the Middle Ages in a combination of crusades, settling, trade and military expansion. Gradually Finland was integrated in the Swedish state and the existence of Swedish-speakers in Finland is a result of the Swedish cultural and linguistic penetration of Finland. Numerically, Swedish-speakers are a minority but in political terms they do not consider themselves as such. Finland is a country with two official languages. The two language groups must be set against the Finnish brand of nationalism, which also led some Swedish-speakers to shift to Finnish for political reasons. Finland's Swedish-speaking population resists conventional labelling. Some groups are called *historic minorities*, which implies that they have been in the area for a long time. Jewish parts of European populations, always in a numerical minority, have existed in most countries for a long time, and are therefore normally labelled as historical minorities.

Most Germans in Estonia and Latvia, normally called German Balts, had a long history in the area and could best be called a dominant historic minority, since they had an upper hand after the expansion of the Teutonic order and the Hansa. Socially, Germans were a dominant minority even after the Russians had taken control in the early 1700s. The German Balts decreased in number from the late 1800s and were enticed to Germany after the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Russians in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania moved in at a slow pace in the 1800s. After incorporation into the Soviet Union in 1940, the political, military and industrial sectors were russified and workers, military personnel, and administrative personnel were recruited from other parts of the USSR. The demise of the USSR in 1991 left a large Russian-speaking population in the area. The Russians in these countries can be called a mixed historic and colonising minority.

Territorial minorities inhabit a well-defined area, and in many cases they can refer to a presence far back in history thousands of years ago. Territorial minorities, who are regarded as the earliest inhabitants in an area, by themselves or by others, are called indigenous or autochthonous. The Saami, a Finno-Ugric people in Northern Scandinavia and Russia, are recognised by the United Nations as indig-



Figure 107. Livonian stronghold – a symbol of the former power of a Fenno-Ugric nation in contemporary Latvia. Photo: Alfred F. Majewicz

enous. The Slavonic Sorbs live in the Länder of Sachsen and Brandenburg. The *Sorbs* number about 70,000. Most of them are bilingual in Sorbian and German or monolingual in German. The *Kashubians* live in Pomerania, with their centre in Gdańsk and are also best classified as a territorial minority. According to some estimations there are between 150,000 and 200,000 Kashubian-speakers. This illustrates the discussion above that it is sometimes very difficult to tell how large an ethnic group is or how many people speak a certain language. Great differences in figures indicate that criteria differ, that those who release figures have political objectives or that identity problems are involved. Several Finno-Ugric peoples exist today only as remnants of larger populations. The *Livonians*, or *Livians*, in Latvia number only about 100 individuals. The *Votes* and *Veps* also remain in small numbers. *Ingrians* and *Finns* in the St Petersburg area number several thousands. The *Karelians*, who live in both Finland and Karelia, make up a 10% minority in the Russian republic Karelia. The Germanic *Frisians* live on the Dutch and German Frisian Islands in the North Sea and on neighbouring shores.

Border minorities are created when borders are drawn or changed as a result of military force or political agreements. They are normally long-time inhabitants of an area. Although they are neighbours to the majority culture from which they originated, they may not identify with it, and they speak their own version of the language. The existence of large numbers of *Danes* south of the Danish-German border, and many *Germans* north of that border, is largely a result of war, border revisions, a referendum in 1920 and international agreements. The *Torne Valley Finns* became a minority in northern Sweden after the division of Sweden and Finland in 1809. This Finnish-speaking group lived under a restrictive Swedish minority policy up to the early 20th century. *Poles* are found in several areas outside present-day Poland. The borders of Poland have changed more dramatically than those of any other country in the Region. After World War II large areas of eastern Poland were transferred to the Soviet republics of Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania. Several hundred years earlier the Lithuanian-Polish commonwealth included these regions. Germans in areas bordering *Germany* are found in Silesia/Schlesien/Âlask in southern Poland, and Denmark among other areas.

Non-territorial minorities have a migratory background. Escaping prosecution, they have settled in a larger region covering several countries. They preserve their language, culture and religion and often live apart from the majority culture, although individuals might be assimilated. The

Baltic Sea Region was the home of the *Jews* for centuries. From the Middle Ages up to the beginning of this century, 90% of world Jewry lived in a region comprising eastern Poland, Western Ukraine, Belarus, and Lithuania. Today only a small part of the once numerous Jewish population remains in the area. Many were killed in the Holocaust, others emigrated, mostly to the United States and to Israel, and still others were assimilated in the majority cultures.

Roma or Gypsies (in Germany called *Sinti und Roma*) have been present in the Baltic Sea Region for centuries, although most Gypsies live elsewhere. They speak Romani, an ancient Indo-European language, and uphold their own cultural traditions. Earlier they led a partly nomadic life, but are today more often settled. They are present almost all over Europe and their lack of status and lack of organisational strength make them Europe's most threatened territorial minority. It is characteristic that their role as victims of the Nazi genocide has attracted very little attention from scholars and politicians. They simply have lacked spokesmen for their case.

Labour migrants are recruited to an area often as labour or expertise. They typically aim at integration into the new society, although sometimes traditions from original cultures are conserved for generations. Labour migration has occurred for centuries. Massive labour immigration into the western part of the Region occurred in the 1960s and early 1970s.


The largest group of immigrant labour in Sweden was the *Finns*, followed by *Yugoslavs* and *Greeks*, but many more nationalities were represented. On the whole the inter-Nordic migration dominated. In Germany the *Turks*, *Yugoslavs*, *Italians* and *Greeks* constitute a majority of labour migrants. Today Turks and Kurds number about two millions in Germany.

Labour migration was extensive within the former Soviet Union. The industrialisation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania led to the massive immigration of workers, particularly from Russia, Belarus and Ukraine. Poland did not experience a similar influx of workers, although more recently Russian labour immigration is notable.


It is sometimes difficult to distinguish between *labour migrants* and *refugees* who are escaping prosecution, terror or



1. Territorial minorities



2. Border minorities



3. Non-territorial minorities



4. Labour migrants

Map 33. Classification of minorities. Ill.: BUP archive

other life-threatening living conditions to settle in a new country, often with the hope of returning home soon. They try to keep their culture. There have always been refugees although their numbers increase during wars. International conventions define when an individual is to be considered a refugee and thus to be granted asylum.

Large refugee groups from the Second World War were *Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, and Jews*. As the only country to stay out of the war, Sweden received all of these groups, but played for many only the role of a transit country. Norwegians, Danes and Finns also fled to Sweden. Large numbers of *Germans* living elsewhere, in particular East Prussia, fled to Germany at the end of the war.

During the 1970s conflicts and prosecution in countries in Africa, Asia and South America resulted in a heavy influx of refugees. *Ethiopia, Sudan, Vietnam, Chile, Argentina, Kurdistan, Iran, and Iraq* were some of the areas from which people fled to Western Europe. Since 1992 the war in former Yugoslavia has forced tens of thousands of *Bosnians, Croatians, and Albanians* to come to the Region.

5. Majorities and minorities: historical perspectives

Minorities have existed in most societies in most stages of history. Individuals and groups have deviated from the greater part of the population, whether the difference has been racial, linguistic, ethnic, national, or cultural. (One must beware that a modern political terminology is not always applicable for older historical periods.) Thus, linguistic deviation had little significance in Europe in the Middle Ages, while religious dissidents had limited leeway. Hussites (named so after their leader, the Czech reformer Jan Hus) in Bohemia and Lollards in England in the beginning of the fifteenth century were isolated and humiliated. Jews were a visible minority, and anti-Semitism was a recurrent phenomenon.

The Reformation created a new religious situation. Protestants became minorities in some societies, while Catholics were disliked in others. In France, 400,000 Huguenots were driven away by the Catholic establishment in 1685 after more than a century's wavering of co-existence experiments. From the period of Enlightenment the problem of religious minorities was less salient in Western Europe.

The current minority problems in Europe are mainly a result of the national movement in the nineteenth century. The then leading principle of "one people – one language – one state" did not leave much room for minorities. Borders were altered to make the territories of nations and states congruent, e.g. in Italy and Germany. In other countries, minorities like Occitans and Bretons in France were asked, stimulated or forced to assimilate culturally and linguistically. In northern Norway and northern Sweden military and security aspects, fear of Russia and uncertainty of Russia's territorial policy, added to the ungenerous treatment of Finnish-speakers around the turn of the century in 1900.

The nationalistic principle culminated after the First World War when the self-determination of peoples was manifested in President Wilson's fourteen points and the organising principle of the Paris peace conference after the war. Large dynastic, polytechnic states – the Romanov, the Habsburg and the Ottoman – were dissolved but new minority problems were unavoidable in the successor states.




Figure 108. Population composition of the Baltic Region. Official figures from Poland and the St Petersburg district area are missing



Figure 109. Roma buskers in Warsaw. Photo: Alfred F. Majewicz

6. Collective strategies of minorities

Minorities (and its individual members) can choose between different strategies:

1. *Isolation*. The current situation of Gypsies in most European countries is a result of forced and voluntary isolation.
2. *Accommodation* was the main strategy of Jews in Western Europe from around 1800. Also, without losing their identity, the Kashubians have accommodated themselves to the dominant German and Polish cultures.
3. *Autonomism*. The Åland Islands and the Faeroe Islands, an outlying part of Denmark in the Atlantic, are examples of a successful search for autonomy. In English terminology “home rule” would be a fitting term for these areas.
4. *Separatism* aims further than autonomy; some researchers use the term micro-nationalism to characterise far-reaching ambitions in these respects by smaller areas or population groups, for example, Basques and Corsicans, who aspire to an almost independent status for their territories.
5. *Irredentism* means seeking unification with a neighbouring territory controlled by members of the same ethnic group. One could refer to the interplay between Germany and German-speaking groups in surrounding countries in the inter-war years.
6. *Emigration*. One way out for persecuted groups is to leave the country. One example of this “exit” behaviour is the religious dissidents in England in the seventeenth century who settled in North America. Jews made up the overwhelming majority of those emigrants who left Russia during the decades before the First World War. This was also the choice among the East European Jews during different periods, for example, during the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, when Israel was an important migration target.

There are also “dominant minorities.” For centuries Germans in Estonia and Latvia were a privileged group, but one must warn against seeing the interplay between the Germans and the rest of the population in modern national terms.

28 The roots of diversity – migrations

Harald Runblom

Geographical mobility is a constant factor in European history. Migration is also a factor behind the current composition of population and mix of ethnic groups, not least in the Baltic Sea Region. In this region people have always been on the move. Nowadays we make a pronounced distinction between *international migration*, i.e. when people cross borders between countries, and *internal migration*, when people move within a country. This distinction is important because migration over the borders might have implications on the relations between the countries involved. From the individual's point of view the distinction between internal and international may be less important. What does it mean in terms of work, income and material well being? How does migration affect the relations to family and kin? Is it possible to join one's church, speak one's language and feel at home culturally in a new country or in another part of one's own country? What is the possibility of return? Individuals who move out of free will more or less consciously make a calculation and summing up of the pros and cons. Internal moves can be long-distance ones and lead to drastic changes. Imagine the extreme shift of environment for someone who leaves an agricultural village in Ostrobothnia (*Österbotten*) in north-western Finland, where the everyday language is Swedish, and moves to the Finnish capital, starts work in an industrial environment and has to use Finnish as his or her main language. In contrast, a businessman and his family who move from Stockholm to Hamburg in Germany or to Houston in Texas, may experience much less change and frustration, if they can move into equivalent job positions and similar social environments.

1. Past migrations

The old agrarian society was not immobile, but migration mostly took place within short distances, primarily within and between neighbouring parishes. Changes in the economic structure during the 18th and 19th centuries had strong effects on mobility. With industrialisation and the growth of cities, there was a need for mobile labour. Seasonal migration became important, and labourers spent part of the year away from home. Within the Baltic Sea Region seasonal migration was significant, and a steady flow of labour migration led to permanent settlements. All expansive large cities in the Baltic Sea Region were surrounded by areas from which they attracted immigrants, Riga, Hamburg, Copenhagen etc. After St Petersburg was founded in 1703, it attracted seasonal labour and permanent settlers from the surrounding countries. There is a strong element of tradition in migration patterns. It is possible to record

an almost constant emigration from coastal areas in Finland to Stockholm from the Middle Ages up to today.

Migration also occurred in the wake of political expansion and economic contacts between the countries. Hence, population movements were part of the German expansion eastwards during the Middle Ages. Germans colonised Prussia during the 13th century, and the Baltic Prussians who lived in the area were pushed away or slowly assimilated. The Teutonic Knights sought early to Christianise the Balts; one consequence was German immigration into contemporary Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. In all the Baltic territories the German (later called the German-Baltic) nobility came to hold a dominant position for centuries to come. Swedish expansion in the Baltic Sea Region in the 17th century stimulated mobility within the enlarged realm; farmers moved from Finland to the recently conquered Estonia.

You may regard the colonisation of northern Europe as a frontier movement. When population increased and the pressure on the land grew, some individuals and families had to make a choice: either to become marginalised in the agricultural sector, to move into a nearby city, or to seek their fortune in far away places in their own country or abroad. In the 19th century the Scandinavian countries had an “America within their own borders”, and there was much internal migration in order to populate regions in the north. In Finland, where industrialisation was late and urbanisation fairly slow, the result was a strong growth of the lower strata of the rural population which, in its turn, resulted in strong social tensions in the beginning of the 20th century. In Polish areas much of the “excess population” moved to industrial work in Germany during the decades around 1900. Large parts of Russia were colonised in a gradual movement eastwards, often in encounters with native peoples, some of whom were sedentary, others nomads. In Norway, Sweden and Finland the movement was directed to the north, and partly resulted in the subjugation and “colonisation” of the Saami population. These colonisation movements continued into the twentieth century.

People have moved extensively within the Baltic Sea Region. Many of the ethnic and linguistic minorities in the region are a result of population movements in the past. Place-names in Sweden and Norway testify to a large-scale immigration from eastern Finland in the 16th and 17th centuries. There is a recently awakened interest in this group, which maintained cultural and language characteristics for many generations. The Kven minority in northern Norway has its origin in the migration from northern Finland to northern Norway during the last two centuries.

2. Emigration to America

During the 19th century, the Baltic Sea Region, especially its western and southern parts, was increasingly integrated in the Atlantic economy, and there was a strong connection between internal migration and transatlantic mobility. For many individuals emigration was a gradual process, first from the countryside to some nearby city, then from the city to America.

One main result of the population increase was transatlantic migration. America as a continent opened up for European colonisation in the 16th and the 17th centuries, but the real mass movement took place between 1830 and 1930. The western countries of the Baltic Sea Region were affected earlier by emigration than those east of the Baltic Sea. This timing was also decisive for where the migrants settled. Danes, Norwegians, Swedes and large numbers of Germans tended to settle in rural surroundings in the American Midwest, while Estonians,

Latvians, Lithuanians and Russians, who arrived later, settled in large cities and industrial areas in the United States.

The existence of overseas populations has had a lasting impact, into our days, on the relations between America and Europe. For certain countries the national awakening during the decades around 1900 was a result of interaction between the European and the overseas parts of a nation's population. Agricultural workers in America who came from Polish areas discovered and developed their Polish identity in America and realised that they belonged to a nation, a European nation. Their national awakening had an impact on their compatriots in Poland proper. To provide other examples: Norwegians in America supported Norway's struggle to break up the unpopular union with Sweden in 1905, and the Finns in Finland had a strong backing from Finnish Americans during the two wars with Russia (1939-1940, 1941-1944). During the new liberation of Central and Eastern Europe in the years around 1990, some have returned to Europe. Emigrant Lithuanians and their descendants in overseas countries number more than a million. A country like Estonia has been able to draw on its many exile communities (in Canada, United States, Australia, Sweden) in her new phase of nation-building, a sign, if it can be counted as such, of the importance of international networks for small communities.

3. Deportations and war refugees

It is sometimes difficult to distinguish between internal and international migration. Would a move from Ukraine to Estonia before the break-up of the Soviet Union be considered internal or international? It is important, though, to note, that many moves were not *voluntary* but *forced*.

It may be worthwhile to place the last century's migration in the Baltic Sea Region in a wider context. In Europe, World War II resulted in fewer changes to the political map than World War I. However, the demographic effects were greater in 1939-1945 than 1914-1918, partly because of larger losses on the battlefields, sufferings among the civilian populations, and genocide. Population movements in the wake of World War II resulted in considerable losses to certain countries. A combination of "precautionary" and other measures led to forced population movements and deportations in the Soviet Union. Crimean Tartars, Volga Germans and Don Cossacks were forced away from their areas of residence. The alterations of the western border of the Soviet Union were preceded and followed by population transfers. The Nordic countries were affected by what happened in the eastern and southern Baltic Sea Region. In round figures 40,000 Estonians, 100,000 Latvians and 80,000 Lithuanians moved eastwards, coerced by Soviet authorities. During the final phase of the war Balts fled *en masse* overseas, with Sweden and Denmark as their ultimate goals. Some also sought refuge in Germany. To many Balts this was a first stage in a flight to non-European countries: the United States, Canada, Australia.

The adjustments of the borders between the Soviet Union, Poland, and Germany caused domino effects in terms of population movements, when masses of Russians, Belarusians, and Ukrainians moved into former Polish areas, while Poles were moved or fled to East Prussia and other areas which became Polish but had earlier been German. Germans (*Reichsdeutsche* as well as *Volksdeutsche*) on the other hand left these areas on their way west.

4. Post-war migration patterns

The migration picture changed dramatically in another respect during the early post-war period. Population losses during the war and low birth rates in combination with economic reconstruction programs created a demand for manpower in Western Europe which could not be supplied from within these countries. Fairly soon after the war a pattern of migration from southern to western Europe emerged.

There are some distinct flows in European migration after World War II. One way to classify them is presented here:

1. Migration in the wake of World War II
2. Labour migration
3. Migration from colonies to European mother countries
4. Refugee migration
5. Family reunion migration
6. Homeland-oriented migration
7. Re-migration

During more than five years of intensive warfare (1939-45) on the European continent, many people had been moved to theatres of warfare. Troops from belligerent states were far from their homes when the war ended. The home transportation of soldiers, forced labour, slave labour in nations occupied by the Nazis, deported people, Jews and others in camps took a large toll in bitterness, pain and suffering, and in many cases the homecoming was less than glorious. Add to this the extensive relocation of people as a result of border changes. Not least the German population was affected by the re-drawing of the European political map. Sweden was affected in different ways by these post-war movements. Baltic refugees arrived in large numbers during the last war year. Refugees who had come to Sweden during the war returned to their home countries, primarily Norwegians and Danes. Finnish war children, who had been placed in Swedish homes primarily during the Continuation War 1941-44, returned to their home country, numbering between 60,000 and 70,000. A smaller number of German soldiers returned home from Norway after a stop-over in Swedish camps, some of them quite unwillingly. Poles stranded in Sweden were forced to, and aided by, Polish authorities to go back to Poland.

5. Labour migration

Contrary to many pessimistic prognoses made by economists and politicians, Europe did not experience any post-war depression of the kind that hurt the area after World War I. In Sweden and Switzerland, where production capacity had been unaffected, and even invigorated by the war, scarcity of labour made itself felt almost immediately after the truce in May 1945. One way of recruiting both skilled and unskilled labour was to make labour force agreements with other countries. Sweden did so in the late 1940s with Central and South European countries, and this model was taken over by West Germany in the 1950s. The gradual establishment of the Nordic Labour Market (of which more below) can be seen in this context, and the system of free flows of labour between the European Union countries has a clear resemblance to the Nordic common labour market model. In some countries labour migrants were labelled guest workers, for example in Denmark and Germany. Sweden never



Figure 110. New Swedes make up a considerable portion of Swedish society today. Photo: Katarzyna Skalska

used this term, and the absence of the “guest worker” label reflected that Sweden hardly saw this migration as temporary.

The labour migration period in post-war European history ended at the beginning of the 1970s. West European governments stopped labour immigration, and this happened during the so-called oil crisis and a strong recession in the world economy. The economic crisis of the early seventies was, however, only one of several reasons why population mobility changed character in the 1970s. Since 1970 the number of refugees on a global scale has been rising almost constantly. Although many Third World countries have received larger numbers of refugees, many West European countries have been affected by refugee flows caused by growing intolerance and repression in non-European countries. It is hard to distinguish between refugees and economic

migrants, but given the fact that East-West migration in Europe has been of large magnitude during the second half of the twentieth century, the role of refugees is anyhow substantial. The large and dramatic migration flows that have affected Western Europe during the 1980s and the 1990s have not taken place within the organised frameworks. The flows of manpower within the regulated international labour markets (the Nordic countries, the European Union) are small compared to the much larger flows of asylum-seekers, refugees and family reunion migrants. On the other hand, European co-operation for controlling the flow of asylum-seekers has led to lower figures of those who seek refuge in some countries, e.g. Sweden.

Two of the neutral European countries during the war, Sweden and Switzerland, gained an economic and social lead. With a strong economic potential they were prepared for post-war production and these two countries were the first to open their gates to foreign labour. Within the framework of these systems, from the mid-1940s to the early 1970s an area developed in Western Europe with immigration countries: France, Switzerland, West Germany, Belgium, The Netherlands, Luxembourg, Great Britain, Sweden, and later on also Denmark and Norway. Pronounced countries of emigration were Finland, Portugal, and the Mediterranean countries Spain, Italy, Yugoslavia, France, and Turkey, as well as the former French colonies Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. To complicate the picture, even emigration countries were targets for migration. Somewhat schematically, three zones may be recognised:

1. *Centre* (West Europe)
2. *Semi-periphery* (parts of South Europe)
3. *Periphery* (rest of South Europe, bordering parts of North Africa and West Asia).

Parallel systems for migration recruitment also emerged in Europe: one in Eastern Europe, and one in Western and Southern Europe. With the erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961 the flow between these systems almost stopped. Before this date smaller migration streams reached Scandinavia from the Baltic area (1944-45), Poland (the years around 1945) and Hungary

(1956). Few immigrants arrived from East Germany after 1948. Yugoslavia, hanging between east and west, was integrated early in the Western system, and the regime in Belgrade not only permitted but also exhorted its citizens to seek employment abroad. Of the Nordic countries first Sweden, then Denmark, welcomed Yugoslavian labour.

From the beginning of the 1970s there was a slackening, even a reversion, of the labour migration streams to Western Europe. Several circumstances inter-played, most notably a deep economic recession, unemployment and the so-called oil crisis. Country after country in West Europe embarked on a restricted immigration policy. Free migration, to the extent that it existed, was stopped. Gradually, many governments sought measures (including economic benefits) to stimulate guest workers and their families to return to their home countries.

While the chances for labour migrants of entering a West European country became almost nil, the possibilities for the reunion of families increased. Denmark, Norway, and Sweden have embraced this pattern. Thus, as immigration was choked, the effect has nonetheless been a continued immigration in the wake of labour migration. The early 1970s also saw another significant change, the increase in refugee migrations to the free countries of the world.

Migration between the Nordic countries has taken place within a framework of extensive political cooperation. As early as 1943, Sweden abolished the requirement for labour permits for citizens from the other Nordic countries. Visa requirements were abolished for Danes, Icelanders, and Norwegians in 1945 and for Finnish citizens in 1949. This last measure opened the sluices for large-scale migration from Finland to Sweden. A full common Nordic labour market became a reality in 1954 when the same steps were taken in all Nordic countries. In 1955 another agreement improved social security for Nordic immigrants. Seen from a non-Nordic immigrant's perspective, a Nordic citizen in another Nordic country is the object of preferential treatment, or positive discrimination, if you like.

The factors behind the large inter-Nordic movements were mainly economic. The streams between Finland and Sweden have mainly followed the business cycles in the two countries. The community in culture and language has facilitated the intra-Nordic migration. As far as language is concerned, one exception is Finnish-speaking Finns; the language situation of this group has been one of the most discussed issues in Swedish-Finnish cooperation during recent decades. One should, however, not overestimate the ease of settling and adjusting in a neighbouring Nordic country. Some observers have pointed out that adjustment to a rather similar culture contains its special problem complex. The immigrant author Marianne Alopeaus, a Swedish-speaking Finn who moved to Sweden, has written about decades of cultural surprises in her new homeland.

6. Re-migration and repatriation

Return migration is an important part of international population flows, as said above. Every migration in one direction results in another flow in the opposite direction. The breakdown and fall of the Soviet Union and the communist regimes in Eastern Europe led to a "return" or homeland-oriented migration by the so-called Aussiedler Germans to Germany and Russians to Russia. Many of these referred to the fact that distant forefathers had left German territories several generations, and even several centuries, ago. A much discussed issue in Western Europe today is to get primarily non-European immigrants to return to their countries of origin. This is also effectuated, sometimes with quite substantial economic incentives.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union had a definite effect on the migration picture. One tendency is that people tend to return to their “home republics”: Russians return to Russia, Kazakhs to Kazakhstan. There is also a stream out of the former Soviet Union: Ethnic Germans return to Germany. One could label this trend as “the Return to the Homeland”.

A much-discussed topic among government people and scholars is: How large is the migration potential from the east to the west? The former Soviet Union is considered a possible source of enormous emigration. One might just recall the mass emigration from Russia and Central Europe around the turn of the 20th century. Some observers send out warning signals for large-scale “uncontrolled” migration, others say that there is no infrastructure that can channel large-scale migration. Transports, currency systems, information channels and social contact systems are not developed enough to make such a large-scale population movement possible. One must remember that migration always takes place in certain systems that are economic, political, and social. There is, of course, also a scenario of terror, namely that ecological or political catastrophes, like in Yugoslavia, will send people out on the roads.

Migration is bringing Europe closer to the rest of the world. Many countries which have traditionally been large emigration countries including Spain, Italy, Greece, Hungary and Poland, are now receiving people from nearby and remote areas. This is evident in southern Europe, but also a country like Finland, a traditional emigration country, has recently experienced an influx of refugees from the Third World.

7. Challenges to the immigration countries: the Scandinavian case

International migration has been a very important factor during the post-war era and has, indeed, served as a dynamic element in Nordic societies. Migration has altered the ethnic composition of populations, has added to the cultural and linguistic variety, and has confronted individuals and local communities with a spectrum of new life-styles. Immigration has also served as a challenge to traditional behaviour and policies in a variety of spheres: education, administration of justice, the medical service, and church-life. These changes have taken place in varying degrees in the five Nordic countries. The process started at different times. For the Nordic area as a whole, the last war years (1943-45) were important. One must remember, though, that the Nordic area has always been a target for international migration. Hence the countries have at all times received small numbers of immigrants from the countries around the Baltic Sea and the North Sea as well as Central Europe. All Nordic countries have experienced Jewish immigration, Denmark as early as during the seventeenth century.

Where do migrants settle? Most immigrants who have arrived in the Nordic countries have sought their abode in urban areas. Only during the early post-war years could agriculture and forestry absorb new labour. For example, many Estonians who arrived in Sweden in 1944 were directed to farms, and as late as 1947 there was a recruitment of agricultural labourers to Swedish farms from Hungary.

As long as immigration was practically free and unregulated up to the years around 1970, market factors and especially the demand for labour in industry and the service sector steered immigrants to cities and expansive industrial centres. The capital regions especially and the large industrial cities (København, Århus, Oslo, Stockholm, Göteborg, Malmö) attracted immigrants. During the years 1945-70 around 40 percent of the immigrants in Sweden settled in the Stockholm metropolitan area.

Border areas have their own patterns. For example, German immigrants have made up the largest immigrant group in Southern Jutland and the Danish islands. Danes in Sweden tend to settle in the southern provinces, and Finnish immigrants to Sweden are to be found in the central part of the country with a concentration on a broad axis from Stockholm to Gothenburg. There are also other regional ethnic patterns among non-Nordic immigrants. Turks are primarily concentrated to the largest cities, among them Copenhagen. The same holds true for Pakistanis: in Norway and Denmark they are mainly found in the Oslo and Copenhagen metropolitan regions, respectively. Balts in Sweden tended to



Figure 111. Finnish children returning home after having lived in Swedish families during the war (1945). Many of the so-called war-children never returned. Photo: *Arbetarrörelsens arkiv*, Stockholm

settle in south-eastern Sweden making up clusters in certain cities (Eskilstuna, Borås) whereas, on the other hand, immigrants from the United States and Great Britain tend to spread.

In some cities certain neighbourhoods are more strongly flavoured by immigrant culture than others, and immigrant districts exist in some larger cities, such as Ishøj in København, Rosengård in Malmö, and Tensta and Rinkeby in Stockholm. In Oslo immigrants have concentrated to the older workers' districts such as Grünerløkka. Many factors are behind the immigrants' choice: economic standard, housing market, availability of apartments, housing policy, and the immigrants' own cultural strategies. When labour immigration grew rapidly in the 1950s and early 1960s a housing shortage steered immigrants to old, inconvenient apartments in the old parts of the cities. In Sweden, the construction boom during the so-called record years (*rekordåren*) during the 1960s resulted in many new-built areas. Much of the new immigration was directed to these areas. In the 1980s there was a tendency in Denmark, Norway and Sweden to distribute refugees to a large number of communes. This has been one aspect of refugee reception programmes, in which the ambition of the governments has been to equalise the burdens of refugee reception. Within the communes the location of immigrants and refugees is largely a combined function of the public services and housing policy. As opposed to many world cities, where new arrivals cluster in slum areas in the city centres or *bidonvilles* in the outskirts, the tendency in the Nordic countries has been rather to place immigrants in large numbers in newly-built areas of decent standard.

In a few areas the strong concentration of immigrants from many parts of the world has led to unique cultures and even ephemeral hybrid linguistic variations. The clustering of immigrants in quarters of a city or town is sometimes an expression of discrimination and forced ghettoisation. But the settlement and housing patterns are also a reflection of the infrastructure of immigrant groups, as well as the need and ambition of individuals and families to support each other during an initial phase. One factor which influences concentration is chain migration; especially striking are the links created by clustering immigrants from Kulu, a rural area in Anatolia, and certain districts of Göteborg and metropolitan Stockholm.



Figure 112. Scandinavian mountains. Photo: Andrzej Szmal

8. Immigrants' cultural strategies

The various immigrant collectives behave quite differently in their new countries. A long series of factors decide the ambitions of both the individual and the group: the cause of migration, time of arrival, the sex composition and social structure of the group, level of education, basic values, and intention to return to the homeland. The collective strategies fall between two extremes, one to preserve as much as possible of the traditional culture in isolation from the host society, and the other to integrate as fully as possible. In the Nordic societies the former extreme is unusual. In reality the attitudes of ethnic groups are a compromise between the host society's demands and expectations, and the ambitions of the ethnic groups. One condition for the survival of ethnic groups (as ethnic groups) is the control of primary socialisation and the ability to keep the groups together in religious and secular organisations. The ambition to preserve the cultural heritage in modern Westernised societies is, generally seen, different between labour migrants and refugees.

Certain immigrant and ethnic groups are collectively anonymous and have a low profile in the Nordic countries. This category includes Norwegians, Danes, and Swedes in other Nordic societies: the migration is individual or based on single families; marriage migration is common; the geographical concentration in the immigrant societies is low; the spirit of association is weak. Language problems are minimal; hence the integration is rapid. This includes the Swedish-speaking Finns. (The Finnish-speaking Finns were discussed above.) As ethnic groups, French, Germans, Dutch, other West Europeans and North Americans have been fairly invisible during the post-war period, although some of them are among the most numerous immigrant groups. Baltic and Latin American groups in exile have had strong ambitions to preserve cultural traditions from their home countries. The political situation in the home countries has preoccupied Latin American expatriates. The mentality of exile has also

characterised the second generation, brought up in the Nordic countries. One effect, at least in Sweden, is that exiles from various countries in South America and Central America have come together and formed a Latin American community with an all-Latin-American culture and created an awareness of the continent that is not common in Latin America proper.

Chain migration is also of vital importance for the cultural life of ethnic groups. Thus, the arrival of Jews from Poland by the end of the war and during the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s from Central Europe has vitalised the Jewish minorities in Denmark and Sweden. The existence of the state of Israel has also meant an injection of life into the Nordic Jewish minorities, while on the other hand several Nordic Jewish families and individuals have emigrated to Israel.

9. New regional identities

Glasnost, perestroika, and the far-ranging political and social movements in Eastern Europe after 1985 have brought new prospects for the ethnic and cultural situation in the Nordic countries, too. Scandinavia's geopolitical situation has changed, and within the new framework of regionalism in Europe there are tendencies to re-establish old links and create new combinations. This also has repercussions in the ethnic minorities of the Nordic countries. New identities are to a certain extent shaped, and even the concept of the "North" (*Norden*) is undergoing a change. This is not least the result of ambitions among the Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) to gain a foothold in Nordic co-operation, something which they have already partly achieved through occasional observer status in Nordic Council meetings and by the rapid acceptance in many quarters of the idea replacing or complementing the Nordic Council with a Baltic council with much the same function. There is a strong likelihood that the Baltic countries, when their recently acquired independence becomes more established, will achieve a more permanent status in Nordic voluntary organisations and NGOs. This seems to have an effect on the identity building around the Baltic Sea.

It is interesting to see how old historical combinations around the Baltic influence the immigration policy and the conditions of ethnic groups. Denmark's and Sweden's roles as former regional great powers are reflected in attitudes to the Baltic groups. Estonians, especially, refer to the good old days of the late 16th and the 17th centuries, when Estonia was a Swedish province. The Swedish rule is contrasted to that of the German, the tsarist, and the Soviet regimes, sometimes with a romantic colouring.

Perestroika has led to a reactivation of support for the home countries by the Baltic immigrant groups in Sweden. The linguistic competence of exiles and their children has been used by the Swedish government and by Swedish firms in their contacts with the countries on the other side of the Baltic. Author Andres Küng is an example of a Swedish-born Estonian and he has even assumed the responsibility of serving as a member of the Estonian national assembly; other Balt-Scandinavians with him have taken on roles to promote cooperation between the Baltic area and the Nordic countries.

29 Majority-minority relations: an overview

Harald Runblom

1. Scandinavia

No country in the Baltic Sea Region could be labelled a pure nation state, and all countries in the region have to cope with complicated majority-minority relations, which are indeed of many different kinds. Issues about old minorities and new immigrants are on the political agenda in practically every country. A sweep around the Baltic Sea Region will give an idea about the complexity in this respect. To start on the Atlantic, Norway, which gradually achieved independence between 1814 and 1905, was long considered one of the most homogeneous countries from an ethnic point of view. This has changed. A citation from a Norwegian anthropologist illustrates the new situation: “Today a Norwegian living in Oslo is likely to ride to work in a tram-car driven by an Indian man, have his office cleaned by an Albanian family and shop for daily provisions from his local Pakistani grocer” (Long Litt Woon 1992).

Third World immigrants have come to Norway during the last decades, and they are visible especially in the Oslo region. Asian immigrants are more visible than representatives of the larger immigrant groups of Britons, Swedes and Danes. Despite the relatively low numbers of non-Europeans, immigration and the integration of newcomers have become topical issues: How many immigrants can Norway accept? Should immigrants stick to their culture or should they become Norwegians? Should Norway become a multicultural society? What happens to Norwegian culture when newcomers arrive? Norway has old minorities as well. For long there was a tendency to overlook the large Saami (Lappish) minority in the northern parts of the country; until the beginning of this century the policy was to assimilate and Norwegianise the Saami. This policy of cultural oppression has been changed gradually during the twentieth century. The Saami are now called an indigenous minority and given special rights as such. (More about the Saami below.)

Denmark was once a great power of northern Europe with small colonies or outposts in Asia, Africa and the Caribbean. Denmark has, like Sweden, gradually transformed into a small power, a peaceful transformation that could serve as a model for other countries. Being a kingdom that still stretches into the Atlantic, Denmark has some overseas territories (The Faroe Islands, Greenland) where the populations ask for various degrees of autonomy. The Faroese situation is a parallel to the Åland case; the standardisation of a Faroese language during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is one aspect of these islanders’ struggle for autonomy. The area along the Danish-German border is a classic example of border minorities.

Sweden. With a few changes the above broad picture can also be applied to Stockholm and other large Swedish cities. More than a tenth of the present population in Sweden has a recent background from abroad (either born in another country or with a parent from another country). The influx of immigrants after 1945 to the early 1970s reflected Sweden's need for labour. Most of the population exchange has been with the other Nordic countries. In Sweden the Finns have always made up a considerable share of the population. (Until 1809 Finland was an integrated part of Sweden). The arrival of large numbers of labour immigrants in the decades after World War II was fairly uncontroversial. The character of immigration changed in the beginning of the 1970s, when labour immigration from non-Nordic countries stopped, and refugees began to arrive in large numbers from Latin America and the Middle East. The main problem during the last two decades has been to provide newcomers with meaningful jobs and integrate them on the labour market during a structural change in the economy and repeated recessions. The role of non-European immigrants and refugees is one of the most burning issues in the political debate and public discourse.

Finland is traditionally a country of emigration. Much of the country's migration policy has dealt with the many Finns who emigrated to Sweden. What happened to them as individuals, and what would happen to them if and when they returned to Finland? Aspects of language have been important. Migration between Sweden and Finland takes place within the free Nordic labour market. Unlike Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, Finland has only in recent years experienced immigration from non-European countries, but numbers have been quite small. The main minority issue in Finland concerns the Swedish-speaking minority. Swedish was once the "majority language" of the Swedish kingdom (in which Finland was a part until 1809). Swedish-speaking Finns made up 14% of the population by 1900 but their share of Finland's population has fallen to 6%. Their decrease in relative terms is partly the result of emigration (earlier to America, after 1945 to Sweden). Urbanisation was also important and led to a large degree of mixed marriages with Finnish-speakers and, as a result, a language shift from Swedish to Finnish. The Swedish language has kept its position better in the countryside than in the cities.

2. Germany

During the last hundred years Germany has had a larger population turnover than any other country in the Region. The German population question is one with many geographical, historical, ideological and political facets. This is a result of political turnovers, harsh dictatorship, race politics, genocide, world wars, a divided nation, and unification. As far as population policies are concerned, Germany has been the hurricane centre of Europe. It is significant that the Berlin Wall was both constructed and destroyed because people were escaping from east to west. In this overview, we have to reduce the time perspective. A century ago Germany, like most other European countries, was an area of emigration, sending million after million to the New World, but Germany both sent and received labour. Foreign workers were the buffers between demand and supply on the labour market. On the eve of World War I, Germany counted as many as 1.2 million foreign seasonal workers from abroad, of which only a minority were German-speakers. Large numbers came from Galicia (then under Austria) and Polish areas. During the inter-war years the numbers of foreign workers were lower, but it is significant that Germany in the late 1930s, a period of *Aufrüstung* (preparation for war), was

Multicultural cities

While our first case, the Åland Islands, is a thinly populated “remote” area with a homogeneous population, our next case is a contrast: a large, culturally mixed city. The Baltic Sea Region is a highly urbanised area, and many of the cities in the region are meeting places of peoples with different backgrounds in terms of religion, culture, language, habit, and tradition. Some places in the region carry the legacy of multicultural and multilingual character – one might even use the word cosmopolitan. Historically, Viborg/Viipuri, is such a city. It was founded as a military outpost by expansionist Swedes in 1293; this city has been Swedish, Russian, Finnish, and Soviet and was once an overall trade centre and an important port for the export of Nordic forest products. It was a meeting place for western Lutheranism and eastern Orthodoxy and an episcopal see for both churches when the city was ceded by Finland to the Soviet Union in 1944. Viborg was the northernmost location for German settlers in the Baltic, and German was for a long time the foremost language of instruction in Viborg’s schools.

The German cultural influence was strong in many cities along the eastern coast of the Baltic: St Petersburg, Reval (today’s Tallinn), Riga (once the largest city in the Baltic Sea Region) and Königsberg (today’s Kaliningrad) and Danzig (today’s Gdańsk). Another example is Vilnius, which in the past sheltered a mixed population. The city was often called the Jerusalem of the North because of its large Jewish population. Many cities have become increasingly multicultural during the last three or four decades, for example, Berlin, Copenhagen, and Stockholm. One could add that Stockholm was at least in one respect more cosmopolitan in the 17th century, when even German and Dutch were spoken beside Swedish in the Swedish parliament, than in the 19th century.

St Petersburg. A case of population turnover and diversity Let us take a look at St Petersburg, currently the largest metropolis in the Baltic Sea Region and consider the population mix of this city! St Petersburg today has the same population as the whole of Finland or Denmark. It houses some five million inhabitants and is of great economic importance for Russia. It also has a strong potential as an economic and cultural partner for the Baltic Sea Region. The city was founded by Peter the Great in 1703 on the river Neva and became the capital of Russia. (After the Revolution in 1917 the capital was moved to Moscow.) Thanks to its location in an inlet of the Baltic Sea, the city became a strong magnet to other parts of the region. By tradition Germans, Finns, Poles and Jews lived in the city, but the German element more or less disappeared after World War I. The area around St Petersburg was the home of Finno-Ugric groups, primarily Ingrian Finns (in Swedish *ingermanländare*). Also, before Finns from Finland emigrated en masse to America in the late 19th century, they went in large numbers to St Petersburg to find jobs and to settle in the city. There was also a small number of Swedes (with a background in Sweden), and for Swedish industries, for example those of the Nobel family, St Petersburg was the avenue to the large Russian market. (Many of these had to return to Sweden after World War I, leaving much of their property behind; in Sweden these returnees were



Map 34. Multicultural cities in the Baltic Region. Throughout history, some cities in the region stand out as meeting places for many cultures. Of the thirteen cities on the map, several were trading points (e.g. Riga), some had a special administrative status (e.g. Fredericia), while others lay on the border area between two or more cultures (e.g. Kraków). After the Second World War, the map changed drastically when several of the cities, among them Viborg and Königsberg, changed population completely after their incorporation into the Soviet Union. Ill.: Karin Hallgren

Multicultural cities

called “Petersburg Swedes”.) St Petersburg also attracted migrants from the Baltic provinces. St Petersburg has always been a multinational city, much in contrast to the more ethnically homogeneous Moscow. In the 19th century there were those who talked of St Petersburg as an “un-Russian city” or a “German” city, and even today there are reflections of this in people’s attitudes. The continual change in the ethnic mix has been typical for St Petersburg. Before the Russian Revolution, Belarusians and Ukrainians moved in, and after World War I and the ensuing Civil War the city attracted refugees, some of whom soon left. In 1918 one fourth of the city’s population was non-Russian. In terms of population the city expanded rapidly because it served as a metropolis for the whole Soviet Union. St Petersburg suffered enormously during the 20th century. The city was partly destroyed during the Revolution. During World War I and the tumultuous postwar years the population was reduced to less than one half. Leningrad (the name of the city from 1924 to 1991) suffered during World War II, when the city was besieged and large numbers had to flee. During the Stalin era many of the Leningrad intellectuals ended their lives in the Gulag.



Figure 113. St Petersburg. Photo: Alfred F. Majewicz

The largest increase in population occurred during the 20th century, despite the setbacks of wars and revolution. This reflects the stronghold of Leningrad/St Petersburg in science, culture, production, and trade. High population turnover and the movement of people are significant. Despite the above-mentioned peoples from neighbouring countries – and assimilated or well-integrated Ukrainians and Belarusians – St Petersburg is still mainly a city of Russians, but the picture has changed and now you can count up to one hundred ethnic groups. The language assimilation has been strong, non-Russians have become Russian-speakers. The city’s character as the window on the west attracted large shares of so-called immigrants from other republics of the Soviet Union. St Petersburg has during recent years become a springboard for Russians and other ex-Soviets who want to emigrate to the west.

Perestroika and *glasnost* changed the ethnic landscape of St Petersburg. Many activities of ethnic groups came to the surface. There was a revival of ethnic cultural life. The Ingrian Finns, whose traditional ethnic base is the larger St Petersburg area, can be mentioned. Much of this group’s activities during recent years have been to publicise the suffering of the group during the Stalin era. The Finno-Ugric character of this group makes its relation to Finland special, and their situation has a parallel in the so-called Aussiedler (Germans living outside Germany). According to current Finnish policy, “historic” Finnish groups have the right to “return” to Finland and quite a few Ingrian Finns have used their right to return to the “old homeland”.

Organisations were formed among many ethnic groups in St Petersburg during the early *glasnost* years, and an inter-ethnic society, *Yedineniye* (Unity), was founded in 1988. *Glasnost* also unleashed other forces: anti-Semitic organisations appeared and latent hostility towards Jews came to the surface. The anti-Semites have a small base in the city’s population, but their spokesmen are vociferous. Three such groups can be noted: neo-Nazis who also turn against aliens in their hate campaigns; the more numerous Russian nationalists (propagating Russia for the Russians) who blame Jews for the political and economic troubles; and the “Soviet patriots” with a base among former bureaucrats and party functionaries. There have been attempts to measure the latent and open anti-Semitism in the city. According to one investigation, half of the population bears anti-Jewish antagonism in some form or another, while 15 percent display open anti-Semitism (Voronkov 1991). Nonetheless, a large part of the St Petersburg population has developed co-existence with Jews, whose tendency to intermarry with Russians and in the long run become Russians is quite pronounced.

Anti-Semitism is held up as one factor behind the large number of Jewish emigrants to Israel during recent years. It is disputed how strong this emigration potential is in St Petersburg. It is interesting to note, however, that Germany has stood out as the most desired goal.

short of labour and filled the vacuum by external recruitment. The situation during World War II was extraordinary. The war efforts all around Europe resulted in shortages of work forces on the home front. Labourers were “recruited” to Germany from occupied areas. More than 8 million foreign workers, mainly from Eastern Europe, were forced to Germany to fill the gap. They made up a third of the total work force in the Reich.

With a heavily reduced working population, the country was in bad need of extra manpower after the Second World War. (West) Germany gradually became dependent on an imported workforce again. This was intentional; Germany reached agreements with several countries (Italy, Spain, Greece, Turkey and others) during the late 1950s and 1960s. West Germany entered a policy of immigration, but officially, at least, the country only reluctantly developed into an immigration country. The idea was evident: people from other countries were invited to the BRD but they were not supposed to stay more than a few years. This was called the rotation principle, and the Germans developed a guest worker (*Gastarbeiter*) policy; later one talked about a staying guests policy (*Dauergäste*), when it was evident that many *Gastarbeiter* had a tendency to settle down permanently. As late as 1991 it was claimed in the *Bundestag* in Bonn, that Germany was not a country of immigration (*kein Einwanderungsland*).

Rising xenophobia is a tendency in several West European countries of immigration. Stealing from immigrants, attacks on homes of asylum-seekers and foreigners, demonstrations in favour of a restricted immigrant policy are more common now than a decade ago. Parallel to these phenomena we see, however, very sharp and decided activities from governments and organisations to counteract. These phenomena are evident both in countries with few immigrants, such as Norway, and countries with many immigrants, such as Germany, where confrontations between police and demonstrating youth have been vehement during recent years.



Figure 114. Networking minorities: Frisian – Kashubian. Photo: Alfred F. Majewicz

From a sociological perspective the German situation is extremely complex. Some observers see historic roots of German xenophobia. In German culture there has traditionally been a strong dichotomy between Germans and non-German (*deutsch* and *undeutsch*). The notion of Germans as one people (*ein Volk*) grew out of the German national process in the 19th century. And the idea of the Germans as one Volk is also linked to German wars: war purifies the people (or the nation). The current unification of the two Germanies and the amalgamation of the East Germans and West Germans have added another factor to the German identity process.

Germany received half of all asylum-seekers that came to Western Europe during the last decades. One reason behind this high figure is the liberal German laws. In the West German constitution of 1949 a basis is found for the benevolent reception of asylum-seekers, and article 16 reflects an ambition to settle accounts for atrocities in the past, i.e. Nazi Germany’s genocidal policies vis-à-vis Jews, Gypsies, Slavs, etc. Article 16 of the constitution states that West Germany can not refuse entry to an asylum-

seeker; his case has to be investigated in the country. An overwhelming majority of asylum-seekers have not qualified for refugee status according to the law, but many have nonetheless been allowed to stay for humanitarian reasons. A more restricted application of the law was introduced in the early 1990s.

The amalgamation of the two Germanies came about abruptly and took many West and East Germans by a surprise. The fusion of the two halves was indeed ideologically prepared in the west, where all GDR citizens were considered as potential citizens of a unified Germany. But 45 years of division has left its mark on mentality on both sides. After the demolition of the Berlin Wall in 1989 the existence of separate West German and East German identities was evident, and these differences can not be easily reconciled. Many former East Germans feel that unification was achieved only on West German terms.

One must not forget that regionalism in Germany is strong. The feeling for historical region is strong, a typical North German is a Protestant and a South German a Catholic and for many reasons they look differently on the world. Now a new, east-west dimension must be added. Germany has a federal political system, which prepares the ground for varying political solutions, and the restoration of the old *Länder*-organisation in former East Germany has given regionalism even freer scope.

The conditions for the Slavic-speaking Sorbian minority in Brandenburg reflects somewhat the German complex. The German Democratic Republic housed only one territorial minority, the Sorbs. In the constitution of 1949 Sorbs were granted the status of “socialist citizens of Sorbian nationality”. This was used as propaganda and through the protection of Sorbs as a minority, East Germany wanted to achieve international legitimacy and improved relations to “Slavic” republics in Eastern Europe. In return, the Sorbs had to accept the supremacy and infallibility of the Communist party. The government’s economic support for Sorbian culture was massive, but the effect double-edged. Sorbian ethnicity seems to have been on the decline during later decades, and more so among protestant than catholic Sorbs. Can a minority survive as a result of this combination of economic benevolence and pressure for ideological standardisation? After German unity, the Sorbs, who live in a brown coal district, have been hit harder by unemployment than the average Germans in the east, and they are under the added stress of anti-foreign attitudes. The future of the Sorbs as a minority is uncertain.

3. Karelia

Karelia is a border region between Finland and Russia. The Finnish seclusion from the Tsarist Empire in 1917 spurred the Karelians to seek independence, which was not achieved. There is one Karelia in southeastern Finland, and Karelia is also an autonomous region in Russia. The composition of the population changed dramatically in the Karelian ASSR. The Karelians, a nationality according to Soviet terminology, made up a tenth of the population in 1989 and were far outnumbered by the Russians (73%). This is in great contrast to the figures of 1929, when Karelia’s population was much smaller; at that time there were twice as many Karelians as Russians. The change in the proportion between these two groups is a result of large-scale in-migration of Russians (and to some extent other Slavic-speakers), out-migration of Karelians to other parts of the Soviet Union, and mixed marriages in which Karelians tend to shift language. After the 1917 Revolution, Finns moved in from Finland, Canada and the United States, hoping that Soviet Karelia would materialise as the socialist utopia. The

situation of the Finns was crucial during and after World War II, when the Soviet Union and Finland were at war.

4. The Baltic Republics

In *Estonia* the ethnic composition has changed during the 20th century. One of the most urgent problems in Estonia is to create a *modus vivendi* between the Estonian majority and the large Russian minority. Moreover, other nationalities have immigrated to the country under the Soviet system. The problem is complicated since the official Estonian line of argument is that the country was occupied by the Soviets and that the influx of people from other republics of the Soviet Union was an oppressor instrument. Many Russians lack citizenship in Estonia and are hence stateless but consider Estonia their home country.

Latvia. Historically Latvia is a multiethnic country. Because of its central location on the Baltic Sea some coastal points have been natural transit places for goods to and from a large hinterland. Latvia was early an object for foreign expansion and cultural influence: Viking raids in the early Middle Ages, Greek Orthodox mission, and Danish mission and colonisation. From the 1200s, Germans took over leading functions, because of the expansion of the Teutonic Order. For several centuries, high culture in the area bore a German stamp. The dominant groups have been Germans, Poles, Swedes, and Russians. Latvians made up the lowest strata of the population, with limited rights. One may wonder how the Latvians have been able to survive as an ethnic group, and how the Latvian language has been able to strengthen its position during the last two centuries.

Latvia, and especially Riga, was a centre and a garrison city in the Swedish empire. The Russian presence and influence is of later date, and it is striking that the Germans maintained their leading positions as landowners and administrators even after Peter the Great's takeover around 1710 during the Great Northern War. Russians did not move in large numbers until the late 1800s. Two factors were important for the growing Russian presence at the time, industrialisation and Russification. Russians appeared in the large cities, where impoverished Russian farmers made up a substantial part of the factory work force. This city/countryside division between Russians and Latvians is striking to this day.

A walk through Riga shows how different groups made an impact on the city, once the largest port on the Baltic Sea.

From a demographic point of view the situation in Latvia is parallel to that in Estonia. The ethnic composition of Latvia has undergone a dramatic change during the 20th century. The share of Latvians has gradually decreased, while the share of Russians has increased. Both in relative and absolute figures Latvians were fewer in 1989 than in 1935. There were several background factors: emigration during and after World War II, the deportation of Latvians to inner parts of Russia, and low birth rates among the Latvians during the last decades; one consequence is the increase in the number of old people. The Soviet occupation in 1940 soon led to purges among resistant Latvians. During the first year of Soviet occupation 35,000 Latvians disappeared. Some were killed, others were sent to Siberia.

Taken as a whole, migration was more important than natural increase for the growth of the population. The increasing number of Russians during recent decades is a result of Soviet industrial and population policy. Industrial enterprises were located to the Baltic republics and immigration followed in its wake. As noted above, there are strong regional differences

in the distribution of the respective ethnic groups. Immigrating Russians were located mainly in cities and industrial centres. In Riga, Latvians are a minority (36.5% in 1989), while the Russians amount to 47.3 %.

Many observers point at the conflict potential between Latvians and Russians in Latvia. Therefore it is necessary to analyse the relations between the two groups. The Russians in Latvia are not a homogeneous category. Some have deep roots in the country with a family history that goes back to early tsarist days. As a whole, this group is integrated in Latvian society. They are Latvian citizens, speak Latvian to a large extent, and quite a few have married Latvian men or women. This group can be regarded as the *integrated group*.

Somewhat schematically one can distinguish three other groups of Russians. A second group is the *immigrants*. They are Russians who by free will have moved to Latvia with the ambition of settling down there and making their careers in Latvia. The high standard of living in Latvia (and other Baltic republics) enticed some of them. This group has a relatively positive attitude to the new country. A third group, the *transients* are those Soviet citizens who more or less happened to end up in Latvia. Some were ordered there to work in industry or take up managerial jobs in plants, enterprises, or state bureaucracy. Many lived in other republics before they came to Latvia. Because of the high degree of industrialisation and development, especially in heavy industry, Latvia received a larger share of the transient Russian population than most other republics in the Soviet Union. This group shows a low degree of integration in Latvia, is unwilling to learn Latvian and to socialise with the Latvians. A fourth category, the *intruders* is related to the Soviet Union as an occupying power and consists of military personnel, functionaries and workers in strategic industry (of which Latvia has had a large share), party people, and those who held positions in the KGB and other surveillance organisations. In this category are many former military officers, who served all over the Soviet Union and who, upon retirement, have chosen to live in Latvia. The Latvians aversion towards the Russians mostly concerns this fourth category, which they see as representatives of the occupation power. The view of the Latvians is that the Soviet Union annexed Latvia in 1940 and occupied it until 1989.

In many respects one can compare the Soviet occupation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania with the Nazi occupation of Denmark and Norway. The German occupation of Scandinavian countries was an affair of five years while the Soviet occupation of the Baltic republics lasted almost half a century, from 1940/44 until 1990. (In December 1989 a Soviet commission acknowledged the existence of secret paragraphs in the German-Soviet "non-aggression pact" of 1939 according to which the Germans accepted the Baltic countries as a Soviet sphere interest.) In Denmark and Norway, German occupants (military troops, administrators, forced labour) had to leave immediately after the end of the war in 1945, while the effects of Soviet occupation on culture, language and population will be long-lived.

After the Soviet take-over in the Baltic area around a million were deported, a quarter of a million emigrated to Scandinavia, Germany and overseas countries during and after the war. Soviet occupation resulted in Sovietisation and Russification of all aspects of life: schools, culture, media, language, industry. Immigration from Russia and other Soviet republics was a combined result of economic and population policy. Estonia and Latvia, and to a lesser extent Lithuania, became advanced industrial areas. Russians, Russian culture, and the Russian language were given preferential treatment. Now that the Baltic republics have regained their independence, many counter-activities to the long Russian domination are of a cultural character. Latvians give priority to the protection of language, culture and historical monuments. Many Latvians fear that a liberal citizenship law in combination with demographic change can make the Russian population the majority group and lead to Russification again, in other



Figure 115. Jewish settlements in Lithuania. Photo: Alfred F. Majewicz

words a new take-over in “democratic disguise”. The understandable argument is that Latvian culture can only survive in Latvia, and overseas Latvians cannot fulfil this task.

The current regimes try to link up with traditions from the short period of independence. This also includes the minority policy. Estonians refer to the law of cultural autonomy from 1925, and Latvians also refer to traditions from the 1920s when the rights of minorities were protected.

Population groups in all three Baltic countries have been worried about the minority policy of the independent states. Will a new nationalism choke their aspirations? In Lithuania this concern led to the founding of a counter-front (in opposition to the Peoples Front), which gathered Poles and Russians, by far the largest minorities. Worries and complaints from these groups brought about a special law for national minorities (1989), which guarantees minority rights to schools, newspapers, organisations, religious congregations, etc. The ethnic composition of Lithuania reflects much of the country’s history. Russians (9% in 1989) and Poles (7%) are the largest minorities. Like in Estonia and Latvia, Russians are concentrated to the cities; they make up a fifth of Vilnius, and they dominate some industrial cities, like Snieckus, where Ignalina, the nuclear power station, is situated. Poles live in areas in the southern part of the country, which were Polish during the inter-war period. During much of its history the capital, Vilnius, was under Polish control. In the inter-war years Poles and Jews formed

the larger part of the population. The city was once called the Jerusalem of the North, with reference to its large Jewish group, tragically decimated during the last world war. The Jewish group is now quite small.

5. Poland

In Poland of today the population is homogeneous to a degree that it was in the early Middle Ages. Polish areas once encompassed large groups of Ukrainians, Belarusians, Germans, and Jews. Also, Poland has not always been so heavily Catholic as it is today. Much of Poland's shifting ethnic composition through the centuries is a result of fluctuations in the political situation. No country in the region has undergone such far-reaching and drastic changes of its borders. Poland has been victim of its neighbours' avarice: Sweden, Prussia, Russia, Germany. Adam Mickiewicz's epithet of Poland is expressive: The Christ of nations.

In the inter-war years ethnic minorities constituted a third of Poland's population, but after the war this figure was some five percent. Similar figures also refer to religion. Ukrainians were 15 percent and were represented in parliament, but they were under strong pressure to assimilate. Generally the relations between the Polish majority and the minorities were bad. The Jews suffered most. In the inter-war years the large Jewish population met the opposite attitude: they were isolated. The Nazi extermination during the war almost annihilated the Jewish minority. Among communist leaders and functionaries that the Soviet Union sent to Poland at the end of the war there were many Jews. They were later made responsible for the unpopular "reforms" during the Stalinist era. The Jewish population again served as scapegoat and was accused for the bad conditions. Authorities supported anti-Semitic and anti-Zionist campaigns. Emigration in the 1950s and the late 1960s reduced the Jewish group to a trickle.

After World War II population transfers with Ukraine and Belarus also reduced the ethnically deviant population. According to official sources no Germans stayed in Poland after the war, which was false information. Germans who claimed German nationality were allowed to leave the country in the 1980s and 1990s. Estimations vary, but the number of Germans is now supposed to be between half a million and 800,000.

Since the mid 1980s the situation for minorities in Poland has changed, which is a result of democratisation and improved international relations, especially with Germany. Germany has signed bilateral agreements with neighbouring countries regarding the mutual protection of minorities; an agreement with Poland was signed in 1991. The general attitude of the population may not have changed drastically and the situation in Silesia, the southwestern part of Poland with a traditionally large German population, will be a test for the future. Ethnic minorities are now allowed to form associations and act publicly; nine



Figure 116. Education in Jewish history. Kazimierz, former Jewish quarter in Kraków. Photo: Alfred F. Majewicz



Figure 117. Günter Grass – Nobel Prize winner in literature, a German of Kashubian origin. Photo: Alfred F. Majewicz

German representatives were elected to the *Sejm*, the Polish parliament, as a result of the elections in 1991.

The Kashubian case illustrates much of the minority conditions in Poland over the centuries. Kashubes live in what is often called the Kashubian Switzerland, an area that stretches west and northwest of Gdańsk. The Kashubes are one of the most distinctive cultural groups in Poland but, as usual, nobody can tell exactly how many they are. They have never constituted a nation, because they have never aimed at creating a political unit of their own. They are of Slavic

descent, and the Kashubian language – some say it is only a Polish dialect – is Slavic. Over the centuries the Kashubes have maintained their cultural features, but the Germans and the Poles especially have influenced them from several angles. The Polish influence was strong during the late Middle Ages, when the upper social strata of Kashubians were polonised. Fishermen and peasants maintained the Kashubian culture. After the division of Poland, Kashubians were exposed to pressure from the Prussians, and German culture was strong in school and church.

The Kashubians were slow in adopting nationalism as a principle, but many Kashubians sympathised with the Polish struggle for independence in the 19th century. Kashubian ethnic identity is deeply rooted in Polish national identity. Typical are the words of the Kashubian poet Jan Hieronim Derdowski: “There is no Kashubia without Poland and no Poland without Kashubia”. During the inter-war years much of Kashubia was located within the Polish corridor. Poles were negative to the Kashubian culture and Kashubes were accused of having “German manners”. Later, during the German occupation, they were badly treated by the Germans; priests and teachers were executed, which led to resistance activities.

The Kashubian story shows how difficult it is for a distinct group to maintain its culture, and in the post-war period there were problems because Poland did not officially acknowledge cultural minorities. There are, however, new signals, and when the Pope visited Poland in 1987 he praised the Kashubes for their loyalty to the Kashubian language and culture.

6. The Jews

Jewish immigration has long been prevalent in the countries around the Baltic Sea, and the treatment of Jews can serve as a measurement of the general tolerance – or intolerance – towards foreigners. In European diasporas, the Jewish people have lived for centuries in relative isolation with social networks, culture and language that have made them distinct from the rest of the population. Jewish minorities have often filled a function, more or less imposed upon them, as merchants and moneylenders. As a distinct group in society, they have often been scapegoats during periods of depression or when things went wrong as, for example, during the Great Plague in the 14th century. During the era of the Crusades violent persecutions of Jews took place in Western Europe.

As early as the 11th century, Jewish settlement took place in Poland. During the 13th and 14th centuries, when the Polish kings encouraged immigration, Jewish refugees from Western Europe were given protection and, to a certain extent, liberal rights. During the 16th and in the beginning of the 17th centuries the Polish-Lithuanian Jewry formed a spiritual centre for Jews throughout the world. This was a golden age, with extensive Jewish self-governance and a high level of religious culture. The Jewish population upheld an important economic function on a medium level between the peasants and the gentry, for example as leaseholders; another important task for them was to handle tax enforcement. Development during the 17th century had a detrimental impact on the Jewry in Poland and Lithuania. It has been calculated that the number of Jews dropped from between 300,000 and 500,000 in the 1640s to some 120,000 in the 1670s. Massacres of the Jews in that period of time were the largest before those of the Holocaust during World War II. In purely demographic terms, the Polish Jewry recovered during the 18th century, but they were then reduced to poverty.



Figure 118. Prayer notices (on a Jewish gravestone in Poland).
Photo: Alfred F. Majewicz

During the 16th and 17th centuries the Jewry in Germany was able to return to many of the cities from which they had been expelled in the Middle Ages. During the 18th century a certain group of so-called court Jews had crystallised. Many of them were wealthy merchants and close to the royal families, but the large masses of Jews were poor and suffered from discrimination. In Denmark immigration by Jews was not allowed until the 17th century and in Sweden until the 18th century. There was a hope that wealthy Jews would come, invest their capital and bring good international contacts. In this respect the arrival of Jews was a disappointment, since many of those who actually arrived were poor German Jews, and therefore they were given limited rights in their new countries.

The 19th century was, in general, an era of the so-called emancipation for the Jewry. Gradually their civil rights were extended in western European countries like Germany, Denmark and Sweden. Another side of the coin was that much of the solidarity within the group was lost in the process. Assimilation was beneficial to the Jew as an individual but detrimental to the Jewry as a people. There were religious as well as non-religious forces that served as a counterweight, above all Zionism, a movement that aimed at creating a Jewish national state. But in the shadow of growing nationalistic tendencies all over Europe in the 19th century, the pressure on the Jewish population increased. Anti-Semitism (the actual word was coined in 1873) had a severe impact on the Jews in Germany and Poland, and a new dimension was added when racist theory gained ground during the late 19th century. There were similar tendencies in Denmark and Sweden, but much less pronounced.

In the beginning of the twentieth century the Jewish population around the Baltic Sea was divided in two groups that differed considerably from economic, social and cultural points of view. While the Jewish elements in Germany, Denmark and Sweden formed a largely assimilated group of the population, those in Poland, the Baltic countries and Russia were much more bound to orthodox Jewish traditions and also lived very much separated from

the majority populations. In Eastern Europe, tightly knitted Yiddish enclaves existed both in the cities and in the countryside. Many villages were formed by Jewish culture, so-called *shtetls*. Much of the *shtetl* life in these places has been brilliantly portrayed in Nobel laureate Isaac Bashevis Singer's novels. The Polish-Lithuanian Jewry developed into a centre both for Orthodox Judaism and for secular Jewish movements such as Zionism and Bundism, the latter being a Socialist movement. Anti-Semitism was a constant threat, in Western Europe more so as a social movement, while anti-Jewish laws were in existence in Russia until the fall of the tsarist government in 1917.


While the emancipation of the Jews in Western Europe meant a liberation on individual grounds – without any official minority policy – the Jews in Poland and the Baltic countries were acknowledged as minorities in the newly independent republics. This was an opportunity for the Jewish population to be on equal terms with other groups in cultural and political life. In Lithuania, where the Jewish population amounted to more than 150,000 (7.5% of the population), there were in 1936 more than a hundred Hebrew and Yiddish elementary schools, 60 secondary schools etc. The conditions in Latvia were similar. In the anti-Semitic atmosphere of the 1930s the Polish Jews were victims of vicious pogroms, while the Baltic Jews suffered from antisemitic agitation. In Latvia, Jewish autonomy was abolished after the coup d'état in 1935. During the Holocaust, the largest genocide in world history, the Polish and Baltic Jewish cultures fell into pieces. Only a tiny fragment of the Jewish populations survived. (The fate of the Jews under Nazi rule is treated above in section I.)

The Åland Islands: a case of homogeneity

Harald Runblom

Let us turn to the middle of the Baltic Sea, where the Åland Islands are situated. Geographically these thousands of islands once linked the western and eastern parts of the Swedish kingdom, which until 1809 included both Sweden and Finland. As in many other parts of northern Europe the question has been raised: Where did the people of the Åland Islands originally come from? There are relics from stone age culture on the islands, but nobody can define their origin with certainty. It is clear both from archaeological data and place names that the Åland Islands were settled from the west during the Middle Ages. People moved in from Sweden proper.

Today the Åland Islands make up a province in Finland. In terms of language, the Ålanders belong to the Swedish-speaking minority in Finland. The old links to Swedish culture are important to the Ålanders, since these links provide historical arguments in their struggle to withhold and strengthen their special status in Finland. The Åland Islands have a large degree of autonomy.



Map 35. Åland, between Sweden and Finland in the Baltic Sea, is a part of Finland, but has a high degree of autonomy. Åland is a prime example of an unusually homogenous society. Ill.: Karin Hallgren

Any visitor to the islands is struck by the ambition of the Ålanders to emphasise the uniqueness and special culture of the province. The Ålanders say neither they are Finns, nor Swedes, but Ålanders. Collectively the Ålanders are anxious to protect their culture, much of which is linked to the language. The interest in local folklore is strong, and the number of books published every year about the culture, historical monuments and traditions of the islands is impressive. Åland does not have strong academic traditions (the few who aspired to a learned career moved to Helsingfors/Helsinki, Stockholm, Åbo/Turku or Uppsala) but during the last century the area around Mariehamn has become a strong educational city for its size. Contacts between Ålanders scattered abroad

The Åland Islands: a case of homogeneity

and those at home are also lively, which is especially important since Ålanders have moved in large numbers to mainland Finland, Sweden and North America.

One might argue that the Åland case is marginal or untypical for the Baltic Sea Region as a whole. The Ålanders form less than one half of one percent of Finland's population. On the other hand, this case illustrates much of the majority-minority problem in the region as a whole and in modern Europe. Ålanders are aware of the risk that the Islands could easily become prey to Fennization. Since the number of Ålanders is only 25,000 (1994), they could easily be outnumbered if Finnish-speakers from the mainland chose to move in. During the last ten years the Ålanders have established contacts with other areas and population groups in Europe with similar situations, for example, the Faeroe Islanders in the Atlantic and the Frisians in Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands.

Åland's special status in Finland is a result of the Ålanders' political actions and of negotiations between the local assembly and the Finnish government. The international turmoil in the wake of World War I both stimulated the Ålanders to change their status, and gradually gave room to manoeuvre. Even before Finland had become independent in 1917, the Ålanders organised a referendum. The result was a clear expression that the population wanted Åland to become part of Sweden. This turned into a delicate issue for the Finnish and Swedish governments: the Finns rejected the idea, the Swedes were reluctant and unwilling to act. The question of the Åland Islands was soon submitted to the League of Nations, which decided that the islands remain Finnish. The Ålanders were given a special status, and the present autonomy is the result of 70 years of negotiations between Mariehamn and Helsingfors/Helsinki. A new autonomy law came into force in 1993, widening the sphere of Ålanders' right to legislate in municipal matters, social assistance and communication. The new law also mentions other spheres of legislation (for example, banking and alcohol policy) which may later on be transferred from the Finnish parliament to the regional parliament in Mariehamn.

Dilemmas of a small nation. One could talk about the dilemma of the Ålanders. The question marks are many. First, there are economic issues. Ålanders are aware of the fact that they need a strong economic base. A sound regional economic policy is important; otherwise the province will lose much of its bargaining capacity vis-à-vis Helsingfors/Helsinki. Cultural and economic issues are intertwined, but how do you preserve and develop a culture, originally based on fishing, small-scale shipping and agriculture? The Ålanders have been successful in finding economic niches, mainly in vegetable production, tourism, and shipping, but the problems in periods of swift structural change are evident; one suggestion is to make Mariehamn the casino capital of the North.

A second issue is how to protect culture, language, and tradition in surroundings where forces of internationalisation are strong. How do you protect a local culture within a nation-state (Finland) which is involved in far-reaching regional cooperation (with the other Nordic countries) and which since 1995 is a member of the European Union with all possible consequences of the free movement of capital and labour? The law of governing autonomy safeguards the Swedish language and serves as a barrier towards immersion in the Finnish language, for example, by means of rather strict and restricted rules for outsiders to settle and seek domicile. This is in conflict with a main principle of the European Union, namely the principle of the free movement of labour.

Very few Ålanders advocate today that the islands should be totally independent, and no voices recommend that the islands break away from Finland and seek association with Sweden. During the negotiations leading to Finland's membership in the EU from 1995, the Ålanders were quite successful in holding its own both with Finland and the Union. The Islands have a special status in the EU, and the Ålanders were able to uphold the exclusive right for themselves to own real property.

The Åland Islands could be considered a border region between Finland and Sweden. As for politics, Finland's sovereignty over the islands is undisputed, and the current status of the islands within the republic of Finland has been solved in a way that satisfies the Ålanders. It is the cultural aspect that reveals the border character. Since Ålanders are Swedish-speaking, there is an immersion of Swedish culture through newspapers, literature, radio, and television. The ether media are available through special agreements between Sweden and Finland within the framework of co-operation in the Nordic Council. Leading Swedish entertainers, singers and musicians have a market on the Åland Islands. The cultural reliance on Sweden is much stronger than in the rest of Swedish-speaking Finland, where the Swedish-speakers to a large extent live in bilingual milieus but with a dominant Finnish language. The "cultural dependence" of the Ålanders on Sweden is also connected with the island's character as a tourist resort for Swedes, thus giving many Ålanders daily contact with the pulse of the neighbouring society in the west. (This is in strong contrast to sports, where there are hardly any links between the islands and Sweden: Ålanders share the sports world with mainland Finns, and in international athletic competitions there is no doubt where Ålanders have their sympathy.)

The Åland case brings a lot of issues of principle to the fore. How can relations between a minority and a majority population be solved? What are the international implications when a territory or a segment of a country's population prefers special treatment which has implications for the security of the whole region? (The Åland Islands comprise a demilitarised zone, and Ålanders are exempt from military service in the Finnish army.) The Åland case may also provide a basis for reflection on the duties and obligations of the minority vis-à-vis the majority. Since the Ålanders want to protect themselves from the cultural and linguistic inundation of Finnish, one may wonder whether the majority population should have the right to settle down or to use their own language (Finnish) on the Islands, where the Swedish language almost has a monopoly situation.

7. The Saami of the North

The *Saami* (former usually *Lapps*) live in a wide area in northern Scandinavia. The Saami interpretation is that they were the earliest inhabitants in the area, and that the others (Finns, Norwegians, and Swedes) came later and therefore are to be seen as immigrants in *Sápmi* (the land of the Saami). Recent archaeological findings substantiate this view. Both the number of



Figure 119. A Saami reindeer owner with his animals. Photo: Andrzej Szmal

the Saami populations and speakers of Saami languages/dialects are hard to establish. There is no such thing as an unambiguous definition of a Saami. The Saami population amounts to approximately 40,000 people in four countries, Finland, Norway, Sweden and Russia. Many of those who consider themselves Saami have become urbanised. Hence, concentrations are to be found in cities like Oslo, Stockholm and Göteborg. After constant repression from the governments towards the Saami culture in Sweden and Norway, which culminated by the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, the policy now is to

protect Saami language, culture and societal life. This is partly due to demands from the Saami. Especially after World War II, the Saami have organised in order to promote their economic, political, and cultural interests. It would be wrong to say that there is a Saami autonomy, but both in Sweden and Norway the parliaments have accepted representative Saami councils. One reason for this is the need for authorised bodies for negotiations with the governments. Also, these councils will have influence in the sphere of language development, culture and schooling. The first elections to Saami councils were held in 1989 in Norway and 1993 in Sweden. Traditionally, the Saami have supported themselves mainly by fishing, hunting and reindeer herding; handicraft has also been important. Modern reindeer herding uses all available technology, e.g. helicopters to gather and drive herds. The majority populations' request of traditional Saami areas for colonisation, mining, roads and tourism have led to conflicts between the Saami and the majority society. Balancing ecological needs is delicate. Among current conflicts are the tendency among the Saami in some areas to keep more reindeers than can be sustained by the environment, and river regulations for electricity that threaten vital pasture lands.

30 Models of coexistence in a multiethnic society

Hans Ingvar Roth

1. The claim of ethnic groups

In a multicultural society various groups often raise demands or claims with the intention of improving the standing of the group visavi the state and other groups of society. In a multicultural society of a liberal-democratic kind, these claims are raised within the framework of a more or less organized and open public dialogue. An important objective of a public dialogue is to identify morally relevant characteristics of various ethnic groups. These characteristics motivate different forms of attention to the ethnic groups, which may find expression in terms of land or property rights, rights to freedom of religion, language and educational rights, and certain forms of representation in political institutions.

Some salient characteristics of ethnic groups are size, *territorial dispersion*, *border location*, *aboriginal status*, *historical standing*, *vulnerability*, *degree of self-identification* and *organizational structure*, and *cultural distinctiveness* or *cultural distance from the majority culture*. An ethnic group may have a specific characteristic that motivates a certain form of attention to their demand for cultural preservation. Some groups may also have faced a grim history of discrimination which may motivate certain group-targeted measures such as “positive action” or “affirmative action” in the American sense of the term.

An ethnic group may, for example, be concentrated as in the case of the Russian population around Narva in Estonia or in Riga, Latvia. The controversies may be based upon Russian claims that are seen as too “distant” from the perspective of the Estonians or the Latvians. Another type of issue may have its origin in the question of vulnerability. How vulnerable is the Russian community given the new Estonian or Latvian state? Do they have a strong culture on their own and/or do they have support from “outside”? Another matter is the feasibility of the Russian claims when they are not too ideologically distant vis-à-vis prevailing Estonian or Latvian ideas concerning the character of the new society. All these cases bear traces of reference to certain common values in the dialogue between the ethnic groups. On the basis of a certain characteristic such as size or native status, a demand for cultural preservation from an ethnic or national group may become urgent in order to fulfil a certain value.

Territorial minority status and cultural distance are associated with the values of commonality and the provision of public goods. If an ethnic group is a territorial minority and regards

itself as alien in terms of culture vis-à-vis the majority culture, the group may have a case for independence or sovereignty. Otherwise the commonality in society may be threatened. In addition, considerations of the public good may be relevant. How easy is it to maintain the provision of a certain public good for the different ethnic groups with the new independence? Could they, for example, provide enough services in terms of security or environmental goods?

The border location of an ethnic group may introduce considerations about general security in the area. How will people from the same ethnic group across the border react to different measures? If an ethnic group is a border minority it may have characteristics such as non-dispersion and may also be more or less non-vulnerable if it has close ties to the same ethnic group across the border. Further, the degree of self-identification and organizational structure are relevant for the issue of self-government.

Issues concerning the vulnerability of the ethnic group may be connected to values such as the maintenance of cultural diversity overall in a multicultural society. Relevant values also include autonomy and prosperity for people in the ethnic groups. The question of the size of the ethnic group may be linked to values such as stability or social peace, which may be threatened if the neglected ethnic group is considerable in size. Further, the feasibility of the claims may be related to values such as efficiency or general welfare.

Other morally relevant features of ethnic groups are native status and historical standing. If an ethnic group has existed in the region from the earliest known period or from an early period, the assumption is that the region plays a crucial role in the self-identification of the people. The Saami population is a good example in this case. Even though they have lived a nomadic life for long periods, they identify themselves strongly with northern parts of Finland, Norway and Sweden. Conditions for identity may be seen as something valuable and thus justify the recognition of the special status of an indigenous group or a national minority (or a group with an old historical standing) within a certain area.

The distinction between geographically isolated and non-isolated minorities is relevant today for the issue of cultural autonomy (or sovereignty) if the minority is culturally different from the majority group. A minority has a stronger case for cultural autonomy when the group lives isolated from the majority, so that it will not come into conflict with the majority population. However, the question is whether this distinction between isolated and non-isolated minority groups is morally relevant in times when communication has become more intense and global. It may be a question of degree, but sooner or later an “isolated” minority group will encounter the majority population. If the groups are culturally different, conflicts of value will exist and they will have to be resolved. Complete cultural and political autonomy for the isolated group may then not be a feasible option.

These are some examples of features of ethnic groups in public discussions that make it plausible to assume that some common values linger on in the background of the dialogue. The different groups have to make a case, and this cannot be done without reference to something that is shared among the participants in the public dialogue, i.e. some shared values. The three crucial questions in assessing the claims from different minorities are: (1) what are the characteristics of the groups, (2) what kind of values do the groups make their case from, and (3) what form of claims do the groups raise against the majority culture?

2. An overview of models

The most well-known models of immigrant or minority integration are the *majority-conformity (or assimilation)*, *melting-pot* and *cultural pluralism models*.

The majority-conformity model is simply the statement that the minority groups should be assimilated into the majority culture. There are different ways of classifying *assimilation*. One theory of assimilation that is still influential has been formulated by the sociologist Milton Gordon. Gordon describes assimilation in terms of different sub-processes. An early phase is *cultural* assimilation or acculturation, in which the minority group conforms to the culture of the dominant group. Another phase is *marital* assimilation, where members of the minority groups marry members of the dominant group. An example of marital assimilation is the marriages of Finland-Swedes to Finns. *Structural* assimilation is regarded as a large-scale entrance into the institutions of the majority group. This phase presupposes the acceptance of the minority by the majority in various primary groups. *Civic* assimilation implies an absence of value and power conflict between the majority group and the minorities. The majority-conformity model may be expressed in strong terms, and it may also imply that ethnic differences should be watered down. The ideal is then the ideal of an ethnic homogeneous nation state. But generally in a society of a more liberal kind, the assimilation or majority-conformity model is expressed in cultural and not in ethnic terms.

The underlying assumption in the former kind of model is that society needs a certain degree of cultural homogeneity in order to maintain, among many things, stability and some feasible “lingua franca” culture. Many other arguments may be presented in terms of justice, for example. The majority culture may claim that it is unjust that a society which has been built up and organized by the majority group should now be re-organized on the basis of the interests of newcomers that may not have the new society as their primary foci of identification. The majority group could say that it is enough from a perspective of justice if the immigrant groups are allowed to live there, and enjoy the same social and political benefits as the majority population. Especially if the minority groups also have their home countries to return to.

The majority-conformity model provokes questions about the value of the autonomy of various ethnic groups. On the basis of this ideal it is often assumed that an ethnic group should be able to pursue its own way of life without any coercion for absorption into the majority culture. However, the autonomy ideal needs to be qualified if various groups should be able to live together in a shared society. The different groups need, in many walks of life, a shared “lingua franca” – culture, for example, in the case of language and in certain spheres of education. This lingua franca culture need not be (and many people would say – should not be) in every respect the culture of the majority population. Apart from a shared language, which is often the language of the majority, other elements may be seen more as joint ventures where both sides – the majority and the minorities – need to make certain compromises if the shared projects should be feasible in the long run. The identification with the overall society may also be stronger from the perspective of a minority group if the members feel that they are able to contribute to the shared enterprises, not at least in the cases of the norms and the visible cultural customs of society. If a state has allowed minorities to enter society, and have accepted them as full-blown members, this also means that the country belongs to the minorities as well as to the majority population. The minorities should then have the opportunity to influence the institutions of society regardless of the historical standing of the groups in question. If the minority is a historical one or an indigenous population, this may also affect what kind of cul-



Figure 120. Minorities as the focus of ethno-linguistic research – a lecture on Kashubian minority. Photo: Alfred F. Majewicz

tural claims are realistic to make – especially in the case of territorial rights.

From a perspective of global justice, certain values or goods should not be seen as exclusionary in the sense that they only belong to the majority population in the country (or the historical minorities) in spite of the fact that they have been “produced” by the native populations. A value with more global dimensions could be, for example, society’s specific potential of being a secure haven for political refugees, and this presents a motive for being more hospitable towards groups that have their historical origin in another part of the world.

A different model is the *melting pot* model which could more or less harmonize well with the idea of a minority sensitive “lingua franca” culture. This model also emphasizes the need for unity in a society, but the unity emerges in different ways through a mutual, autonomous interaction among different immigrant groups or historical minorities. The various ethnic groups become involved in a pooling of cultural traits, and a new blend emerges from the diversity. A famous formulation of this ideal was made by the

19th century American philosopher Ralph Waldo Emerson: “so in this continent – asylum of all nations – the energy of Irish, Germans, Swedes, Poles, and Cossacks, and all the European tribes, of the Africans, and of the Polynesians, will construct a new race, a new religion, a new state, a new literature, which will be as vigorous as the new Europe which came out of the smelting of the Dark Ages...”. (Abramson 1980, p. 152)

The melting pot model raises questions about the value of diversity itself. Why should we strive for unity in all spheres of society? Is cultural diversity not something intrinsically valuable, can diversity also lead to cultural and moral progress? Some pluralist writers were influenced by 19th century romanticism, which emphasized the value of cultural differences.

One may also ask whether different groups participate in the process on equal, autonomous terms. According to the melting pot ideal, everyone should be involved, minorities as well as dominant cultures. But will not majority groups prevail and dominate the minorities in a way which makes it hard to distinguish the melting pot model from the conformity ideal? The response is to emphasize the need for cultural minority rights which make it possible for the more vulnerable minorities to cultivate their more specific cultural traits. A mosaic of differences is a possible metaphor for this ideal of cultural pluralism. This metaphor has mainly been used in Canada in order to describe multiculturalism. Other metaphors common in the debate are “orchestration”; by the 1960s the image of the salad bowl replaced other metaphors. The different cultures are seen as necessary parts of a valuable whole. The cultural distinctiveness is not officially meant to be a politics of

negative segregation which neglects values such as social equality. Cultural differences should be allowed to exist at the same time as social equality between the groups should be achieved.

The *model of cultural pluralism* is difficult to pin down. It may be interpreted as the statement that a society should have a climate which encourages every ethnic minority group to retain its individuality. As it stands, the model is imprecise and indeterminate. It needs to be spelled out. Within what kind of societal context is the pluralism supposed to exist? According to Horace Kallen, democracy allows people to develop their own cultural heritages. The cultural pluralism principle in this formulation assumes, then, that people have something in common, namely, democratic rights within a shared public arena, which allow them to preserve their cultural diversity. One could also say that the ideal of cultural diversity presupposes that the different groups of society meet each other and exchange ideas within shared activities in society, many of them located in a shared civil society. Cultural, recreational and scientific enterprises could, for example, present important meeting places for members from various minority groups.

3. Cultural pluralism

So far we have been operating with political responses to an assumed diversity within a society. It could be suggested that many multicultural societies have implicit views about common goods that shape the public sphere, and which also define the societal contexts where pluralism should be encouraged. The diversity may, in other words, be a spurious diversity or a diversity that actually presupposes some common values. As Frank Wong has expressed it: “It is not a multicultural community that we seek; it is an *intercultural community*, where different groups engage each other with united purpose. We seek not a community of the lowest common denominator, where differences are tolerated and sometimes sullenly accepted, but a community of the highest common denominator, where difference is an enriching resource that leads us to a fuller understanding of what is universally true”. (Wong, 1992, p. 45)

One potential common ground presents itself in the concept of culture. Why does culture matter? There are several plausible reasons different ethnic groups in a multicultural society might accept. Culture matters because it provides the grounds for people’s identities. Hence, it can also create a sense of belonging. Culture in a broader sense defines a set of spheres within society, such as family institutions, professions, and religion, which provide individuals with different roles. The role models constitute parts of their identities. A culture framework also provides material for expressing life-views, religious allegiances and in more general terms, human creativity. If we assume cultural diversity of some form, not necessarily a radical one, the availability of cultural options enhances the autonomy of the individuals. Diversity may also make it easier for individuals to give voice to their identities in a changing environment. A popular argument is the argument from intellectual and moral progress. Some kind of diversity is necessary in order to make room for progress in art, science and morals. These arguments for diversity could more or less be seen as shared commitments among different ethnic groups (and other “identity groups”) who enter a specific form of public dialogue. The problem with this form of public dialogue is how to strike the right balance between diversity and cultural homogeneity.

The acceptance of cultural pluralism also means respect for the identities of people from different ethnic and religious groups, for example sincere expressions of life-views. Mutual respect can evolve on the basis of recognition of the value of having a life-view or a religion. Mutual respect is also based upon the recognition that life-views and religious allegiances are dependent upon diverse histories of the ethnic groups. Furthermore, respect for different identities is based upon the will to see people in ethnic groups as participants in a common project, i.e. to become citizens with shared responsibilities and rights in a common society. This objective puts constraints upon diversity. Tolerance or respect for identities cannot be so extensive that it undermines the possibility of building up a community. What is excluded is a respect for a cultural identity that encourages polarization and fragmentation within society. Respect does not include respect for groups that promulgate complete anarchy or racial segregation.

Table 12. Some Historic Treaties to Protect Religious Minorities

Year	Treaty	Parties	Minority
1573	Confederation of Warsaw		Protestants and Roman Catholics in Poland
1598	Edict of Nante	the King of France	Catholics and Protestants in France
1606	Treaty of Vienna	the King of Hungary and the Prince of Transylvania	Transylvanian Protestants
1648	Treaty of Westphalia	France and the Holy Roman Empire	German protestants
1660	Treaty of Oliwa		Protestants and Roman Catholics in Poland
1763	Treaty of Paris		Roman Catholics in Europe and Canada

Religious minorities were the first to receive formal protection, as early as in the 16th Century.

Statute of General Tolerance (The final Act of Confederation of Warsaw, 1572):

Whereas in our Common Wealth there is no small disagreement in the matter of the Christian Faith, and in order to prevent that any harmful contention should arise from this, as we see clearly taking place in other kingdoms, we swear to each other, in our name and in that of our descendants for ever more, on our honour, our faith, our love and our consciences, that albeit we are *dissidentes in religione*, we will keep the peace between ourselves, and that we will not, for the sake of our various faith and difference of church, either shed blood or confiscate property, deny favour, imprison or banish, and that furthermore we will not aid or abet any power or office which strives to this in any way whatsoever...

4. Dialogue and commonality

A multicultural society presents, in other words, a challenge to different groups to formulate a common framework given the new situation. The ambition is to put ethnic identities into a wider context, and to find a new kind of shared identity in the multicultural situation. This new identity does not need to exclude or ignore older cultural identities. However, the project of formulating a sense of common citizenship could, as was said earlier, make it necessary for certain groups to downgrade some features of their former identities and interests. This is a process of give and take among the participants in the public dialogue. Some cultural interests must be relinquished in order to achieve commonality. A plausible strategy from the majority population in a country like Sweden is, for example, to take seriously the religious interests of the Muslims. Facilitating the practice of Islam through constructing more mosques, could make them more inclined to accept certain features of the majority culture.

The existence of the public dialogue in a multicultural society is based upon the will to develop a common society. When a group finds that it is not possible to compromise a certain custom or lifestyle, they may find that it is no longer possible to participate in a dialogue with the majority group and the other minority groups. The only solution may be some kind of cultural sovereignty. It is important to stress that a sincere reflection upon one's identity is necessary for an evolution of a common society. The foundation for one's identity needs to be scrutinized to see if it is possible to downgrade certain roles or identifications that clash with a feasible vision of commonality. Culture-based identities should be exposed to open dialogues. The content of an identity needs, in other words, to be shaped in interaction with the world, and not be protected in a way that neglects other people's needs and interests.

The participants in the dialogue must show respect for the seriousness and the sincerity of personal identities, even though the foundation for the identities may be scrutinized and challenged in discussion. The sincerity of the fundamentalist belief that schools should not teach anything about Darwin's theory of evolution may be respected as a sincere expression of one's faith, but at the same time the plausibility of the content of this conviction may be challenged from a more secular perspective. What should be respected is the fact that a certain religious view is a deeply personal matter. It matters highly for the person in question. This is a seriousness people from different ethnical groups may identify with, even though they formulate their life views in different ways. This way of constructing a common basis for different ethnic and religious groups might, of course, be challenged in a highly secular society where many persons do not tend to take life views seriously at all. It could also be questioned by the groups who do not take seriously the moral importance of "universalizing one's ethical rules", i.e. that the rule applies to me (or my group) because of certain characteristics, it also applies to you (and your group) if you share the same kind of features. If the sincerity of my religious belief should be taken seriously, why should not yours be taken seriously if it has the same psychological characteristics?

Apart from the belief of the importance of having a more or less secure culture and the value of taking certain deeply engrained feelings seriously, the participants in the public dialogue about multicultural society will find that their reasons reflect the maintenance of certain public goods such as national defence, a certain political climate, clean air, etc. Public goods could be defined as those which serve the interests of people in a *conflict-free, non-exclusive* and *non-excludable* way. A public good is non-exclusive in the sense that one person's enjoyment that good does not diminish the enjoyment of other persons. A common good is also non-excludable in the sense that when it is available in a society no citizen may be excluded from enjoying it. Many public



Figure 121. Photo: Andrzej Szmaj

goods are public in the sense that they cannot exist without collective action. When people co-operate through activities that aim to provide collective or public goods this can, in itself, also create a sense of commonality.

The public dialogue comprises argumentation among different cultural groups with reference to what is regarded as valuable features of a common society. People may have different views about what is regarded as a public good and what is seen as a desirable feature of a society, but this is a lack of agreement that is not particular to a multicultural society. Different interpretations of the concept of a public good exist in Western liberal traditions as well as different interpretations of the public sphere (see below). Of course, the value of commonality may be challenged. Why should we strive for a sense of commonality? This is an extremely individualist query. However, when different ethnic groups stress the importance of commonality, this is often described in terms of shared commitments and responsibilities. The shared commitments are expressed through the maintenance of public goods and a sense of solidarity with the fellow members of the group. The task of finding a common political framework might come from, for example, a will to formulate common institutions of law. One could then ask why a group should reject the possibility of a wider commonality that includes other ethnic and religious groups if the groups find out that they have common concerns. Often it may be reasonable to differentiate between common, public concerns and more private (cultural-specific) concerns in a more fine grained manner than is usually done in public debate. Making room for cultural distinctiveness in various spheres of society such as education may also require new and progressive thoughts concerning the content of the state curriculum and its institutional implementation. What kind of independent schools are reasonable and what kind of cultural-specific education could be possible within the framework of the common school system?

31 The state and minority politics

Hans Ingvar Roth

1. The public and private domains

It is important to stress that a society needs to have two ideals which seem difficult to reconcile: the recognition of cultural differences, and the recognition of equality of opportunity in terms of various rights, among them certain legal, political and social rights. These ideals should not downgrade one another. How may they be reconciled? One common way is to relegate the ideals to different spheres of community life: the private and public spheres. This solution assumes that the private/public distinction can be clearly explained.

Many advocates of cultural pluralism, especially in the United States, make a distinction between political citizenship and cultural heritage. To become an American is to endorse the political rights that define the concept of American citizenship such as freedom of speech and the other ideals of the American constitution. It is not a question of denying one's ethnic heritage. In other words, political citizenship is located to the public sphere while cultural identity remains in the private domain. The idea of making a distinction between private and public spheres touches a chord among many people. It seems that there really is a vital part of our lives that we would like to describe as private. A complete denial of this distinction is described in a dramatic way in George Orwell's novel "1984", where the state penetrates every corner of the private sphere, and almost completely controls the minds of its citizens.

The distinction between private and public domains is difficult to draw in a general manner. A more modest way of defining the distinction is to point out some different spheres between the domains. Spheres such as law, politics and economy may be seen as spheres of the public domain, while marriage, family and religion are regarded as more private spheres. Education may be seen as both a public and private matter. In countries such as Finland, Norway and Sweden the curriculum is still to a large extent determined by public decision, although some educational content is handed over to the private domain. For example, Muslims and other religious minorities in Sweden have been allowed to have a Muslim grade in schools.

However, there are certain aspects of private institutions that may be considered public matters. A society needs, for example, a civic morality and the transmission of morality takes place in spheres such as the family and the school. This fact has been seen as a motivation for

not allowing the “independent” religious schools to distance themselves from norms that are seen as necessary parts of a civic education, norms such as psychological and physical integrity, tolerance and various democratic attitudes.

It might be that the distinction between public and private requires all but the traditional liberal to be endowed with a schizophrenic personality. “Because liberalism regards a whole range of beliefs as mere personal opinions, liberals have no difficulty in tolerating a variety of views on most questions. True believers, in contrast, admit no such scepticism and would be inconsistent to do so.” (Bellamy 1992, p. 240.) According to the political philosopher Richard Bellamy, many true believers would sacrifice their core commitments if they embraced the private/public distinction. Numerous religious fundamentalists reject the private/public distinction on the basis of a conception of religion where religious faith permeates every sector of society. However, the distinction has been used by several authors in the debate about multi-cultural society, and it has been seen as a useful tool for clarification. An important task is to look at its various interpretations and empirical applications.

2. Four types of society

The British sociologist John Rex uses the private/public distinction when he tries to characterize different conceptions of multi- and mono-cultural society. He distinguishes four types of society which may be interpreted in *de jure* and in *de facto* senses:

1. Equality of opportunity in the public domain (between ethnic, national and “racial” groups) with multiculturalism in the private domain;
2. Equality of opportunity in the public domain with monoculturalism in the private domain;
3. Inequality of opportunity in the public domain with multiculturalism in the private domain;
4. Inequality of opportunity in the public domain with monoculturalism in the private domain.

Rex has recently challenged the realism and the plausibility of a sharp distinction between the private and the public domain. The distinction may be challenged on the basis of sociological observations. Institutions located in different spheres influence one another in various ways as we have stated before. The moral values inculcated by a family, for instance, are evaluated in terms of their functionality for performances in the political and economic spheres.

Society of type 1 represents a common ideal when people talk about a multicultural society. In this society every citizen has equal rights before the law, in politics and in the market place. People furthermore have the right to conduct “private” matters, for example, the practices peculiar to their own cultural community. In the Baltic region several states would probably like to officially consider their ideal as the first model. The Swedish immigration policy and other Nordic countries’ policies come close to this first type at least *de jure*. However, Sweden and the other Nordic countries still show cultural homogeneity in spite of increased immigration. Immigrants in the second generation have become assimilated to a large extent into the majority culture. *De facto* these states still seem to be of the second type.

The Baltic states are today in a different situation. Latvia and Estonia, especially, have large Russian minorities which, after the secessions from Soviet Union, have expressed concern about their status as citizens if, for example, full citizenship and work in public offices are con-

ditional upon the ability to speak the language of the majority culture. Finding an arrangement that can be accepted by both sides remains a crucial political problem. Russian groups fear the Baltic states will become societies of the third or fourth type. Estonians and Latvians on the other hand are apprehensive about possible fragmentation of their societies in their current “nation building” projects. The fourth type of society sounds more or less like a contradiction in terms. How could a society have inequalities between various ethnic groups in the public domain and still be monocultural in the private domain? To have a monocultural private sphere could in this context alternatively mean that the majority population only encourage their own culture as the ideal or “the high culture” of society, including the private sphere at the same time as they do not allow certain minorities to have the same opportunities as the majority population in the public sphere.

Between 1920 and 1930 progressive minority policies were developed in the Baltic states. Germans and Russians had found themselves in new situations in 1917-18 when they lost political power. Many Germans also lost their estates. Germans, Russians, Jews and Swedes were interested in protecting their cultural needs and interests in the new Baltic states. The independence of the Baltic states raised the question of minority rights in the new constitutions. In the Estonian constitution all citizens were granted equal rights irrespective of nationality. All national groups were also allowed to establish their own schools and teach their children in their mother tongue. A similar constitution was established in Latvia where various national groups had the right to set up autonomous cultural corporations.

One state which has given a minority a privileged constitutional standing is Finland. Finland has a Swedish-speaking minority which has special language and educational rights in areas where the Swedish-speaking population consists of at least 3,000 people in the municipalities. The Swedish-speaking population on the Åland islands has special property rights in comparison to people on the Finnish mainland. The method is, in other words, to maintain language diversity or a bilingual society overall in Finnish society through special legal provisions for historical minority groups. The method comes close to a society of the third type in Rex's scheme. The aim in this case is to provide general equality and justice between various minority groups through special measures for a minority group that at first sight could be interpreted as “inequality in the public sphere”.

Various countries have, for example, recently ratified “the European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages”. In Sweden there is a new minority legislation that has given minority status to five historical minority languages: Finnish, Saami, Yiddish, Tornedal Finnish (Meänkieli) and Romani Chib. The new legislation means, among other things, that children who have these languages as their mother tongue should be granted the right to have education both in and with the language. In some municipalities in the North of Sweden Saami, Finnish and Meänkieli-speaking people should be allowed to address the authorities in their own languages.

However, in a society of the third type the model may be applied in less favourable ways and amount to negative discrimination. One may refer to Apartheid in South Africa where different racial groups have had unequal status in the public domain. The lesson is that the scheme needs to be filled out in order to make an evaluation of each type of society.

The crucial questions are:

- 1) what is included under the labels “private” and “public”, and
- 2) what special provisions are made in the public domain for various ethnic groups, i.e. what kind of inequalities in the public domain could be justifiable from the perspective of justice?

A controversial example in the debate concerning justified differential treatment in the public sphere is the policy of “affirmative action” (or positive discrimination) of various minority groups. Could differential treatment of minority groups be accepted, for example in the case of higher education if it is done in the name of justice? Or, is it basically an unfair policy that amounts to reverse discrimination of certain members of the majority population? This policy is especially well known with reference to the situation of African Americans in American society, but it has also attracted a lot of attention in several states around the Baltic Sea in recent times, not least with reference to the problems that women face in the labour market. The policy assumes that one could clearly delineate the salient public (and private) spheres of society that various groups should be integrated with, such as the labour market and the institutions of higher education.

An especially contested form of affirmative action (or more specifically – “preferential treatment”) is a *quota policy* that states that a certain number of seats should be reserved for under-represented minority members in higher education or in certain prestigious professions. A softer and more uncontroversial form of affirmative action is the attempt to *reach out* to various disadvantaged minority groups through advertising and certain methods of encouragement or alternatively, specific training programs. The harder forms of affirmative action, which are often named “preferential treatment”, have been questioned on the basis of the conviction that they merit or that competence should be the sole determinant of educational and professional success. The critics of the programs also claim that the policies do not help the minorities and instead present serious problems. According to this view the programs encourage negative attitudes among the citizens that downgrade the performances of the minority members because everyone knows that the members did not get the job through ordinary merit assessments. The advocates of the programs have, on the other hand, stressed that these harder forms of affirmative action are necessary in order to combat a deeply ingrained “multidimensional” history of personal and institutional discrimination. The methods may not be ideal but as long as there are no other less costly methods available, these methods provide the most reasonable alternatives. An often cited reason for various forms of affirmative action (cited in higher court settings in the U.S.A.) is that affirmative action/preferential treatment fulfill a vibrant and fruitful cultural diversity within the institutions of higher education. The democratic accountability of an important public institution could also be enhanced if it includes members from both the majority population and the minority groups in society.

3. Welfare institutions and justice

The public sphere can be limited whereby the function of the state would not exceed the provision of public goods such as national defense, a legal system, police institutions and a market economy. This is the so-called *night-watchman* state. It seems plausible to assume that this form of state may be a thin common denominator, even in an extremely plural society. We can imagine that all ethnic groups in a certain area are interested in physical protection, institutions of law and an efficient market. These general needs motivate the acceptance of a minimal state by

different groups. Within this state people can choose to live in certain enclaves where their own cultures may be sustained and developed. The idea is that groups also develop welfare institutions on their own. Let us call this idea *the cultural enclave model*. Ethnic culture and the public sphere are held separate, and the public sphere is defined in a minimal way. Equality of opportunity means equality with respect to what is provided by a state that is deemed necessary according to the cultural enclaves.

For some, it is important to uphold a night-watchman state that defends property rights and an efficient functioning of the market economy, in order to allow people to live autonomous lives. People should have opportunities to enter into different cultures according to their tastes. There exists, in other words, a market of cultures. Models of ethnic coexistence exist that are similar to the cultural enclave model in the sense that they allow for specific forms of segmental autonomy.

The cultural enclave model, however, should not be equated with the Ottoman millet system which existed for about five centuries starting in 1456. In the Ottoman empire, different ethnic and religious groups were given autonomy in vital areas, but people were not allowed to dissent within these communities. Three non-Muslim minorities (the Greek Orthodox, the Armenian Orthodox, and the Jews) were allowed to have self-governing communities (or "millets"). Traditional legal practices as well as religious traditions were respected by the Ottoman Turks. The relations between the communities and the Ottoman Turks were, on the other hand, strictly regulated. Inter-marriage was not allowed, and proselytization and apostasy were prohibited. The millet system has been described as a federation of theocracies. In some ways the Ottoman system was similar to the system of co-existence between Protestants and Catholics established under the Edict of Nantes (1598). In comparison with the millet system, the cultural autonomy model has the advantage of allowing *individual* dissent.

However, from a normative point of view, other criticism may be levelled at the cultural autonomy model. What happens to the people who cannot find their identities within the groups available? It seems at first glance handy to think in terms of definite classifications of ethnic or cultural groups, but reality is more complex than that. Groups are not fixed, static entities. If ethnic groups possess different resources, the result may be an extremely unequal society. The limits of the state may also be questioned. Why should people just be interested in a night-watchman state? Would they not also be interested in a state which expressed commitments in terms of provision of welfare and a common civic morality if the groups find out that it is not realistic to live separate lives in the new globalized economy? In other words, diversity is maintained at the price of commonality in the cultural enclave model.

One question is how a well-ordered society should be organized where the members disagree radically in moral and religious beliefs. The American philosopher John Rawls argues that a necessary condition for a well-ordered society is the agreement of citizens about the principles of justice which apply to its basic institutions. These principles must be based upon something other than shared morality, because this morality is lacking. Rawls states that people may reach agreement about these principles even though they have dissimilar ethical and religious views. He assumes that people are able to abstract from their divergent conceptions of good and formulate a common political framework. Rawls claims that, given the facts of pluralism, people with varying ethical or religious outlooks will accept certain political principles.

Liberal toleration is something that people may agree upon even though they have different ethical or religious views. Toleration can be justified on the basis of utilitarian philosophy (this defines right actions in terms of the promotion of overall welfare) by pointing to its posi-

tive consequences in a plural society. The principle may also be justified on religious grounds. Religious belief has to be sincere, and one cannot force people to have certain religious beliefs. These shared principles constitute an “overlapping consensus”. The principles do not presuppose any specific ethical or religious outlook but can be seen as the outcomes of radically different ethical or cultural views in a plural society. Ethnic culture and the public sphere are connected by means of the implications of private ethical views. Equality of opportunity then means equality with respect to political or public principles that are the outcome of an overlapping consensus.

A problem with this view is that it seems too optimistic. Overlapping consensus may be valid in certain areas in a plural society. The example of toleration is one plausible case. But how is overlapping consensus reached in all vital areas of public life? Could a Christian fundamentalist and a Marxist reach agreement about the content of public education? One has to build in certain assumptions about the limits of diversity in order to reach agreement about the character of basic institutions in a society. Rawls has to assume a conception of reasonable diversity. Commonality is thus reached at the expense of diversity. The model of overlapping consensus could only be applied to societies with limited diversity in ethical and religious beliefs. The other alternative is that various ideological and religious outlooks reach general agreement through “thin” political principles. The principles are then described in such a general and vacuous manner that various life-views may subscribe to them. All ethnic groups in Western society presumably condone ideals such as justice. The controversial problem is how to interpret the ideal in concrete situations. The dilemma for a model of overlapping consensus is, then, between limited application (through assumptions about reasonable diversity) or generality and emptiness.

4. To find a *modus vivendi*

Another alternative is to organize public life in a multicultural society through certain “neutral” procedures that do not presuppose any contestable life-view or ideology. The question then becomes how to find a *modus vivendi* in a multicultural society. One possibility is to bargain or compromise. The opponents have to bracket their sincere beliefs, and they have to accept a compromise solution or a solution that is favoured by “neutral procedures”. The aim is to organize a public debate through a consistent and rule-governed adjudication. The political solution is not something that is directly justified on the basis of the different ethical/religious doctrines, but rather on (the implications for the outcome for) stability and peaceful co-operation. The model could be seen as superior to that of overlapping consensus in the sense that it does not put any limits upon cultural diversity other than that the ethnic groups should strive for a stable and peaceful society. Ethnic culture and the public sphere are not in touch through the overlapping consensus of the ethnic groups but through the acceptance of neutral bargaining procedures and considerations of stability. Equality of opportunity then means equality with respect to public principles that govern the basic institutions through a *modus vivendi*.

The problem with the *modus vivendi* model is that some things are not matters for compromise among certain cultural groups. The different groups may also have different ideas about how long the bargaining process should take. What is the ultimate time limit for making a compromise? This decision is based upon conceptions of value, that may differ among ethnic groups. One could generally question the sharp dichotomy between neutral procedures and more substantive philosophical or ethical views. They often go hand in hand. Procedures

are delineated for different areas on the basis of what is regarded as morally suitable, given the specific subject matter. If a group of people finds out that a cake has been sliced in a specific way (the person who has not sliced the cake should take the first piece), the decision procedure is based upon views concerning the urgency of the needs of the people, and the importance of the subject matter, i.e. the cake. The model of *modus vivendi* thus makes assumptions about the limits of diversity. The choice of decision procedures is based upon conceptions of good. Commonality is in this case also reached at the price of diversity.

All models have problems in striking the right balance between diversity and homogeneity. The model of cultural autonomy makes room for diversity at the expense of commonality, while the models of overlapping consensus and *modus vivendi* make assumptions about the homogeneity of their societies. The first model makes the concept of citizenship very “thin” indeed, while the two latter models do not fulfil their ambitions of neutrality.

So far we have reasoned on the basis of the assumption that cultural groups influence the politics of the public sphere in one way or another. But we have not used the view that they constitute the public sphere as a departure point, i.e. the private domain is a part of the public. The public domain is regarded instead as plausible ways of formulating common interests *from* the private domain. A radical challenge to this view might state that the different ethnic groups should constitute the public domain in the sense that they are actually represented as participants. The people in the groups are, in other words, not only citizens that are abstracted from their cultural identities; they participate in the public domain as representatives of different cultural groups. The main objective becomes the fulfilment of *a cultural identity policy*.

In order to safeguard the interests of different groups, one has to argue for the claim that cultural diversity should show itself directly in the public domain. It is not enough that it is located to the private domain. It is necessary to strive for cultural or ethnic corporatism. Equality of opportunity then means equality in terms of ethnic or cultural participation in the public sphere.

However, there are some striking problems with this model. One problem might be described as the problem of arbitrariness. How are the groups that should be represented selected? Why should we just concentrate our attention upon ethnic or national groups? Why not include Christian fundamentalists, homosexuals, etc? Radical feminists also make claims of being neglected in political life. Even within the ethnic sphere there is room for vagueness. How do we determine the main ethnic groups? How wide should the scope be? Ordinary people may also find their loci of identification in different groups. There is, in other words, a diversity of identifications, and it could prove difficult for people to state which group is the most important locus of identification in terms of politics. One person may describe his or her identity in terms of sex, profession, education, family status, religious allegiance, ideological sympathies, nationality, or ethnic or regional origin. What is emphasized as identity depends then upon the circumstances.

Another criticism of the model is that it may increase polarization in politics. When ethnicity is emphasized and expressed at a public level it could undermine a sense of common citizenship. The representatives may feel that they represent first and foremost their ethnic groups, and the state or the public domain acquires a secondary or purely instrumental status for the representatives of the groups. As in the case of the cultural autonomy model, diversity is sacrificed to commonality. People who accept the model of identity politics celebrate their own ways of living, and the upshot may be cultural isolation instead of openness to other cultures that for many signifies what multiculturalism is all about.

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Figure 122. Seal hunters, a detail of *Carta marina* by Olaus Magnus, published 1539 in Venedig. Ill.: Uppsala University Library



Section VI

PEACE AND SECURITY

Figure 123. The Soviet forces in Europe changed to Russian control and withdrew to Russia in 1994. A Russian soldier, waiting for returning home to an uncertain future, demonstrates his weapons to interested youngsters. Photo: Pressens Bild

VI

Section

PEACE AND SECURITY

Editor: *Claes Levinsson*

This section has been written by a group of authors:

Katarina Engberg

Björn Hagelin

Lena Jonson

Michael Karlsson

Claes Levinsson

Erik Melander

Kjell-Åke Nordqvist

Peter Wallensteen

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INTRODUCTION:

The Baltic Sea Region: Strives towards an International Security Community

Peter Wallensteen

The Baltic Region has changed dramatically over the last twelve years. In 1989 it was a region full of tension. The Cold War divided the Baltic Sea. It was a cold sea of confrontation. The knowledge of the countries and peoples on the other side of this divide was limited and biased. Hostility and hope blended in unrealistic mixes. In retrospect, the division appears unimaginable. Was this really an area in which people who were “realistic” speculated about as starting point of a world conflict? Certainly, that was the case.

There were historical precedents, no doubt. Only ten years previously there had been a severe crisis in Poland, which led to Soviet troop movements and warnings from the United States. Ten years before that, there was another crisis in Poland, with the same tensions. In 1968, Soviet naval forces sailed out from Leningrad in a move that the Swedish Air Force feared could be part of a Soviet invasion across the Baltic Sea. It was the beginning of the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia. The military pact on the East side, the Warsaw Pact, was created, in this region, in 1955. By many accounts, the first Cold War dispute concerned the composition of the new Polish government (1944-45). The Second World War, indeed, began as a dispute over Gdańsk (Danzig) in 1939. No doubt, the region, particularly its southern shores, has been an integral part of the emergence of major European conflagrations and at least two global confrontations that are in the living memory of generations still active. Thus, to expect the region once again to become the focal point of major power confrontations was realistic, a decade ago.

Much has changed. The independence of the Baltic States, the democratisation of Poland, the inclusion of East Germany into the Federal Republic, and not the least, the moves towards democracy in Russia, all impact on the region. So does the fact that NATO now has more member states and cooperating partners in the region. EU includes Sweden and Finland and, soon, other new members. Even in the military field changes are visible. For instance, since 1996 the region has seen integrated military manoeuvres with forces from countries around the Baltic. It has trained national agencies as well as non-governmental organizations in peace operations. Appropriately it was termed ‘Nordic Peace’. The threats that political leaders address publicly have changed. In fact, there are today very few issues of contention that can be expected to give rise to inter-state or intra-state armed confrontations within a reasonably assessed future. There is a stronger sense of security in the region. There have been determined strivings towards a security community. Independent countries are able to cooperate, to the benefit of all concerned.

These are all achievements and it is important to analyse the developments. This is true for the region itself, and for its self-understanding. There are also lessons to be learnt for other areas in the world. The notion of a *security community* is general and thus can be used as a framework for comparison between different areas of the world. Still, there are many pertinent

questions to be asked about the Baltic region itself. How was this change brought about? What are the most important aspects of this development? There are also sobering thoughts to be raised: Is this a break in a long-term trend? Is it a “lull” between confrontations? Are there worrying signs that should be picked up, to provide for early, preventive action? Or is the present situation the culmination of an undercurrent that has long worked for peace rather than conflict in the region? In a historical perspective it is too early to answer such questions with any degree of certainty. But questions are as important as answers. And indeed, whatever the answers, it is clear that these years provide examples of a change in conditions for a previously conflict-ridden region.

There are many features to this development. They are brought together in this volume. There are global factors. They, no doubt, have a particular meaning for the region. The end of the Cold War had its important regional dimension: the end of the Soviet Union, the restoration of national independence and the return to democracy. There is a mental liberation of security thinking. There is the creation and activities of the new acronym organizations (OSCE, EU, “new” NATO). Not least of all, there is the integration into the global economy.

These matters are aptly raised in this section, organized around key aspects of the notion of “security community”. It integrates a previous publication, made in 1994 and revised in 1995, updates the developments and develops the notion of a security community still further. Claes Levinsson has been responsible for this revision and co-authors remain most grateful for his efforts.

Common Abbreviations

ABM	Anti-ballistic missile (missile defence against intercontinental ballistic missiles)
BW	Biological weapons
CBM	Confidence-building measures
CW	Chemical weapons
CBW	Chemical and biological weapons
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CSBM	Confidence and Security Building Measures
CTB(T)	Comprehensive Test Ban (Treaty); (nuclear weapons)
ICBM	Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles
INF	Intermediate range Nuclear Forces
MAD	Mutually assured destruction (deterrence based capacity of each super-power to destroy the other)
M(B)FR	Mutual (and Balanced) Force Reductions
NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty (nuclear weapons)
NWFZ	Nuclear Weapons Free Zone R&DResearch and Development
SALT	Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (SALT I and II)
SLBM	Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile
SDI	Strategic Defence Initiative (‘Star Wars’ programme, USA, launched 1983)
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (US-USSR negotiations beginning in 1982; START I agreement signed 1991, START II between USA and Russia in 1993)

32 The concept of a security community

1. Wars and armed conflicts

One of the most significant issues in international relations is the one of armed conflict and war. During the Cold War, the continuous danger of nuclear war and a general insecurity for small countries plagued the world. In December 1991 the Soviet Union dissolved. The 'Cold War' as we were used to seeing it – military, political and to an important degree technological competition and rivalry between the world's two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union and their respective military alliances – came to an end. The end of the Cold War also reduced the likelihood of a major war among the great powers of the world. The reduced tension in the international system has also created possibilities for promoting co-operation and building new kinds of bonds between former enemies. It has also created opportunities for domestic liberalisation and a rebirth of states and nations all around the world.

But the end of the Cold War has also unleashed new violence and unrest in some regions and nations where the newborn sovereignty has, for many of the states, been challenged by age-old rivalries and animosities. These internal conflicts, that were suppressed during the Cold War, today constitute a major challenge to the international community. Indeed, patterns of disruption can be found all over the world, and are not merely confined to remote areas in Africa or the former Soviet Union. A similar pattern can be seen in many other places. India, Pakistan, Canada, the remaining parts of Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Italy, Peru, Colombia, Brazil, Haiti and Mexico, just to mention a few. All of them face similar structural tendencies for disintegration within their territories. Tendencies that imply the strengthening, or the emergence, of the ethnic state at the expense of the territorial state.

The same patterns can be found in the Baltic region. But set against the recent violent history of the Baltic region, the past decade has shown positive signs of both political and economical consolidation towards democracy and the market-economy and new forms of co-operation and accord. But due to the relatively short time span of these new developments, the question is what the future holds for the countries of the region in terms of peace and security. To respond to this question, the authors have chosen to begin with the notion of "security community". Thus, we ask: are conditions created for a future security community in the Baltic region? In a long-term perspective, a second question is important: towards which type of relations are we heading as a region?

2. Security community

What then does the notion of a “security community” entail? Today there is no fear of a renewed war between Sweden and Norway. The fear of war between Germany and France is also receding among the general population and among leading decision-makers. This means that disputes between these countries are expected to be handled in peaceful ways: through direct negotiations or within multilateral organisations (such as Nordic co-operation, the European Union). These are examples of significant and lasting changes in relationships which, in this century, have given rise to serious conflicts or wars. The peoples of these countries now feel more secure vis-à-vis each other. As this feeling is shared on both sides, it can be said that a security community has been created in these cases, i.e. Sweden – Norway and France – Germany.

The notion of a security community was introduced by a leading social scientist, Karl W. Deutsch, active in the United States but originally from Prague. His definitions can be seen below. The process, by which such security communities are created, while the countries still consolidate their independence, is an important one. In a discussion on the dangers of wars and chances for peace in the Baltic area, the concept is useful. We thus ask whether such a security community can be developed in the Baltic region in the foreseeable future. This would mean a significant change in present relations between countries and peoples in the region. Especially since the Baltic region has been an area of conflict for many wars in recent centuries.

3. Characteristics of a security community

Deutsch specified 14 factors for the emergence of security communities. These seem to be relevant in a discussion of the use of this concept for the Baltic region, but can be merged into the following five aspects:

1. *Relations to outside actors* are important for the emergence of a security community. This might be the existence of a common military threat to the region or joint security co-operation extending beyond the region. Deutsch finds that outside military threats sometimes promote co-operation within a region, but that such effects are short-lived. It suggests, however, that the general relationships surrounding the region are important, and thus, we need to discuss the relations between the smaller states of the region and the major centres of power in Europe (chapter 33).
2. There would have to be a *communality of major values* among the countries concerned. This refers to a shared view of, for instance, democracy and market economy. *The spreading and stabilisation of democracy in Europe as a whole*, as agreed in the Paris Treaty of 1990, and in the Baltic region would be a most important factor for the future. In particular, democracy increases the legitimacy of governments and gives access to power for more groups. The links between domestic democracy and the absence of war are dealt with specifically (chapter 34).
3. There would have to be *mutual responsiveness* among the states and peoples of the region. This refers to an ability to predict the behaviour of other states. It requires extensive contacts and communication, as well as psychological and political adjustment, for instance, to the loss of a dominant status that is a result of changing conditions. *Experience in solving*

conflicts peacefully, as well as active participation in international conferences, would indicate responsiveness. This aspect is dealt with in chapter 35.

4. *New forms of behaviour* among the states and peoples, which make the present distinctly different from the past, are another feature of a security community. This involves, for instance, improving economic conditions for the whole or important parts of the region (compared to other regions, as well as compared to the past). This we could interpret to mean a *move away from reliance on armaments for security to disarmament*, giving room for other types of contacts, chapter 36.
5. To this we need to add the significance of *common institutions*, which at the same time respect and uphold the independence of the member states, and contribute to concerted actions in security matters. Such institutions may incorporate many of the four factors but are still important in their own respect. Such institutions, which might be the *United Nations*, the *Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE)*, NATO, EU (the European Union) or others, can be evaluated with respect to their significance for security in the Baltic region (chapter 37).

The five characteristic factors of a security community dealt with separately in these five chapters are discussed in the final chapter. There, an answer is suggested to the question of whether the conditions for a security community are present or not, or emerging. This is done by comparing three different points with respect to twelve significant relations involving all littoral Baltic States.

4. Security communities and alliances

The five principal components in a security community as described by Karl Deutsch are expected to contribute to a sense of security within a region. Although “security” can mean many things, we treat the five factors as a way of discussing the possibilities of the emergence of a security community in the Baltic region. This means that the factors are used to describe present developments without making assessments of what in fact will happen to the region. It is, however, a broader approach than the customary one for the analysis of peace and security.

One may then ask if a security community is the only way to enhance the security of a state or a region? To be sure, the quest for security is often described in terms of defensibility, alliance-building and military capability. According to this perspective the only way to gain security and stability is to join an alliance. The problem with this view is the fundamental question of inclusion and exclusion, i.e. that an alliance is always directed towards some other, and this other is usually perceived as a threat. It may even be so that the creation of alliances in a particular region, to all intents and purposes, decreases the level of security for both the insiders and the outsiders and that new patterns of conflict are created upon old ones. In addition, history is full of examples where the promises of the alliance have not been very credible and the supposed security has in fact turned out to be an in-security.

A security community is not the same thing as an alliance. Whereas a security community is about trust, confidence, transparency and a high degree of non-formal interactions between central actors and institutions among states within an area of geographical proximity, an alliance is a formal coalition of states that coordinates its actions to accomplish some ends. An alliance that is concerned with international security is normally codified and formalised by a written treaty that encompasses a range of issues that is supposed to last across time. Another major distinction is that alliances and security communities have different purposes. Alliances

generally have the purpose of augmenting their members' power relative to other states, and they join the alliance to defend themselves against a common external enemy. In a security community states join in so as to increase common welfare by enhancing interdependence.

An alliance also differs from a security community in terms of the promises that are behind its purpose. The security that derives from an alliance is upheld by the promise that an attack on one is an attack on all. It means that every member in the alliance is willing and obligated to use force in order to defend its allies even though its own security is not threatened. In a security community, disputes are settled peaceably and no one will use force against any member of the community.

The final distinction that can be made between an alliance and a security community is the way the institutions are organised in order to provide or facilitate security. In an alliance, the institutional mechanisms are based on an authoritative or hierarchical decision structure. This is usually visible in a unified command and that some parts of the political national decision-making are surrendered to a supranational level. A security community, on the other hand, is based on an egalitarian decision structure. It means that every peaceful procedure of dispute settlement is sought by an enhanced transparency, mainly through such institutional mechanisms as sharing information, and by promoting different confidence-building measures.

Table 13. Main differences between an Alliance and a Security Community

	Alliance	Security Community
Purpose	States join to defend against a common external enemy	States join to increase common welfare by enhancing interdependence
What kind of promise?	An attack on one is an attack on all: 'I will use force to defend my allies even when my own security is not threatened.'	Disputes between states are settled peaceably; 'I will not use force against any member of the security community.'
What kinds of institution add credibility to the promise?	Authoritative or hierarchical decision structure. Unified military command. Maximum integration of armed forces	Egalitarian decision structure. Peaceful dispute settlement procedures. Other means for enhancing transparency such as sharing information, confidence-building measures.

Source: Steven Weber. 'A Modest Proposal for NATO Expansion'. In Robert W. Rauchhaus (ed). Explaining NATO Enlargement. Frank Cass. 2001

5. What is security policy?

"Defence policy", "foreign policy", "security policy" – anyone interested in international relations frequently encounters different concepts regarding a state's relations with its neighbours. There is no final definition of these concepts – their meaning is constantly changing.

Different states use different means to maximise security. All states try to prevent an armed attack against its territory. For small states, it is especially important to establish good neighbourly relations with bordering states. However, this is not always possible. Alliance

membership is considered an alternative by many small states. For some, this is an important way to compensate for local insecurity, for others an alliance adds to an already stable regional situation.

Major powers also make use of a military presence abroad as an important part of their security policy. During the Cold War, the superpowers, USA and USSR, had well-defined spheres of influence on all continents. This was often perceived as a security problem by minor states. Today, with the superpower rivalry dissolved, foreign military presence is less problematic for regional and national security.

During the first part of the Cold War, “security policy” was often synonymous with defence and strategic matters since its primary objective for analysis was the idea of power, balance and influence in the international system, which stressed the role of military and economic resources that governments have at their disposal. Much of this perspective was dependent upon the bi-polar world of the Cold War and the conception and determination to treat politics as *realpolitik* – according to the notion that the strong can have their way with the weak. Beginning in the middle of the 1970s, the concept of security shifted its emphasis towards a more open and wider tenor, emphasising a world of complex interdependence characterised by multiple channels and actors in world politics.

During the 1980s, a further wider understanding of “security” developed. This development began among Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and spilled over into policy-making circles and governments. In 1984, for instance, the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues (also called the Palme Commission) coined the concept of “Common Security”. The Commission thereby stressed the mutual character of security, and said that it was no longer sufficient to decelerate the arms race of nuclear and conventional weapons. It was also indispensable to implement a sustainable development that would promote global security by encouraging economic and social development, environmental protection and the extension of human rights.

6. The widening and deepening of the concept of security

The end of the Cold War marked the beginning of an even further development of the notion of security. The end of the bi-polar world, with the consequent lessening of the nuclear threat, did not only entail a fundamental different world order that brought about new forms of multilateral international relations. It also obliged academics to re-think and re-analyse the concept of security both theoretically and practically. Consequently, several scholars in the academic community have re-considered what is, and what should be, included within the concept of security and whether a broader definition reflects a more accurate interpretation of reality.

By bringing in a broader spectrum of actors and societal structures into the security agenda, the concept of security tends to include more and more issues of an internal or transnational character. Thus, the role of the state has diminished at the expense of a more comprehensive understanding of what is “security”. But even if this wider meaning of security and security policy, including dimensions of economy, societal issues, environmental protection and disarmament better reflects a common understanding of security, it also makes the security debate more difficult. The decade after the Cold War has therefore been marked by an ongoing debate about how far the traditional political-military concept of security should be extended to include non-military aspects of security as well.

The debate about the concept of security has been divided according to two theoretical perspectives, in which the first one argues that a widening and deepening of the concept reflects the contemporary world better than the old one, and a second one that argues that a broadening of the concept will result in a theoretical anarchy where everything from “thugs”, “drugs” and “bugs” to severe international crisis and armed aggression is included in the concept. To facilitate a better understanding and provide an overview of this debate, it is practical to categorise these perspectives according to their “core arguments”. The first one should therefore be labelled as the “traditional” view since it defines the concept of security in terms of an original state-centric essence. The other perspective is labelled liberal, because of its more open view of the security agenda. However, even if there is agreement among those who see a need for a wider definition of security, they sometimes hold a different view on the need of deepening the concept – i.e., that the concept of security should have another object of reference than the state.

Table 14. Concepts of security

	Definition	Reference	Threats
Traditional	Narrow	State	External
Liberal (I)	Broad	State	Internal/external
Liberal (II)	Broad	Individual	Global/internal

The “traditionalists” hold the view that by leaving the long-established notion of security, made up by power politics and military capabilities, it would mean that everything becomes a matter of security and that the concept loses its theoretical cogency. The definition and understanding of security should therefore be as narrow as possible in order to maintain analytical clarity and theoretical simplicity. The state, according to this perspective, is the most important object of reference since it is the primary actor in the international system and the principal organiser of political, economical and social matters on the national level – such as the welfare of its subjects and the safeguard from any external threats. By expanding the concept of security beyond the limits of the territorial state, it is not possible to identify and study security since it becomes impossible to assess and determine the real threats to one’s security and complicates the ability to make necessary political priorities between “security” and “non-security”.

Among the advocates for a wider and deeper understanding of the concept of security, there are those who see a need to broaden the concept to other areas than the military one, but that it is still necessary to refer to the state or to other large scale of political collectives. And there are those who argue for a more extensive interpretation and definition of security that should have a global perspective with a focus on the individual, and not the state, as the primary object of reference. They consider the “traditionalist” view of security as ethno-centric and out of touch with the current process of globalisation that has diminished the role and the significance of the territorial state. However, what unites the advocates for a wider and deeper understanding of security, is the perception that most threats towards security are not solely external and primarily derived from power politics and military capabilities. They firmly believe that a definition of security must appreciate the fact that the majority of contemporary conflicts, and for that reason threats to security, are not external but internal, and comes from political domestic mismanagement, social and economical discrimination, cultural and ethnical intolerance and environmental catastrophes.

What underlies the conceptual debate of security is the way in which both the traditional and liberal proponents perceive the function and organisation of international politics and relations.

7. The study of international relations

During the period after the Second World War, three perspectives on conflicts in the international system have been guiding research and policy analysis: *realism* (or “power politics”; “statism”), *integration* (or “trans-nationalism”; “liberalism”; “idealism”) and *dominance-liberation* (or “radicalism”). Although the basic characteristics are the same, the perspectives are sometimes labelled differently (as in parentheses) by different authors. In this summary, the perspectives are presented in a way that stresses their differences rather than similarities.

Realism is a perspective, which stresses the role of (mainly) military and economic resources that governments have at their disposal for pursuing their interests. According to this perspective the international system is characterised by clashing national interests, and a certain balance of forces is required to maintain international stability. Peace, according to this view, is at best stability through a balance-of-power. The state, according to this view, is seen as a self-interested actor that always seeks to maximise its own advantages and thereby tries to manoeuvre successfully in an anarchical international realm. The self-sufficiency of the state means that it is practically impossible for the creation of any kind of “world governments”, or that the international system can ever be organised and function with the same characteristics as the national state. Any attempt at building “common security” with other means than military capabilities and power politics is doomed to fail, because, eventually, every state will seek to maximise its own interests and this will inevitably be at the expense of someone else. The world is inhabited by strong states and weak states, and the only way to seek security is either to be stronger than everyone else, or by joining a stronger state or a group of states in an alliance. Indeed, realism is more than just a theoretical perspective on international relations. It is also a normative assessment of the way the international system is constructed and the possibilities that exist for states to pursue co-operation and building common interests.

The integration perspective focuses on the many forms of international co-operation in political and economic matters that characterise the global system of today. Increased co-operation is a way to increase peaceful relations according to this perspective. Thus, non-state actors such as corporations and non-governmental organisations should be studied, as well as governments. The integration perspective is, in contrast to the realist view, not a clear-cut “theoretical school” within international relations. Instead, the core arguments behind the integration perspective are represented among a variety of “schools” within international relations. Two important tracks of the integration perspective in the contemporary study of international relations can be found in the neo-liberal and constructivist schools of thought. The former perspective holds that even if states sometimes act solely in their own self-interest, it is often combined with ways of seeking and facilitating trust in order to enhance different kinds of collaboration. The constructivist perspective, on the other hand, rejects the realist view of the international system as a static anarchy that seldom changes because of fixed identities of self-interest among the states within the system. The international system is seen instead as

a social construction which is a reflection of how different states view themselves and of how they perceive the world around them. Thus, the identity of the state is in constant change and this creates opportunities for co-operation and the building of common interests. The world is what we make of it, and removing mistrust and misconceptions therefore enhances security, according to the constructivists.

The dominance-liberation perspective, finally, focuses the economically unbalanced relations – asymmetries – that characterise global trade relations for instance. This asymmetric system – which in practice exploits its weaker parts – is an important factor behind conflicts both within and between states, according to this perspective. The perspective, then, is often a rationale for liberation movements of different kinds. All of them, however, stress the need for structural changes in society. In the contemporary world, this integration-liberation perspective is often connected to the ongoing process of globalisation. The harmonising of economies and increasing interconnectedness that creates new norms and values in world politics and new possibilities for states, individuals and transnational organisations, is not entirely a positive development. The flipside, according to this perspective, is an increasing degree of autarchy, unilateralism, disintegration, heterogeneity and separation. It both reinforces existing asymmetric relations between weak and strong states and creates new kinds of threats that can no longer be resolved by individual governments acting alone. The advocates for this perspective argue that as long as the process of globalisation is not altered, or controlled, the prospect of security for those who cannot benefit from this process will gradually decrease.

The three perspectives focus on different aspects of international relations. They are not incompatible, but complementary. Each one has its merits and weaknesses.

Table 15. Three Perspectives on International Relations

Perspective	Realism	Integration	Dominance-Liberation
Basis for stable relations	International balance of power; elite rule	International co-operation; internal democracy	Transformation into symmetric relations; economic justice
Central unit of analysis	The state; government	World society; inter- and intra-state relations	Structures; trade relations
Focused level of conflict	“Acute”; open conflict; crisis orientation	Open but not militarised, manageable	Latent and/or open conflict inevitable in society
Key actors for change	Decision-makers	International organisations; Non-Governmental Organisations	Liberation movements
Causes of war	Failing balance of power	Ignorance, prejudices, power interests	Centre–periphery conflict
View of the human being as	Self-oriented	Co-operative	Structurally conditioned

Patterns of Conflict and Security

Patterns of Conflict. Not a single day passes without the mass media telling us about violence, death and destruction following political struggle. During the period 1989-98 there were 108 armed conflicts in 73 different locations. Of the 108 conflicts, 37 were active in 1998 in 32 different locations, compared with 34 in 27 locations in 1997. 1998 marked an increase in the number of armed conflicts from 1997, after an overall decline since 1992. The number of wars doubled in 1998, after a marked decrease that had also started in 1992. Most wars took place in Africa. Of the 108 armed conflicts during the period 1989-98, only seven were interstate conflicts. Two of these were active in 1998: India-Pakistan, which had also been active in earlier years, and Ethiopia-Eritrea, which broke out in 1998. All the armed conflicts listed had at least 25 battle-related deaths during the year. The last two categories are referred to together as major armed conflict, making up more than two-thirds of the armed conflicts recorded in 1998.

A “major armed conflict” here means a conflict that has caused at least 1000 deaths since its beginning and concerns the control of a government or of a territory (or both). In some conflicts, such as the Iraq – Kuwait War of 1991, many lives were taken during a short period of time. In others, such as in Northern Ireland, the conflict claims comparatively few lives but it exists for a long period of time. They have been divided into three categories: *minor armed conflict*, where the number of battle-related deaths during the course of the conflict is below 1,000. In 1998 there were 10 such conflicts. *Intermediate armed conflict*, with more than 1,000 battle-related deaths recorded during the course of the conflict, but fewer than 1,000 in a particular year. In 1998 there were 13 such conflicts. War, with more than 1,000 battle-related deaths during a particular year. In 1998 there were 14 such conflicts.

These examples of what constitutes armed conflict are often conducted in different kinds of settings ranging from the international to the internal, i.e., local, level. Here we will point to three different categories of conflict:

1. *Inter-state conflicts* are international, i.e. between sovereign states.
2. *State-formation -conflicts* are non-international and concerned with the basic constitutional structure of a state (e.g. Northern Ireland/Great Britain). A typical example of such a conflict is when a region wants to secede or to have autonomy within an existing state. Such conflicts may also have international connections to governments and movements in other countries.
3. *Internal conflicts* are concerned with the control of a government, for instance when a liberation movement wants to replace an incumbent government.

In the contemporary world, very few conflicts are conducted on the international level. This is also something that follows a trend that has dominated since World War II: very few inter-state conflicts and an increasing number of internal and state formation conflicts.

After the Second World War a more or less stable pattern of conflicts emerged. However, this pattern changed after the Cold war and a number of new conflicting regions was added to old ones. A conflicting region is defined as a region where at least three geographically bordering states are involved in major armed conflicts. Examples of these conflicting regions can be found all over the world:

The Middle East (Israel/Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, Iran/Iraq),
Southern Africa (Angola, South Africa, Mozambique, Zimbabwe),
Central America (Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua), *South Asia* (India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka),
Central Asia (Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan), *Indo-China* (Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia),
South-eastern Europe (Serbia – with Kosovo and Montenegro, Bosnia, Croatia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia).

Patterns of security. There are some regions in the world that have been free from armed conflicts after the Second World War and have developed in a direction towards “security communities”. A pattern of security has emerged.

Such security regions are:

North America (Canada, Mexico, USA);
The Nordic countries (Denmark, Iceland, Finland, Norway, Sweden);
The European Community (France, Germany, The Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg and Italy);
The Australia/Pacific region (Australia, New Zealand, Pacific states).

These regions all have a history of violence. For some of them this goes far back in time. The Nordic countries have not experienced an interstate war since 1809. The last Mexican-American war ended at the beginning of the 20th century. France and Germany, now considering forming a security community were major belligerents on the European continent up to 1945.

The security regions have all established democratic systems since the early part of the century, with the sole exception of Germany with its periods of Nazism and weaker democratic institutions in Mexico. Trade patterns have been an important feature in the creation of patterns of security. The European Community was created expressly with

Patterns of Conflict and Security

European security as a major objective. More recently, formal trade agreements between the Nordic countries in the framework of EFTA and between Canada, USA and Mexico in NAFTA, have emerged.

The end of the Cold War led to two different global processes: new peace agreements were made in a number of conflict situations (such as Namibia, Angola, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Mozambique, Cambodia), while in other areas new conflicts emerged (such as in former Yugoslavia, and the Caucasus region). In addition, a number of nations in the Baltic region regained independence following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Thus the outcome of the end of the Cold War was of both positive and negative in character when it comes to peace and security aspects.

There is a possibility that southern Africa, which is a conflict region today, may develop into a security region. The conflicts following the end of Portuguese colonialism in Angola and Mozambique seem to have come to an end. The apartheid system in the Republic of South Africa is being abandoned. Democratic institutions are slowly developing with new multiparty elections. Yet the war in Angola has been recorded as being the worst in the world in terms of casualties. Positive developments are also seen in Central America, where important steps towards internal demilitarisation have been taken.

There is also a third category of regions or states, where neither war nor peace has reigned in the post-World War II period. We will not count these as security regions, but as *suppressed regions*. States that did not allow pluralist views about their own society are included in this category. Examples are a majority of African states from independence up to 1990, the Soviet Union, China/Burma/Mongolia, and military dictatorships in Latin America from the 1950s up to 1992. However, it is important to note that even if many of these suppressed regions has either been broken down or is undergoing a process of liberalisation, there are still a great number of dictatorships and authoritarian regimes left. These regimes exist not only in remote parts of Africa and Asia, but also in the Baltic region of today.

Thus, we can see three types of regions in the post-World War II period: “security regions”, “conflicting regions”, and “suppressed regions”.

The Baltic region has experiences from two of the three types of regions. This heritage shapes the conceptions of security in different countries of the region, as well as opinions about how security can be achieved in the future.



Map 36. Major armed conflicts / Security regions. See map on page VIII. Ill.: Radosław Przebitkowski

33 Security dilemmas, politics and major actors

1. The dilemmas

The purpose of a security community in the Baltic region is to solve security dilemmas. Thus, we need to consider the basic security problems in the region. Going from a narrow definition of security, i.e. freedom from the threat of military attack, to a more comprehensive concept, we can make an inventory of possible security problems today. This includes the following four comprehensive dilemmas:

1. *Maintaining independence* of the smaller countries in the region versus strategic and military objectives of major actors in Europe. This means the deployment of foreign forces, the building on new forms of defence capacity, transparency in military activities and the creation of security arrangements.
2. *Consolidating democratic forms of government versus* the fear of minorities being left out from the political process. This means creating societies with a durable democracy, and where secessionist elements can be restrained, by civilian society.
3. *Building states out of many peoples versus* building states dominated by one people. This entails questions of citizenship, voting rights, right to be elected and to hold office, as well as respect for differences in cultural heritage and political *views*.
4. *Achieving economic growth with Western integration versus* fear of groups or states being “left behind” with regard to economic development. This points to the dangers of uneven economic development nationally as well as regionally.

The security community is particularly focused on the first type of dilemma. The solution of other dilemmas is seen as contributing to the creation of the security community.

2. Security strategies after WW II

The peace arrangement agreed upon by the allied powers – the Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain and France – after WW II was not one of stability. Soviet expansion in the three Baltic States and Central Europe soon developed into a new confrontation, the Cold War, between the Soviet Union and the Western powers.

The central piece in the Western strategy against an offensive threat from the Soviet Union was the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO, in 1949. NATO was the US-led military alliance of Canada, the USA and West European states, which today

consists of 16 members. It was formed in the aftermath of the Prague coup in February 1948 and the Berlin Blockade later the same year.

The official strategy was *containment*. Its goal was to keep the Soviet threat against Western Europe and North America within limits. The *threat* was seen on several levels: First, the Communist Parties in Western Europe were perceived as a domestic arm of Soviet power. Second, there was the threat of the increasing offensive Soviet conventional capacity in Eastern Europe. Finally, Soviet behaviour against democratic or nationalist forces in Eastern Europe was an additional element in the Western threat image, as well as Stalinist terror in the enlarged Soviet Union itself.

Thus, Soviet armed forces were seen as a sign of strength at a time when Western military capacity was reduced, economic crisis was serious and difficult reconstruction work had begun. In the West, Soviet behaviour was not often seen as a reaction to uncertainty or fear of American superiority in a technological, nuclear and industrial capacity. The victories of the Communists in China and the Korean War were further indications of the expansionism and global reach of Soviet ambitions.

Throughout the entire subsequent Cold War period there were alternating periods of *détente* and confrontation. Basic societal cleavages remained, and investments in nuclear and conventional military technological development remained at a high level. Strategies of second strike nuclear capability were developed in the West: only if the West kept sufficient nuclear capacity to retaliate against a Soviet first strike with nuclear weapons could deterrence be achieved and Soviet aggressiveness contained, argued NATO and Western leaders.

Thus, a *nuclear arms race* ensued first in quantitative terms (each side acquiring as many and as varied nuclear forces as possibility) and later in qualitative terms (increased precision, multiple warheads, missile defences). This was accompanied by a high level of force readiness, continuous military manoeuvres involving both conventional and nuclear forces, a system of military bases around the globe, and support for different sides in wars in the Third World. Historically unprecedented amounts of resources were devoted to military research and development, as well as to large standing armies.

All this had implications for the Baltic Region. The region was divided between the two sides, with neutral Sweden and Finland in-between, and the less threatening NATO links to Norway. During the Cold War the Baltic Sea became a sea where military nerves were tested. Fleets from the two sides were permanently observing each other in Baltic waters. There was continuous surveillance by air.

The neutral countries in the region, Sweden and Finland, were under pressure from both sides. In the 1950s there were repeated crises between Sweden and the Soviet Union. The most serious incident was when the Soviet air force shot down a Swedish aircraft. Finland was exposed to direct political intervention from the Soviet authorities on several occasions, the most notable being the so-called Note Crisis of 1961. Repeated crises over Berlin, e.g. in 1953, 1958 and 1961 kept tension high. Militarily suppressed revolts in Poland showed the fragility of the Soviet-controlled Warsaw Pact (1956, 1970, 1980-1981). Alternative forms of government emerged but were quickly repressed (Prague 1968).

3. The Cold War ends

Only by the second half of the 1980s did the prospective combatants begin to move out of this chilling grip. Confidence-building measures in the field of conventional weap-

ons were initiated, especially at the Stockholm conference of 1986. A political dialogue was begun following the summit meeting in Geneva in 1985, and a joint position was developed on particular conflicts, e.g. the war between Iran and Iraq in 1987. Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan was agreed upon in 1988. The first disarmament agreement, the INF treaty in 1987, was concluded on intermediate-range nuclear forces stating that the missiles should be abolished within three years. This agreement has been implemented.

The disarmament agreement on nuclear issues, the end of Communist monopoly of power in East European countries in 1989, and the unification of Germany paved the way for a more durable and hopeful structure for peace and security in Europe as a whole and, thus, for the Baltic Region. The development was not without setbacks, however. The independence movements in Lithuania and Latvia were met by military power in January 1991. The unsuccessful coup in Moscow in August 1991 was followed by the independence of the Baltic countries in September 1991 and, three months later, by the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The Warsaw Pact disappeared and NATO remained the only militarily effective international organisation in Europe.

4. NATO

The question has now emerged about the roles of NATO, created as an alliance in case of a major war in Europe. In 1991, when the Cold War ended, NATO's institutional design was criticised for being an historical anachronism lacking a clear objective for dealing with a new security environment with no visible enemies. Only in 1994 did it find a new task. In the Bosnian crisis the organisation was employed in military combat for the first time since its inception. This gave the alliance an opportunity to reformulate its old objectives and cast itself in the role of a peacekeeping organisation, especially in situations where the European countries in general would agree on the objectives and means of the possible missions. The new role of NATO was clearly demonstrated in October 1998 when it took the unprecedented step of issuing an activation order and threatening to bomb the sovereign state of Yugoslavia for its treatment of ethnic Albanians in the province of Kosovo. With the consent of the international community NATO began, on 24 March, a 78-day air campaign, which included more than 38,000 sorties and the deployment of 28,000 bombs and missiles.

In November 1993 President Clinton proposed the creation of Partnership for Peace (PFP) as an extension or complement to NATO. The offer was directed to all former Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union members in Europe. The first attempt at creating a complement to NATO was made in 1991 with the creation of the North Atlantic Co-Operation Council (NACC), consisting of NATO-members, the Central European states and all Soviet successor states. NACC was intended to be a forum for consultation on democratic practices, and would oversee such things as military-to-military liaisons for co-operation on the development of democratic institutions, civil-military coordination and approaches to peacekeeping, defence planning and disarmament. PFP was a further development of NACC, but focused more on the military aspects of the co-operation.

The US objective was clear: PFP would enhance transparency among the military establishments in Europe and include, for instance, joint training for peacekeeping missions. In effect, PFP paved the way for the countries of Eastern and Central Europe to become acquainted with Western military and political thinking. Some countries saw PFP as a way of

getting closer to NATO and enhancing their opportunities of a membership in the alliance, others considered it as a confidence-building measure between former enemies, thus creating conditions for equal co-operation between Russia and the West. PFP does not include any security guarantees and does not specify any external threats. In fact, it is operating as a set of bilateral agreements, rather than as a unified model. However, both NACC and PFP have served as incubators for NATO expansion.

In January 1994 the Clinton administration proposed a strategy for a new NATO. The primary components in this new strategy included new missions, new members and new partnerships. First, NATO needed to strengthen its core mission of self-defence and deterrence, but this would be coupled with the adaptation of taking on new challenges in order to strengthen security and stability in both the USA and Europe. Second, NATO should be prepared to take in new members from the former Warsaw-pact. Third, NATO needed to forge a strong co-operative relationship with Russia.

The new strategy for NATO was put into practice in 1997. In May that year, at a special NATO summit conference in Paris, the then sixteen NATO members signed the “Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian federation”. A similar agreement was also signed between NATO and Ukraine. With the NATO-Russian founding act, Russia was given an inclusive role in the formation of the strategy for a new NATO. This was primarily made by the development of an institutional mechanism in the form of the multi-level Permanent Joint Council, which provided both NATO and Russia with a platform for discussions and negotiations concerning issues of mutual interest. This open door policy also paved the way for the decision at the Madrid summit in July 1997 to enlarge the alliance by bringing in new members. On 30 April 1998, the US senate approved the inclusion of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in NATO. The decision to expand the alliance has caused both expectations and disagreements in the Baltic area as to whether the enlargement will have positive or negative effects. The main obstacle to a further expansion of the alliance thus far has been Russia which strongly opposes NATO membership of the Baltic States and Ukraine.

5. Security thinking in Russia: the New Doctrine

Soviet security policy during the Cold War period was shaped by the experiences from the Second World War. Never again was war to be fought on Russian soil. Soviet defence was going to be placed on the same technological level as the Western powers and to have the capacity to attack quickly across borders. A war should be fought on enemy territory. Tanks and armed vehicles made up the core of the armaments. Research, development and production by indigenous military industry were aiming at keeping pace with Western military activities. As a consequence, Soviet defence became a burden on the civilian population and was perceived by the outside world as threatening. The end of the Cold War and the break-up of the Soviet Union changed the situation fundamentally.

In November 1993 President Yeltsin signed Russia's first military doctrine. It declared that the threat of a direct aggression against Russia had “considerably declined”, but the threat of military conflict remained. The threat caused by local conflicts within the former Soviet Union had taken priority over the threat from the West. Yet, several conceivable sources of external threats to Russian security were mentioned, which were easily identified as the result of a political conflict with the West. Among them were: the expansion of military blocs and

alliances to the detriment of the interests of Russia, the introduction of foreign troops on the territories of neighbouring states, and military build-up undermining the “strategic stability”, as well as neighbouring states allowing foreign deployment on their territory and the use of those territories for hostile and subversive activities against Russia. No direct enemy was pointed out, but judging from the description of potential sources and factors sustaining conflicts and wars, the authors of the doctrine have two groups in mind: neighbouring states and great powers including Western countries.

The doctrine gave the strategic nuclear deterrence an important role. The strategic nuclear force was to guarantee the destruction of an aggressor (*nanesenie zadannogo ushcherba agressoru*). Earlier Soviet declarations of no first strike of nuclear weapons were abandoned. Among the factors allowing a local war escalating into large-scale war, special attention was paid to “internal armed conflicts (inside Russia), which threaten the vitally important interests of the Russian Federation and may be used as an excuse for other states to intervene in its internal affairs”. Local wars, said the doctrine, have a potential for escalating into global war, involving the use of nuclear weapons.

Nevertheless, the doctrine pointed at armed conflicts and local wars in the vicinity of Russian borders as the most serious threat to Russian security. The main reasons for military conflict were to be found in social, political, territorial, religious, national/ethnic contradictions and “the desire of a number of states and political forces to resolve them by means of armed struggle”. Aggressive nationalism and religious intolerance were pointed out in particular. In order to prevent the escalation of local conflict and war into large-scale war, the doctrine emphasised the importance of “upholding stability in regions bordering Russia and its allies, as in the world in general”. Subsequently, the Russian government was very active after 1993 in trying to make the international community agree to Russian peacekeeping forces in the former Soviet Union under the auspices of the UN or the OSCE.

In February 2000 a revised military doctrine was signed by the then Acting President Vladimir Putin. It was followed in April by the National Security Concept (replacing a previous document from 1997), and in July by a Foreign Policy Concept (replacing a 1993 document). Other documents on specific aspects of security followed such as, for example, the doctrine on information security (September 2000). The National Security Concept was not the first to be published, though it is regarded as the basic document from which the other documents emanate. All these documents reflect the ideas of the Putin leadership. Yet, they are all compromise documents, and therefore give only general directions rather than solving issues of priorities in policy. Taken together they are used here to describe the new Russian doctrine.

The documents from 2000 reflect the deep concern of the Russian leadership with both the external and domestic security situation in Russia. As in the earlier evaluation the threat of large-scale war has drastically declined but the threat of military conflict remains and grows. The new doctrine reflects concern with Russia’s marginalisation in international affairs and the strategic change along Russia’s western and southern periphery. NATO’s bombing in the Kosovo conflict in the spring of 1999 is reflected; among the factors destabilising the international-political situation the military doctrine depicts the use of military force for “humanitarian intervention” without the sanction of the UN Security Council. In 2000 the description of external threats was given a more direct anti-NATO slant and more clearly traced back to NATO enlargement and an increased role of NATO in European military crisis management. The National Security Concept is very explicit on a developing threat that would result from NATO ignoring Russian interests.

Russia's strategic nuclear force is still given a vital role in Russian defence, and the wording with regard to the use of nuclear weapons is maintained. The great power status associated with strategic weapons is pointed out. In 2000 the military press also indicated a larger interest in the possible use of tactical nuclear weapons in local wars.

Terrorism as an external and internal threat to Russian security was briefly mentioned in the 1993 military doctrine. More attention was given to the internal threat of terrorism in the 2000 version. While the 1997 National Security Concept had already warned about terrorism, the Concept of 2000 concluded that "International terrorism is waging an open campaign to destabilise Russia". The issue of fighting terrorism is therefore presented as an urgent task for international cooperation.

Domestic threats to security have become more prevalent in the doctrine of 2000. The National Security Concept points at economic disintegration, social stratification and the dilution of spiritual values, which result in tension in society. Weak state institutions and deteriorating relations between state and society, an ongoing social and political polarisation, the criminalisation of social relations, growth of organised crime and terrorism threaten Russian security. Ethno-egoism, chauvinism and uncontrolled migration "promote nationalism, political and religious extremism and ethno-separatism, and create a breeding ground for conflicts". The Security Concept does pay attention to different aspects of security, thereby using a broad definition of security – among them the deteriorating state of public health and the declining demographic development. Yet, the activities of extremist nationalist, religious, separatist and terrorist movements and organisations are regarded as the most dangerous internal threat.

For the first time the 2000 military doctrine stipulates that military force can be used to repel not only external aggression but also to protect the state from "anti-constitutional actions and illegal armed violence" in domestic operations. In 1993 this task was given to the Interior Forces.

The main objective of the Foreign Policy Concept of 2000 is to serve Russia's economic recovery and build-up. This presupposes a stable international environment and Russian integration into the world economy. Yet, in spite of its weakness, Russia is to pursue an active diplomacy in order to increase its international standing. For this purpose Alexander Gorchakov, Foreign Minister in late 19th century Russia, was introduced as an example by Yevgenii Primakov during the second half of the 1990s. Gorchakov brought Russia back to international influence when it had been exhausted at the end of the Crimean war. Russian foreign policy under Putin is encouraged to follow Gorchakov's recipe: though still weak, a state can pursue an active diplomacy and strengthen its international standing. Gorchakov's recipe was international cooperation but also a skill for using differences and divisions between states to find the basis for coalition-building in international politics.

The formulation of Russian security thinking under Putin is torn between the threat associated with a larger role for NATO in Europe as well as threats from within Russia and the newly-independent states on former Soviet territory. In the latter, internal cleavages find a breeding ground in the difficult economic and social conditions under which large groups of the population live. Also, Russian thinking is torn between a traditional geopolitical approach where a larger Western engagement on former Soviet territory threatens Russian security and interests; and a more modern approach that tries to maintain an open mind for the benefits of international cooperation in a globalised world. Limited resources will, however, force Russian policy to make a choice between the different kinds of threats and approaches in order to better allocate resources and in a more effective way respond to challenges.

State building and boundary making

Today there is no land on earth that is not regulated by an international boundary. This situation is a recent development in political history. Only one hundred years ago, vast territories on many continents were not defined or demarcated as belonging to particular states. This was not necessarily a problem for the inhabitants, who handled their relations by other means than establishing boundaries in the modern sense of the word.

In Europe, the drawing of boundaries has been an intra-continental process, while boundary making in other parts of the world has been external.

There are three concepts used in connection with this subject. *Boundary* indicates the line separating two states, while *border* refers to the area where the boundary line is located. *Frontier* means a (legally) unregulated territory between two political centres, or just the outer reaches of a political centre. These concepts are often used without any distinction.

By the end of the 11th century there were no large unknown territories between political centres, i.e. frontiers, in Europe. Throughout the ages, the many small areas – parishes, cantons, bishoprics etc. – that existed from time to time, have functioned as “building pieces” in the many border changes that Europe has experienced, particularly after wars.

In the late 18th century the drawing of boundaries was presented as a form of peace making, by geographers in Europe and elsewhere. During the colonial period, when many European states expanded beyond their political centres, claims for mining, cultivation, the use of rivers, or control of mountain passes were often causes of armed conflict and wars. When state interests clashed over a certain territory, a precise delimitation and demarcation on the ground was considered a way of removing “every occasion for quarrel” (Vattel 1758, cited in Prescott, 1987, p. 58). This idea is also present today. When states conclude boundary agreements, the peace-making effect is often mentioned in the preamble of the agreement.

Today, the drawing of boundaries can be a way for both small states and major powers to strengthen their position. For instance, when a small state has internationally recognised boundaries with its neighbours, it also has the legal protection for these boundaries as it is formulated in international treaties. The Helsinki Final Act from 1975 stipulates that boundaries are inviolable. This treaty is now accepted by 53 states, among them all the states in Europe. The Final Act states that:

“The participating States regard as inviolable all one another’s frontiers as well as the frontiers of all States in Europe and therefore they will refrain now and in the future from assaulting these frontiers. Accordingly, they will also refrain from any demand for, or act of, seizure and usurpation of part or all of the territory of any participating State.” (From Helsinki Final Act, 1975)

States whose boundary relations are unclear may be tempted to establish “physical facts” on land that serves as borderlands. These facts can then be used as a point of reference for boundary negotiations. The typical example is the building of settlements, for instance for agricultural purposes, in areas which are not under forceful national jurisdiction.

Borders are often thought of as areas of separation, taxation and control, if not of overt conflict. But borders can also function as meeting-points and areas of co-operation and development. It is not easy to think of a well-functioning international community without borders and boundaries. They mark where one legal system ends and another begins, thus making clear the conditions for economic co-operation and development. A well-defined, internationally recognised boundary is a good point of reference for the development of resources, also

those that surround the boundary.

Finally, boundaries have a psychological function in being a physical mark of “what is ours”, and what is not. This works in two directions: it creates togetherness for those that accept the boundary – which can be something good in itself – but it creates opposite feelings for those who feel they are “on the wrong side”. When a boundary excludes people from one another, extreme ideologies, misperceptions and chauvinist sentiments are likely to develop. The best way of treating the emotions that may arise around boundaries is to make them penetrable. If a boundary is open for people and goods, it is not likely to cause problems.



Figure 124. Ethnic rivalry appears today in sports competition. Photo: Katarzyna Skalska

34 Peace and democracy

1. Peace and democracy

Democracies are about as prone to war as are authoritarian states. But stable democracies are very unlikely to wage war against other stable democracies. The explanation for peace among stable democracies lies primarily in normative restraints on conflict behaviour inherent in the democratic political culture. When two democracies face each other in a dispute, mutual trust is maintained as each side perceives the aversion to violent solutions in the other. This is a brief summary of the results from recent research on how democracy influences the willingness of states to enter into war.

In 1993, Bruce Russett published a book reflecting the state of the art of the research on the democracy-peace nexus. The finding that democracies shun war against each other is very solid, and has been characterised as the closest that empirical research in the area of international relations has come. In fact, apart from a few special cases, one of which will be dealt with below, two democracies have not once fought a full-scale war against each other. Democratic peace is thus important and needs to be fully understood. It is also a crucial element in developing a security community.

Learning about this relationship for the first time, one might be beset by doubts, especially if one is used to viewing the world through the mistrustful, perhaps even cynical, lenses of *realpolitik*. A person used to thinking in terms of power politics might argue that the democratic states never fought each other simply because they perceived a threat from a common enemy, and therefore felt a need to keep peace among themselves. Or one might explain the absence of war among the democracies by claiming that most democracies are rich countries, and therefore lack issues of disagreement that are serious enough to cause war. These, and similar arguments, propose that the democratic peace is *spurious*, that is, only illusory. An example of a truly spurious relation can be found in the folklore “wisdom” saying that the stork brings babies. It probably originates in the observation that where there are many storks, there are many babies. Of course the storks have nothing to do with it. Both the number of storks and babies can to a great extent be explained by another influence: the degree of urbanisation. In rural areas the stork population is larger, and the birth rate among humans tends to be higher in the countryside than in towns and cities. Thus the relationship between storks and babies is spurious.

There are, however, ways of checking for shared influences, such as the degree of urbanisation in the folklore example. The relationship between a high degree of democracy in two states and the absence of war between them has been thoroughly checked for many such influences through the use of advanced statistical methods. It is true that other influences, such as wealth, economic growth and common alliance membership, reduce the likelihood of war between two states. But the democratic peace holds for such controls. Recently a consensus

has emerged in the research community that mutual stable democracy is very close to a sufficient condition for peace in the relationship between two states. Democratic peace reigns even when other favourable conditions, such as wealth, are absent. Democratic peace is not limited to, for example, rich industrialised countries or to NATO-members. Furthermore, no other favourable influence can aspire to the status of a sufficient condition for stable peace, since one can find cases of war that clearly refute such assertions. For example, wars between members of the same military alliance system are in fact quite common, as is indicated by wars such as the Hungarian uprising in 1956, when Hungary and the Soviet Union, two members of the Warsaw Pact, fought each other. Another example is the war in 1982 between Great Britain and Argentina, both of which were allied to the United States.

2. Democracy as conflict resolution

Democracy is rule by the electorate on the basis of the peaceful resolution of conflicts. This basis of peaceful conflict resolution is at the heart of the explanation for democratic peace. In democracies, violence is seen as an illegitimate way of furthering one's political ambitions. Actors in the democratic political game abstain from violent means, and trust others to do the same. A competitive political system cannot survive in the absence of this mutual trust in peaceful intentions. Thus the peaceful resolution of conflict is a powerful norm that allows a smooth process of achieving a consensus among wills within the democratic state. Other important norms that constitute the democratic political culture are tolerance and a willingness to compromise. The norms of the democratic political culture carry with them normative restraints on the use of violence in settling a conflict.

The very same norm of peaceful resolution of conflicts can be applied to relations between states, provided that mutual trust is present. In the same way as actors within a democracy view each other as trustworthy, in terms of peaceful intentions, a stable democratic political system works as an identification tag, allowing foreign policy decision makers to distinguish between states. Decision makers in democratic states view other democracies as peaceful, just, and deserving of accommodation. Authoritarian states, on the other hand, rely on the suppression of their own people. If these states are in a state of aggression with their own citizens, how can they be trusted not to have aggressive intentions towards other states? Decision makers in democracies see authoritarian states as inherently distrustful, aggressive and unjust.

Another important aspect of democracy is the institutional constraints on the executive's power to decide in matters of war. It is often a complicated procedure to persuade the people, the legislature, and other independent institutions that war is necessary. Especially ordinary men and women, who, in the event of war, must bear the burden of military service, bombings, shortages and so on, can be expected to dislike costly foreign adventures. If the executives are directly or indirectly accountable to the people, they must take the preferences of the population into consideration if they want to remain in power after the next election.

Due to the high degree of institutional constraint in most democracies, a state in a dispute with another democratic state can count on ample time for conflict resolution processes, such as mediation, and virtually no risk of incurring a surprise attack. However, not all democratic states have highly constrained executives. The presidents of France and Russia, for example, have extensive presidential powers, and could be considered as relatively unconstrained in this regard. Furthermore, a state may have a constrained executive without being truly demo-

cratic. There have been wars between states where both belligerents have been of the latter category.

3. Explaining the democratic peace

Systematic research indicates that normative restraints are more important in explaining the democratic peace, although institutional constraints are important as well. Evidence indicates that normative restraints best explain why democracies rarely engage even in low-level militarised disputes. Institutional constraints, in turn, prevent escalation into war in the rare cases of serious conflict between democracies.

The discussion above, about constrained executives and political culture, indicates that democracy is a complex phenomenon, making it rather difficult to identify democracies. During the Cold War era of great ideological confrontation, the socialist countries of the Soviet bloc used to argue that the so-called people's democracies, dominated by Communist parties, were more democratic in the true sense of the word. Today, however, the notion of a people's democracy has been thrown into the dustbin of history. Instead there are some rather non-controversial criteria of democracy within the field of political science that might be used. In modern states, democracy is usually identified with the right of all citizens to vote, freely contested multi-party elections, and an executive either popularly elected, or responsible to an elected legislature. Often, requirements for civil liberties, such as free speech, are also added. One way of gauging the political culture of a state is to measure the amount of internal political violence, such as terrorism and political executions.

When it comes to democratising countries, special problems arise. As was already outlined above, perceptions are key. It is very important to the process how decision makers in one country view the regime in another country, and whether or not a democratising counterpart is judged sincere in its democratic conviction. In order for mutual trust to develop, the democratic regime must be seen as stable, it must have some duration, and it must have proven its democratic conviction. Some additional criteria are sometimes used against this background when it comes to differentiating reasonably stable democracies from weak democracies that might slide back into authoritarian practices. An observer might require that a working democratic system must have been in existence for a certain number of years for a state to be classified as democratic. Another criterion is that the possibility of the leaders of the government being defeated in an election has been proven by a transfer of power following democratic elections. It is clear that several states on the southeastern shore of the Baltic Sea could be considered in a transitional period in these respects.

4. The historical evidence

In applying the criteria outlined above to the history of warfare, one reaches the conclusion that two democracies never, or extremely rarely, fight full-scale wars against each other. One case that seems to contradict this assertion might be the case of Finland during the Second World War. Following the defeat in the Winter War of 1939-1940, in which Finland suffered large territorial losses in the aftermath of a Soviet war of aggression, Finland joined Nazi-Germany in 1941 in its attack on the Soviet Union. After great pressure from Stalin, the Western Democracies, now allied to the Soviet Union, declared war on Finland. Democratic

Finland, thus, ended up on the “wrong” side, formally in a state of war with several democratic countries. It is important to note, however, that Finland only fought the Soviet Union, and that no battles took place between Finnish forces and forces from a democratic country.

Nothing in the arguments above suggests that democracies will not experience conflicts among themselves. The point is that democracies can handle even serious disagreement when dealing with other democracies without resorting to arms. One example might be the territorial dispute between Sweden and Denmark in 1982, concerning the status of a small island (Hesselö) located between the two countries. The interest in the issue was heightened by the belief that the seabed in the disputed area might contain valuable mineral resources. This conflict was resolved without any references to military power or use of coercive measures. In contrast, the dispute between democratic Great Britain and the military dictatorship of Argentina over the Falkland/Malvinas Islands in the South Atlantic resulted in war the same year.

One might argue that conflict, or more accurately – competition, is inherent in human existence, or at least in the capitalist economic system. Firms and individual entrepreneurs compete at the local level, and great trade blocs and trading nations, such as the European Union and the USA, compete at a global level. Democracy is a manifestation of the human ability to solve conflicts peacefully, and in a context of democratic norms and peaceful mechanisms of conflict resolution, human conflict and competition might be seen as a dynamic force, contributing to progress and pluralism.

The theory of Kant

The theory of democratic peace actually originates from the Baltic region. In 1795, the famous German philosopher Immanuel Kant in Königsberg, present-day Kaliningrad, finished *Zum Ewigen Frieden – Ein philosophischer Entwurf* (known in English as *On Perpetual Peace – A Philosophical Essay*). In this work, Kant spoke of “liberal republics” that would create a “pacific union” by accepting the principles of a metaphorical “treaty”. In addition to the normative restraints and the institutional constraints, Kant pointed to the pacifying effect of mutually beneficial trade, an argument that was later to become central to the liberal tradition.



Figure 125. At the end of the 18th century, the German philosopher Immanuel Kant published his book *On Eternal Peace*, which contained an initial outline of the concepts of security communities, and a discussion on the prerequisite for lasting peace. Kant was a professor of Philosophy at the old East Prussian University of Königsberg, today's Kaliningrad, a site that has been turned into a military fortress both under German and Russian rule. Painting: Uppsala University Library

In Kant's days, not very many countries were democracies even by the relatively lower standards of that time. As long as Switzerland, the USA and possibly France, were the only reasonably democratic countries, Kant's vision might indeed seem utopian. Today, judging by the global spread of democracy, the prospects for Kant's pacific union to become reality are greater than ever before in history. Particularly important is the dramatic change that followed the end of the Cold War vis-à-vis democracy in the Baltic region – one important element in building a security community.

Figure 126. Inscription on Kant's grave in the cathedral church of Kaliningrad. Photo: Katarzyna Skalska



35 Mutual responsiveness and conflict resolution

1. Conflict resolution

“Conflict resolution” takes place at all levels of society, every day. It can be described as “a process of harmonising goals that initially were incompatible”. More practically formulated it is “an adjustment to realities”. A “conflict” emerges when individuals or groups try to satisfy their demands in a way that is not compatible with those of others. This takes the form of a social process, which may or may not be violent. In politics, this includes the expression of a variety of attitudes and many different forms of behaviour: from war to peaceful talks.

In recent years, it has become common between international governmental, as well as non-governmental organisations, to talk about “peaceful conflict resolution”. Also, in the social sciences this concept has increasingly aroused more interest. Some point to this concept as the main principle of treating political controversy within and between states in the post-Cold War era. Others look upon it as a theoretical challenge in the development of knowledge of human society. These two different ways of approaching the same idea is more an asset than a problem in the development of knowledge in this field.

The Westphalian system

In the Middle Ages, feudal princes fought each other for territory and influence and emperors and popes struggled over worldly and spiritual power. Political authority was layered and overlapping with no clear jurisdiction between church, lords, kings, emperors and towns. Authority over territory was therefore neither exclusive nor discrete, and occupants of a particular territory were subject to a multitude of authorities. With the rise of the nation-state and the advent of capitalism, feudal lords and religious leaders in Europe gradually lost their power, which was transferred to the central government in the form of absolute monarchy.

The decisive break with the medieval system and the transition from a feudal to a nation-state system came with the Treaty of Westphalia. Many historians, social scientists and international relations scholars see the Peace Treaty as a cornerstone, or a symbol, of the modern international system. The treaty gave sovereignty to about 300 small states in the heart of Europe and established the principle of territorially-based sovereignty as the main foundation for power relations. Indeed, the agreement confirmed that territory was the key requirement for participation in international politics. It thus consolidated the concept of the territorial state, which then gained common acceptance in Europe. Thus, ever since 1648 territorial states and governments have been the principal actors on the international arena with the exclusive right to deal with each other, make war or peace, sign treaties and conventions and the responsibility of introducing some order to the world.

The governing political principle of self-determination that was introduced in the international system by the Treaty of Westphalia was jealously guarded and expanded by the principal actors through both military and economic policies. The ebb and flows in the international system that followed after Westphalia were chiefly manifested by the mercantilist era advocating a state intervention and protectionist trade theory between the late 17th and early 18th century, and economic liberalism advocating free trade that continued throughout the 19th century. These two antitheses of political organization and economic transaction were accompanied by colonial expansion and the establishment of integrated global commodity markets. The world became a smaller place. By the end of the 19th century, the international system had reached a level of interconnectedness between states, people, goods, and capital and developed a version of what we now call globalisation.

In the following, “peaceful conflict resolution” will mean conflict settlements that take place:

- without the use of military operations or threats
- with the voluntary acceptance from all parties
- with a solution that the parties find acceptable over a period long enough to allow review of the matter.

The concept of “security community” is closely related to “peaceful conflict resolution”. In particular the characteristic of “mutual responsiveness” is an important condition for conflict resolution. “Mutual responsiveness” indicates a requirement for the establishment of a peaceful conflict resolution process. It points to the “ability to predict the behaviour of other states”. Avoiding escalation is the first step in a conflict resolution process. If two parties are not able to predict the behaviour in a conflict situation, the conflict escalates more easily, since no one wants to be taken by surprise by the other party’s preparations. Therefore, predicting the counter-party’s behaviour is crucial.

2. Conflict resolution and territorial changes

Throughout history, the Baltic region has experienced both peaceful and violent forms of conflict resolution. One important type of conflict, where both types of conflict resolution have been used in the region, is conflict over *territory*. The Baltic region has seen a large number of territorial changes between states. A territorial change includes a change of political status of the whole of a territory (for instance from independent status to occupation), as well as portions of it. Also, many Baltic territories have had – and some still have – a special political status as a result of an agreement between governments. In most cases these territorial changes were the result of wars or post-war negotiations.

In the CSCE Treaty from 1975 – also called the Helsinki Final Act – it was agreed that the present boundaries in Europe were inviolable and could only be changed through negotiations. During the Cold War era, this provision signified a stabilising status quo. In the post-Cold War era, two of the CSCE Treaty signatory states (the German Democratic Republic and the Soviet Union) were dissolved and boundaries have since then been seen in a different light. Governments bring up the question of boundaries as matters of negotiation and, according to nationalist groups in some countries, these matters are devices in support-raising rhetoric. Thus, proposals for the establishment of new boundary lines have been put forward. The historic reasons for these demands are innumerable. The Baltic region has seen territorial changes in the 20th century that range from achieving statehood or becoming occupied by other states (Norway, Denmark, Finland, Baltic republics), autonomy solutions (Åland, Schleswig), boundary revisions (Germany, Poland, Baltic republics, Finland, Russia) to practical boundary line adjustments (Sweden/Norway). More examples on each type could be given; in fact all the Baltic region countries have undergone territorial changes during the 20th century.

With this background, it is interesting to reflect on major experiences of peaceful settlement of territorial conflicts in the Baltic region. At least three such situations were implemented during the 20th century, with very different characters from a structural point of view:

- An ethnically mixed and balanced region, divided between two states (Schleswig divided between Denmark and Germany)
- A territorial minority community, with a homogenous local ethnic majority within one state (Åland Islands in Finland)

- Two balanced ethnic groups in one state (Norwegians and Swedes in the Union of the two countries).

These three situations have their historically given particularities. At the same time, they share traits with conflicts of today with ethnic dimensions. It is probably not an exaggeration to say, that these three types of situations describe a significant portion of all conflict situations within which ethnic conflicts take place today.

3. The case of Schleswig – divided region in Denmark and Germany

The present boundary between Denmark and Germany was created in 1920, after the First World War. It divided a territory that since medieval times had been held together, although under various formal arrangements. The territory in question includes the regions of Schleswig, Holstein, and the Frisian Islands. A German-Frisian dialect is spoken on these islands. In Schleswig, German and Danish are mixed. Following the First World War, Denmark – although neutral in the war – proposed a readjustment of its boundary with Germany to the Versailles Conference. According to the principle of people's self-determination, a popular referendum was employed to create a foundation for the future political decision. Such referenda were held in many German border areas after the First World War, for instance in Alsace Lorraine, Gdańsk and Memelland.

The 1920 boundary divides an area where language is not the dividing factor. Even if German is generally more spoken in the south, and Danish in the north of the region, this does not divide the national groups. A Danish identity, which for instance is shown as a preference for the Danish Royal family, can be combined with the use of German as the daily language.

Germany and Denmark have declared that everybody – living in this region on both sides of the international border – is free to express loyalty to any of the national identities in the region, without Denmark or Germany having any possibility to interfere. The result of this is that it is practically impossible to measure the size of any national group in the region.

4. The case of Norway – separation from a union

In 1905, relations between Sweden and Norway had developed into a point where the Union between the two countries was challenged. The Union had been created in 1814, in the wake of the Napoleonic wars. Norway was then forced to join in a union with Sweden, as agreed in a peace treaty between Denmark-Norway and Sweden. However, in that process, political forces in Norway developed a constitution, adopted at Eidsvold in 1814. This was rejected by Sweden which attacked Norway militarily and forced the newly elected Norwegian King, Kristian Fredrik, to lay down the Crown. The conditions agreed upon were that Sweden accepted Norway as an independent kingdom with its own parliament, only sharing the King with Sweden.

In 1905 this situation was challenged by Norway. The crisis was a fact when the Swedish King – Oscar II – refused to sign a decision taken by the Norwegian parliament to establish an independent Norwegian consular service. Negotiations between the two countries were eventually held in Karlstad, located in the western part of Sweden – halfway between Oslo and Stockholm. Although some forces in Sweden argued for a military solution, an agreement

on a peaceful ending of the Union was finally made in 1905, and Norway could elect its first King – brought from Denmark!

The new relations between the countries could develop peacefully from the start. No armed conflict, with memories of violence and injustices across the border, had occurred. Historians ascribe this peaceful way out of a significant crisis a main role in the coming stability of the relations between the two countries. This stability developed in spite of the challenges posed by two world wars.

5. Åland Islands – from periphery to autonomy

The archipelago of islands stretching out from Finland into the Baltic, ending with a few major islands where the open sea begins, have been a major link between East and West throughout history. During Sweden's and Russia's century-long struggle for influence in Northern Europe, the Åland Islands have been exposed to invasions from all sides. Although Åland acquired its status of autonomy through a decision in the League of Nations 1921, the islands were demilitarized as early as 1856. In the Peace Treaty between Britain, France and Russia, that ended the Crimean War, it was decided that no fortresses were allowed on the islands. Attempts by Russia in the early 1900s to change this status were strongly opposed by Britain and Sweden. In 1908 the Baltic Declaration was signed by Russia, Sweden and Britain where the parties agreed to maintain the demilitarisation of Åland.

Following World War I, Finland sought independence from Russia. However, before that, the population on Åland expressed a clear preference for joining Sweden. Sweden was reluctant to act on this matter in a situation where Finland was to become independent. Finally, the matter was brought by Great Britain before the League of Nations, which decided both on the demilitarisation aspect and the political status in 1921. The demilitarisation was extended into a total demilitarisation of the islands, and Åland was to remain part of Finland (which had declared its independence in 1917) but have significant rights for the preservation of its Swedish identity.

Although the decision was partly against the will of the Åland population, it was accepted and implemented. Gradually Åland developed its own identity and prosperity as a trading island in the midst of two industrialising countries – Finland and Sweden. Instead of becoming a periphery of Sweden, Åland became a bridgehead between two countries.

In 1991, Åland got a revised Autonomy Act, which increases the scope and jurisdiction of the local government.

6. Why did these solutions last?

Why were these solutions durable? One important factor is that in all three cases, the basic aspirations of the peoples of the respective regions were taken into consideration. There was a popular dimension to the decision making in all three cases. This is an important aspect of durable conflict resolution generally when it comes to territorial matters.

Second, the relations after the agreement were co-operative but not exploitative. There were no economic ties linked to the settlements as such. Such links had to develop on their own merits. Thus, the agreements were not endangered by non-territorial developments, such as trade.

Documents on the peaceful resolution of conflict

The principle of the peaceful resolution of disputes between states is well established in international law. In fact, states are today obliged to find a peaceful settlement to any conflict that threatens international peace and security. This principle has been developed in a series of agreements between states. Some of the most important are listed below.

Table 16. Agreements on Peaceful Conflict Resolution

1899/1907	Hague Conventions on the peaceful settlement of disputes.
1920	Charter of the League of Nations, articles 13 – 15
1920	Charter of the Permanent Court of International Justice
1921	Charter of the United Nations, articles 2(3) and 33
1945	Charter of the International Court of Justice
1945	Charter of the Organisation of American States, article 20
1948	European Convention on the peaceful resolution of conflicts
1957	European Court for Human Rights
1959	Charter of the Organisation of African Unity
1975	Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
1990	Paris Treaty

It is easy to see the principle of peaceful conflict resolution as a weak tool for states attempting to maintain security and territorial integrity. However, the principle of peaceful conflict resolution cannot be seen in isolation. First, it is a basic norm in the development of international relations in general without which the international community would risk more anarchic behaviour, for instance in trade relations. Secondly, it is part of a normative system of opinions, interests, and sentiments among leaders, peoples and international organisations. Combined, these norms can exert a strong influence on any party that violates the principle. The principle of peaceful conflict resolution applies to major as well as minor states, and is in the interest of both. All are treated equally in a formal sense. Major states gain prestige and goodwill if they abide by international law, and minor states achieve a treatment on equal terms, thus avoiding the issue of “might is right”.

Third, the agreements brought in all-important aspects: in the Norway-Sweden case, independence for Norway was the overriding issue but border fortifications were also an important matter. Once agreement was reached on these matters, for instance by the establishment of a demilitarised zone along the border – other issues could also be settled. In the Åland case, a large number of issues were treated in the League of Nations decision. What should be included and what should not, was clearly stated and could not be an issue of its own afterwards. Finally, the Schleswig case stated certain regulations of a cultural and political nature to be applied on both sides of the boundary that was drawn.

Even if favourable conditions were established in these cases, the implementation has not been a simple matter for the parties. However, the emerging democratic traditions that developed in the countries involved created a mutual responsiveness between those involved, for instance during the Second World War. On the whole, these cases illustrate, that what was once a political issue threatening the stability and integrity of more than one country, can be transformed into a peaceful and developing political order, where ethnic and other aspirations are given their proper role in the conflict resolution process.

36 Armament and disarmament

1. Armaments, arms control and disarmament

Several attempts have been made to explain why and how nations arm themselves, and the approaches are manifold. The main factor distinguishing different explanations is often the *level* of explanation, such as actor-characteristics (the actor is often defined as a nation or government); groups within an actor; characteristics of relations between actors; and the social system or the physical context.

Within the different explanations there are two “schools”, which have achieved special importance. The first tries to explain armaments mainly as a result of relational factors. Lewis F. Richardson’s mathematical study in 1960 may be considered the starting-point for one of the most influential approaches within this group, namely “action-reaction”. They generally focus on pairs of antagonistic major powers. Governments are treated as unified and rational actors with complete information. US-Soviet military relations were often presented in terms of this explanation.

During the 1970s, the simple assumptions in the action-reaction approach led to explanations building on the variety of groups and interests within nations. These types of studies



Figure 127. Building up the Lithuanian Army. Photo: Alfred F. Majewicz

do not confine themselves to antagonistic powers or bilateral “arms races”. Instead, they include more varied explanations, such as bureaucratic processes, conflicting interests among groups and individuals, pressure groups, as well as economic and technological constraints and demands. The so-called “military-industrial complex” (MIC) theory is the core theoretical approach in this group.

From the 1970s, different theoretical approaches have been combined and further developed, involving more factors. It is very likely that detailed armament studies of US-USSR rela-

tions during the 1980s, which are surely to be written, will find some support from all or most types of explanations. For instance, the general international antagonism as a prerequisite for their bilateral arms race behaviour with regard to nuclear weapons in particular, both quantitatively and qualitatively, may find support in the action-reaction theory. The qualitative

aspects could probably be applied, at least in part, to MIC factors. If one might dare make a prediction, it could be that domestic factors, political and not least economic, were the most important for the new arms control and disarmament agreements drawn up between the superpowers from the late 1980s.

The factors explaining “arms races” may, therefore, be useful in attempting to explain arms control and disarmament. But it cannot be assumed that the old theoretical explanations can just be “turned around”.

There are several issues affecting the military situation in and around the Baltic Sea. In particular, there is both old and new behaviour in terms of parallel armament and disarmament developments. Both may, in fact, be necessary in order for the region to achieve a state of security in the short term. Armament and disarmament policies in Russia and the Central European states, as well as in the USA, will depend upon the willingness of president Putin’s policies. In this, support by governments outside the Baltic region is important. Continued good relations between the USA and Russia, as well as a successful political balance between history and the future by the governments in the new independent states, is of central importance for European security in general and Baltic security in particular.

The new independent states are “remilitarising” – although on a low level – by formulating national defence policies and creating national defence forces. This is generally done in cooperation with western countries. This, as well as the interest of several of the new independent states in becoming members of NATO, has complicated Russia’s foreign policy, as well as that of USA, vis-à-vis these states and their own bilateral relations. It has been clear, however, that the previous US Clinton administration did not want to risk its relations with the Russian leadership by offering full NATO membership to the Baltic States.

In order to create a security community in the long run, however, further successful “arms build-down” and restructuring are needed, not only in Europe, but globally as well. Policy is “the art of the possible”, and it may be wise to remember that today is tomorrow’s yesterday. What we do not achieve today may be impossible tomorrow. In a security community, national military forces, defence and security policies must not increase uncertainty and mistrust regarding national military ambitions. In the Baltic Sea region, issues affecting national and regional (in)security – in whatever way – should be discussed and settled in democratic agreement among the nations concerned. Generally, open and good statesmanship is always a better recipe for security-building than secrecy and hostile statements.

The break-up of the Soviet Union and the consequent end of the bipolar world opened the way for new arms control and disarmament initiatives.

The agreements in 1991 and 1993 to reduce and limit offensive strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and warheads on American and Soviet/Russian missiles (the START I Treaty, to which Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine also accede, and the START II Treaty), as well as decisions by France and Great Britain to either eliminate, reduce or no longer deploy certain weapons and/or nuclear delivery systems, are clearly important.

However, other agreements also had direct consequences for Europe and the Baltic region, in particular the 1987 INF (i.e. intermediate range nuclear forces) Treaty and follow-on agreements to the 1990 CFE reductions (i.e. conventional armed forces in Europe), as well as confidence and security-building measures discussed in the Organisation on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

2. The Treaty on Intermediate Nuclear Forces in Europe

The Treaty, formally known as the *Treaty Between the United States and the Soviet Union on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles*, was signed in December 1987. It went into force in June 1988, and was the first nuclear disarmament treaty. As such, it is important not only for the peoples of the Baltic, but for all of Europe. It may be assumed that those missiles were all aimed at military and economic targets in Europe both inside and outside the respective military alliances.

The destruction required by the Treaty covered four types of US nuclear missiles (BGM-109G Ground Launched Cruise Missile, Pershing II, Pershing 1A and Pershing 1B) and six types of Soviet nuclear missiles with a range of between 500 and 5,500 kilometres (SS-20, SS-4, SS-5, SS-12, SS-23, and SSC-X-4). The missiles and associated equipment, except for the warheads, were completely eliminated by June 1, 1991. This included facilities in countries other than the USA and the Soviet Union where these missiles and support equipment were located. The Treaty also prohibits further production, testing and deployment of such systems, as well as ground-launched systems within the same range limits. The Treaty, therefore, eliminated this category of weapons from the inventories of the United States and the Soviet Union.

The INF Treaty laid the groundwork for follow-on reductions in conventional arms and new confidence-building measures in Europe. Its importance is not mainly in the actual destruction of these weapons – only an estimated five percent of all nuclear weapons at the time – but in the acceptance by both sides of on-site inspection on their respective territories to verify the destruction of these weapons and assembly facilities. This was a breakthrough in confidence building.

While the Treaty's inspection rules are limited to 13 years, the Treaty is of indefinite duration. It has established co-operative measures to enhance the use of reconnaissance systems and a Special Verification Commission as a forum for American and Russian representatives to discuss compliance issues and measures to improve the effectiveness of the Treaty.

3. The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe

The CFE Treaty was signed by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) governments and the Warsaw Pact (WP) governments in November 1990. Rapid progress has been made largely due to Soviet acceptance of large reductions in WP's ground forces. The purpose of this treaty was not disarmament, but increased stability in Europe by reducing the military potential and by reducing the possibilities for a surprise attack. Although some types of equipment could remain, most equipment within the CFE region to be reduced was to be destroyed or converted to avoid a quick re-creation of the previous force structures.

The CFE includes conventional forces deployed in the member states from the Atlantic to the Urals (ATTU): tanks (weighing at least 16.5 metric tons with a gun of at least 7.5 cms), artillery (guns, howitzers, mortars and multiple rocket launchers of 10 cm calibre and above), armoured combat vehicles, combat aircraft and attack helicopters. For all of these categories of weapons there is a maximum quantitative ceiling. As a consequence of the formulation of the Treaty, the USA had only to reduce its tank inventory by a few percent, while the Soviet Union had to cut it almost by half.

The complications and uncertainties with implementing the CFE Treaty caused by the dissolution of the Soviet Union were largely settled in 1992 and the Treaty came into power in November 1992. The new independent states were not parties to the initial Treaty and were therefore not bound by it. The three Baltic States were in what was defined in 1990 as the “expanded central zone”, together with the rest of the then four Soviet military districts including the Leningrad region. However, at a meeting on 10 January 1992 at NATO Headquarters the so-called High Level Working Group agreed that:

Treaty obligations assumed by the former Soviet Union should be wholly accounted for by all the newly independent States in the area of application and apportioned among them in a manner acceptable to all Parties to the Treaty.

The Treaty contains a commitment to follow-on talks – the 1990 CFE treaty is therefore referred to as CFE-1. In 1991 it was agreed to reduce the armed forces of a unified Germany to 370,000 personnel within 3-4 years of the start of the Treaty. Further, in 1992, troop level ceilings were agreed upon in the so-called CFE-1A talks.

Due to the fact that the Europe of 1993 was very different to the Europe of 1990, some analysts questioned the future relevance of CFE. The acceptance of the CFE provisions by the new independent states, plus the future complete withdrawal of Russian troops and equipment from these countries, means that much of the original basis for CFE-1 is, in fact, already outdated. For these reasons, there were important benefits to be gained by continuing the CFE negotiations.

On July 23, 1997, a joint consultative group on the CFE Treaty adopted an interim agreement on revising the treaty. The most important outlines of this revision are that the original idea of balance between NATO and the former Warsaw Pact members, was replaced by a structure of individual national arms limits, together with territorial limits that determined in which areas the military equipment would be allowed. The agreement also included several other important areas where either a revision or amendment was necessary: like, for example, an overall reduction in equipment in Europe; different kinds of transitional regulations that would allow stationing and temporary deployment, enabling new NATO members the opportunity to participate on equal terms in the alliance, while regional limitations would continue to neutralise any build-up of forces; the implementation of additional transparency measures; and the re-insurance and preservation of the Flank limitations which prevents deployment in the Caucasus region and on the borders to Norway and the Baltic States.

4. The Organisation on Security and Co-operation in Europe

The OSCE has come a long way from the initial steps in 1975, when the first important initiatives were taken in terms of diplomatic involvement in European security.

In 1975, thirty five states – including all NATO and WTO member states – concluded the Helsinki Final Act, which aimed at creating peace and stability in Europe. This was the founding document for the OSCE process. It included, among other things, a declaration about the inviolability of existing European borders, which meant that all European states and the USA accepted the post-World War II order in Europe. The agreement was divided into sections (“baskets”) dealing with specific areas:

1. Security and confidence-building measures
2. Economic, scientific and technological co-operation and environmental issues
3. Human rights, culture, education and free flow of people and of information.

Example of Factors Influencing Armaments

The different types of factors listed below are in most cases assumed to support armaments. Some, however, may also have a restraining effect.

- *Internal*: economic, bureaucratic, research, military, political interest and pressure groups or combined sectional interests.
- *Actor characteristics*, such as military mission, 'national pride', expansionist ideology, alliance position, conflict patterns or type of political rule.
- *Relations between governments*, such as specific political, economic or other relations to the opponent(s), as well as political, military, economic and other relations to allies and 'friendly governments' (see also alliance position as an actor characteristic).
- *Systemic characteristics*, for instance changes in long-term economic cycles, international 'power distribution', technological requirements, etc.

Adapted from Gleditsch & Njølstad 1990.

A fourth section states that regular review conferences be held in order to continue and strengthen the multilateral process that was started by the Helsinki Conference. The central theme of confidence-building measures in the Final Act from Helsinki in 1975 has been the basis for all discussions. The OSCE member states come together regularly to meetings and conferences, represented by their Heads of State, to review conferences, and various council and committee meetings.

The OSCE approach to security is comprehensive and co-operative: comprehensive in dealing with a wide range of security-related issues including arms control, preventive diplomacy, confidence and security-building measures, human rights, democratisation, election monitoring and economic and environmental security; co-operative in the sense that all OSCE-participating States have equal status, and decisions are based on consensus.

Following the end of the Cold War, the OSCE has increased its activities. In particular preventive diplomacy, minority questions and the strengthening of democratic institutions have been on the CSCE agenda. As a result of this, an Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODHIR) was set up in Poland, and in 1992 a High Commissioner on National Minorities was appointed. The task for the Commissioner was to provide early warning and early action with respect to tensions where national minority issues were involved.

During the past decade, the OSCE has sent a number of Missions to areas of tension and conflict, for instance to Yugoslavia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Georgia, Estonia, Moldova, Latvia, and Tajikistan. The CSCE is also actively involved in efforts to settle the conflict about Nagorno-Karabakh in the Caucasus region. All European states in the Baltic Region are members of the CSCE.

At a summit in Budapest on 5-6 December 1994, the OSCE adopted a document entitled "*Towards a Genuine Partnership in a New Era*". This document confirmed that the confidence-building measures that started in 1975 had evolved from their original idea of being a process, into being an organisation. As a result, a decision was taken to re-name CSCE to OSCE, the Organisation on Security and Co-operation in Europe that would reflect that it was no longer simply a conference.

At the Lisbon summit in 1996, the OSCE officially adopted a "common and comprehensive security model for Europe for the twenty-first century". The Lisbon Document stated that:

Freedom, democracy and co-operation among our nations and peoples are now the foundation for our common security. We are determined to learn from the tragedies of the past and to translate our vision of a co-operative future by creating a common security space free of dividing lines in which all states are equal partners.

We face serious challenges, but we face them together. They concern the security and sovereignty of States as well as the stability of our societies. Human rights are not fully respected in all OSCE states. Ethnic tension, aggressive nationalism, violations of the rights of people belonging to national minorities, as well as serious difficulties of economic transition can threaten stability and may also spread to other states. Terrorism, organised crime, drug and arms trafficking, uncontrolled migration and environmental damage are of increasing concern to the entire OSCE community.

The new and active role that the OSCE has come to play in the security dialogue in Europe was further confirmed in Istanbul on 18-19 November 1999 with the adoption of the “*Istanbul Summit Declaration*”. Apart from current security matters of concern for the OSCE, the foremost important aim with the declaration was the strengthening of the organisation. In the declaration, five areas of concern were pointed out: A) adopting a platform for Co-operative Security to enhance co-operation between the OSCE and other international organisations and institutions. B) Developing the OSCE role in peacekeeping operations. C) Creating Rapid Expert Assistance and a Co-operation team (REACT) to speed up staff employment. D) Expanding the OSCE ability to carry out police-related activities. E) Establishing an Operations Centre at the secretariat to facilitate the effective preparation and planning of rapid deployment of OSCE field operations. F) Establishing a Preparatory Committee under the direction of the OSCE Permanent Council to improve the consultation process within the OSCE. Together with the adoption of the declaration, the 30 signatory countries also signed the Agreement of the Adoption of the Treaty of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, which adjusted the 1990 CFE Treaty to better reflect the changes brought about by the ending of the Cold war.

It is clear that the OSCE has an important role to play. The newly independent states are part of the new European architecture, agreeing on the common values defined in the OSCE negotiations. Both the documents from Paris in 1990 – the Paris Charter for a New Europe, the Lisbon document of 1996 and the Istanbul document of 1999, define a new Europe and extend the future roles of the OSCE in crisis management and conflict resolution, including the possibility of military peacekeeping operations.

Some major multilateral arms control agreements

Geneva Protocol, 1925, prohibits the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons in war. The *1993 Chemical Weapons Convention*, in addition to usage, also bans the production, development and stockpiling of chemical weapons. The Convention is under ratification and is not yet in force.

Partial Test Ban Treaty, 1963, bans testing of nuclear weapons on the ground, under water or in outer space. In 1992 the USA made 6 tests and China 2. In 1993 only one nuclear test (under ground) was made (by China) and in July the USA declared a moratorium to September 1994. This moratorium is accepted by Russia, France, Great Britain and China. Negotiations based on a Swedish proposal for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, are presently going on. If accepted, this would completely prohibit all nuclear tests. The prospects for such an agreement are presently better than at any time since 1963.

Non-Proliferation Treaty, 1968, prohibits the transfer of technology for nuclear weapons to non-nuclear weapon states. Requires safeguards on nuclear facilities. Non-nuclear states undertake to have their nuclear facilities under IAEA inspection.

Biological Weapons Convention, 1972, prohibits the development, production and stockpiling of biological and toxin weapons.

Inhumane Weapons Convention, 1981, is an umbrella convention covering protocols that a) prohibit weapons intended to injure by fragments that cannot be X-rayed, b) restricts or prohibits the use of mines, booby-traps etc., and c) restricts the use of incendiary weapons.

The CFE Treaty, 1990 and its amendments in 1999, sets a ceiling for five categories of military equipment (tanks, armoured vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters) from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains.

37 Common institutions for Baltic security

1. The Baltic Region and the rest of Europe

While none of the major issues about the Baltic region, notably the Russian-Baltic agenda, can be solved by international entities if there is no bilateral understanding at hand, it is also true that Baltic security cannot be of concern solely to the Baltic States and Russia. There are a number of reasons why the rest of Europe ought to pay more attention to Baltic security:

1. Europe cannot isolate itself from Baltic insecurity or, for that matter, from unrest in any of the territories of the former Soviet Union. Traditional concepts, such as “buffer” and “strategic depth” have a limited application in today’s Europe. A re-assertion of Russian hegemony over the Baltic States would have a destabilising effect on European security.
2. The Baltic area constitutes one of the few points where Russia meets the West. The relationship between the Nordic countries and the Soviet Union was, during the Cold War, a matter primarily of regional concern. Following the Cold War, Norway and Finland have become the border states to Russia for new combinations of West European co-operation, such as the European Union or the Western European Union. Together with Sweden, these Nordic states will condition general West European policies towards the Baltic states as well as towards Russia.
3. The Baltic area contains one of Russia’s main urban areas – Greater St Petersburg with 7 million inhabitants. It is perfectly possible to develop a policy that could benefit the whole region – the Scandinavian countries, the Baltic countries and Russia.
4. The Kaliningrad exclave, which has a large concentration of Russian forces outside Russia. The West is not likely to extend security guarantees to the Baltic States and traditional Western security instruments are not particularly useful in an area of gradual political and economic transition.

Even if the western part of Europe has launched a number of policy documents, it has seldom used the instrument at its disposition in dealing with these intricate challenges to its security. But standing back also entails a cost to be reckoned with, as has been shown by the Balkan experience. Refugee flows are just one of many scenarios that could be visible as a result of discrimination or political and economical collapse. The need to stigmatise and sanction the quest for “ethnic superiority” from predominant ethnic groups seems to be one lesson to be drawn from the Balkan war. Another is the urgency of codifying and enforcing the right of minorities both to protect them and to minimise the danger of manipulation of the minority issue by either the majority or the minority side of the conflict. An enhanced OSCE, possibly Partnership for Peace, seems to offer the best forum for dealing with the densely interwoven Baltic security problems such as the demilitarisation of the area, including Kaliningrad, the solution of border disputes, and the protection of minority rights.

The Baltic region has its best historic chance ever to equip itself with a co-operative security regime. It could again become a crossroads for Russian, German, Polish and Nordic influence. Unlike the past however, when the Baltic area formed the bedrock of European Great Power politics, the region in the future is likely to constitute a European subregion of transition from the countries of the European Union to Russia – the only of its kind in Europe. The uniqueness of the Baltic region will require unique solutions.

2. Institutions in the Baltic Region

The countries in the Baltic Region have for the most part been left to fend for themselves. Four of them are today members of a military alliance (Norway, Denmark, Poland and Germany). The other countries are, in a strict sense, militarily non-aligned. Many of them are in search of partners. For many, there is a fear that recently attained independence, restoration of statehood and/or democratisation will be threatened from inside or outside. Levels of economic development vary in the region. Economic performance, no matter at what level of development, does not meet expectations in some countries. All this contributes to a sense of uneasiness, if not insecurity.

During the 1990s, there have been significant steps taken to broaden the field of co-operation in the region. The main substance of this co-operation has been aimed in two directions, locally among the three Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, and towards Western Europe between the Nordic countries, Germany, and parts of Central Europe.

Formalised co-operation between the Baltic States is a relatively new phenomenon. Neither in distant history nor during the interwar independent years of 1920-1940, were the Baltic states particular about concluding alliances with each other, and the presidents of the three states did not even hold a joint meeting. In 1923 Estonia and Latvia entered a ten-year agreement, which included economic co-operation, border issues and defence. Lithuania was left out because of its conflict with Poland due to the Polish annexation of the Vilnius area in 1920. The peak of Baltic co-operation was reached with the Baltic entente in 1934, which only lasted until 1937. During the Soviet era, the Baltic republics had little genuine co-operation. All vertical contacts between the republics went through Moscow and all horizontal contacts were discouraged and limited. During the 1980s, however, inter-Baltic contacts increased significantly through the co-operation between the popular fronts.

The informal contacts between the popular fronts during the era of Perestroika were formalised in 1991 when the Baltic Assembly was established, a bi-annual gathering of parliamentarians. During the 1990s co-operation between the three Baltic States was further developed with the creation of the Baltic Council, consisting of the Assembly and a Council of ministers, which holds regular meetings at presidential level and with prime ministers and ministers of foreign affairs.

The direction of co-operation towards Western Europe has been expressed by Estonia's re-establishment of its special relationship with Finland, while Latvia has declared its old Hanseatic ties with Germany and Lithuania its old historical ties with Poland. Taken together, co-operation at the local level and with Western Europe has cleared the way for a situation of lively and vigorous contacts and co-ordination of questions of mutual interest. During the past ten years, a number of agendas and specific programs have been launched and put into practice involving the creation and strengthening of a regional political, economic, cultural and environmental infrastructure.

But even though Baltic co-operation has taken a large step forward during the past ten years, this has to a large extent been directed towards the western part of Europe. Co-operative initiatives launched by the Baltic States directed eastwards have been few and far between. One important reason for this is the security policies of the Baltic states, whose aim it is to cooperate with western Europe as much as possible in order to put as much political distance as possible to Russia and to escape the status of Russia's special sphere of influence.

In terms of regional high politics, every kind of security policy that does not consider Russia as an integral part of any security structures runs the risk of being counterproductive. Russia is a part of the security environment of each Baltic State, whether they like it or not. And every effort to build a sustainable security environment in the Baltic area must therefore also include Russia. However, from the Baltic States' point of view, this is probably not due to a lack of political will, but more a result of the existing asymmetrical power relations in the area. Russia is a regional great power, and as such it has its own geopolitical ambitions. Furthermore, Russia's involvement in the creation of new security structures in the Baltic rim is dependent on Russia's transformation into an ordinary state with a functional democracy and economy. Russia's involvement in the Baltic region has, until today, been marked by its own geopolitical priorities rather than a sincere desire to shape regional security co-operation based on equality and consensus.

The only single international institution that covers the Baltic Region (as defined here) is the Council of the Baltic States. The Council of the Baltic States was set up in March 1992 with all 10 Baltic littoral states as members. The Council is an organisational framework that intends to increase co-ordination and ensure better results and efficiency of a wide range of activities that take place in the Baltic Sea region. The work of the CBSS is primarily based on a traditional inter-governmental model of co-operation, which is guided by principles laid down in the UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris and other OSCE documents.

The activities of the CBSS are agreed on in the so-called Action Programmes, which are limited to three areas:

1. *Participation and stable political developments*, which includes such areas as local political initiatives, political participation, NGOs, civic security, educational exchange and free travel.
2. *Economic integration and prosperity*, in areas such as economic integration, transport, spatial planning and energy.
3. *Solidarity and burden-sharing in the Baltic Sea environment* in areas such as trans-boundary water-management, waste and chemicals, oil pollution, atmospheric deposition, non-polluting agriculture, protection of marine ecosystems and nature conservation in order to protect diversity.

The organisational body of the CBSS consists of a secretariat that was inaugurated on 20 October 1998 and is located in Stockholm, and is financed through contributions from the Member states. Along with the secretariat, the activities of the CBSS are supervised by the Council, which consists of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of each member state, with a rotating chairmanship on an annual basis. The purpose of the Council is to act as a forum for guidance and co-ordination among the participating states.

During the 1990s the CBSS adopted a number of guidelines for strengthening the organisation. At the third CBSS Summit in Kolding, Denmark, 12-13 April 2000, an important document was agreed on that in the future the CBSS should encompass all regional inter-governmental, multilateral co-operations among the members of the organisation. At an addi-

tional Ministerial session in Bergen, Norway, 21-22 June 2000, the Council decided to fully implement these recommendations concerning the new structure and working methods of the CBSS – with the exception that the independence of existing sectorised co-operation would be preserved.

The only existing institutions that explicitly deal with foreign and defence policies, and who have members in the region, are those associated with the European Union (e.g. the EU itself and WEU, the Western European Union), NATO (NATO itself, NACC, the North Atlantic Co-operation Council and PFP, Partnership for Peace), the CSCE (Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe) and the United Nations.

The atomistic nature of the security arrangements in the area has led to a debate as well as practical efforts to establish new institutional frameworks, covering at least some of the states. However, the future is difficult to predict, in particular due to the issues of Russia's political and economic development. This means that important elements of a security community have not yet emerged. Nevertheless, there is a growth in the communality of values (new democratic and market institutions) and an increasing responsiveness among many countries. New and constructive forms of behaviour are occurring. Thus, some of the factors we specified for a security community are increasingly present.

3. Four frameworks considered

Let us consider the four frameworks and their implications for security in the Baltic region. For an operational pluralistic security community there are four important functions to fulfil: first, the institution should *preserve the independence* of the members, by respecting the sovereignty of the member states, but also by being able to act in case of threats. A successful organisation, then, is one that contributes to reducing the fear of member states of losing national independence.

Second, it should manage to *keep the Baltic region peaceful*, i. e. contribute to an open sea and to arms control in the region. Third, it is important that it *incorporates the European powers* that have an impact on regional security. This refers in particular to *Russia*, being the foremost military power of the area, and *Germany*. Fourth, there has to be a *link to other centres and parts of the world*, notably, Western Europe, North America and the rest of the world. It is unlikely that the Baltic region will be isolated from all events in other regions. During the Cold War, tension was transported via alliances. Following the Cold War, economic ties, as well as refugee flows, arms trade, and international crime may provide such links.

The only multilateral international institutions that include the states in the Baltic region and at the same time encompass all the major powers in Europe and are linked to other parts of the world, are the European Union, the United Nations, OSCE and NATO. One important question to ask is therefore what the contribution could be of these four institutions with respect to the four functions listed above?

The table below is a point of departure for discussion. It shows that none of the available frameworks receives a full score. There are many question marks and doubts. The most inclusive is the United Nations. It should have many advantages, particularly as it incorporates all major states and security interests in the region. Its record in preserving the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina is neither better nor worse than any other organisation. It may, however, have been able to maintain impartiality more than many others. Would the UN act swiftly and early to counter a threat to the independence of countries in the Baltic

region? It should then be remembered that one member of the region has the right to veto decisions in the Security Council. The answer will depend on the decisions of the Security Council and on the options available to the organisation. This might necessitate a change in the composition of the Security Council, as well as an extension of security options available to the United Nations. The present international debate on reforming and strengthening the UN does, in other words, have an important implication for the Baltic Region. For instance, many countries would like Germany, another Baltic Sea country, to become a permanent member of the Security Council.

The OSCE has many of the same advantages as the UN. It incorporates many of the interested parties, although it is restricted to “European” members. Japan is an observer. The broad definition of “Europe”, extending from Vancouver to Vladivostok, makes it an organisation of the North of the world. It has a record of dealing with Baltic regional affairs, in particular with Estonia and Latvia. Diplomatically, the OSCE has gradually increased its importance during the 1990s and has played a significant role in the Baltic region. Although it is an organisation under development, further reforms and the strengthening of its capacity may yield more important benefits to the Baltic region in the future. The paradox of the organisation is that its success rests on its lack of intrusion: it has not been perceived as a threat. Thus, it has been able to take up internal issues, e.g. the status of the Russian-speaking minorities in Estonia and Latvia. The OSCE is not seen as representing the interest of any particular member state, as decisions have to rely on a near-consensus. If it were to become more intrusive (“strong”), for instance, through a European Security Council arrangement, this might reduce its diplomatic effectiveness.

Table 17. Four possible frameworks for a Baltic security community

Framework/ Organisation	Does it preserve independence?	Does it contribute to Arms Control?	Does it incorporate Russia?	Does it incorporate Germany?	Does it link to USA?	Does it link to Third World?
EU/WEU	Provides “soft security” by interdependence, but lacks a clear foreign and defence policy	No	No	Yes	No	No
NATO	Strongest military institution, but uncertain future mission	Through CFE talks	No	Yes	Yes	No
OSCE	Diplomatic strength. No military functions. Decisions require consensus	Only through overlapping membership in CFE talks	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
UN	Committed to sovereignty, but would it act in the Baltic?	Yes. For instance chemical weapons. NPT.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

NATO is the only truly military organisation. Together with Russia, it is the foremost military power in Europe. It keeps the United States committed to European affairs. It is, however, a product of the Cold War, even if its military strategies and doctrines have been re-evaluated to a large extent. An important question is how NATO is viewed in Russia: as a potential threat or as a partner? Russia's attitudes have shifted, for instance, with regard to Poland's membership in NATO but it does not support NATO membership for all former Soviet block states. Furthermore, NATO is an organisation that is dominated by major powers. Its strategies are likely to reflect their concerns, more than those of smaller states. Certainly, NATO shares this feature with any other organisation. More than other organisations, it may be shaped by the overall security relations between the USA and Russia. It involves the immediate and basic defence interests of these two states in particular.

Finally, the EU might remain being less significant from a military point of view. However, it is an important actor in regard to building a security community in the Baltic Region, as it rests on economic co-operation rather than direct military security interests. Its strength lies in its ability to tie countries together into networks and thus prevent conflicts from emerging or escalating into serious inter-state disputes.

The EU's military abilities are likely to remain low for the foreseeable future. It is not likely to engage in military action to preserve the independence of small states, or play a role in arms control questions. The EU is, however, an arrangement presently undergoing significant change. During the 1990s, efforts have been made to co-ordinate the EU's foreign and security policy. Most notable is the creation of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) which has both strengthened the Western European Union (WEU) and increased the capability of the EU to conduct a credible and efficient security policy. The WEU has developed an organisational structure that enables it to function more or less like NATO, except that it does not have an integrated command structure. In addition, during the EU summit in Cologne in 1999, it was decided that the EU and the WEU should merge and give the EU indispensable military means to carry out armed operations in matters of crisis management. As a result, new organisational bodies have been created such as a permanent Political and Security Committee (PSC), and a non-permanent Military Committee (MC), together with a Military Staff (MS) within the EU Council.

However, the creation of these new organisational bodies does not mean, a priori, that the EU is functioning more strongly and effectively in matters of security and military capabilities. What hampers a development in this direction is the question of the current decision-making structure in the Union and the disharmony among the members of the EU regarding Europe's future security policy, i.e. the relationship between the EU and NATO, the question of nuclear weapons and the questionable participation of neutral states in a Union with extended military capabilities.

The scoreboard of the four institutions regarding the building of a security community, then, gives a mixed result. There is no institution that by itself would be the only candidate for constructing such a framework. The states of the region already have links to the organisations, but in most organisations Baltic regional affairs take a low priority. Is this, then, an argument for creating entirely new organisations or frameworks? Should such frameworks be subsections of existing larger units or be entirely independent? This might be the most useful discussion to pursue.

There are subregional collective efforts that could be discussed. For instance, would closer security co-operation between Sweden, Finland and Norway today be an alternative that might benefit the entire region? Would such co-operation require a formal link to NATO?

Would similar co-ordination between Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania be of military significance? There are also possible bilateral relationships, such as direct links between the USA and individual countries in the region, in the form of security guarantees. Would such assurances be credible? Would they be provocative?

Finally, there are the individual routes to security: maintaining a military defence so as to dissuade an aggressor from the most simple forms of tension he could possibly invent. This would amount to being a well-armed but neutral and/or non-aligned state. The military investments would be very costly and would reinforce the atomistic state concept in the region. A cheaper and equally peace-promoting alternative might be to contribute to the conditions for a security community.

The issues of institutions for a security community should be coupled with a thorough discussion on how contacts at all levels could be encouraged, and by doing so improve the development of common values, facilitate mutual responsiveness, improve the chances of economic growth and continuously transcend the borders to outside actors. The institutions mentioned should be encouraged to promote, rather than prevent, such conditions. Put differently: first, a community of security would have to emerge, and then an institution of a security community would follow. In due course, appropriate institutional forms may become logical and grow organically.

38 Conclusions

1. Four main points to be considered

We have described four conditions that are important for the emergence of a security community in the Baltic Region. Initially, we asked, what type of relations in a long-term perspective are we heading towards as a region? We have illustrated a variety of possible threats in the region.

However, as Karl W. Deutsch suggests, a security community will not develop through threats but through *shared values, responsiveness, new behaviour and joint frameworks*. Clearly, the Baltic Region has been exposed to violence, often brought to the region rather than emerging from within. Particularly, relationships between the major actors in the region (Germany, Poland, Russia) and their counterparts (e.g. Britain and France) have been important. None the less, in a long-term perspective the Baltic Region has been heading towards what Deutsch would label “a security community”.

What have we learnt about the present state of affairs in the region? Does a security community exist today in the region as a whole or in particular relationships? What are the prospects of such a community developing? If there is no uniform development, which relations are problematic? The different chapters give us insights that need to be brought together in a systematic fashion. First, we may note that, as of today, the threat of war in the region is generally low. This does not mean, however, that threats have disappeared or that all people feel safe.

We illustrated three security dilemmas associated with strategic considerations, *consolidation of democracy, multi-ethnic state-building and economic development*. There is potential for serious conflict. The concept of a security community is a positive definition of peace. It suggests that there is something more than deterrence or isolationism that guides security thinking. It sets the goals higher than deterring the threat of war. It points to the need for preventive and comprehensive policies to reduce the danger of future wars.

We have also illustrated ways in which war can be avoided by peaceful means. During the past decade, we have seen considerable progress towards democratic forms of government. Almost everywhere the press is free. The roles of the military, police and intelligence services are, for the most part, curtailed.

In terms of *responsiveness and conflict resolution*, less has happened. Negotiations take place, nevertheless, on serious matters among the states of the region. In this regard, there is a positive tendency. The same is partly true for the development of non-military forms of behaviour. Defence doctrines are generally becoming more defensive and new relationships are being formed. At the same time, the search for more security by applying for membership in NATO is not considered benign by all parties. Nonetheless, in terms of institutional development, not

much has yet occurred. The region is still trying to find its position in the European security arrangement.

2. What have we learnt?

The table *“Assessing the Emergence of a Security Community in the Baltic Region, 1934, 1964, 1994, 2001”* summarises what we have learnt, focusing on relations among the littoral countries of the Baltic Sea. Rather than analysing all possible bilateral relations, some countries are grouped together. This is done for practical purposes and of necessity overlooks important nuances. For instance, Finland is treated together with the Baltic countries proper, in a group termed “Fenno-Baltic countries”, a group that may in fact not see itself as an actor. In all, there are 12 relationships. Furthermore, the table attempts to portray the developments of the region towards a security community. Thus, an assessment has been made with respect to each of the 12 relationships at four times: 1934, 1964, 1994 and 2001. These years indicate the situation in the period between the World Wars, at the height of the Cold War and a time in the post-Cold War era. 1934 marks the time when expectations were still high for the League of Nations as a vehicle for peace in Europe. 1964 was the time when major power *détentes* and tensions set the framework for what was regarded as “realistic”. 1994 can be seen as the time when practically all states in the table left the transitional phase towards democracy and market economy, and entered a phase of consolidation. 2001 shows the present “window of opportunity”.

The table requires some explanations. Relations between states, or groups of states, are found in the column to the far left. The next column indicates the most recent experience of war or politically significant armed clash in this relationship. The most recent important political crises are also indicated. Such experiences constitute important memories and might create fears for the future. The third column shows the year when all countries in the group attained a democratic state. This, as we have indicated, is an important factor for commonality of values in a security community. There are two periods of democracy-building: after the First World War and after the Cold War. Thus, for some countries, where democratic conditions were overturned, two different dates are indicated. In the three columns to the right, assessments are made of the state of the relationships in terms of attaining a security community at four different times during the last 70 years.

The last line in the table shows a considerable move towards a security community in the region. In 1934 only one relationship met the criteria set for a security community, namely the intra-Scandinavian relations. In all other relationships, democratic conditions were weakened by 1934 (e.g. in Germany, Latvia, Estonia; Poland soon to follow) or never given a chance to develop (Russia). Responsiveness between the states was low, military action was on the rise, and no common institutions existed, apart from the League of Nations. By 1964 only one relationship had achieved a firm change, the one between the Scandinavian states and Germany. For these countries, the Second World War was more a memory, democratic conditions in Germany appeared secure and the threat of war among these states was subsiding. By 1994 relationships had changed considerably. The end of the Cold War meant that more secure relations were established among many states, formerly divided by block confrontation. Thus, a change had clearly occurred, centred on the attainment of domestic democratic conditions, and other factors. The current situation indicates a trend towards even more secure

relations. In 1994 only three relationships met the criteria for a security community, and in 2001 the number has risen to five.

The table suggests that a long period without war does not necessarily constitute a security community. The limited and historic war experience between Norway and Russia, and between Denmark and Russia still did not prevent dangers. The Cold War legacies coloured many relationships. The fact that wars occurred a long time ago, e.g. between Sweden and Russia (1809) did not mean that fears subsided. Thus, time in itself does not make for a security community. Something has to happen, in concrete terms. Some relations meet the conditions of a security community despite recent wars. This is true for Germany's relations with Scandinavian countries, and indeed the current relation between Poland and Germany. There is no fear of war in these relations any longer. There might be tensions, but they are manageable within the existing frameworks of co-operation. This means that the commonality of values (democracy) as well as responsiveness and new forms of behaviour are clearly visible. Institutions, such as the OECD, might be useful for handling economic relations. To be sure, responsiveness contributes to predictability and confidence.

Of the twelve relationships described, in 2001, five are in security communities, and are likely to remain so in the future. Another two show positive developments. These relations are described as "emerging" in the table. This label is chosen from the expectation that democratic conditions are durable, and that a gradual learning process in responsiveness and new behaviour is taking place. Organisational frameworks may be developing as well.

For Russia there is uncertainty in four relations. The basic reason is the prospect of the continuous stability of democratic institutions. Russia is the country most recently democratised. The recent presidential election can be seen as a landmark in this development. The stabilisation of democratic institutions, increased responsiveness and participation in international institution-building might be important for the emergence of a security community in Russia's relations.

In none of the relationships is there an expectation of war in the near future. The conclusive picture of the region shows that it finds itself in a dynamic phase in which there are many possibilities. It is for public debate, civil society and political leaders within and outside the region to realise the possibilities and grasp the opportunities at hand.



Figure 128. Photo: Katarzyna Skalska

Table 18. Assessing the Emergence of a Security Community in the Baltic Region, 1934, 1964, 1994, 2001

Relations between states or groups of states	End of most recent war, int. crisis or forced milit. presence	All states democratic since**	Security Community:			
			1934	1964	1994	2001
Fenno-Baltic relations*	not relevant	1922/1991	no	no	emerging	yes
Scandinavian states and Baltic states	1721	1922/1991	no	no	yes	yes
Scandinavian states and Poland	1721	1917/1990	no	no	emerging	emerging
Scandinavian states and Russia	1809 (Cold War crises)	1993	no	no	no	no
Intra-Scandinavian relations	1814 (1905)	1914	yes	yes	yes	yes
Baltic states and Poland	1922	1922/1991	no	no	no	emerging
Scandinavian states and Germany	1945	1918/1949	no	yes	yes	yes
Baltic states and Germany	1945	1922/1991	no	no	emerging	yes
Russia and Poland	1945 (1956, 1970, 1981)	1993	no	no	no	no
Poland and Germany	1945	1918/1990	no	no	emerging	yes
Germany and Russia	1945 (Berlin: 1953, 1958, 1961)	1993	no	no	no	no
Baltic states and Russia	1945 (1952, 1993, 1994)	1993	no	no	no	no
Number of relations with "No Security Community"			11	10	5	4

Note:

* Finland and Baltic states constitute the group of "Fenno-Baltic" states. Sources: Doyle 1986, yearbooks

** Two years in the column indicates that democracy has vanished and returned

7 The Significance of Security – Considerations for Transnational Actors

Michael Karlsson

1. Introduction

The interest among political scientists in theorizing about *transnational relations* has changed tangibly over the years. In retrospect we can talk about two waves of theorizing. The first wave appeared during the early 1970s, while a second wave has been observable since at least the mid-1990s (Risse-Kappen 1995a: xi). Interestingly, as noted by Matthew Evangelista (1999: 16-17), these “generations” have made rather different assumptions about the relationship between transnational relations and “high politics” (*security policy*).

I define transnational relations as “regular interactions across national boundaries when at least one actor is a non-state agent or does not operate on behalf of a national government or an intergovernmental organization” (Risse-Kappen 1995a: 3).

Thus, while the original theorizing assumed that transnational relations would predominate outside this issue-area, this assumption is no longer taken for granted. On the contrary, the renewed scholarly interest in transnational relations has generated a number of case studies suggesting that the cross-border activism of *NGOs (Non-Governmental Organizations)* might be an important factor for including in analyses of how governments approach security issues (e.g. Risse-Kappen 1995b; Evangelista 1999).

The Baltic Sea region today includes a large number of transnational relations. Besides numerous bilateral contacts, this manifests itself in approximately 21 regional *INGOs (International Non-Governmental Organizations)* and networks.

The existence of these transnational relations, in combination with the still ongoing transformation of Baltic Sea security as well

as the current academic debate on broader conceptions of security, presents an excellent opportunity to learn more about the relationship between transnational relations and various processes of security. The purpose of this work is therefore to briefly reflect upon three puzzles or research questions which are raised by these developments. *First, what does Baltic Sea security signify to transnational actors?* By definition we should expect these actors to be less concerned with the physical safety of states, but which threats to Baltic Sea security do they emphasize instead and who are the threats aimed at? *Second, how are transnational relations affected by changes in the regional security context?* For instance, was the end of the Cold War in 1991 (including the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union) a necessary condition for the establishment of the present regional *INGOs* and networks? *Third, how do transnational actors affect Baltic Sea security?* Have they approached the intergovernmental level with their security concerns and, if so, which transnational actors have been the most influential in getting the attention of the governments? The empirical evidence for reflecting upon these questions is based upon data on the 21 Baltic Sea *INGOs* and transnational networks.

2. Transnational conceptions of security

The efforts in security studies to broaden the view of security have brought new distinctions, for instance between *hard and soft security* or *between military, political, economic, environmental, and societal security* (e.g. Buzan, 1991). However, distinctions such as these work with

The regional *INGOs*

The number of *INGOs* – 21 – only refers to regional *INGOs* and networks that include *NGOs* from the littoral states and Norway. Beside these, there are also some organizations that include *NGOs* from more geographically distant countries and a large number of sub-regional *INGOs* (embracing *NGOs* from, for example, only the five Nordic states or the three Baltic States). For more information about the regional *INGOs* and networks, see *UIA* 1998 and the database of the *Ballad* (www.ballad.org).

very different results when applied to the transnational actors in the Baltic Sea region. The pattern is that those regional INGOs and networks that explicitly make reference to Baltic Sea security work with broader conceptions of security. This means that they see security as a multi-dimensional phenomenon, embracing two or more of the categories mentioned. To this observation comes an underlying pattern in which the actors also differ with respect to the possibility of integrative aspects or links between different categories of security. In the view of some actors, the links are so strong that the categories almost lose their meaning and because of this they prefer to talk about 'sustainable security' or 'common security' instead. Most actors, however, appear to see only weaker links and therefore still make distinctions between various categories of security.

About 70 per cent of the regional INGOs and networks can be classified as 'promotional' in character, i.e. the member NGOs have joined together to promote certain values rather than protect their material interests. Many of these actors express a general concern for values such as peace, human rights and democracy, but only two of them appear to have developed any deeper thoughts about the concept of security. The Trans-Baltic Network (TBN), which has some 40 member NGOs, has made the value of 'sustainable security' its primary concern and operates with a very broad view on the objects as well as the concept of security (TBN 1997):

The aim of the TBN is a community of states and peoples in the Baltic Sea region living together in sustainable security. Here, not only military conflicts will be prevented, but security for civil societies will be insured by a clean environment, respect for human rights, participatory democracy, and sustainable development.

...Armed forces can no longer guarantee the security of the Baltic Sea region. Today, the threats to our security are things like violations of human rights, environmental catastrophes, economic disparity, or political disputes over sovereignty, territory, and resources. What we need is a new, "sustainable" security, where elements of both "hard" and "soft" security are taken into account. Sustainable security must be based on human needs and entrusted to governments, acting in cooperation, and peoples of the region, as individual "citizen diplomats," and through their non-governmental organizations.

The second promotional INGO with a more developed conceptualization of security is the Coalition Clean Baltic (CCB), which has some 25 member NGOs from the nine littoral states. The CCB has put the value of 'common security' at the center of its activities, but has given the concept a much broader meaning than it usually had during the days of the Cold War. To the CCB, the concept of 'common security' not only marks security for different actors, but it is also used to emphasize that ecological, economic and social sustainability go hand in hand (CCB 1996).

Turning to the protective INGOs and networks in the region, these exist primarily to uphold the material interests of the member NGOs. Quite naturally, these actors have a much more narrow view on the objects of security, i.e. their primary concern is the well-being of the members. As regards their conception of security, it is possible to find both similarities and differences compared to the promotional actors. This means that they share the multi-dimensional view of security, but it tends to be a much less integrative one. Consequently, the protective INGOs and networks often point at various regional threats to the well-being of their members, but they hardly make any attempts to develop syntheses between different categories. For example, the transnational business organizations – the Baltic Sea Business Summit (BSBS) and the Baltic Sea Chambers of Commerce Association (BCCA) – claim that the threats to regional growth and development primarily come from institutions (inadequate institutional settings, bureaucracy, and corruption in public administration), policies (protectionism, European disintegration, and growth-impeding economic policies), and to a lesser extent also from organized crime, and the environmental situation (Karlsson, forthcoming). However, these threats are basically viewed as being separate from one another. The same conclusions can be made with the transnational organizations that gather sub-national actors in the region – the Baltic Sea States Subregional Cooperation (BSSSC), the Union of the Baltic Cities (UBC), and the Islands of the Baltic Sea (B7). Although these actors emphasize other regional threats and put comparatively more emphasis on environmental and societal aspects, they too tend to overlook possible connections between different categories of security.

Table 19. The year of establishment of Baltic Sea transnational organizations and networks

Year	No.	Transnational organizations and networks
1957	1	Conference of Baltic Oceanographers
–		
1968	1	Baltic Marine Biologists
–		
1988	1	Baltic Sea Project
1989	1	Islands of the Baltic Sea
1990	2	Coalition Clean Baltic, Conference of Baltic University Rectors
1991	3	Association of Museums and Castles around the Baltic Sea, Baltic Ports Organization, Union of the Baltic Cities
1992	2	Baltic Sea Chambers of Commerce Association, Pro Baltica Forum
1993	3	Baltic Music Network, Baltic Sea States Subregional Cooperation, UBC Women's Network
1994	1	Trans-Baltic Network
1995	–	
1996	2	Baltic Sea Business Summit, Baltic Sea Youth Forum
1997	4	Baltic Nordic Network for Women with Disabilities, Baltic Sea Alliance, Baltic Sea Women's Conference, Liberal Youth of the Baltic Sea
1998	–	

Source: UIA (1998) and Ballad (www.ballad.org)

3. The role of security

How are transnational relations affected by changes in the regional security context? One way to see if there are any co-variations between these factors is to see how the regional INGOs and networks have developed in relation to the end of the Cold War. Thus, to what extent was the end of the Cold War in 1991 a necessary condition for the establishment of these actors? Of course, to be able to say that the end of the Cold War was a necessary condition requires that the 21 regional INGOs and networks were all established after 1991. On the other hand, if these actors were established earlier, it would be natural to look for co-variations with periods of less tension, such as the perestroika period (1985-1991) or the détente period (1962-1975). Table 19 summarizes the year of establishment of the current 21 regional actors.

If we first look at the development of the regional INGOs and networks in general, regardless of whether they focus on security issues or not, we can conclude that the end of the Cold War was not a necessary condition for these transnational relations to develop. Nine of these actors, or 43 per cent, were established before 1992. Of these, seven were established during the perestroika period (1985-1991),

which suggests that this was to some extent a sufficient condition. Only two regional INGOs were established before the perestroika period. These were the Conference of Baltic Oceanographers (1957) and the Baltic Marine Biologists (1968). If we then focus more closely on the development of the regional actors with a more developed conceptualization of security, Table 19 shows a very much similar pattern. Thus, the decrease in great power tensions during the perestroika period was sufficient for some of the INGOs in the Baltic Sea region to begin a more organized cooperation also on security-related matters. In addition to these conclusions, Table 19 shows no signs of co-variations with other types of change in the security context – such as the Chernobyl accident in 1986 or the withdrawal of the last Russian troops from the Baltic states, Poland and Germany in 1993-94.

4. The role of transnational actors

How do transnational actors affect Baltic Sea security? Have they approached the inter-governmental level with their security concerns and, if so, which transnational actors have been the most influential in getting the atten-

tion of the governments? In order to answer these questions, we can initially make two distinctions. First, transnational actors are assumed to affect Baltic Sea security either directly or indirectly. 'Direct effects' refer to situations in which the activities of the transnational actors themselves have consequences for regional security, while 'indirect effects' refer to situations in which they get other actors to take action with respect to security. Second, it is assumed that transnational actors perceive transnational relations to have positive or negative effects for Baltic Sea security, depending on whether or not they are thought to contribute to an increase in security. Table 20 shows the combined result of the two distinctions and gives four examples of how the regional INGOs and networks have perceived the security effects of transnational relations.

Several regional INGOs and networks express a general hope that their activities will in the long run have some direct positive effects for peace and security in the Baltic Sea region. For instance, the Trans-Baltic Network explains that "Getting non-governmental organizations (NGOs) from all shores of the Baltic Sea to work together is a way to effectively deal with our region's problems, but is also a confidence-building measure in itself" (TBN 1997). Although the regional actors say very little about where this process will eventually end, it could be seen as contributing to an increasing sense of 'regionality'. However, some transnational activities are also assumed to have direct negative effects on regional security. This can be exemplified with the phenomenon of transnational crime, which among others the Baltic Sea Business Summit has emphasized as a new regional threat.

Björn Hettne (1999) distinguishes between five degrees of regionality, in which the last degree implies that the region has transformed into an "acting subject with a

distinct identity, actor capability, legitimacy, and structure of decision-making". (p. 9).

As regards the indirect effects on regional security, these can for instance be seen if we study how transnational actors have influenced the agenda of the Council of the Baltic Sea States. The evidence shows that the business INGOs and networks, besides traditional lobbying, have been able to communicate their views and demands through different variants of 'semi-corporatism', including regular meetings with administrative structures of the Council (Karlsson 1999). As a contrast, the Trans-Baltic Network has so far been invited only once to inform of its activities. This pattern can be looked upon from two angles. First, it is clear that the Council itself has tried so far to avoid 'hard security' issues. Second, although some transnational actors may perceive a possibility to put 'soft security' issues on the Council's agenda (perceived positive effects), the pattern also shows that the economically stronger interest groups have far more developed channels of influence. This means that there is a risk that some threats to security are not represented on the inter-governmental agenda at all or that they are being de-emphasized (perceived negative effects). This risk is, for instance, emphasized by the Coalition Clean Baltic, which sees a much stronger connection between environmental security and the economic activities in the Baltic Sea region.

5. Conclusions

The purpose of this work was to reflect briefly upon the significance of security considerations to transnational actors. Starting out from the case of transnational relations in the Baltic Sea region, there are in conclusion three observations that should be stressed.

Table 20. Four examples of how transnational organizations and networks in the Baltic Sea region have perceived the security effects of transnational relations

	Perceived positive effects	Perceived negative effects
Direct effects	Increasing sense of 'regionality'	New threats to regional security
Indirect effects	Putting security on the regional agenda	Keeping security off the regional agenda



Figure 129. Stockholm. Photo: Katarzyna Skalska

First, transnational actors that make explicit reference to Baltic Sea security tend to have a broader view of security, i.e. emphasizing its multi-dimensional character (military security, economic security, environmental security and so on). Two promotional regional INGOs also stressed the links between different categories of security and therefore preferred the concepts of “sustainable security” or “common security” instead. Second, a fundamental change in the security context such as the end of the Cold War could not be seen as a necessary condition for the development of transnational relations in the Baltic Sea area. However, although such relations existed before, the empirical evidence

suggests that the period of less tension during the perestroika years in particular (1985-1991) was sufficient for the establishment of a significant number of transnational organizations and networks. Third, the perception of these actors is that transnational relations could affect Baltic Sea security in several ways. The positive interpretations imply hopes that this will contribute to an increased sense of ‘regionality’ and that security problems are put on the regional agenda, while the perceived negative effects denote fears of new threats to regional security (e.g. transnational crime) and that powerful interests will work to keep some security issues off the agenda.

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Part

C

THE SOCIAL LANDSCAPE

*SOCIAL CONDITIONS
AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT*



Section VII

SOCIAL CONDITIONS

Figure 130. Ageing of the Baltic societies, noted by demography, is a process that can be crucial for the coming generations. Photo: Katarzyna Skalska

VII

Section

SOCIAL CONDITIONS

Editor: Marina Thorborg

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INTRODUCTION

Marina Thorborg

This section deals with the basics of human existence relating to demographic development such as work and living standards, as well as the necessities for improving the quality of life; things like education, citizenship and the social equality of man and women. Regional cultural diversity; the heterogeneity of languages, ethnic groups and religions; along with the drive for democracy are common topics in all the contributions.

Economic research on creativity, problem solving, and efficiency has shown that homogeneous groups can quickly and easily arrive at decisions that achieve satisfactory results in the short- and medium-term but tend to produce less adequate achievements in the long term. Heterogeneous gatherings, however, will need more time and energy to negotiate a plan of action and will be slower in producing initial agreements, but the more heterogeneous the assemblage of people, the more creative the solutions that tend to be produced. From a medium- and long-term perspective heterogeneity produced the best results.

With this and the living memory of people in mind it is no wonder that the regaining of Independence, particularly for the Baltic states but also for the rest of Eastern Europe, naturally evoked expectations of a quick and easy return to at least the standards of living in the 1930s. This expectation is also touched upon in the chapter on *Populations around the Baltic Sea* by Marina Thorborg. In the period from the 1950s to the 1990s the similarity in demographic development between the Nordic countries and the European USSR is particularly striking, with low and falling birth, death, and infant mortality rates, women living half a dozen years longer than men and a population growth around the replacement level. In both types of society a high level of industrialization, urbanization, and education together with a high level of economic activity among women contributed to this demographic profile.

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union what followed in the Russian Federation was almost a demographic catastrophe, with a population decrease resulting from more deaths than births. That alcohol was a significant killer of men can be gathered from the fact that the men who lived longest lived in Dagestan and Ingushetiya areas (65 and 66 years respectively in the mid-1990s) where the social infrastructure was least developed, alcohol consumption was prohibited by Muslim tradition.

All the demographic figures point to an all-time low in the mid-1990s, and since then a slow recovery, for most nations of the former Soviet bloc. But, as some of the discussions show, changes in accounting and statistical systems can produce new results though very little has changed in reality, as can be illustrated by, for example, the statistics on divorce in table 27.

In the same vein history shows that after every devastating war or great social upheaval a seemingly very healthy generation takes over after all the weak have succumbed. How far this explains the rise in the life expectancy of men in the Russian Federation today and how much can be due to better circumstances is yet to be determined.

A further discussion of the demographic characteristics of the Baltic region – including a treatise on the St-Petersburg area – is given by Gaiane Safarova. Demographically large urban conglomerations in the industrialized world tend to be similar which is also the case for the St-Petersburg region. In both chapters on demographic development the ageing of the population is discussed from different angles. Not only are basic demographic terms explained

– after table 28 – but also some new measurements are introduced such as HDI, the Human Development Index, and GDI, the Gender Development Index, with the latter being compared to HDI in the chapter on women and gender.

In addition to these two parameters other new ways of measuring are presented in the above-mentioned chapter, where a way of assessing the gender aspect by means of GEM, the Gender Empowerment Measure, is introduced. Major trends of development with regard to women are delineated in the same chapter, showing how specific trajectories have shaped the history of women and gender in different areas of this region. Depending on circumstances such as foreign invasions or deep polarization in society, either nationalism or class-consciousness has shaped priorities in regard to gender which has to be taken into account when starting a dialogue across the Baltic Sea.

It is startling to see how similar the verbal superstructure was in the official Soviet version of state feminism and in what developed in Western feminist discourse. However, in practice it still meant different things which of course can explain some of the initial confusion when contacts were intensified after 1991. Interestingly, in the Russian-cum Soviet development in regard to gender, examples of the most advanced state of affairs existed side by side with the most backward ones – the first state school in the world for girls, the Smolny Institute, opened in 1765 while peasant women (and men) were in bondage until 1861 – as this society has been highly stratified throughout history and today this polarization is increasing further. What the Soviet heritage left to all the countries of the former Soviet bloc is the high educational accomplishment of women, on average higher than men – explained in the chapter on *work and unemployment* – but also a generally high level of education.

In the chapter on *education and schools* this high general level forms a background to the changes that occurred after regaining Independence and how societies are trying to cope with the transition to a new system. A special section is devoted to the role of universities in Poland under communism and how an informal civil society developed outside the universities. The Polish experience is also valuable for the Nordic countries today, especially for Sweden.

Another supplement section to the *chapter on education* deals with the latest developments in regard to educational attainment and the learning of foreign languages as a way of reaching out to the world.

However learning a foreign language such as Estonian or Latvian for Russians living in Estonia or Latvia can also be a way of relating to the society where they or their parents most likely have been living for the last generation. In almost all states of the world a basic precondition for attaining citizenship would be fluency in the national language. In these cases accepting a foreign language on par with the national one might mean that 30-40 % of the total population would never speak the national language nor become integrated into that society. Successful economic development seems to have been a more decisive factor for integration than language per se.

These questions are at the core of the chapter on *citizenship* – the most theoretical chapter – which introduces a number of ways of viewing citizenship from a gendered point of view, how to look at minorities, and how to see the positive potential in diversity and heterogeneity. The origins of liberal thoughts are seen as the inspiration for the evolution of ideas on citizenship and how the “old” opposition against the authorities meant “absolute monarchy, scholasticism, the church, and kinship”; while today this would mean opposing the modern state and its power of taxation, thereby implying the welfare state and its recipients, and meaning that citizenship would not be equal for all as citizenship is about equal rights and duties.

Citizenship was traditionally seen as being developed in three consecutive stages; civil, political, and social. However, under the Soviet system social citizenship – in its basic form of economic security – was provided but not civil or political citizenship. One of the first measures of the totalitarian Soviet state after the illegal annexation of the Baltic states in 1940 was the total destruction of civil society; for example all women’s organizations were dissolved, their membership registers taken over and/or destroyed, their houses or meeting places closed down and taken over and all activities strictly forbidden. This was the same for all organizations, except those controlled from above by the communist party and which were imposed on the people. Hence neither civil nor political citizenship had any chance to develop during more than half a century of illegal occupation.

The state’s protection of its citizens against violence, which is another important aspect of citizenship, was only gradually extended to women, particularly in regard to violence in the family. However, nowhere is this fully implemented yet.

In the same chapter on citizenship new concepts of motherhood are introduced, namely constructivist and essentialist modes of motherhood. In Sweden, for example, both women and men seem to have adopted a constructivist view of motherhood, meaning womanhood may be constructed with or without children. Hence, if the conditions for having a family with children do not involve unreasonable deprivation of work opportunities, money, and time only then do couples decide to have children. Therefore in the early 1990s when Sweden had a high level of social infrastructure including well developed child benefits, Swedish women were number one in Europe in giving birth to many children. When the benefits were cut, Swedish men and women answered by drastically reducing their birth rate to under replacement level. Hence Swedish political campaigns will not increase the birth rate, but concrete measures to ease the life of families with children will, as the young generation, both men and women, do not seem prepared to forsake what they regard as the normal life for having progeny.

On the other hand, the essentialist view of womanhood sees this as a biological condition, that no matter what the circumstances women will always have children. Hence worsening conditions will not have any great impact, therefore benefits to families can always be tampered with without any consequences. This is of course the dream of politicians for saving money, in nations and situations when and where women’s political voice is weaker than men’s. The essentialist view can, of course, also be seen as a leftover from traditional society and from pre-family planning times, when it was thought that some higher spiritual authority and not the couple concerned should decide the number of children being born, irrespective of circumstances. In the Baltic states, for example, politicians seem to have the essentialist view of motherhood, expecting women to take full responsibility for motherhood and renounce professional ambitions. However the steeply reduced birth rate seems to indicate that the women themselves have adopted the constructivist view of motherhood regardless of the number of talks by politicians.

The chapter on *work and unemployment* demonstrates some of the difficulties when transforming a system of “soft” budget constraints – originally a planned economy – into a system of “hard” budget constraints, a market economy with competition.

In the long run the system of central planning and guaranteed work for all led to inefficiency, a waste of resources, and over-staffing problems. The latest research on developing countries stresses again the hitherto undervalued importance of private property as a dynamic motor for growth by the non-property owning classes, instead of mainly focusing on investment and technology transfer. (De Soto, 2001)

The chapter on work and unemployment shows the similarity in development between market and planned economies in regard to the division of labour, however, there is a time-lag of a generation for the latter ones and an underdeveloped service sector. As unemployment, by definition, did not exist in planned economies, statistics on this naturally first developed in the 1990s. The main feature of economic transition with regard to unemployment was how the political situation shaped policy. Where, for example, mass unemployment was threatening and was deemed politically and socially undesirable, the solution was, de facto, the lowering of wages through inflation and price increases, and keeping people at work thereby drastically lowering the productivity of labour; which of course led to a falling standard of living. Crucial to the success of changing into a market economy was how privatization was carried out. In hindsight, quick voucher schemes, meant to give everybody a share of state property, enabled the elite to capture the bulk of a nation's resources to the detriment of the majority of the population. While the number of those employed shrank, the simultaneous growth of the informal sector blurred the picture, as did the growth of corruption. These worst case scenarios were only experienced by a few countries close to the Baltic Sea, and even there the hope is that their robber barons, like those of the USA a century and a half earlier, would eventually see the economy and the labour market integrated with the outside world as being in their own interest.

Research seems to confirm that some factors – the fewer the years under communism, the more secondary schooling the society had and the higher the chance of joining EU – have so far been crucial in easing the road towards an open market economy and a functioning labour market.

Glossary

- Population transfer** usually means an exchange of citizens, generally belonging to a minority in one country for those in another country as a result of an agreement in writing between states seeking to attain a more homogeneous population.
- Expulsion** refers to a coercive, conscious and sustained effort by either a dominant nationality and/or government to expel a minority population across the borders of the state.
- Deportation** means a forced, state-organized round-up and the transportation of populations either into occupied territories or remote areas of the same country.
- Refugees** are categorized as individuals who, because of various forms of threat or pressure, decide to flee abroad and seek asylum in a foreign country.
- Resettlement** can have two meanings: either a process of colonizing areas that have been depopulated for various reasons by groups from the dominant nationality or meaning a process of relocating a forcibly, deported population into new areas.
- Ethnic cleansing** which is widely used today, would mean a systematic, conscious effort by a state or its army to drive out, or kill a population group, defined by ethnic, religious, or nationalistic criteria, or a mixture of these.
- Genocide** which often is used interchangeably with ethnic cleansing, has a more strict definition and applies to a systematic, conscious attempt to exterminate physically an entire population group either defined along religious, ethnic or nationalistic lines. In this strict sense it can only be applied to the Armenians during the First World War and the Jews and the Roma, (Gypsies) during the Second World War.
- Holocaust** means large-scale destruction and loss of life (Greek *holos*, whole + *kaustos*, burnt) referring to the mass murder of Jews by the Nazis during the Second World War.

Hence the Germans leaving Eastern and Central Europe at the end of the Second World War would be a mixture of those being expelled, deported and in many cases simply fleeing. In literature these Germans are referred to as deportees and expellees as well as refugees showing how intertwined and complex the motives and reasons for flight were.



Figure 131. Death camp prisoners, liberated in 1945.
Photo: United States Holocaust Memorial Museum

It was clearly a deportation when the Soviet Union made use of its combined administrative-police methods to arrest and haul away “alien” elements of the Belarusian, Polish and West Ukrainian population from the Eastern provinces of Poland after the Soviet army occupied it in September-October 1939.

When people of Jewish “nationality” (according to their Soviet domestic passport) threatened by German invasion were running away from the Western part of the Soviet Union during the Second World War this was labeled as unauthorized flight and as such was perceived by the Soviet state as an illegal and even criminal act which can be seen in the Russian term ‘*bezbenets*’ meaning both fugitive and deserter.

Expulsion, population transfer, forced migration and resettlement are well-known phenomena throughout European history, but after the rise of the system with nation states in Europe they have acquired a more sinister character.

Except for the case of the Jews, almost everywhere suffering a similar fatal stigma – with the exception of the Polish Commonwealth becoming a haven for expelled Jews from Western Europe – deportation was a 20th century phenomenon that was not being used in Western Europe, but in Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe.

39 Populations around the Baltic Sea

Marina Thorborg

1. Migrations in the Baltic region in history

In a historic context rivers, seas and lakes were usually seen as something that bound peoples together instead of dividing them as water transport from earliest times onwards was the superior means of communication. Hence for example Sweden's proto-history began by its expansion Eastwards from the Western side of the Baltic Sea, while at a much later date Northward exploration along both sides of the Baltic Sea began in earnest. Throughout its long and varied formation period the history of the Muscovite empire was characterized by a movement towards the sea and particularly the Baltic sea. In addition to these long-term developments around the Baltic Sea from what was later to become the German Reich there was an expansion of Germanic influence and colonization along the South-Eastern shores of the Baltic sea. This meant that the diverse peoples already inhabiting these coasts were either successfully resisting invasion and expanding as the Poles and the Lithuanians at times managed to do, or conquered and subjugated as was more often the lot of other Balts and the Estonians.

Because of these long-term historical trends diversity is what characterizes the populations around the Baltic Sea. Diversity in relation to background, history, languages, culture and religion. Recent history has left layers of population around the Baltic rim as latter day relics from earlier periods. Swedes are scattered on islands along the Baltic coast far into the Finnish Bay on its

Northern shore and also on its Southern side and until quite recently well into the Bay of Riga, mixing with the Estonian population that earlier inhabited most of the land between the Baltic Sea and what is now Moscow, while to the North of it were Finnish speaking populations and South of this area Lithuanians dominated and at times their influence stretched all the way to the Black Sea.



Figure 132. Teutonic Knights' strongholds symbolize the former power of crusaders. In the late 14th century, the German order controlled a considerable part of the Baltic coasts (including Gotland). Photo: Katarzyna Skalska

2. Religion and migration

The Teutonic Order, a German order of crusaders, left a landlord class and a trading class as part of an urban population, meaning for example that Riga through much of its history was a cosmopolitan city, while for a 300 year period the Hanseatic cities of Königsberg, (now Kaliningrad), Danzig, (Gdańsk), Tallinn, (Reval), Visby, and Kalmar were dominated by German-speaking populations. Through Russian expansion layers of Slavs were added to the Germans and Swedes already there. Slavs not only made their imprint on the Southeastern shores of the Baltic Sea as rulers, military and police, but in order to practice their religion freely a Slave population of Old Believers settled in the Baltic interior in what is now Latgale. The Poles on the Southern shores of the Baltic Sea were at times in alliance with the Swedes and the Lithuanians and at other times were fighting off invasions from Sweden as well as from neighboring Germans and Russians. Being annihilated 3 times throughout its history as a nation state through unfriendly alliances between its neighbors a Polish nation managed to survive mainly through its strong culture, language, and religion.

Religion can be a uniting factor for a nation but can also work the other way. When for example, Sweden in the 17th century, being fervently protestant, took over Ingermanland and Karelia Orthodox believers fled to Russia, hence adding to the kaleidoscope of peoples around the Baltic Sea. In 1809 Sweden lost its Eastern part, Finland, after 700 years of colonization, but left a Swedish speaking population in the archipelago and in the upper class. Many historic researchers would today argue that Finland as a separate and respected part of the Russian empire experienced more freedom than under Swedish tutelage.

3. Population losses and population mixtures

Sweden as a nation during almost one generation – from the severe famine years in the mid-1860s to 1904 when a war with the formal union partner Norway was threatening – lost up to a quarter of its population, well over one million out of four left the country, through emigration mainly over the Atlantic.

What Sweden lost was mainly its dispossessed population, the landless, moving out to promised land in the West, some of it later returning with new skills. Hence when Sweden industrialized from 1860s and onwards, because there was no surplus of population the Swedish trade union movement could develop more along American than British lines, meaning that the Swedish unions were not out to save jobs as a first priority, but viewed positively new techniques including labor-saving devices, which in the long run served Sweden well.

Neither population nor language was viewed as threatened in Sweden by either the loss of Finland or loss of a quarter of its population to emigration. This was not the case on the other side of the Baltic Sea, with much smaller margins in both cases. Some theories maintain that when either a language or a population is coming closer to what many of its representatives see as the road leading towards extinction, then certain survival reactions set in, which is how these theories, questioned by many, would explain the policy on language and citizenship in Estonia and Latvia today, where both national capitals have long multi-linguistic histories.

In Lithuania – never threatened in the same way either in regard to population or language – its capital Vilnius in the 19th century was referred to as the Jerusalem of Lithuania with the

Jewish population being the single largest group around the turn of the last century, making up over 40% of all, while the Poles made up 30% and the Russians 20%. Though under the Russian Empire the Polish influence was so great that many of those registered as Poles were Lithuanians with Polish as their mother tongue, while those with Lithuanian as their first language only made up 2% of the Vilnius residents. Hence the capitals in the Baltic Sea region have, throughout their history, experienced a multitude of peoples and languages, while the countryside was always dominated more by local people and idioms.

4. Migrations caused by the Second World War

In recent history during and after the Second World War, states, borders and populations were moved. The Soviet Union managed illegally, in the secret additional clause in the protocol of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact between Nazi-Germany and the Soviet Union, to annex the three independent, Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. It also managed to move the Eastern border of Poland 200 kms to the West by taking over Galicia, areas that earlier belonged to the Habsburg empire.

During this war Belarus lost a quarter of its population, which proportionally was a higher loss than in any other country. On the other hand the Soviet Union lost around 20 million people, which was more people than any other country. Though according to recent research after the opening of Soviet archives of the secret police, NKVD, KGB, almost as many Soviet subjects, 20 million, perished in peacetime between the two world wars in mass killings and deportations by the Soviet state. Sometimes deportations of whole populations occurred, such as the Crimean Tartars, being exposed to the wrath of Stalin, the Soviet dictator 1924-1953, as a latter-day revenge for their burning of Moscow in 1571.

In the Baltic states about one tenth of the population was deported to slave-labor camps in Siberia or Arctic Russia, or died on the way to it in unheated railway wagons made for cattle.

A quarter of a million Poles from the areas annexed by the Soviet Union from Poland in September 1939 were deported. Of these 66,000 Poles were sent to the dry steppes of Kazakhstan against their will and knowledge, 78,000 Poles were forcibly removed to the Soviet Far East and remote Northern regions, and the remaining 139,000 Poles were sent to Siberia. Of these latter 139,000 only 33,000 were men above age 18 many being old and sick, the remaining 106,000 Poles were women and children.

As has recently been acknowledged by Russia a whole corps of Polish officers and police were shot at Katyn and elsewhere, about 5000 of them, while altogether 21,857 prisoners-of-war were shot (according to the Soviet historian A. Shelepin), while their families were simultaneously deported in a carefully planned operation to Kazakhstan for 10 years. After the Second World War up to 40% of the pre-war population of the areas annexed from Poland by the Soviet Union was missing. Apart from these forced population movements, further deportations took place in Poland in 1944-1945.

In the planned genocide against Jews by Nazi-Germany, of the 6 million Jews killed by the end of the Second World War only 5% came from North and Western Europe, the majority coming from Eastern and Central Europe, and most were killed in Poland, Ukraine, Hungary, Rumania, Belarus, the Baltic states and Germany, in that order. Of the quarter of a million Jews living in the Baltic states – 150-200,000 in Lithuania, 93,000 in Latvia, and less than 5,000 in Estonia in 1939 – only 10,000 survived the Holocaust.

A still debated and sensitive question is how much popular support the Nazi killing of Jews received in Eastern Europe. This has been particularly discussed in relation to the Baltic states as they were in the unique situation of being occupied by both sides during the Second World War. After being through the horror of Soviet occupation and terror initially the German invaders were greeted as liberators, which also happened in all areas that had been exposed to the terrors of the Soviet state. In 1943 over one million former Soviet citizens were cooperating with the Germans.

Another earlier and not so openly discussed question was the fate of the Germans that – since the Slavs were at the Elbe river about 500 A.D. – have for centuries been moving Eastwards, either fleeing religious persecution or by being invited as colonists. The Germans were disproportionately large both among the landowning class and the intellectual elite in their adopted countries. In the Baltic states tens of thousands of Germans, who had settled there from the period of the Teutonic Order and onwards mostly belonging to the landlord class were retreating at the end of the war with the German army. In the same way anything from several 100,000 up to a million German-speaking citizens of former Yugoslavia, Romania, Hungary, and the USSR who had managed to flee West with the German army were then repatriated, and later deported as forced labor and sent to the Soviet Union. In the Soviet Union about 400,000 Volga-Germans were deported to Siberia and Kazakhstan. Throughout Eastern Europe a German-speaking population of 13-15 million fled or were driven out by the Soviet army, while simultaneously the same army was the unlikely savior of those Jews having survived the Holocaust. About 7 million Germans fled from Prussia, Brandenburg, and Poznań, while Czechoslovakia expelled 3 million Germans from Sudetenland and these 10 million Germans did not return. However, some of these Germans fleeing were quite recent settlers. For example, from the mid-1880s under Bismarck, the German Chancellor, in his “Kulturkampf” (cultural fight) against Catholics and in the German “struggle for soil” in East Prussia, the German authorities had resettled up to 120,000 Germans on former Polish estates by the outbreak of the First World War. Simultaneously 30,000 Poles and Jews, mainly seasonal workers, had been expelled from Prussia.

In the Second World War educated guesses estimated that Poland lost 20% of its population, the Baltic states 9%, the Soviet Union 9% if those perished in Stalin's labor camps and prisons are included, and Germany 5%.

The period from the end of the Second World War until today can best be described as a westward movement of people. From deportees who survived managing to return home from Kazakhstan, Siberia and the Soviet Far East, to refugees fleeing the Soviet Union from Pechenga by the Norwegian border in the North to the Black Sea in the South. In addition people were voting with their feet and whenever possible leaving the countries under Soviet domination. As Finland had to deliver back refugees to the Soviet Union for geopolitical reasons, Sweden got wave after wave of refugees after the Second World War with Estonians, Latvians, Karelians, Ingrian Finns, Russians, Hungarians, Poles, East-Germans and also Rumanians.

Simultaneously the Soviet Union carried out its own policy of Sovietization in the newly conquered areas. The first measure had been deportations of indigenous people to the East, next was movement of Russians to the West. This program was accelerated by the building of a military-industrial complex in the more industrialized parts of the conquered areas from the 1960s onwards. This meant that Estonia and Latvia experienced a heavy influx of Russians, so much so that after Malaysia, no other countries have a larger proportion of foreigners. While this westward movement continues in Russia with, for example, more than

1.2 million Russians having left for the USA during the last 10 years Russia itself has in the meantime received over 20 million of its citizens fleeing civil unrest in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and elsewhere after becoming foreigners in states they grew in and saw as part of their own country. Similarly Russians in the Baltic states were suddenly living abroad and all that they took for granted was questioned. Their language and citizenship was suddenly invalid and out in the open belonging to a state structure that was dissolved, the Soviet Union.




Figure 133. Hill of the Crosses, in Siauliai, Lithuania, symbolizes the martyrdom of the Baltic people. Photo: Alfred F. Majewicz

Although wide differences existed in languages and peoples around the Baltic Sea, however, greater similarities can be observed in regard to demographic development.

5. Demographic development

During the second part of the last century the population development in the Soviet Union was quite similar to that of Scandinavia with a high life expectancy, women living more than half a dozen years longer than men, low and falling birth and death rates and hence decreasing fertility rates combined with falling infant mortality rates and a population growth hovering around the replacement level of 2.1 for most of the period. (See tables 21-25 and chap. 40 by Gaiane Safarova on Population and living standards, table 28 and for basic definitions of terminology on population see the same chapter)

Further a high level of urbanization, industrialization, education and a high proportion of women in the labor market made Scandinavia and the European part of the Soviet Union look alike, except for Lithuania that like Poland had a Catholic population, with higher population growth and a large agrarian sector that usually reflected an earlier stage of demographic and economic development.

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 there followed not only great demographic changes but also changes in calculation methods, thereby blurring the lines between real changes and changes due to new ways of measuring.




Figure 134. The age distribution of the German population mirrors the history of the country. The decrease in birth rates during the two world wars is shown as a narrowing of the pyramid around 74 and 45 years of age. A surplus of women from age 60 and upwards is due to the loss of men in the Second World War. The pyramid looks rather like a tree. Only since 1970 are the birth and death rates in western Germany on a level, around 11 per 1000 inhabitants

Table 21. Population in states around the Baltic Sea in millions, selected years

Year	1963-68	1973-78	1980	1991	1999
Country					
Estonia	1.3	1.4	1.5	1.6	1.4
Latvia	2.3	2.4	2.5	2.7	2.4
Lithuania	3.1	3.3	3.4	3.7	3.6
USSR*		261		292	
Russ.Fed.**	124	134	139	149	146.7
Belarus**				10.3	10.3-4
Poland	31.5	34	35.6	38.2	38.6
Germany	75.6	78.7	78.3	80.1	82
Finland	4.6	4.7	4.8	5	5.1
Denmark	4.6	5.1	5.1	5.2	5.3
Sweden	7.7	8.2	8.3	8.6	8.9

Sources: World Bank, World Development Report, (hereafter WDR) 1980, and 2000/2001,

World Bank, Social Indicators of Development, (hereafter SID) 1993,

Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia, Statistical Yearbook of Latvia, (hereafter SYLa) 1999,

Statistikos Departamentas, Statistical Yearbook of Lithuania, (hereafter SYLi) 1999, and for 1999, Website, <http://www.ballad.org/facts/index.ssi> while the UN figures are slightly lower, hence the Website <http://www.unicef.org/statis/Country>, gives 147,2 for Russia and 10,3 for Belarus

* refers to mid-1978

** approximations from “Russijskij statisticheskij eshegodnik, ofitsialnoye isdanye”, (Russian statistical yearbook, official edition,) in Russian, 1999 tab.5.2, where the 1999 figure is set at 146,7 and in tab.5.9 to 146,3.

Goskomstat of Russia, (Central Statistical Bureau of Russia) Women and Men in Russia, 1997, while Website, www.timesofindia.com/010300/01hlth8.htm gives a January 1st 1999 population of 145,5 citing an official report

6. Population decrease

In the European parts of the former Soviet Union population growth rates were halved from the mid-1960s to the 1980s when the whole Soviet system entered a structural crisis.

However the already low population growth rates of Germany and the Scandinavian countries were also drastically reduced during the same period.

Although the Nordic countries and Germany showed a net population increase in the 1960s below the replacement level of 2,1 children per women (which is what is needed to keep a population constant), because of immigration – consisting overwhelmingly of people of working age – still a net increase of population occurred. In addition the recent immigrants tended to have more children in the first generation in the new country.

The implications of population decrease are that a difficult transition period might become even more difficult as the future productive generation will be smaller and have to support a relatively larger old generation in addition to building up the country. For this reason the pension age, which used to be 55 for women and 60 for men, is now being raised gradually in the Baltic states.

In the early 1990s all the countries of the former Soviet Union encountered a population decrease, caused by lower birth rates, but particularly by higher death rates. The higher death rates were caused by an increase of those people, overwhelmingly men, who committed suicide and died from alcohol. The population decrease was most dramatic in the mid-1990s for countries of the former Soviet Union, and has slowed down somewhat since then (See tables 21, 22 and 28).

All countries of the Baltic region experienced population growth lower than the replacement level of 2.1 children per women, which is what is needed to keep a population constant (see table 24)

Table 22. Population growth rate in states around the Baltic Sea, selected years

Year	1963-68	1973-78	1980-90	1990-99	1999
Country					
Estonia	1.2	0.8	0.6	-0.9	-1.1
Latvia		0.5	-1	-1.1	
Lithuania	1	0.6	0.9	-0.1	-0.01
USSR*	1.2	0.9			
Russ.Fed.**			0.6	-0.1	-0.5
Belarus			0.6	-0.1	-0.2
Poland	1.1	1	0.7	0.2	-0.2
Germany***	0.9	-0.4	0.1	0.4	0.5
Finland	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.5
Denmark	0.8	0.3	0	0.4	0.3
Sweden	0.9	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.5

Sources: WDP 1980 and 2000/2001, SYLi-99, Statistical Office of Estonia, Statistical Yearbook of Estonia, (hereafter SYE) 1999

* Refers to 1960-70 and 1970-80

** Website, Durham University, UK, Europe population, for Russia <http://www.timesofindia.com/010300/01hlth8.htm>

*** Refers to Federal Republic of Germany until 1989

Demography of Russia

Since the 1930s Soviet state policy had been pro-natalistic and with large losses of men in the Second World War in 1944, women who gave birth to ten children became Heroine Mothers, while five children gave a second class Motherhood Award. Abortion had been made legal by the Soviet government as the first country in the world in 1920, was made illegal in 1935 and 1936 and legal again in 1955. Since it was made legal the first time it came to serve as a major means of birth control and still functions that way, with all the harmful effects on women's health that this implies such as increased infertility. According to the latest data one third of the Russian women are said to be infertile because of too many abortions. For every 10,000 children born alive there were 1,693 abortions in Russia compared to 349 in Sweden and 387 in the USA in 1999. Officially the concern was women's emancipation for the labor market and not the interest of the state being of priority.

Although Western and Eastern Europe experienced a baby boom directly after the end of the Second World War, however, the 1950s were characterized by low and quickly falling birth rates and – with the exception of France – it was in Eastern Europe and particularly in the Soviet Union that the low birth rates caused concern. Historically urbanization, industrialization, female education and high levels of women's employment were associated with falling birth rates.

But surveys indicate that the malfunctioning of the Soviet planning system, particularly the lack of housing, bad infrastructure and the fact that only full-time work was available contributed to the continuing low fertility.

In Russia in the mid-1890s the difference in life expectancy between women and men was about 3 years, while 100 years later in 1998 it was the broadest in the world with 12 years, 73 for women and 61 for men. (see table 23) However, in 1995 it was even broader, with a difference of more than 13 years, 71.7 for women and 58.3 for men. (see table 28)

Interestingly enough the republics of Ingushetiya and Dagestan with large Muslim populations show the highest life expectancy for men of 66 and 65 years respectively, thereby indirectly pointing to the life shortening impact of alcohol – as Muslims are not supposed to drink alcohol and together with the republic of Tuva in East Siberia the only regions with a fertility rate above replacement level.

In Sweden as in many industrialized welfare states the most common cause of death is cancer, which only takes third place in Russia where diseases of the circulatory system are the most common cause of death, followed by “unnatural causes”, accidents, poisonings and injuries which include alcohol poisoning, suicide, homicide, drowning and traffic accidents of which the latter four can also all be related to alcohol.

The lower life expectancy for men has mainly been caused by drinking, homicide, and suicide with men committing 3 times as many suicides as women. According to statistics from Goskomstat of Russia, the official bureau of statistics, in 1994 alcoholism and alcoholic psychosis claimed the lives of 290 men out of every 100 000 of the population, but only the lives of 70 women. For example, during the mid-1990s, 35,000 Russian men have died annually from acute alcohol poisoning which was double as much compared to 10 years earlier. This could be compared to 300 men dying from the same cause in the USA, which has a much larger population. However, the high suicide rate is continuing but has abated somewhat while the rates for the other “unnatural causes” of death show downturns, particularly for traffic accidents, while the rates for the rest – homicide, alcohol, and drowning – not yet have returned to the levels of 1992.




Figure 135. Parameters of natural movement of the population in the Pskov region of Russia (for 1000 people). Ill.: Andrey Manakov

Demography of Russia




Figure 136. Change of Pskov population of the Pskov territory in the XVI-XX century (thousands of people). Ill.: Andrey Manakov

In addition Russia is experiencing the highest tobacco consumption in the world, which also contributes to death from diseases of the circulatory system. For example, tuberculosis, T.B., seen as a disease of poverty also doubled in the last decade claiming 24,000 victims in 1999.

The population of Russia has shrunk by 6.6 million people since the dissolution of the Soviet Union up until May 2001. During the four first months of 2001 a loss of 309,000 people was recorded. Russia's total population has been decreasing since 1993, and the Russian population pyramid shows a surplus of women older than 34 in every age cohort (see Figure 140 in chapter 40).

During the Second World War the Soviet Union lost 20 million people, mainly men, and until the 1980s the surplus of women over men was slowly shrinking only to be reversed in the 1990s. Today there are three women for every man above the age of 70, and one and half more women for every man past age 64.

In certain areas of Central Russia today the death rates are 3-4 times higher than the birth rates, with the men dying out and contributing to a growing surplus of women.

The Pskov region is an example of this, experiencing since 1986 an accelerating population decrease, particularly since 1991, but as early as 1966 the death rate exceeded the birth rate. (see Figure 135)

When comparing the population pyramids of 1897, that look like perfect pyramids, and that one of 1998 looking like a badly grown Christmas tree, two things stand out: the lack of the very young and the surplus of women among the old. (see Figure 136 and 137)

As a border region next to the Baltic states, the Pskov region has been exposed to massive flows of population, either in or out. In 1994 the Pskov region experienced the worst depopulation of all regions of the Russian Federation. However, there is a relatively large teenage population, the result of an earlier baby boom, which can be seen as Russia's hope for the future.

In the whole of the Russian Federation so far, part of the population decrease has been offset by a positive migration balance, meaning more Russians are still arriving from the former parts of the Soviet Union than are leaving the Russian Federation for the West.





Figure 137. Population pyramids for Pskov region, 1897 and 1998. Ill.: Andrey Manakov

7. Life Expectancy

While certain well-off countries in Western Europe, such as Denmark, have experienced a reduced life expectancy – a reduction for men during the last 10 years through a self-induced unhealthy life-style and a halt in the increase in life expectancy for women – the break-up of the Soviet Union meant drastic changes, the severing of economic ties and trade links and a concomitant fall in the standard of living and life expectancy through external factors affecting whole populations.

Just as with population growth rates, the republics of the former Soviet Union experienced a decrease in the average life expectancy during the 1990s that, however, in the late 1990s turned upwards for both sexes (see tables 23 and 28).

This means that women tend to outlive men by well over 11 years, one of the highest differences in the world. Therefore there are twice as many old women as men and many of them are widows, except those women in the age bracket above 65, who were around 20 years of age in 1940. Because up to 10% of the women in this age cohort could never marry, due to the fact that men in the same age group were either killed in the Second World War or were executed or deported.

A woman in the Baltic states, for example, has on average 20 years as an old age pensioner, from 56 to 76; while a man has 4 years, from 60 to 64! This means that if men's life expectancy is not increased, then by the time the new pension age of 65 for men is fully implemented, then life expectancy will be lower than the pension age. This explains why the pension age is only being raised gradually to 65 years in the Baltic states.

Table 23. Life expectancy at birth, in states around the Baltic Sea, selected years

Country	Year	1963-68		1975		1992		1998	
		ALL	M/F	M/F	M/F	M/F	M/F		
Estonia		70	65	75	64	75	64	75	
Latvia			64	74	63	75	64	76	
Lithuania		70	66	75	65	76	67	77	
Russ.Fed.		69	62	73	62	74	61	73	
Belarus			67	76	65	75	63	74	
Poland		69	67	74	67	76	69	77	
Germany		70	69	74	70	77	74	80	
Finland		69	68	76	72	79	74	81	
Denmark		73	71	77	73	78	73	78	
Sweden		74	72	78	75	81	77	82	

Sources: WDR 1980 and 2000/2001,

Goskomstat of Russia, (Central Statistical Bureau of Russia) Women and Men in Russia, 1997

The MONEE Project CEE/CIS/Baltics, REGIONAL MONITORING REPORT– NO 6- 1999, Women in Transition, UNICEF, 1999 (hereafter WiT-6-99)

Table 24. Total fertility rate in states around the Baltic Sea selected years, total number of births per women

Year	1963-68	1973-78	1992	2000
Estonia	1.9	2.1	2.1	1.3
Latvia	1.7	1.9	2	1.3
Lithuania	2.2	1.9	2	1.4
Russ.Fed.	2.1	2	1.7	1.4
Belarus				1.4
Poland	2.5	2.2	2.1	1.5
Germany	2.5	1.5	1.4	1.3
Finland	2.4	1.7	1.9	1.7
Denmark	2.6	1.9	1.7	1.7
Sweden	2.4	1.8	2.1	1.6

Sources: SID, 1993, for the year 2000 Website, UNICEF: www.unicef.org/statis/country

Infant mortality. Infant mortality is usually considered one of the most crucial indicators of development in a society. It is one of the bases in the Quality of Life Index. Many see it as the most revealing indicator of how developed a society is.

In regard to infant mortality it is important to bear in mind the old Soviet definition in which, according to World Health Organization, WHO, the definitions of lines between infant mortality and abortion became blurred, meaning that the very high Soviet abortion rates were to some extent taken from the infant mortality rate, which contributed to keeping the latter lower than it would otherwise have been.

This meant that in comparison to the WHO's recommended definitions, the abortion rates were higher, because in the Soviet statistical system the infant mortality rates were kept down by transferring a number of infant deaths to the abortion statistics.

Hence when former Soviet bloc states change to the WHO system of counting abortions and infant mortality rates, the first effects are decreases in abortions, and an increase in infant mortality, which is also what has happened in all the Baltic states.

The interesting question here is, of course, how many of the changes are due to changes in the statistical system and how many are real changes? Will also, for example, religious attitudes to abortion contribute to more abortions being hidden than before? And how well will newly-established private clinics report upon their abortion number?

Live births definitions in statistics

According to the Ministry of Health of the Soviet Union, prior to 1992, live births were defined in the following way: if the child died within the first week it was not counted among live births if a) the mother's pregnancy did not exceed 28 weeks, b) and/or a child's weight at birth was under 1000 grams, c) and/ or a child's height did not exceed 35 cm. The children who died during their first week according to the 3 definitions above were instead added to the abortion statistics. The WHO definitions are that a live birth is considered to be a birth with a mother's pregnancy of at least 22 weeks and where weight at birth is at least 500 grams.

Still, there are more abortions than live births as has been shown above, indicating that the transition period is so hard indeed for the population that many births are postponed, but also that due to bad economic resources and means abortion is still widely used as contraception, just as during the Soviet period.

Infant mortality has been decreasing from the 1960s until the late 1990s in most states of the Baltic Sea region. However, states of the former Soviet Union showed increased mortality rates reflecting with a delay the worst years of the mid-1990s. The situation in Belarus would seem to be particularly serious where the lack of resources, particularly hospital equipment, would seem to contribute to a further worsening of the situation for infants. In contrast, Poland is rapidly lowering its infant mortality and quickly approaching the low levels of North-Western Europe, where Sweden, Holland, Norway and Japan used to be and still are those countries with the lowest rate of infant deaths in the world. (See tables 25 and 28)

Table 25. Infant mortality rate in states around the Baltic Sea, selected years, in number of deaths under-1 year per 1000 live births

Year	1963-68	1973-78	1992	1996	2000
Country					
Estonia	24	19	16	10	17
Latvia	24	24	17	16	17
Lithuania		25	17	10	18
USSR*	23	22			
Russ.Fed.			18	17	18
Belarus			12	13	23
Poland	42	25	15	12	9
Germany	24	19	7	6	5
Finland	17	10	6	5	4
Denmark	19	10	8	5	4
Sweden	13	9	6	5	3

Sources: SID,1993,

Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia, Latvia and the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe, 1998 for the year 2000 Website, UNICEF: www.unicef.org/statis/country

* "Russijskij statistitjeskij esjegodnik, ofitsialnoye isdanye", (Russian statistical yearbook, official edition,) in Russian, 1999 tab. 5.27

8. Marriage and divorce

In all the states of the former Soviet bloc the number of registered marriages has decreased and divorces has increased from 1980 to 1997 (See tables 26 and 27). However, much of what looks like changes on the surface in trends in marriage and divorce might in reality reflect other things, such as new rules for housing allowances and new rules for divorce.

During the Soviet time, the tendency developed not to register a divorce, if there was no intention to remarry, because personal reasons such as divorce or remarriage were not grounds for receiving new housing, which meant that even people who already had remarried someone else, were still forced to share their old apartment with their former spouse for lack of housing. Hence when, for example, new divorce rules were introduced in Estonia registered divorces

increased markedly from 1991 onwards, because many who had separated a long time previously chose to register their divorce.

If housing conditions permit in the modern Baltic states, particularly in the Estonian and in the Nordic societies, many couples just choose to live together without any formalities, which means that they can of course also split up without involving the authorities.

Statistics on marriage and divorce will then only show part of the picture, just as statistics on children born in and out of wedlock for the same reason only give a glimpse of reality.

Table 26. Registered marriages in states around the Baltic Sea, selected years, number of marriages per 1000 mid-year population

Year	1980	1989	1992	1995	1997
Country					
Estonia	9	8	6	5	4
Latvia	10	9	7	4	4
Lithuania	9	9	8	6	5
Russ.Fed.	11	9	7	6	6
Belarus	10	10	8	7	7
Poland	9	7	6	5	5

Sources: WiT-99

Table 27. Registered divorces in states around the Baltic Sea, selected years, number of divorces per 1,000 marriages

Year	1980	1989	1992	1995	1997
Country					
Estonia	48	47	75	106	95
Latvia	51	46	77	71	63
Lithuania	35	36	46	46	61
Russ.Fed.	40	42	61	62	60
Belarus	32	35	50	55	68
Poland	13	19	15	18	21

Sources: WiT-99

Household size. Because of rapid industrialization and urbanization from the late 1950s onwards, Estonia and Latvia particularly came to display many of the features associated with modern Western societies, while Lithuania, resembling Poland, to a much greater extent was agrarian with a slower growth in urbanization.

The smallest families and the highest divorce rates of the former Soviet Union were found in Estonia, followed by Latvia.

Due to severe housing shortages many young people were and still do live with their parents well into their 20's, also because hardly any young people today can afford to live on their own.



Figure 138. Marriages, divorces... Photo : Katarzyna Skalska

As women outlive men by more than 10 years, a high proportion of those living in single households – which constitute the most common household size – are elderly women, while the second most common household size consists of 2 people, in which the urban areas dominate, while slightly larger households prevail in rural areas.

Thanks to the break-up of the Soviet collective system, where small flats were the norm, individual homesteads are again allowed in the countryside, leaving room for more people to cohabit.

The population group in the nations that lives under the harshest conditions of the South-Eastern Baltic, elderly women, are also those that are most exposed to economic changes by having to live alone. Hence the problems of elderly people are in the main women's problems today.

9. Food and health

It is important to remember that a structural crisis had already developed from the mid-1980s onwards in the Soviet central planning system. With the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991 the planned economy was crumbling, many economic ties were severed, with high inflation and shaky exchange rates as part of the picture contributing to a steep fall in the established way of life. The fall in living standards was so great that for a couple of years the majority of the population, regardless of education and work, lived next to minimum level of existence.



Figure 139. Photo: Katarzyna Skalska

For example, according to surveys, up to two thirds of the population in the Baltic states lived from 1990-1994 close to a minimum level of existence, where food expenditures consumed half of the budget. Without resorting to bartering for or producing some of their own food in one way or another, which in the case of Estonia always figured high for 2/3 of all urban households, they could not have survived.

That the worst years for the East-European transition economies were 1993-95 is amply demonstrated in vital statistics where both population growth, infant mortality, death and birth rates and life expectancy hit an all-time low, but still the majority of the population remain far from their former accustomed way of life. (See tables 12, 24, 25 and 28).

Food expenses consume the major part of the household budget and also the time used for finding or preparing food drains already overworked people. Food expenses, which in the early 1980s were one third of the household budget, increased in the 1990s to half of the budget.

This prolonged food scarcity naturally led to deteriorated health and increased mortality and shortened life expectancy. In Lithuania, for example 35% of the women had live births

complicated by anemia – generally seen as a sign of malnutrition and worsened conditions – in 1997 as against 6% in 1989 and in Russia 36% in 1996 as against 17% in 1991. Worse, 81% of pregnant women had birth complications in 1996, compared to only half that number in 1991.

Since, according to statistics, men are the main consumers of tobacco and alcohol, and commit most suicides, men's life expectancy decreased twice as much as that of women.

Hence, health deteriorated to an all-time low in the mid-1990s, but has since improved in most states of the former Soviet bloc and this is reflected in longer life expectancy. New threats are the rapid spread of HIV and aids in which the Russian border zones such as Kaliningrad, Murmansk and the St-Petersburg area seem to be the most exposed.

10. Conclusions

The countries of the former Soviet bloc have experienced a number of massive changes over the last decade in most aspects which, with a time-lag, shows in the demographic set-up. This ranges from population decrease, to shortened life expectancy and increasing death rates and infant mortality with falling birth rates and a concomitant graying of the population, meaning the elderly, who as in more mature industrialized societies, are becoming more numerous, thereby further increasing the burden on society. This is particularly serious when the young and the active can hardly make enough to survive themselves, less so to support a growing, elderly generation.

On the other side of the Baltic Sea, the Nordic countries were characterized by slow demographic changes that for decades after the Second World War were similar to those of the South-Eastern side of the Baltic Sea with regard to high life expectancy, low birth and death rates, high education for women, and a high proportion of women in the labor force.

The break-up of the Soviet Union and its system, exposing it to new and uncharted roads to development, led to demographic decline and in the case of Russia to the brink of catastrophe, though the light can be seen at the end of the tunnel, as thus far the worst years were those of the mid-1990s.

In the former Soviet bloc some basic preconditions are there for development such as a highly educated population and, one hopes, through interaction and cooperation around the Baltic Sea the trends can be turned in more positive directions. In this regard, the Baltic states and Poland are well on their way into the Europe they were always part of, but not always allowed to belong to.

40 Population and living standards

Gaiane Safarova

Economic and population issues are inseparable. Economic and population change interact over time in a number of complex ways. These interactions have a very important impact on the dynamics of development and population change. For example, internal migration usually occurs as individuals and families respond to differences in economic and other opportunities in various locations. In spite of some similarities, the way any given relationship manifests itself in any particular country will depend on a wide range of unique local conditions.

In this chapter the population of the enlarged Baltic region, i.e. Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, St-Petersburg/Russian Federation, Sweden and Belarus will be considered. First, the demographic characteristics of the region will be given, then living standards will be analysed.

1. Population of the Baltic region and Russia

The total population of the 10 European countries covered in this chapter was estimated at around 304 million at the beginning of 1999, being equal to 37.5% of the population of Europe (here St-Petersburg is considered as part of the Russian Federation). The main demographic indicators for the populations of the Baltic region in regard to population size, population growth, fertility, mortality and migration; i.e. total population size, population growth rate, rate of natural increase (RNI), rate of net migration, total fertility rate (TFR), life expectancy at birth (LE) for males and females, and infant mortality rate; are given in table 28.

Differences between populations considered are remarkable: in 1999 the population size varied from about 1.5 million for Estonia to the giant Russian Federation with 146.3 million; in 1998 the TFR varied from 0.95 in St-Petersburg to 1.72 in Denmark; life expectancy also differed within a wide range from 61.3 for males (72.9 for females) in Russia to 76.9 for males (81.9 for females) in Sweden. Moreover, in Russia the LE for females is lower than the LE for males in Sweden.

The present picture presents some contrasting features of population growth. While some countries report low growth rates as the combined result of positive natural and net migration increase (Denmark, Finland) or dominating positive natural/migrational increase (Sweden, Poland), the situation in other countries is one of successive declines. In some cases, declines in natural changes are mitigated by net migration (Germany, Russia, Lithuania, Belarus), while in others both natural and migrational increase are negative (Estonia, Latvia).

In any analysis of population changes one has to distinguish between countries in Western/Northern Europe with rather stable demographic development and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe where the demographic process was interrupted by the political, social and economic development in the 1990s (Recent Demographic Developments in Europe, 1999). Thus the TFR as well as LE for post-Soviet states are lower than for other populations of the region (LE in Nordic countries being higher than for Europe as a whole) while infant mortality is higher. There is a correlation between longevity and economic and social development. People in North and West Europe live much longer than in countries in Central and Eastern Europe, and particularly in post-Soviet states. Everywhere, females enjoy a longer life span, the gap between female and male life expectancy closing for Western and Nordic countries. But for post-Soviet states this gap has been substantial (e.g. for the Russian Federation, 1998, the life expectancy for men was lower than that for females by 11.6 years).

But some similarities can be also seen, e.g. fertility rates have been declining in all countries considered. The decline in infant mortality, that is an important indicator of standard and effectiveness of health services, has been general throughout countries of the region, the proportion of births outside marriage has increased due to the significant increase in the number of consensual unions, population ageing is progressing as will be shown below.

It should be mentioned that only Denmark, Finland and Poland have small positive natural increases while for other populations of the region the RNI is negative. In the situation of negative natural increase, the role of migration as a factor of population growth becomes extremely important and migrational issues should be of great concern to policy makers.

Generally speaking, population reproduction is determined by the reproduction regime (i.e. by fertility and mortality levels) and migration. But the population age-sex composition is a very important factor of population development. Thus, if the population of modern Russia with its low fertility and rather high mortality levels had the age-sex structure as in 1897 (when the proportion of population under 15 was 37.7% and that of 60 and over was 7.3%) its total size would not decrease.

Besides, for example, the structure of household consumption demand of a population group could change as a result of shifts in the group's age structure. Since consumption preferences vary among persons at different stages of the life cycle, the demand for various consumption goods and services would change as the proportions of a group's members change at different years of age (United Nations, 1989).

Population age structures by major age groups (0-14, 15-64, 65+) are given in Table 29. For Europe as a whole, without Russia, the proportion of age group 0-14 being 18%, the population of the extended Baltic region has a higher percentage of children (except for St Petersburg) while the proportion of the elderly (65+) is higher than for Europe (without Russia) only in Germany and Sweden.

In all developed countries the steady increase of proportion of the elderly in the total population, called demographic ageing, has been observed. It is widely recognised that population ageing is one of the most important features of demographic dynamics which has multilateral longitudinal economic, social and political implications.

A number of quantitative characteristics of the process of ageing are given in Table 29. The simplest but very informative characteristic is the proportion of population 60+ (65+) in the total population. Another important characteristic of ageing is the ageing index showing the number of elderly per child multiplied by 100. For social and economic analysts dependency ratios (i.e. the number of children and/or elderly divided by the working

Table 28. Main demographic indicators for the Baltic region

Country, year	Population (thousands)	Population Growth rate, per 1000 (1)	RNI (2)	Rate of net migr. per 1000 (3)	TFR (4)	L E for males females (5)		infant mortality rate, per 1000 (6)
Denmark								
1975	5054.4	2.5	4.2	-1.7	1.92	71.3	77.0	10.4
1980	5122.1	0.3	0.3	0	1.55	71.2	77.2	8.4
1985	5111.1	1.0	-0.9	1.9	1.45	71.6	77.5	8.0
1990	5135.4	2.1	0.5	1.6	1.67	72.0	77.8	7.5
1995	5215.7	6.7	1.3	5.4	1.80	72.8	77.9	5.1
1998	5313.6*	3.5	1.5	2.0	1.72	73.7	78.6	4.7
Estonia								
1975	1424.1	7.4	3.3	4.0	2.04	64.8	74.6	18.2
1980	1472.2	6.8	2.7	4.1	2.02	64.1	74.1	17.1
1985	1523.5	6.9	2.8	4.1	2.12	65.5	74.8	14.1
1990	1571.6	-0.8	1.8	-2.5	2.05	64.6	74.6	12.4
1995	1491.6	-10.3	-4.9	-5.4	1.32	61.7	74.3	14.8
1998	1445.6*	-5.7	-5.0	-0.7	1.21	64.4	75.5	9.3
Finland								
1975	4702.4	3.8	4.6	-0.8	1.68	67.5	76.2	9.6
1980	4771.3	3.4	3.9	-0.5	1.63	69.3	77.9	7.6
1985	4893.7	3.5	3.0	0.5	1.64	70.2	78.7	6.3
1990	4974.4	4.8	3.1	1.7	1.78	71.0	78.9	5.7
1995	5098.8	3.5	2.7	0.8	1.81	72.8	80.2	3.9
1998	5159.6*	2.4	1.5	0.9	1.70	73.5	80.8	4.2
Germany								
1975	78882.2	-5.3	-2.6	-2.7	1.48	68.6	74.0	18.8
1980	78179.7	2.8	-1.1	3.9	1.56	68.7	74.6	12.5
1985	77709.2	-0.6	-1.5	0.9	1.37	69.6	75.4	9.1
1990	79112.8	8.1	-0.2	8.3	1.45	69.2	76.2	7.1
1995	81538.6	3.4	-1.5	4.9	1.25	71.2	78.5	5.3
1998	82037.0*	-0.2	-0.8	0.6	1.33	72.4	79.5	4.7
Latvia								
1975	2447.7	6.8	1.9	4.9	1.96	64.2	74.3	20.3
1980	2508.8	2.3	1.4	1.0	1.90	63.6	73.9	15.4
1985	2570.0	6.9	2.2	4.7	2.09	65.5	74.5	13.0
1990	2673.5	-2.1	1.2	-3.3	2.02	64.2	74.6	13.7
1995	2529.5	-11.1	-6.9	-4.2	1.25	60.8	73.1	18.5
1998	2439.4*	-7.7	-6.4	-1.3	1.09	64.1	75.5	14.9
Lithuania								
1975	3288.5	8.0	6.2	1.8	2.20	-	-	19.6
1980	3402.2	5.3	4.7	0.6	2.00	65.5	75.4	14.4
1985	3528.7	8.9	5.4	3.5	2.10	65.5	75.4	14.2
1990	3708.2	7.6	4.6	3.0	2.00	66.6	76.2	10.3
1995	3717.7	-1.6	-1.1	-0.5	1.49	63.5	75.2	12.5
1998	3700.8*	-0.9	-1.0	0.2	1.36	66.5	76.9	9.2

Table 28. Main demographic indicators for the Baltic region

Country, year	Population (thousands)	Population Growth rate, per 1000 (1)	RNI (2)	Rate of net migr. per 1000 (3)	TFR (4)	L E for males females (5)		infant mortality rate, per 1000 (6)
Poland								
1975	33845.7	10.0	10.2	-0.2	2.27	67.0	74.3	29.0
1980	35413.4	9.0	9.6	-0.6	2.28	66.0	74.4	25.5
1985	37063.3	7.5	8.0	-0.5	2.33	66.5	74.8	22.0
1990	38038.4	3.8	4.1	-0.3	2.04	66.5	75.5	19.3
1995	38580.6	0.7	1.2	-0.5	1.61	67.6	76.4	13.6
1998	38667.0*	0.2	0.5	-0.3	1.43	68.9	77.3	9.5
Russia								
1975	133634.0	6.8	5.9	0.9	1.97	62.3	73.0	23.7
1980	138122.0	5.2	4.9	0.3	1.86	61.5	73.1	22.1
1985	142519.2	7.0	5.2	1.8	2.05	63.8	74.0	20.7
1990	147762.5	-2.2	2.3	-4.4	1.90	63.8	74.3	17.4
1995	147938.5	-2.2	-5.7	3.5	1.34	58.3	71.7	18.1
1998	146327.6*	-2.8	-4.9	2.1	1.24	61.3	72.9	16.5
Sweden								
1975	8176.7	3.9	1.9	2.0	1.77	72.2	77.9	8.6
1980	8303.0	1.8	0.6	1.2	1.68	72.8	78.8	6.9
1985	8342.6	1.9	0.5	1.3	1.74	73.8	79.6	6.8
1990	8527.0	7.4	3.4	4.1	2.13	74.8	80.4	6.0
1995	8816.4	2.4	1.1	1.3	1.73	76.2	81.4	4.1
1998	8854.3*	0.8	-0.5	1.2	1.51	76.9	81.9	3.5
Belarus								
1975	9345.2	4.6	7.1	-2.5	2.20	66.9	76.0	18.8
1980	9621.8	7.6	6.1	1.5	2.00	65.9	75.5	16.3
1985	9968.9	6.0	5.9	0.0	2.07	66.7	75.5	14.5
1990	10259.3	0.1	3.2	-3.1	1.91	66.3	75.6	11.9
1995	10345.1	-3.2	-3.2	0.0	1.39	62.9	74.3	13.3
1998	10227*	-2.4	-4.4	1.9	1.27	62.7	74.4	11.3
St Petersburg								
1976	4417.9	12.0	3.5	8.5	-	-	-	-
1980	4614.2	1.9	2.2	-0.3	1.5	63.6	73.3	20.5
1985	4816.7	7.6	2.3	5.3	1.7	65.1	73.9	19.1
1990	5002.4	-0.1	-1.4	1.3	1.5	65.2	74.3	18.0
1995	4805.2	-7.6	-9.0	1.4	1.0	59.9	72.3	13.8
1998	4695.4*	-4.3	-7.2	2.9	0.95	63.8	74.4	11.4

Sources: Levy M. 1999; Main Indicators of Demographic Processes in St Petersburg and Leningrad Region, 1990-1999; Recent Demographic Developments in Europe, 1999; Sardon, 2000; The Demographic Yearbook of Russia, 1999; United Nations, 1999.

* - for 1999

- (1). Growth rate - the rate at which a population is increasing (or decreasing) in a given year due to natural increase and migration, expressed as a percentage of the base population or per 1000 inhabitants;
- (2). RNI, the rate of natural increase, the surplus (or deficit) of births over deaths within a population in a given time period, i.e. the difference between crude birth and death rates. Crude birth (death) rate is obtained by dividing the number of births (deaths) during a given year by the average population and is expressed per 1000 inhabitants;
- (3). Net migration - the difference between the number of immigrants and emigrants in a given time period per 1000 inhabitants;
- (4). TFR, the total fertility rate, the average number of children that would be born alive to a woman during her lifetime if she were to pass through her childbearing years conforming to the age-specific fertility rates of a given year;
- (5). Life expectancy at birth - the mean length of the life of individuals who are subjected since birth to current mortality trends;
- (6). Infant mortality rate - ratio of deaths during one year of age to the number of live births of the same year (Recent Demographic Developments in Europe, 1999).

age population, in per cent) are of great interest. Some of these ratios are connected with ageing, i.e. old-age dependency and the proportion of old-age dependency in the total dependency ratio. The lowest proportions of population aged 60+ (65+) are in Poland and Russia, the highest ones in Germany and Sweden.

The primary needs of the people, which the development programmes aim to satisfy, cannot be gauged rationally without regard to the expected size and composition of the population, nor can national resources be appraised adequately without considering labour, the supply of which depends primarily on population size and structure (United Nations, 1956). Thus, population projections are made taking into account different changes in the main demographic processes (fertility, mortality and migration). Since the 1950s the UN Population Division has regularly made world population projections. The UN projections consist of four variants, i.e. constant-variant, low, medium and high variants related to hypotheses of fertility change (United Nations, 1999).

According to the UN medium-variant (1998 Revision) by 2025 the total population size of the region considered as well as that of Europe as a whole, will decrease by 4% as compared with the estimated population size in 2000. At the same time, the population size of Finland, Poland and Sweden will increase slightly. In 2025 the proportion of the region's population in the total population of Europe will be 42%, i.e. it will be higher than it was in 1999.

Figure 140 shows the population pyramids for Russia in 1997 and 2025 (the UN medium-variant projection, 1998 Revision), clearly demonstrating population ageing. Population ageing under all projections is expected to continue thereby affecting the labour market, pension system, health services and other social institutions. Values of the ageing characteristics for 2025 are given in Table 29.

Glossary

Gross National Product, GNP, the broadest measure of national income, measures total value added from domestic and foreign sources claimed by residents. GNP comprises GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (GDP), (see below) plus net receipts of primary income from non-resident sources.

GNP per capita is GNP divided by mid-year population.

Gross Domestic Product, GDP, is the most widely used concept of national income defined in the System of National Accounts. It measures the final total output of services and goods produced by a country during a certain period and is calculated without making deductions for depreciation.

GDP measured at *Purchasing Power Parity*, PPP, means that GDP is converted into U.S. dollars by the PPP exchange rate whereby one dollar has the same purchasing power over domestic GDP that one U.S. dollar has over U.S. GDP, also referred to as international dollar.




Figure 140. Population pyramids for Russia, 1997 and 2025

For all countries of the region the percentage of the elderly (65+) will increase by 40-60 per cent compared with the percentage in 1999. It is remarkable that for the whole region except for Latvia and Belarus the proportions of 65+ in 2025 are higher than the proportions of 60+ in 1999.

The increase in the total dependency ratio does not exceed 40 per cent, while the increase in old-age dependency is greater than 37% reaching 84% for Finland. Besides, in 1999 the old-age dependency did not exceed half of the total dependency (being equal to only 50 per cent for Germany) but in 2025 it will constitute more than 50 per cent of the total dependency for all countries of the region (reaching 64% of the total for Germany).

The analysis of a population should also include consideration of marriages and divorces affecting the process of family formation. A very important characteristic of a population is its family structure. The family is a mediator between an individual and society. For elaboration of an effective demographic/family policy as well as for many other tasks related to employment, education, public health and different programmes aimed at the improvement of living standards, knowledge of family structure and its changes is required.

Table 29. Population structure by major age groups for 1999 and ageing characteristics for 1999 and 2025 (the UN medium-variant projection)

	1 9 9 9						2 0 2 5											
	proportion by age group (%)			proportion (%)			dependency ratios			ageing index			proportion (%)			dependency ratios (for 2025–2030) percentage		
	0-14	15-64	65+	60+	0-14 of 15-64	65+ of 15-64	0+14 and 65+ of 15-64	60+	60+	60+	65+	65+	65+	65+	65+	65+	65+	65+
Denmark	18.2	66.9	14.9	19.7	27.2	22.2	49.4	81.7	28.7	21.7	26.0	34.8	60.8					
Estonia	18.6	67.1	14.3	19.9	27.7	21.3	49.0	76.9	27.5	20.3	19.9	30.6	50.5					
Finland	18.4	66.9	14.7	19.6	27.6	22.0	49.6	79.8	30.7	24.0	28.0	40.4	68.4					
Germany	16	68	16	23	23.5	23.5	47.0	100	31.8	23.4	21.1	37.0	58.1					
Latvia	18.5	67.0	14.5	20.3	27.7	21.6	49.3	78.2	26.8	19.6	21.9	29.7	51.6					
Lithuania	20.4	66.5	13.1	18.2	30.6	19.6	50.2	64.1	26.0	18.9	22.4	28.4	50.8					
Poland	20.3	67.8	11.9	16.4	30.0	17.5	47.5	58.4	25.3	19.4	24.2	30.0	54.2					
Russia	19.0	68.5	12.5	18.0	27.8	18.3	46.1	65.9	25.0	18.1	22.7	27.2	49.9					
Sweden	18.6	64.0	17.4	22.1	29.1	27.1	56.2	93.3	30.9	24.3	26.1	40.4	66.5					
Belarus	19.6	67.3	13.1	18.5	29.4	19.7	49.1	66.9	24.9	18.0	23.1	27.0	50.1					
St Petersburg	15.2	70.4	14.4	20.5	21.6	20.4	42.0	94.7	--	--	--	--	--					

Sources: see Table 28

2. Living standards

An increase in the standard of living is the priority aim of development. Any improvement in living standards is not just a result of economic growth but is also an important precondition. The standard of living is a composite indicator characterising welfare and quality of life. Measurement of living standards gives an opportunity to assess the effects of socio-economic changes in a society on population, to evaluate economic differentiation of a society, to compare living conditions in different regions.

The standard of living is a complex socio-economic concept expressing the extent of satisfaction of material and spiritual needs of people. There are a number of approaches to the definition of the standard of living depending on different basic concepts, e.g. production, consumption, income, cost of living and others. Ultimately, the standard of living is determined by the development of productive forces but it is displayed in characteristics of consumption. Living standards are determined not only by activities of individuals, households, firms but by the efficiency of economy and national wealth. Thus, countries with effective economies and great social wealth can provide their citizens with higher living standards than less economically developed ones.

There is no unified universal indicator or a system of living standards. Rather, detailed systems of living standards usually include the following main directions related to income, cost of living, consumption, poverty, characteristics of social infrastructure, medical and demographic characteristics of population, ecological characteristics and security (V. Zherebin and N. Yermakova, 2000; Social conditions and living standards, 1998):

- Basic macro-economic indicators (e.g. GDP per capita, consumer price index, the number of unemployed);
- Main economic indicators related to
 - income (e.g. money income per capita),
 - property (e.g. real estate, cars),
 - cost of living (e.g. living wage),
 - consumption, including nutrition (e.g. the structure of expenditures, daily calorie supply per capita, food consumption as a percentage of total household consumption)
 - correlation of income and living wage,
 - social security benefits,
 - income differentiation (e.g. Gini coefficient showing how close a given distribution of income is to absolute equality or inequality),
 - poverty (e.g. percentage of population with income below living wage);
- Indicators of living conditions, i.e. provision of infrastructure objects, personnel and technical means of social and cultural branches (including housing, health services, educational institutions, retail trade, public transport);
- Indicators of development of social sphere (e.g. proportions of health, education, science, culture expenditures of GDP);
- Medical and demographic indicators (e.g. life expectancy at birth, infant mortality rate, the rate of mortality by suicide);
- Ecological indicators (e.g. air, water pollution);
- Security indicators (e.g. the annual number of registered crimes, the rate of mortality by homicide).

Table 30. Selected living standards for Russia and St Petersburg

	Russia							St Petersburg
	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998/1999
GDP (percentage of the preceding year)	95	85.5	91.3	87.3	95.9	96.5	100.8	
Consumer price index (December of the December of the preceding year, times)	2.6	26.1	9.4	3.2	2.3	1.2	1.1	2.3 (1)
Number of unemployed (thousands)	–	3594	4160	5478	6431	7280	8180	
Correlation between income per capita and living wage (%)	–	210	219	238	195	206	225 (170)*	143
Population with income below living wage (% of the total population)	–	33.5	31.5	22.4	24.7	22.1	20.8	33.2
Living space (sq. m)	16.5	16.8	17.4	17.7	18.1	18.3	18.6	18.6 (1)
Doctors per 1000 inhabitants	4.4	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.5	4.5	4.6	7.1 (1)
LE for males	63.5	62.0	58.9	57.6	58.3	59.8	60.8	63.8
LE for females	74.3	73.8	71.9	71.2	71.7	72.5	72.9	74.4
Infant mortality rate (per 1000 births)	17.8	18	19.9	18.6	18.1	17.4	17.2	11.4
Rate of mortality by suicide (per 100000)	26.4	26.5	31	38.1	41.4	39.4	37.6	19.3 (2)
Number of state institutions of higher education	519	535	548	553	569	573	578	42 (2)
Number of registered crimes (thousands)	2173	2761	2800	2633	2756	2625	2397	78.7 (2)
Rate of mortality by homicide (per 100000)	15.2	22.8	30.6	32.6	30.7	26.6	23.9	18.5 (2)

Sources: Chaisnais J-P, 2000; Social Conditions and Living Standards, 1998; Peterburgkomstat, 2000

* – for 1999

(1) – for 1995

(2) – for 1997

Living standards for the countries of the region differ greatly. Living standards in the Nordic countries are the highest in the region while for the post-Soviet states they are much lower. Thus, for example, consumer price index (percentage 1996 of 1990 not exceeding 125) for Denmark, Germany, Finland and Sweden amounted to 5669 times for Russia (Russia and Countries of the World, 1998). In the 1990s the Gini coefficient for the Nordic countries

was about 25 while for Russia it was 39.9, indicating a higher differentiation of income in Russia.

Special attention should be paid to a very important indicator of the standard of living – HDI (Human Development Index). The HDI, introduced in 1990, is a composite measure containing indicators representing three equally weighted dimensions of human development (United Nations Development Programme, 1990 and later) – longevity (life expectancy at birth), knowledge (adult literacy and mean age of schooling) and income (purchasing power parity dollars per capita).

Though not being an exhaustive measure of the state of living, the HDI reflects basic aspects of human development. Besides, being regularly computed following the same methodology and included in Human Development Reports, it makes international comparisons possible. Thus, in the 1990s the HDI for Denmark, Germany, Finland and Sweden was greater than 0.9 while for post-Soviet states it was lower than 0.8, Poland occupying an intermediate position. Consideration of the components of the HDI shows that differences in the HDI values for the countries of the region resulted from differences in income while their educational levels were close (*Russia and countries of the world*, 1998).



Figure 141. In the so-called new democracies living conditions are still diversified. Interior of a Lithuanian house in the country side. Photo: Alfred F. Majewicz

Unfortunately, differences in the methodology of computation of separate indicators and in ways of their aggregation in general make comparisons of living standards in different countries difficult.

It should be mentioned that the social well-being of the family, being a component of the quality of life, after reaching a certain welfare level, society should pay particular attention to the psychological, social and moral aspects of life.

41 Structural Change and Citizenship – A Gendered View to Changes in the Baltic Region

Ingegerd Municio-Larsson

1. Introduction

The division of the former Soviet Union into various independent countries, as well as the rise of democracy in these countries was one of the major changes of the last decade. These changes have in many ways actualised the issue of citizenship, which gives an opportunity to discuss changes of the conceptions of citizenship during periods of transition, as well as of nation-formation. However, the 1990s have also involved changes in countries in the west. These changes have to some extent affected the public sector, which actualises in turn changes in rights associated to citizenship in these countries. This paper aims to discuss the meaning of citizenship, today, in our recent past, as well as historically.

A theoretical introduction is presented for an understanding of citizenship, as well as of the rights connected to varying conceptions of citizenship in different social contexts. Particular emphasis is given to ways of gendering citizenship in democratic transition. Is citizenship gendered in new ways in the new democracies? Are women as citizens expected to fulfil different obligations compared to men during periods of state-formation? Are the rights connected to citizenship different for women than for men, when actually put into practice, in spite of formally being gender-neutral?

2. Citizenship in Liberal Democracy

It is widely considered that the transition in the post-socialist states was carried through in a mental atmosphere characterized by a strong belief in the values of liberalism. The change from a socialist economic system to a capitalist one also gave many proofs of raw capitalism. Privatization of the means of production was a highly disordered process, with a minimum of public control. Thus capitalism was introduced before the possibilities of democratic control had been established.

Today when we receive information on social problems in these countries, particularly in the three Baltic states, it would not be far-fetched to analyse these problems in the light of the theories of liberalism formulated in the 17th and 18th centuries. These theories stressed the right to private property, but also the right to individual freedom and to self-government. In her analysis of theories of citizenship, Yeatman (1994) points to the renewed interest of these original theories, brought into politics at the present time in the claims for the small govern-

ment/minimal-state by advocates of new liberalism. The parallel between the transition of the former socialist countries and the changes in the capitalist democracies is also drawn in a survey on public opinion in countries around the Baltic Sea. It is stated that “all societies around the Baltic Sea have become increasingly dominated by the anonymous market forces, often referred to as an invisible hand” (Moskalewicz & Tigerstedt 1998:5).

According to Yeatman, one important reason why these original theories have maintained their potential for explaining the relationship between the state and the citizen is the fact that natural right has remained the “dominant account” in theories of citizenship (1994:58). Thus, when in these theories the idea of freedom of action was first formulated, it relied on the “natural” right of each individual to freedom. In Yeatman’s analysis this was first and foremost a right to act, and consequently a claim to self-government. In those days, this claim was directed against “the traditionally legitimate authorities of absolute monarchy, scholasticism, the church, and kinship” (1994:59). Instead of submitting to such authorities, the free individuals were supposed to form a common public authority by means of a social contract. The freedom of the individual included the right to property. This right was at first limited to those products of one’s labour that were for one’s own use. With the introduction of a monetary economy this right was extended to allow the accumulation of capital.

There are traits in this theory that appeal to contemporary societies, but it is obvious that they have to be reinterpreted to fit a modern social context. Thus, when advocates for new liberalism in the West turn to the origins of liberalism for new definitions of the relationship between the citizen and the state, the authorities that they oppose are not the traditional ones of absolute monarchy, the church, or kinship. Instead, they oppose the “strong” modern state with an extended power of taxation, and a wide range of activities interfering with civil society. They describe the modern state as struck by overload and inefficiency. By way of solving this crisis of the state they envisage a minimal state. Their critique is directed against the welfare state and its recipients. However, though they emphasize the right of the individual to personal freedom and private property, to be exercised without state interference, they assume that the minimal state will ensure economic stability, the validity of contracts and other necessary conditions for private economic activities. They are also in favour of a strong state, when it refers to the repressive forces of the police and the military (Liedman 1982).

When these original theories of liberalism are used to interpret the transition in post-socialist countries, the authority opposed is firstly the Soviet domination of these countries. The claim for self-government is translated into a claim for national sovereignty. Secondly, the right to private property is contrasted with the socialist economy. In the years before and of transition it was well-known that the standard of living was much higher in the neighbouring capitalist countries. An illustration of this is given by a survey in Latvia, where a majority of the respondents agreed to the proposition that the standard of living would be higher, if Latvia had remained independent like Finland in 1945 (Zepa 1996/97). Thus, in the period of transition to democracy, great hopes were connected to the privatization of capital and production, and to the benefits of a free market.

When we receive information which indicates that women more than men suffer the consequences of the transition in the post-socialist countries (Kutsar 1997:98-100), we could also turn to the theories of liberal democracy for an explanation. Yeatman points out that the right to property included individual men’s jurisdiction over his “wife, children, and his household servants” (1994:62). As other feminist theorists have shown, this exclusion of women and children is often implicit also in modern theories of citizenship (Moller Okin

1991). Thus, political theories tend to exclude from their analysis those who are not conceived to be the signers of the social contract. Consequently the theories of liberal democracy may allow us to conclude that the citizens who really matter in a democratization process are men who own property, while women, children and men who own nothing may be excluded.

This would allow us to suggest that any exclusion of women and poor men from the events of democratization is a logical consequence of the political ideas that guided the transformation in the post-socialist countries.

3. Transition in the 1990s

In contrast to the above, my claim is that the old theories of liberal democracy do not give us much guidance to analyse what has actually occurred during the 1990s. Thus, neither in the Nordic countries nor in the three Baltic countries of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, did the theories of neo-liberalism gain such overwhelming support. This becomes clear when we look more closely into the processes of change.

It is generally recognized that in the 1980s the rhetoric of the neo-liberalism gained support in the well-established welfare states. In the words of Yeatman (1994:4f.) this implied that “Western-identified state societies (...) abandoned the rhetoric of social citizenship”. I would not describe the changes in such a drastic wording, at least not in the case of Sweden. Instead, the rhetoric of social citizenship was largely maintained, but the institutions providing welfare were increasingly described in terms of an economic discourse (Municio-Larsson 1999). In order to increase the economic efficiency of public institutions, great efforts were made to describe the activities of these institutions in market terms. In addition, elements of private entrepreneurship were introduced into the public sector. However, even privately administered welfare activities generally continued to be publicly financed. Likewise, the political support for the state’s responsibility to provide basic resources in order to guarantee the citizen’s autonomy and participation in society continued to be strong (Rothstein 1994).

With reference to the transition in the three Baltic countries, available facts show that this responsibility was not questioned there either. Instead, the main goals of transition were national sovereignty and democracy of a Western type. To these goals were added the changes necessary for the introduction of a capitalist economic system, i.e. private property and entrepreneurship, free markets, as well as a stop to state subsidies to industry and agriculture. It was widely expected that these changes, taken together, would resolve the economic and social problems that these countries had been struggling with for decades. It was also expected that the wealth thus produced would allow for maintaining public welfare measures for those citizens who could not manage on their own in the new economic system. As we know today, what happened instead was that these countries were struck by “high inflation, increasing unemployment, a notable differentiation in the income of residents, a stratification of society, and declines in the standard of living of a large share of society” (Dobelniece 1996/97:205).

Thus, though the transition was characterized by a belief in the values of liberalism, this did not imply a retreat from the ambitions of a welfare state. People expected the social security previously provided by the totalitarian state to continue during the democratically-elected government. The reforms of the social protections systems in the Baltic states, during the 1990s, illustrate state ambitions to guarantee economic security after independence to

“the increasing part of the population who need support from the state and social security resources” (Venesaar and Hachey 1995:33). These reforms cover pension insurance, children’s benefits, medical insurance and sickness benefits, as well as housing allowances and social protection of the unemployed. In an analysis of the political elite of Latvia, it is stated that the failure of the economic transition was actually due to an inconsistent orientation “toward property and the role of the state in society”. Thus, a “significantly socialist thinking” survived the transition and therefore “Latvia’s political elite has exaggerated the significance of the state in the economic and social process” (Lakis 1996/97:163).

This analysis implies that it was precisely the lack of determination as to definitely leaving the paternalistic, socialist state behind that is the real cause of the economic deprivation that the people of Latvia are now experiencing. Consequently, the solution would be to abolish state welfare measures and to give market mechanisms unrestricted free play. It could be suggested that this drastic conclusion finds no support in the existing welfare states. In the Nordic countries, for example, the welfare state still coexists with a comparatively thriving economy. Additional evidence against such a conclusion is shown because, in the economic sectors of the countries in the west, private initiatives intermingle with state interventions.

4. Three Stages of Citizenship Rights

Another way of analysing the changes in citizenship involved in the democratic transition in the Baltic states is to turn to the traditional conception of citizenship as divided into three consecutive stages, occurring during the development of democracy. According to a theory developed by Marshall, citizenship has

three parts, or elements, civil, political and social. The civil element is composed of the rights necessary for individual freedom – liberty of the person, freedom of speech and thought and faith, the right to own property and to conclude valid contracts, and the right to justice (...). This shows us that the institutions most directly associated with civil rights are the courts of justice. By the political element I mean the right to participate in the exercise of political power, as a member of a body invested with political authority or as an elector of the members of such a body. The corresponding institutions are parliament and councils of local government. By the social element I mean the whole range from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being, according to the standards prevailing in the society. The institutions most closely connected with it are the education system and the social services. (Marshall 1964:71-72)

These rights were considered to be successive steps in a democratic development, first civil rights, then political, lastly social. The situation in the former socialist countries could probably be described as following an opposite chain of development. Thus, basic forms of economic security were provided during the socialist era, while on the other hand indispensable parts of the other two forms of citizenship were severely limited. One goal of the transition in the Baltic region towards independent and democratic states has been the reinstatement of rights corresponding to the first two stages, i.e. the rights of individual freedom, as well as the right to exercise political power in free elections. However, the present situation of the right to basic forms of economic security is uncertain, because more often than not the benefit levels of the different systems of social protection are merely symbolic (cf. Dobelniece 1996/97:205-211, Eglite 1999:35, Rungule 1997:318 and Viies 1998:53-60). Neither is there any guarantee of the future development of this right.

As has already been commented on, this uncertainty does not follow from any decision by the new political elites to abolish these rights. Instead, it was widely expected that national sovereignty, democracy and private ownership of property would result in economic means to guarantee each citizen of these countries a minimum. Instead, these difficulties are generally considered to be a consequence of the lack of taxation capacity of the newly formed states.

In his categorization of different stages of citizenship, Marshall did not raise the issue of gender. As is usual in political theory, he assumed that the citizen is a man and that the rights acquired are only for men. That is why he ignored that in the order described by him, these rights were acquired by white adult males, while they were still denied to women. In addition, his Anglocentric view made him disregard actual deficiencies as to the rights granted to minorities in the countries that he described. Later theorists have untangled the assumptions underlying Marshall's and other political theorists' descriptions of the relationship between the state and its members. An alternative approach to citizenship has been suggested, where a key feature is "the differential access of inhabitants of a given territory to civil, political and social citizenship" (Walby 1997:171). This refers to women, but also to minorities.

What is then the relationship of women to citizenship? Recent feminist work has also questioned the workability of a notion of a single model of citizenship for the analysis of women's rights as citizens (Pateman 1991; Lister 1990). Instead, they suggest that "(t)he different experiences and structural position of women (...) militate against their full access to the rights of citizenship" (Walby 1997:173). In addition, they suggest that the notion of social citizenship is of particular importance to women. In view of the fact that social rights are closely connected to gainful employment and contributions, women obtain less welfare provision than men. The disproportionate share of obligations that women have towards those who require care places them at a disadvantage in relation to political and social citizenship (Walby 1997:173). A welfare state, as we know it in Britain or Sweden, is not a sufficient guarantee for equal access by women to the rights connected to social citizenship. Instead, three fundamental changes are required (Lister 1990). The first is to change "to individual rather than household entitlements", the second to disconnect benefit from contribution, and the third to supply child care "to facilitate women's participation in the labour market" (Walby 1997:174). However, a first premise for social citizenship, for men as well as for women, is the very basis of a welfare state.

5. The Baltics in the 1990s

Minorities. If we turn again to the Baltic countries, we find an illustration of the differential access to citizenship in the limitations given by the citizenship laws. After independence, Estonia and Latvia chose different paths to delimit their citizenry, as compared to Lithuania. All three countries opted for the restoration of the pre-war citizenry. However, with respect to the Soviet era migrants and their descendants, they were offered the right in Lithuania to choose unconditionally which citizenship to acquire, either Lithuanian or another post-Soviet citizenship. In Estonia and Latvia, unconditional citizenship was offered neither to the migrants of the Soviet era, nor to their descendants. Instead, they had to apply for residence permits, and for naturalization as citizens. The conditions imposed remain a severe obstacle to citizenship.

This has resulted in approximately one third of the inhabitants of Estonia, and one fourth of Latvia, not yet having acquired full citizenship rights (Statistical Yearbook of Latvia

1999:60, Jacobsen 1996:21, 32). In both countries, this primarily affects political rights, but recent language laws also impose conditions on the access to a wide range of professions and occupations. This adds to the exclusion of those who have been defined as being outside the framework of the citizenship laws.

Women and freedom. If we now turn to the gendering of citizenship, and to the three stages outlined by Marshall, we find evidence to question whether the democratic transition has brought individual freedom and participation in political power to women, to the same degree as to men. As to individual freedom, an important part of this is the “liberty of the person”. This right is generally conceived of as a contract between the state and its citizens, in which each citizen accepts the authority of the state and in turn receives state protection against violence from other citizens. Thus, according to the well-known definition of state authority by Max Weber, the monopoly of using violence within a given territory is retained by the state. Feminist theorists have questioned if this right to state protection against violence was ever extended to women. Instead, this protection has covered men’s violence against other men, while in the family the state’s monopoly has traditionally been paralleled with men’s monopoly of violence against his wife, children and servants. In Sweden, as well as in other countries of the west, this problem has increasingly been recognized as the most extreme expression of patriarchal structures, which constantly benefit men at the expense of women.



Figure 142. Different generations, different experiences. Photo: Katarzyna Skalska

The issue here is whether the transition of the post-Soviet states has affected violence against women and children. According to a recent UNICEF Report, “...violence against women was largely under-recognized and undocumented” during communism. In spite of this lack of data for comparisons, it is concluded that after transition women are “surely” exposed to greater risks, because of the “expanding culture of violence” (*Women in Transition* 1999:16). As an illustration, it reports extremely high levels of domestic violence, particularly against divorced women, in Moscow in 1996. Varying, and in some cases very high levels of violence against women in the workplace are also reported from 11 post-Soviet countries. Similarly, high levels of unwanted sexual contact and harassment have been reported by adolescent girls and boys in Ukraine (*Women...* 1999:18). These data may well lead to the conclusion that women have not gained in transition, with reference to the first stage of citizenship rights, which in part refers to individual freedom and protection against violence. Instead, women may experience increased risks of violence in the post-Soviet period.

In Latvia, official statistics report a very low incidence of rape, 3.4 per 100 000 population, as compared to 19.1 in Sweden, while other types of violence against women are not specified (*Crime and Social Deviance in Latvia* 1999:21). In a study covering gender-based violence, more men than women say they have been victim of physical violence (24.5% as compared to 9.4%), while more women than men report psychological violence (18.7%

and 15.2%). Also as regards sexual violence, women give evidence of higher levels than men (6.6% as to 0.4%). In an analysis of these figures it is concluded that violence against women is underreported both in official statistics and in large-scale surveys, “while small-scale surveys and informal research (...) have in fact yielded results more in line with global statistics”. The underreporting is said to be due to “an insufficient understanding in society of what exactly violence is”, as well as “an unwillingness to discuss violence by both victims and society as a whole” (*Gender and Human Development in Latvia*, 1999:25).

In the same report it is pointed out that the legal system in Latvia fails to protect women from violence. Domestic violence is not recognized by the legislation as a special crime under the Criminal Code. Instead, it is treated as common assault, and only on rare occasions are the offenders brought to trial. Neither is psychological abuse, which is suffered by many women, recognized in the law. A parallel case to the point is the recent regulation on prostitution, in which prostitutes are addressed, but not their clients (*Gender and Human...*, 1999:27).

In conclusion, there is a lack of awareness of the specific character of violence generally suffered by women. The right of women to justice is limited, when it refers to domestic violence, which is the form of violence most commonly suffered by women. Consequently, the legal protection for women and for their rights to “liberty of the person” is insufficient. This confirms the assumption that access to this part of the civil element of the citizenship rights is differentiated between women and men. With reference to other parts of civil rights, i.e. the right to own property and to conclude valid contracts, these are indispensable ingredients of the democratic transition. However, the opportunities for entrepreneurship given in the new economies are predominantly taken by men. Likewise, women benefit less than men in labour contracts. This is expressed in lower wages, less labour security, and a segregated labour market (*Gender and Human...* 1999:13-15). These expressions of the fact that society values the work of women less are also apparent in the west. In Sweden, the labour market is segregated by gender, and women’s wages are approximately three fourths of men’s (*Women and Men...* 1998).

Women and political rights. The second stage of citizenship rights refers to political rights. We know that in general the access of women to the assemblies where political decisions are taken is limited. In Latvia, this is illustrated by the election to the Saeima, in 1995 as well as in 1998. On the first of these elections, eight of 100 elected members were women. On the second occasion, the women’s share had doubled to seventeen members (*Statistical Yearbook 1996 and 1998*). Women fared better in the elections of local governments in 1997. They constituted 39 percent of the deputies elected. However, women’s possibilities of being elected seem to be related to the importance of the government they join. In cities they constituted 19 percent of the members elected, in towns 30 percent and 41 percent in civil parishes (*Latvian Women and Men...* 1997:90).

In the UNICEF Report mentioned above, figures of women’s political representation before and after transition are referred to. The conclusion is that “the share of women elected dropped substantially across the full region – from the 30 percent or so imposed by quotas under communism to somewhere between 4 and 14 percent in most countries” (*Women in Transition* 1999:19). This refers to the mid-nineties and is close to the figures for Latvia given above. A higher proportion of women elected to local governments is also reported in other countries of the region. Another conclusion of the UNICEF Report is that women are under-represented in “senior government posts at the ministerial and sub-ministerial levels” (*Women...* 1999:20). In the Baltics, the share of women in these positions was 13.1 percent

in 1996, which is the same as in the non-Nordic OECD countries, but below 22.3 percent, the average in the Nordic countries. These data lead us to the conclusion that women do not benefit from political rights to the same degree as men. Instead, after transition, similar patterns of exclusion to those observed in the western democracies appear in the post-socialist countries. Thus, we may conclude that with reference to the political element of citizenship rights, citizenship is gendered in new ways in the new democracies.

Women and social rights. As to the access of women to welfare, there are many reports from Estonia, as well as from Latvia, that testify to the losses of welfare in the 1990s (for example *Estonian...* 1994 and Aasland 1996, Dobelniece 1996/97). Due to the larger share women have of caring, they are more exposed to poverty, which is a new but widespread phenomenon in the Baltic states (Venesaar and Hachey 1995:168).

According to the UNESCO Report cited previously, a general characteristic of transition is that “the umbrella of family policies is removed” (*Women...* 1999:11). Different measures of state support for families are still in force, but the levels paid are generally too low. They do not compensate for the costs incurred for each new child born to a family, nor for the loss of income that often follows increased caring responsibilities in the family. However, a more pressing problem in Latvia seems to be that women who take parental leave risk losing their job, in spite of the formal right to return (Eglite 1997:52, Rungule 1997:318). Another problem facing mothers with young children is the lack of day care provision, which is reported to be lowest in Latvia, as compared to other European countries, and almost non-existent for children younger than three years (Eglite 1998:22).



Figure 143. Photo: Katarzyna Skalska

This inevitably leads to demographic changes. The most obvious one is the declining birth rate, which “indicates a trend towards the eventual extinction of the nation” (*Reproductive Health in Latvia* 1998:11). In Latvia the total fertility rate has fallen from 1.90 in 1980 and 2.02 in 1990 to 1.16 in 1996 (*Latvian Women and Men* 1997:30). If this trend continues it will inevitably lead to a cumulative loss of population, unless compensated by large-scale immigration.

As is well known, the challenge of decreasing fertility rates and ageing populations is also faced by countries in the west (*Living conditions in Europe* 1997). In Estonia and Lithuania, the fertility rates are somewhat higher (1.32 and 1.49 in 1996) but in Spain and Italy they are almost as low as in Latvia. In Sweden, the latest figure is approximately the same as in Lithuania, but as recently as 1990 it was as high as 2.1. This coincided with high child benefits and generous conditions for parental leave. During the 1990s the benefits for families and the conditions for childbirth were diminished, which was paralleled with decreasing birth rates.

The present Swedish government has announced renewed efforts to increase benefits for families, with the aim of favouring families with children. In other western countries, as for

example Italy and Spain, the economic burden of childbirth and child rearing, as well as other measures associated to a welfare state, are entrusted to the individual families, that is, to the mothers. This seems to be the path chosen in the Baltic countries as well.

The assumptions discerned behind these alternative approaches to family policy may be distinguished as either constructivist or essentialist. Sweden seems to have adopted a constructivist view to gender, according to which womanhood may be constructed with or without motherhood. Accordingly, women and men decide to have children, only if the conditions for raising a family do not involve unreasonable deprivation in time, money and work opportunities. Quite to the contrary, in an essentialist view womanhood is considered to be a biological condition, which inevitably leads to women having children, irrespective of the economic and professional consequences (Eglite 1997:52; Rungule 1997:319-320). This view has also been echoed in the political messages directed to women, during the period of transition in the Baltic countries. In these messages women are expected to take responsibility for reproduction, while renouncing professional ambitions. The future will tell which of these approaches women themselves use to define their destiny.

6. Universal Citizenship

We may conclude that data on the situation of women in the post-Soviet countries suggest that “the gender dynamic in the transition itself” works against women’s citizenship rights (Connell 1987:154). The newly-gained civil and political rights are gendered in ways that benefit men at the expense of women. Social rights, which were very much taken for granted in the socialist systems, have not kept pace with the increasing costs of living.

This leads us to ask which way to continue, when aiming for equal access for women and men to civil and political rights, a task common to citizens of the east and the west. Another question we pose is which way to go, when trying to remedy deficiencies in the delivery of social rights for women, as well as for men. In the west, we ask how to turn away from the dismantling of the welfare state, as suggested by advocates of the neo-liberalism. In the east, the mission seems to be to find resources for financing a welfare state, which guarantees “a modicum of welfare and security”, referred to by Marshall. The issue at stake is whether a universal citizenship is possible. The aim would be to offer equal civil and political rights to residents within a specific territory, as well as equal access to social welfare for women and for men, to meet their often differing needs.

In the by now *old* welfare state, a necessary solution might well be continued rights to social welfare, coupled to more opportunities for citizens to influence both the scope and the types of welfare measures received, by means of a contract. In the newly-formed Baltic states, the establishment of a welfare state, which gives benefits at a reasonable level to its citizens in need, has still not been accomplished. In this situation, it seems pointless to discuss the problems of the *old* welfare states. The challenge is, instead, to find ways to comply with the foremost condition of a modern state, which is the power of taxation (Pierson 1996:30). The total burden of taxes in the Baltic states is still more similar to that of developing countries. It remains behind that of “the developed industrial countries and Central European countries in transition” (Venesaar and Hachey 1995:99). Until this has been achieved, no state-formation will be able to guarantee the rights generally associated with citizenship in a modern state.

42 Women and gender in history in the Baltic region

Marina Thorborg

This chapter will focus on women and gender, the role, status, influence, and meaning of women in societies around the Baltic Sea set in a wider, historic, Euro-Asian context.

An overview of what is now the Baltic states, Poland, and the Nordic countries will be given, while a more detailed treatise will be devoted to Russia and the Soviet Union as developments there had wider implications for most of the people on the South-Eastern side of the Baltic Sea until 1991.

Glossary

Gender refers to culturally and socially constructed characteristics of women and men which change over time and place. This is the way a given society at a given time describes its women and men.

Gender equality means that women and men are accorded:
equal social value
equal rights and obligations
equal access to resources
equal opportunities

Internationally accepted definition of gender equality

“Equality between women and men is a matter of human rights and a condition for social justice and is also a necessary and fundamental prerequisite for equality, development and peace. ...The principle of shared power and responsibility should be established between women and men at home, in the workplace and in the wider national and international communities.”
(Platform of Action adopted by the UN Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing, 1995)

Gender roles refers to roles which are socially and culturally, but not biologically, ascribed to women and men. Gender has everywhere been an important part in shaping a general social pattern.

Gender role stereotyping is a portrayal for example in school books or in the media of women and men in a narrow range of traditional gender roles which do not accurately reflect the contemporary world.

Mainstreaming means acknowledging that gender equality is an integral part of every government policy decision, and to make sure that women's priorities and views are included in decisions on policy

The current internationally accepted concept of gender equality is often blended with Soviet-style “equality” and is because of that rejected by many.

1. Background

Many societies praise an early and more matriarchal age before the dawn of history, with a fertility goddess eventually being superseded by a male war god as society gradually turned more patriarchal. From the Baltic Sea to the Pacific this was often the case. The female fertility goddesses gave way for a period of 500 years to the male warrior gods. This was a slow and uneven process. In European religions – almost wholly inspired by those of West Asia – the female goddesses eventually lost out to a monolithic male god.

The Lada of the Slavs, the Laima of the Lithuanians, the Sun goddess of the Scythians and the Japanese, the green Tara of the Mongols, and the Dragon and the Moon goddesses of the Chinese all represent early female deities and principles. However, opinion is still divided on how direct relationships were between the world of worship and that of reality.

Marija Gimbutas, the world-famous Lithuanian archaeologist, went 8500 to 5500 years back in time to find the first high culture of the Old Europeans – supposedly peaceful, egalitarian, Neolithic – worshipping the Goddess of Fertility, only to later, 4300-2800 B.C., be superseded by a more patriarchal, Proto-Indo-European culture called Kurgan – “kurgan” meaning barrow in Russian, named after the round barrows covering mortuary houses for important men – with their male war gods, domesticated horses and well-developed weapons. With the Kurgan culture spreading Northwards from the Black Sea, coupled with successive invasions from inner Asia, more martial societies developed in which women had a lower position.

This, as well as other theories about social development prior to written history are disputed, but if burial finds give any indication of culture and society we can discern a trend of an earlier period with fertility goddesses as symbols and expressions of power eventually being superimposed by martial gods. Both Gimbutas and Ehrenberg, a researcher on women's early history, agree on this point, as well as on the high status of North-West European and especially Nordic women during the late Bronze Age.

Gerda Lerner, professor of history, proved a similar development in the areas watered by Euphrates and Tigris rivers beginning 7-8000 years before our time. From a perceived more matriarchal origin already in the old Assyrian societies women were defined and treated as beings of generally lower value than men. Already the laws of Hammurabi from 1750 B.C. began to regulate women's behaviour and sexuality, while the Middle Assyrian Law of 1252 B.C. in §40 detailed the veiling of women, thereby classifying them into “good” and “bad” women.

Against this background a bipolar world emerged, man/women – fixed into opposites with women first being classified through their sex and then through their class – contributing to shaping definitions and ideas on women. This classification and degrading of women into “good” and “bad” was carried over into the Greek, Roman and Judeo-Christian traditions of Europe. A clear line can be drawn to these ancient traditions in today's pornography and discussions of rape and violence against women.

However, our presentation of problems is bound to culture and is culture-specific. For example, in the Western world we had the Enlightenment with individuals' questioning of and opposition to divine answers to scientific problems for example whether the sun circled the earth or the other way around. In China the secular Confucian view of the world did not in general oppose the development of science and this was certainly the case for astronomy. Hence, Marco Polo could report in the 13th century that the Chinese thought that the earth circled the sun, which at that time in Europe was a heresy often punishable by death. On the other, hand the Confucian-influenced world of East Asia – China, Korea, Japan, and Vietnam

– did not experience the subjects’ opposition to and liberation from the authority of their rulers, nor the women’s from that of the men, nor the children’s from that of their parents until late in the last century, while this process had been going on for a couple of hundred of years in the Western world, leading first of all to a distribution of power in society, and then to the development of individual rights, culminating in the belief in the equal human rights of every individual and later on also in the rights of women. Hence, for example, when the Soviet Union from the 1920s onwards and China from the 1950s introduced policies on women’s emancipation, this was done in societies with different cultural backgrounds with more collectivistic traditions and where neither had experienced the Enlightenment nor an early division of power, or where the development of the rights of individuals had taken place. Therefore when policies and debates in these societies on women’s issues were translated into Western terminology, it led many Westerners to misunderstand the issues and see parallels when there were none. Also for this reason many East European women reacted in the early transition period against the terminology of Western feminism sounding like official Soviet state ideology on women only to discover later that similar terminology had different meanings.

Interestingly enough on a global, cultural map that measures a country on a scale of “low trust” versus “high trust” society – depending on how well developed civil society is – East Asia, with Japan, South Korea, China, and Taiwan, dominated by Confucian culture, is placed between the Nordic countries of Protestant Europe and the Ex-communist, Baltic countries. (See chapter 12 by Thorleif Pettersson, Figure 49 in this book.)

However in regard to traditional-conservative values contra secular values, all these regions are on the same level – with the great exception of Poland – which explains the examples taken from the other side of the Eurasian landmass in this chapter.

Of the Baltic countries, Lithuania emerged relatively early as a state with supposedly the oldest living language in Europe closest to Sanskrit, a relatively late transition to Christianity and with a special development for women in society. Some speculations have come forward about the interconnections between the last two developments.

2. Lithuania

For a number of centuries women in Lithuania enjoyed a higher profile in public life than in neighbouring countries.

After a centralised state had been established under the rule of King Mindaugas in the 13th century, Lithuania managed to enlarge its territory rapidly through conquering Slavic lands all the way down to the Black Sea and became the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, covering areas which contained both Ukrainians and White Russians. As a way of managing a state of this size far outside the traditional, ethnic Lithuanian area, an alliance eventually developed with Poland. As early as in 1529 the Seimas of the Nobility, the Parliament, with the permission of the king, Sigismund the Old, adopted a codified collection of the current laws, the Statute of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, with later editions in 1566 and 1588. This Statute was in force for about 300 years and was remarkable for the rights given to women compared to other European laws at that time. Women were given the right to attend assemblies and to defend their rights in court. A woman was entitled to a part of her husband’s property which had to be approved by the spouse to be in a special act before the wedding. She also had the right to

succession and the right to own property. Severe punishment was meted out in case of sexual violence as a way of defending her dignity.

These rights in the Statutes given to women and the behaviour of women thereby sanctioned in civil society were criticised by some male Lithuanian authors as well as men from neighbouring, less developed countries. What particularly annoyed foreign male observers from more backward countries was the way Lithuanian women spoke up in public, in assemblies and churches, even instructing their men and shamelessly expressing their views.

The male Lithuanian author, Mykolas Lietuvis, wrote in 1550 that his country was struck by 3 types of catastrophes: the bribery of judges, drinking of soldiers, and freedom of women. According to him the role models were the societies of the Muscovites and the Tartars, where women had few, if any, legal rights and were subordinated under either fathers or husbands. This was later turned into cruel reality for women when the largest part of Lithuania during the 18th century came under the Russian Empire and Russian law, the “Domostroy”, replaced the Statutes. Russian became the official language and Lithuanian children could only become literate in their mother tongue through their mothers. That century also saw the birth of a whole generation of female authors turning into classical writers of Lithuanian literature. When the national liberation movement gathered momentum at the end of the 19th century both the general public and the Catholic Church were positive towards what was called women’s issues and the women’s movement.

Two catholic priests, P. Dogelis and P. Janusevicius, were those who took initiative for the 1st women’s congress held in Kaunas in 1907 with almost a 1000 participants from all parts of the country and all segments of society.

However, when the act of the Declaration of Independence was signed on February 16th in 1918 no woman was among the 20 signatories. Therefore the very next day a huge gathering took place in Kaunas demanding women’s participation. The next year the Women’s Congress of Lithuania demanded equal political and civil rights and when the first re-constitutive Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania was elected the 1st session was assigned to be chaired by Gabriele Petkevicaite-Bite, a well-known author. In the 1st parliament of the Republic of Lithuania the 1st parliamentary women’s group was also set up. Hence with a clear historic precedent and a 300 year long tradition Lithuania at the crossroads between East and West also has a unique history and experience of female participation in society.

3. Livonia, Kurland and Poland

The regions North of Lithuania experienced quite a different development, particularly for women. After about 1250 – what is now Latvia and South-Western Estonia – earlier Livonia and Kurland – came under German, Swedish-Danish and Polish influence until the early 18th century.

The area of present-day Latvia was at the time of Ivan Groznyj, 1533-84, the tsar of Russia, the last outpost of Central Europe under the Teutonic Order and later, for almost a century, under Swedish rule after which it was another two centuries under Polish rule. From that time the Estonian and Livonian peasant class was mostly in bondage under a layer of German landlords and a Russian police and military force.

Hence living under foreign domination and suppression for centuries might shape an attitude where ethnicity might be seen as and maybe often was more important in certain

decisive life situations than gender. Maybe that is why the original goddesses, all courageous, fearless and daring survived in folk songs and mythology up to modern times in what is now Latvia according to anthropologist Marija Gimbutas. In addition, Latvia has more folk songs and poems than any other known country.

When faiths stressing the soul of the individual were introduced such as Buddhism, Christianity or Islam at first, this usually meant greater protection for women compared to that hitherto given in tribal, nomadic or agrarian societies at the time. Individuals, both Christian women and men, were given greater leeway against the collective. Childless women in particular could not be disposed of in the same utilitarian way as earlier, because childlessness was not accepted as grounds for divorce any more. The Christian church demanded that marriages should be voluntary, which could give women a legal claim against scheming kin who used it as a lever for possession and power. The demand for monogamy and prohibition against divorce and having concubines both helped and rendered life more difficult for individual women. The Christian principle that all children should have inheritance rights naturally made life easier for daughters born out of wedlock. The Christian church prohibited the setting out of children in the wilderness or the woods to die, an accepted way of getting rid of surplus children, particularly daughters, in pre-Christian times. In order to avoid involuntary marriage and risky childbirths, women had the option of choosing life in

The Flying University

Dominika Skrzypek

The Flying University – an underground organization founded in 1886 by Jadwiga Szczawińska-Dawidowa and Jan Władysław Dawid in Warsaw that arranged scholarly gatherings – in private apartments, hence the name – mainly for women. These clandestine classes were primarily held for the teaching of the Polish language and history, in order to maintain Polishness until independent Poland could be formed, as while in the purely economic area there was little interference from the occupying forces, education was clamped down on and Russified. This ‘Polishness’ was identified mainly with the mother tongue, both by the Polish nation and by the Russian occupiers, who imposed an official ban on the use of Polish at all educational levels. The lecturers of the Flying University had ties with the former University of Warsaw. The peak of its educational activities came at the beginning of the 1900s. After over twenty years of existence, it was legalized in 1905 under the name of the Society for Academic Courses (TKN – *Towarzystwo Kursów Naukowych*). The Flying University offered some of the first opportunities for women in Warsaw and in Eastern Poland to attend higher education, and women comprised up to 70% of the student body. Between 1883 and 1905 about three thousand women received diplomas there. One of the Flying University’s most famous students was Marie Skłodowska-Curie, the first woman to receive a Nobel prize, who studied science there.

The name ‘Flying University’ was later applied to a series of underground educative and publishing activities (open lectures, seminars and discussions) organised by KOR (*Komitet Obrony Robotników*, the Worker’s Defence Committee) and independent intellectuals between 1977 and 1979. This Flying University opposed the communist system and defied its ideology, its aim being, among others, the formation of a new political elite. Its activists (among them Andrzej Celiński and Adam Michnik) were constantly harassed and discriminated against by the communist militia. From 1978 the Flying University operated under the auspices of the Society for Academic Courses.




Figure 144. Maria Skłodowska-Curie with her husband Pierre Curie. Photo: BUP archive

a convent by becoming nuns, in Christianity, particularly Catholicism and in Buddhism, particularly Vajrayana, in Tibet and Mahayana Buddhism, where the latter in China with the nuns' orders established in the 4th century A.D. has survived until today as an unbroken tradition. In the convents women could in this way have an opportunity to live an active, respectable life outside the confines of the traditional family structure and devote themselves not only to religious, but also to medical and highly intellectual endeavours. Nuns became great teachers not only in Europe, but also in China and lectured not only to other nuns but also to large congregations of lay people on the doctrine, wrote commentaries and treatises on them, held important positions as abbesses of influential convents and were directors of convents in the region of the capital. Some nuns publicly debated monks and defeated them, for example, the famous abbess of the Mo-Shan convent, Liao-Ran, where the monk Zhi-Xian publicly acknowledged himself as being her disciple.

In Poland, exposed to three partitions during the 19th century, both the Catholic church and women played a special role in upholding the country as a nation when it was being invaded. As a country dominated by farming and a patriarchal family model the duty of women was not only to have many children to supply the necessary number of hands in agriculture, but also to provide moral instruction to the young to a greater extent than that of most European countries. Because of Poland's stormy past, when men were out fighting invasions, women had to become heads of households. When Poland was partitioned the schools were more or less inclined to either Germanise or Russify the pupils depending on where and which the current partition was. Hence the family came to be seen as a bastion of Polishness and women were even called "mother-Poles", being responsible for political socialization and maintaining national awareness. In this endeavour the church helped to reinforce this value of women while identifying with the struggle for the independence of Poland. The cult of the Madonna in Catholicism was particularly reinforced in Poland and provided a frame for celebrating women as heroic and self-sacrificing mothers. With men fighting for the nation the duty of women was to maintain the family and thereby preserve Poland's national identity. This has been called a "managerial-matriarchy" by some researchers, bestowing upon women both dignity, prestige and also psychological gratification. Hence women's main road to a higher value was during long periods of history as family social figure and mother.

This can also explain why Poland still today is a stronghold of traditional-conservative values in relation to secular rational authority, being quite different from the rest of the Baltic region and in a global comparison closer to Portugal, Bosnia and India. (See chapter 12 by Thorleif Pettersson, Figure 47 and 49 in this book.)

But women in Poland were not only noticed in the family framework. In the secular world, authors such as Elżbieta Drużbacka dominated the literary scene in Poland in the early 18th century, while a century and a half later Maria Konopnicka in her epic masterpiece, "Mr Balzar in Brazil", completed in 1900, described Polish emigrants. Her contemporary Eliza Orzeszkowa is still seen as a leading positivist while Gabryela Zapolska was known for social criticism in a dramatic form and in novels.

4. The Nordic countries

We know about special laws for protecting women from around the last millennium in the Nordic countries. This meant that the prospective offenders could be punished by a woman's relatives, implying in reality that the lower the social rank of the woman the harder it was to

get real protection by laws as it was up to her relatives to avenge any offence. From the time of the Icelandic sagas and onwards, laws existed that forbade the stealing of women for marriage in the Nordic countries, but as late as 1316 this prohibition was stressed again in order to protect women, wives, widows, and unmarried women in the Swedish part of Karelia, while the stealing of women continued unabated in Russian Karelia. Also in Western Estonia and on the island of Ösel, (Hiiumaa) this custom was so common among the peasants that as late as 1521 this was again forbidden by the authority of the nobility, with the threat of capital punishment.

Women of the Nordic countries were considered as belonging to their families. When it came to inheritance, brothers usually first got everything, and later double as much as their sisters. In regard to work and sexual segregation, not only the common division of women being occupied with inside work and men in outside work dominated, but also old folk beliefs influenced the gender division of work.

In Eastern Finland for example and the North of the province of Österbotten, the peasant wife did the sowing and in certain areas she was the one who initiated the threshing as she was supposed to stand in a special relation to the earth. In the same area, cooking dishes of meat for the family was a man's job, just as hunting and preparing it was, because a woman was considered more exposed as she was carrying the young generation.

Among the most outstanding women in early Nordic history are the Holy Bridget, (*Heliga Birgitta*), later a saint in the Catholic Church and Queen Kristina of Sweden, an outstanding intellectual.

From 1809-1810 the Swedish parliament began in earnest to implement laws to make women and men equal before the law.

From the mid-19th century, general education for all was introduced in Sweden. Milestones for Swedish women were decisions on equal inheritance rights in 1845, on freedom of trade in 1846-64, on unmarried women becoming equal before the law in stages in 1858, 1863 and 1884, on admittance to lower government service from the 1860s, on the decision to enlarge the number of girls' schools from the 1860s, on access to higher education in the 1870s, on the equal rights of married women under administrative law in 1874, on equality in marriage from 1920, on equal municipal and political voting rights in 1918-21, and finally the right to higher government office in 1923. Hence formal equality was achieved rather early, with the universities lagging as bastions of eloquent conservatism.

Carl Jonas Love Almqvist, a male author who promoted women's rights and Fredrika Bremer, an author who wrote extensively on women's issues set the agenda for the radical debate in the 19th century. In the 20th century a number of outstanding women, Elise Ottesen-Jensen, Ellen Key, Elin Wägner, Alva Myrdal, among others contributed to easing the way for women into full participation in society.



Sta Birgitta

Figure 145. St. Birgitta of Sweden, who lived in 14th century, was a person with international outlook. She might also today be considered a symbol of religion in the Baltic region. Birgitta, belonging to the nobility, was politically active. Her main missions were peace and reform of the Church. World renowned for her visions, which contained material of practical policy in addition to religious, she was sanctified by the Pope already 20 years after her death. 600 years later, on October 6, 1996, the Pope John Paul II proclaimed her the patron saint of Europe. Ill.: Uppsala University Library

However, old ways of looking at women were still strong. When voting for prohibition against selling alcohol in Sweden in 1922 – in contrast to the USA in the 1880s where women’s votes were used to ensure a total prohibition – the social-democratic government decided that the ballot-papers of women and men be different in order that men’s votes were given a higher value as alcohol was considered more important for men! This is the only example of sex segregated ballot-papers in Sweden.

In 1906 Finland was the first state in the world that granted women and men equal civil and political rights and this also included voting rights. It was not until 1918 that Swedish

women had the right to vote, while for example Lithuanian women got it two years after Independence in 1920.

It was not until after World War II that Nordic women come into politics in greater numbers. Nowadays they make up around 40% of the political decision-makers at all levels, thereby being part of the agenda-setting and the reformulation of priorities. With more women in most age groups and particularly in the eldest age group and with increasingly more women in relation to men voting from all age groups women in a democracy will decide the vote and hence politicians have to create



Figure 146. A Swedish girl of Somali origin. Photo: Katarzyna Skalska

a female-friendly agenda if they are to survive the elections.

Research shows that women from all political parties in the Nordic countries have some common priorities from a female point of view, being prepared to spend more resources on care of the old, the young and the infirm and relatively less on highways, the military and ice hockey rinks.

From the relatively homogeneous development in the Nordic countries we now turn to Russia and the Soviet Union where, depending on time and place we could prove that Russian and/or Soviet women are both leading in the world and among the most downtrodden, depending upon what time, which part of the vast country or which regime we are looking at.

5. Russian development

Russian researchers have studied periods with matriarchal traits at the dawn of Russian history, and often attributed the combined fear and admiration of strong women, the “poliantsy”, to a more matriarchal origin.

From Kievan Russia at the turn of the last millennium, research seem to indicate that class differences widened and deepened also showing a worsening situation over time for women in regard to legal, social, and cultural development. In the Enlarged Russian Law from the 12th century, in article 88, it states that a woman’s life is worth half of a man’s life, except among those at the lower rung of society, where a woman’s life was more valuable. Women among the affluent, the “boyars”, enjoyed a more egalitarian relationship than women among the

peasants, the “smerdy”, in regard to land ownership and inheritance rights. However among the least free, the “khology”, the women, the “roba”, were regarded as just as valuable as the men, probably because female slaves bore children and therefore could be considered more valuable to their owners.

This asymmetrical relationship – whereby women at the top and at the bottom of society enjoyed less blatant discrimination than those women trapped in the middle layers – is also evident from other parts of the world, such as in Chinese society throughout history.

Sometimes this deterioration was ascribed to Mongol influence from the 13th to 15th centuries, such as the practise of “terem” – the tradition of enclosing higher class women in the upper part of the house – which is somewhat curious as Mongol women never experienced “terem”, instead Mongol women were active outside. This practice could rather have its origin South of Russia in the Turkish world.

In “Domostroi”, the Russian Law, from the middle of the 16th century a hardening attitude also towards women of the upper classes could be identified. An absolute low point for Russian women occurred under the autocratic regime of Ivan Groznyj, 1533-84, (known as Ivan the Terrible in the West). Though beginning as a reformer in his brutal fight against the “boyars”, high nobility, the suppression of women was intensified, from his own rapes to raw punishments that afflicted women, when they did not want to pose naked in the snow when he passed by. They were hacked to death or dragged by horses over the fields down to the river to be drowned. Sometimes several hundred Muscovite women were forced to parade naked in deep snow for him, the court, and their families. Some were randomly chosen and flogged to death in front of those gathered, to serve as a warning. From this absolute and lawless autocracy a century later the enlightened regime of Peter the Great began, from 1682, in which women partially achieved a better position and reforms were introduced to get women into public life. The institution of “terem”, seclusion for upper-class women, was abolished and women’s property and veto rights in regard to marriage were strengthened.

Under Catherine the Great the first state school for girls in the world, the Smolny Institute, was opened in 1765.

At the beginning of the 19th century wife-beating was prohibited, but among the peasants, who made up more than three quarters of the population, this tradition – seen as a man’s right – continued unabated well into the 20th century.

In 1863 N. G. Chernyshevskij published “Chto delat?”, *What to do?*, probably the most feminist book ever written by a man, pleading amongst other things for full freedom for women and also insisting that a husband as a means of redressing the former imbalance between the sexes should give his wife more freedom than himself. In 1869 landowning women could vote through a go-between and in 1874 civilian marriages were introduced.

At the turn of the last century women of the Russian empire – reaching from the Pacific Ocean to the Baltic Sea – were deeply divided by class. A Russian, intellectual upper-class woman could travel the world unchaperoned smoking “papyros” as a sign of emancipation, which no Western women of similar standing could get away with without ruining her reputation, while a woman of the emerging industrial class led a slave-like existence, not to mention her unfortunate sister eking out a living in the Russian countryside just liberated from bondage in 1861. In Sweden, for example, the first woman professor in mathematics was Sophia Kovalevskaya, a Russian, at the end of the 19th century. Hence, development for Russian women from the upper class was along European lines and sometimes more advanced than that.

The Russian upper class was always part of the European intellectual mainstream, sometimes lagging behind sometimes surging ahead. What set Russia apart from the rest of Europe at the turn of the last century was that a general European trend towards a closing of the wide gap between the classes was arrested and reversed in Russia after an interlude with a more European-style economic development from the 1890s until 1904. However, in regard to their husbands all women were legal minors.

6. Soviet development

The deepening cleavages in society and the fact that 1/3 of the early Bolsheviks either were women and/or had an upper class origin might explain why a radical women's program was promoted after the Bolshevik party usurped power from the first ever democratically elected government in Russian history in October 1917. This fact also is part of the explanation why a number of radical laws in regard to women's rights were promulgated in the early Soviet period in the 1920s. However, this Soviet period also led to another brutalisation of the entire society. Literary works from such diverse authors as Alexandra Kollontay and Alexander Solzjenitsyn, as well as recently published research from archives just opened in Moscow confirm this renewed brutalization of Russian society in the 1920s and the 1930s.

Partly for ideological reasons and partly because of the deep class divisions in Russian society the primacy of class over sex was not generally questioned. The official concepts of the Soviet planned economy came to operate within the ideological boundaries of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the emancipation of labour and egalitarianism. Hence emancipation for women implied full participation in production. A woman was to strive to become "Homo Sovieticus" as a worker, but at the same time she had to be a mother. She was not to challenge gender relations, nor ask for change in the underlying structure. Over time a male dominated elite defined the official ideology on women's emancipation. Women in this system became even more vulnerable than before, as leading men in building up a totalitarian state gained absolute power and did use it to their full advantage.

One such example is vividly described in Alexandra Kollontay's book, "The Love of Work Bees", (*Arbetsbins kärlek* in Swedish) when the wife early in the morning outside the door of her husband – one of the new elite – briefly encounters a woman coming out of that door after spending the night there. When talking they realized both were stuck under the absolute power of men and even more than before. Neither the wife nor the jobless and desperate woman had more alternatives than the other.

The author, Alexandra Kollontay, leader for the People's Commissariat for Social Welfare, already dismissed in 1918 by Lenin, the first Soviet leader, and sent by him to Scandinavia in 1922, eventually as ambassador to Stockholm in 1925, the first female one in the world, but – according to many – sent away as her radical ideas clashed with Lenin's. In her absence the laws she had introduced for women were abolished. After the experimental and culturally radical period under the NEP, the New Economic Policy, in the Soviet Union until 1928, a more conservative and dogmatic period began with the first five-year plans. This period of state terrorism left nobody protected from the whims of the Soviet dictator, Stalin, when up to one out of every seven people in the whole population perished during peacetime.

Nevertheless, the Soviet system tended never to forget to stress its removal of formal and legal hindrances for women's full participation in working life while simultaneously emphasizing women's crucial role as mothers in bringing up the young.

What also followed was Soviet style liberation of women, meaning women had to carry a double or triple work burden – with fulltime work in production assured combined with responsibility for household and childcare – because cultural constructions of gender assigned women the whole responsibility for child care and housework and because the services this ideology built on were not forthcoming until much later.

During Soviet time there were 4 features characterizing women's lives; 1) militarization, 2) collectivization, 3) internationalization, 4) hard tempering of daily life.

- 1) *Militarization*. During the war-time period Soviet unity was glorified and romanticized, and afterwards a militarization and regimentation of daily life occurred. In the propaganda people were “friends-in-arms” and comrades, the words “struggle” and “fight” were everywhere. The military terminology dominated with discipline in everyday relations. Not until the dissolution of the Soviet Union began did this warlike rhetoric cease.
- 2) *Collectivization*. With the liquidation of private property followed that property no longer could be a basis of self-esteem nor a foundation for a family. Hence families did not matter as before and there was a lack of self-esteem for many men as society took over. The functions of the men changed, males only became biological additions to women's lives. The economic interests gained priority.
- 3) *Internationalization*. In propaganda the Soviet woman came from no special nation, she was international, her image was unifying, and the family meant little to her. She was Homo Sovieticus made into one mass. The ties between woman and nationality were cut, while those between woman and Soviet society were emphasized.
- 4) *Hard tempering of daily life*. Comparing measurements between women's total average workload, paid and unpaid work, showed that women pre-1989 in the Soviet Bloc worked roughly 70 hours a week as against 15-20 hours less in the West. For example women in West Germany and Hungary in 1965 shared similar unpaid workloads of 36-37 hours a week. However, Hungarian women contributed an additional 35 hours of paid work, while West German women worked just less than half of that amount, implying that Hungarian women worked altogether almost 20 hours more every week. Soviet sociological surveys conducted in the 1970s indicated that while men on the average enjoyed almost 6 hours free time daily, women barely got 2 hours.

Some Western researchers dubbed Soviet-style liberation for women the “star system”, whereby individual women were elevated as role models thereby showing the success of the Soviet promises on women's emancipation without eliminating some basic causes – such as lack of social infrastructure – that were hindering the mass of women to gain liberation in daily life. Although all legal and other formal obstacles were removed for women's participation in public life and production, the focus was in the propaganda and in politics on individual successful women, but not on the category of women per se. When resources were scarce and women as a group had no real political power, male priorities prevailed. It was less costly to promote a few “stars”, than trying to elevate women as a group, thereby making women's unpaid work visible and part of the state budget.

In 1987 the last Soviet leader, Gorbachev, called on women to devote themselves to “their pure womanly mission” while simultaneously setting up women's sections, “zhen soviety”, under strict party control like a latter-day revival of the more independently functioning women's departments, “zhenotdely” in the experimental period of the 1920s. Although

opening up to modernizing influences from the outside in many areas, however, the socio-economic stratification of Soviet society remained intact on the surface.

During the Soviet period a policy developed to give higher wages to those branches of industry deemed more important for a rapid industrialization, which meant that workers in heavy industry were favoured while employees in academia over time experienced a hollowing out of their salaries. Therefore while often more attractive for young men to go to heavy industry over time women came to dominate a number of professions requiring academic background, such as those of teachers, librarians, and medical doctors. Hence women were highly educated for low salary professions, while men had shorter training for high waged jobs, therefore more women than men received tertiary education in the Soviet system.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 led to a new set of problems and discussions on how to proceed. However, no other system had trained more women with less prejudice on gender and still had erected so many practical barriers for these well-trained women to fulfil their potential.

7. Transition period

After half a century of Soviet power and for many countries outright occupation and continued Russification carried on from the tsar times it is no wonder that phenomena associated with the Soviet period were negatively regarded in Baltic area countries of the former Soviet bloc. Such as, for example, rhetoric on women's emancipation conjuring up so much and often – while insisting on women's full participation in production – ended with a double work load and hardships in daily life for women due to lack of promised social infrastructure. Many women felt they had been forced to take on public and economic responsibilities they did neither ask for nor want to.

So here was Eastern Europe suddenly with women more educated than men and all had been exposed to an official, socialist ideology on women's emancipation for half a century. And the last thing these women wanted was to live under a planned economy again, under another Big Brother state.

Of all the new, democratic movements coming to the fore only a few – the Interfront in Latvia, the Estonian Popular Front and The Women's Party in Lithuania – explicitly included demands for equal rights for women on their agenda. Hence during the first decade of transition women's equal participation in the overall changes in society were not high on the agenda, as social networks did not exist and much of what existed of the old social infrastructure crumbled. Also for most men and most people in the countryside time was used trying to manage to support themselves, their families and particularly their children. Equality and gender equality were usually understood as legal equality. But in spite of formal equality under the law gender relations could still be structured in unequal ways. Many of the inequalities between women and men, which were based in the practice and attitudes on what women and men should try to accomplish were seen apart from legal equality of opportunity. These structured inequalities affected both individual relationships and also had an impact on the course of social, political and economic transformation.

The Human Development Index and the Gender Empowerment Index

How far have we come since 1989 and how to measure changes over time in a comparative way?

The earlier frequently used measurement of well-being Gross Domestic Product, GDP*, per capita which can be computed in a number of ways was in 1990 by the United Nations Development Programme, UNDP, supplemented with a broader measure of standard of living; the Human Development Index, HDI.

The HDI tries to capture three basic aspects of human welfare; longevity, living conditions and knowledge. Methods of calculating the HDI have evolved over time. Currently this is done by using life expectancy at birth to measure health, and by adjusting per capita income to relative purchasing power, often measured at Purchasing Power Parity, PPP**, to calculate living conditions, and to use literacy of a population and combining it with enrolment ratios for education at the primary, secondary, and tertiary level to arrive at knowledge. Thereafter each variable are standardized on a scale from 0 to 1 for each country. A simple arithmetic average of the 3 scores makes up the composite index thereby showing a country's overall level of development.

However this HDI refers only to national averages and does not mirror inequality between groups in society such as women and men. For this reason further measurements have been developed such as the income-distribution index, the Gender Empowerment Measure, GEM and the Gender-related Development Index, GDI.

The GEM looks particularly at women in positions of effective power, in elected bodies such as parliaments, political parties, administration, and governments, but also in positions of power in the economy. In regard to GEM, Sweden ranks as number 1 in the world, with more women than men in government and about 45% women in the parliament and of the leaders of the 5 major political parties 2 are women. Denmark and Finland are also among the 10 highest countries ranked on the index.

In 1995 the GDI was introduced in the Human Development Report by the United Nations Development Programme, UNDP. This GDI has the same 3 elements as the HDI adjusted for gender inequality. The greater the equality between women and men the higher the GDI compared to the HDI. The GDI considers gender differences in life expectancy, in earned income and in education and is basically calculated in the same way as the HDI.

In Figure 147 countries are ranked in relation to how advanced they are in relation to GDI and HDI, the higher on the list the more developed. The Nordic countries are leading worldwide in relation to GDI. They record the longest life expectancy, and lowest infant mortality with only Japan on par, but as soon as a GDI index is employed Japan falls far behind in rank. The rest of North-Western Europe, with Germany included, belongs to the 2nd group followed by former Soviet bloc countries. Poland comes out as most developed in relation to HDI and GDI compared to the Baltic countries, Russia, and Belarus. A special feature is that the countries here are more advanced in relation to gender equality than in relation to general human development. The high educational attainment of women and the high development of health facilities expressed in low infant and maternal mortality rates contributed to this state of affairs. Hence positive legacies of the Soviet past – giving women almost unlimited access to higher education and well developed health facilities – have been a strong contributing factor to a more advanced ranking in the GDI than in the HDI. However to utilise this potential of women is still up to countries now in transformation.

Even though women in the transition economies had a dip in their life expectancy in the mid-1990s, notwithstanding that this dip was much deeper and longer lasting for men, caused by alcohol, suicide and homicide, they still rank high in an international comparison (see tables 25 and 28). Hence a faster and deeper deterioration in the situation for men than for women made women come out as faring relatively better, though women in society did not experience a better situation on the contrary. This clearly illustrates how dangerous it is to rely on an index – though correct – without knowing about the underlying reality.

Since Independence most former Soviet bloc countries have year after year received an increasingly lower HDI rating. For example Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia, were rated as nr 29, 34, and 35 respectively in 1993, belonging to the High Human Development Group of nations, and down to 57, 48, 36 respectively, in 1996 and a further worsening in 1999.




Figure 147. Development ranking according to the Human Development Index, HDI, and the Gender Development Index, GDI, for selected countries, 1995
 This is part of the world index which classifies countries from number 1 to 174, where number 1 is best.
 Source: WiT-6-99, p. 2

8. Conclusions

Hence in the history of the Baltic region no linear movement towards a more egalitarian and/or humanitarian society can be discerned.

Heterogeneity, a multiplicity of languages, life-styles, peoples, governments and policies on women's rights are instead characteristic of the Baltic region. All this diversity has a deep symbolic importance and can be seen as symptomatic proof of competition between countries and cultures, but is also the key in understanding the spiritual power inherent in this region and the potential for further development and cooperation with tolerance and a democratic mind as a necessary precondition.

On the one hand to diminish the role of the state is an essential goal of the transition, while on the other hand the state has an instrumental role in being responsible for promoting the balance of gender in transition societies. Gender equality is hard to impose from above as was attempted to during the Soviet period, while on the other hand it cannot develop totally on its own, as it is about giving more influence and voice to those having relatively less of it, hence the unfettered market place is not ideal either. For this reason the Nordic countries, with relatively strong states and functioning welfare systems stand out also in a global context as those countries of the world where women fare best, followed by other North-West European countries, such as Germany, followed by the rest of the market economies of Europe and thereafter by countries of the former Soviet bloc.

It is important to notice that the principles which are at the base for the transition from communism to democracy, from a planned economy towards a market economy are as well the same principles setting in motion the movement for gender equality namely: genuine political participation and representation, expression of diversity, the widening of choice and economic development.

43 Education in the Baltic area – recent changes

Eva Ericsson

Introduction

Even if education has been until very recently mainly a national issue, there are historical and vital links that make it possible to talk about education in the Baltic area.

In this short chapter it will not be possible to go into each Baltic country's national history of education preceding the Soviet occupation, but nevertheless it is from earlier independent periods of shorter or larger duration that each country today has been drawing its cultural fuel, especially in the early years of liberation. In a historical perspective, education has had as high a priority as in the Nordic countries. Literacy is for instance of an early date in the whole Baltic area. Adult education is a pride shared by Denmark and Sweden, but this tradition has also been strong for instance in Lithuania, and is today further developed in Nordic-Baltic projects.

During the Soviet time the educational system in the whole Soviet Block was centralised and standardized, and the situation after the liberation was similar in all former SU states. There was in general a lack of comprehensive higher education development and reform policies. The prevailing system was characterised by centralised management, low efficiency, and poor links between education, research, and industry. The former Soviet curricula had aimed at preparing a labour force and loyal citizens, and was characterised by a heavy load of politics and ideology, hierarchical relations between teachers and students, lacking philosophy, ignoring psychology and sociology, isolating theory from practice, and using only Russian educational theory. Study aims were remote from life, atomistic, academic, resulting in a lack of motivation, integration and holism. Memorisation of facts instead of reflection, questioning and decision-making was the rule. Already in 1987 Kreitzberg strongly criticised the Estonian educational system for its overcentralisation of educational steering, indifferent curriculum and overinstitutionalisation of schools. Other critics made waves in other Baltic countries. After having compared Eastern and Western educational thinking (1993) Kreitzberg rather sees common problems of a paradigmatic character. After liberation the newly independent academic communities were left with three main problems: a lack of autonomy by universities, a lack of academic freedom and responsibility, and a lack of equality between disciplines. Thus, social and humanitarian sciences had little priority. "Before, we had lots of engineers, now we have lots of managers" my Lithuanian colleague from Kaunas University of Technology, Audrone Poskiene declared recently.

1. The impact of modernisation

The modernisation process at the institutional level comprises *restructuring, reorganising and reconceptualising of educational systems* both East and West, from different points of departure. Bauman (1997) points at new conditions in the free societies who have made *individual freedom the principal value*, that has an important *bearing upon education: people have to realise their own goals, thereby being dependent upon their own motivation to do so*. This condition challenges the educational system at all levels today, when the social profiles of student populations are being diversified.

Education becomes a lifestyle. Few academic disciplines have undergone such dramatic change during the last decades as that of education. The modernisation process in education is as much an answer to socio-economic and technological change as it is a driving force. Education is no longer restricted to a life-phase in young years, it has now become a lifelong and lifetime lifestyle. A holistic view is therefore necessary. Traditional institutions like school and family are still educational, but it is also relevant to talk about learning in the workplace, in organisations, in cultural life, in intercultural settings, in public service, in recreational activities and in many other contexts.

The 90s, a period of rapid change in education both East and West. Today Nordic, Baltic and other European countries are challenged by the same major factors of change manifested by the European Commission in their White Paper on Education and training (1996), namely: the *impact of the information society, of internationalisation, and of the scientific and technological world*. Therefore we now *share many educational goals*, and we share them with the whole Western world. At an individual level a wide range of new or more advanced skills and competencies are required: work-process-related theoretical skills, social and communicative skills, language skills, teaching technology skills, the ability to compete, teamwork skills, democratic manners, the ability to support human resource development, problem-solving skills, stress-management and flexibility. The last one, flexibility, is important in creating a positive attitude towards change; at the workplace, at home, in one's profession, and to be prepared to start learning anew. In the competitive society *Quality* is written with capital letters, so that above all *excellence* in knowledge, awareness and skills is required.

There is a constant development towards *harmonisation and transparency of educational systems*; student and staff mobility is increasing, and the rapid spread in the use of ECTS (European Credit Transfer System) facilitates the recognition procedures. A "*common education area*" was first initiated between the *Nordic countries* in 1971. Rules for the recognition and evaluation of studies were developed in a spirit of mutual trust. The exchange programme NORDPLUS has operated since 1991 and there is nowadays compensation for an unequal exchange. *Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia signed a similar agreement in February 2000.*

New social segregation. A new problem in the Baltic countries is social segregation, also a growing problem in the Nordic countries. *There are winners and losers in this radical process of change.* Young and well-educated persons belong to the winners in the Baltic countries as in the Nordic countries. The difference is that the Nordic countries have well established adult education systems and temporary measures to take care of unemployed and poorly educated persons, as well as co-operation between authorities to trace these persons. But still, according to Rinne (2000) increasing competition and a new *segregation* might lead to extensive social change in the Nordic countries also.

The Nordic countries have some ethnic minority groups, such as the Saami, but Nordic heterogeneity today mainly stems from immigration. A new situation occurred in Sweden when 22% of primary school leavers failed in at least one subject. Among these there are many immigrants but there are also great differences between immigrant groups as between immigrants and Swedes. Schools offer *mother tongue instruction*, sometimes extra-curricular, though. Schools are also getting more aware of the needs of the *multicultural society* (Roth, 1999). In the Baltic countries there have been efforts of various intensity to reduce discrimination against migrant children in education. Legislation is mostly in line with European requirements, whereas implementation is not yet effective enough.

The growing awareness of the need for reforms in education does not always go along with an awareness of the need for investment in education. *Under-financing of the educational sector* seems to be a common trait among Nordic and Baltic countries.

The gender aspect. Participation in higher education is similar in the Nordic and the Baltic countries. *Women are over-represented in undergraduate studies* as a whole, but less well represented in traditional male dominated fields like technology and the natural sciences. *The higher the position in the academic hierarchy, the lower the number of women.* Gender issues are of great concern in Nordic educational documents and statistics, but seem to be of no great concern whether in the Baltic countries nor in Poland or Russia for the time being.

2. Child care, primary, secondary and vocational education

Full-time public institutional child care has existed in all the Baltic countries. *However, the situation in the former Soviet states did not improve after liberation.* Due to the economic reconstruction many state enterprises, local authorities and private firms had to close down their pre-school establishments. Unemployed parents could not afford to pay for care. There is a shortage of teachers because of a decline in salaries, and furthermore teachers are not properly qualified through the relevant training. Among the Nordic countries Sweden is said to have an outstanding system of pre-school education which shows respect for children, teachers, parents, the public and not least for society (OECD, 1999). More than 93% of all six-year-olds were enrolled in the new pre-school class in 1999 and over 4% had started compulsory school.

School is *compulsory and comprehensive* in most countries in the Baltic area, and in Denmark tuition at home is an alternative to schooling. There is no streaming and little differentiation in primary schools. Germany has a *parallel school system*, providing different paths for students



Figure 148. Roma (Gypsy) school in Poland, run by an NGO. Photo: Alfred F. Majewicz

based on individual ability. Primary education usually lasts 9 years and pupils start at 6 or 7 years of age. *Upper secondary schools are not part of compulsory education*, although in Germany part-time studies are mandatory until the age of 19 and in Poland recently to 18. There is great variation in the organisational forms of the studies. In most countries the pupils are differentiated into separate school classes, some already during primary education. Sweden is the only country that has integrated the administration of programmes which prepare for both vocational and academic studies. In all EU, EFTA and EEA countries upper secondary schools are mainly public, except Belgium and the Netherlands, where private schools account for more than half of the pupils. *Private upper secondary schools* are usually state financed. In Denmark an educational organisation may have no more than one school, and a condition for German private schools is non-profitability. Pupils in these German schools are expected to contribute to the running of the school. There is currently an *expansion in private schools* and attitudes are generally positive in the Baltic countries: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and especially Poland welcome private initiatives. One reason may be the shrinking numbers of students in upper secondary education. However, facilitations for private schools have also been proposed by the Swedish government.

Vocational school networks and pilot projects are being launched in the Baltic countries. There are still barriers between vocational secondary education and professional education at the university level. To support the *reform of national vocational education and training systems* the ETF (European Training Foundation) together with the CEDEFOP (European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training) have initiated a network of National Observatories. Baltic member countries can analyse and disseminate information here on national developments and trends in vocational education and training. Legislation has advanced and the development of national standards has begun, even if this development is somewhat uneven between the various countries.

Hübner (1993) compared East and West German teachers: “The East German teachers have more a *technical instrumental interpretation of their professional action*, while the West German teachers have rather a *communicative interactive definition*”. Experts from Nordic countries are involved in the further education of teachers in the Baltic countries (School Development, 2000) and the problem of teacher’s low salaries is being addressed. But it is also important to remember that similar criticisms have been and still are current within *Western countries* and that *we are just a few steps ahead*. It is also, writes Sander (Teacher, 1999, p. 2) important to have “a very precise idea about the role and functions of teacher education within the education system and society in general – and about what could definitely not be its role and functions”. There is public criticism concerning schools, which do not fulfill their tasks, and teachers who do not cope effectively with the growing number of problems, of which some probably are justified, and some certainly not. A Nordic Council survey on attitudes to school in the year 2000 shows that *Swedes in general are twice as critical of the way schools meet their objectives as Danes and Finns*. However, a more problem-based orientation can be observed; more trust is put in students abilities, more is required in terms of independent learning and teachers are becoming tutors. Critics maintain that, again, those who already possess enough cultural capital of the kind that the French cultural sociologist Bourdieu has described as necessary, are the winners, whereas immigrants and working-class children run the risk of being discouraged.

3. Higher education systems

Higher education is mainly organised in two *different forms*: Sweden has a *unitary or comprehensive system* offering both academic and professionally oriented programmes; whereas most of the others have a *binary or dual system* with a traditional university sector, and a separate non-university sector offering high-level professionally oriented programmes. There are also differences in levels, in Sweden the Master's degree is part of undergraduate education, which is not common in other countries.

According to Beresford-Hill (*Education and Privatisation*, 1998) Poland and Russia represent a society with more traditional trends, whereas the three Baltic states have chosen the liberal path, meaning more dissociation from the old system. However, all the countries are very *concerned about higher educational quality*, therefore *international experts* and international experience are used *to evaluate higher educational institutions* and study programmes. In the upgrading of the social sciences, law and economics at the universities in Tallinn, Tartu and Riga contributions have come from the Nordic countries, Germany and the EU in a joint 10 year project soon to be finalised. The European PHARE Tempus programme and other foreign foundations have offered substantial support in the transitional period. The opinion of the European Commission (Regular Reports, 2000) is that generally the countries should build upon progress made so far and speed up the implementation of reforms.

Expansion and the mass-utilisation of higher education. Higher Education has expanded throughout the 20th Century. The knowledge society and working life today require more and *more people to go through some kind of higher education*. Higher education has become a *mass-utilisation business*. Universities have become more diversified in answer to the heterogeneity of the students. Students today vary in many ways, in terms of experience, knowledge, age, gender composition in groups, social and ethnic background, and language proficiency. It has been pointed out that Nordic students are older than the average student populations. This situation may be an *expression of a lifelong learning society*. Many upper-secondary school leavers set out for a year of “informal learning”, some work experience, or an overseas trip before studying. Teacher's competencies are being challenged through new and bigger student groups, and need to be improved. Also there is another important change; the use of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) and the development of distance or virtual education. The Baltic countries have most probably been able to derive some benefit from the relatively high technological level of their Nordic neighbours. There is a *growing awareness about educational competition* at a global level, however, and education as an item for export and import.

Privatisation and marketisation. Fern (1968) gave four principal reasons from a liberal point of view for independent universities that still seem to have some topicality: *independence, unsatis-*



Figure 149. Vilnius university, founded in 1579 by the Jesuits, was the oldest university in the former Soviet empire. Photo: Alfred F. Majewicz

fied demand, response to the market, and variety. Estonia, Latvia and recently Lithuania, have permitted private universities; Poland has also, since the beginning of the 90s. Russia permits private universities but is very restrictive in issuing state recognised exams or degrees. Since state-planned enrolment has been limited, private institutions provide for expansion. *The private institutions can meet the new demand* for shorter higher education courses of a more practical and non-university type, as they are less traditional, use new pedagogical approaches, and provide opportunities for individual development. Private higher education is more *market-oriented* and offer courses in business and marketing that did not exist in state universities until recently. On the other hand, *private higher education in the Nordic countries is poorly developed*, only Sweden has a few institutions. None of the Nordic countries take fees from the students, but in the three Baltic States universities have begun to ask fees to be able to pay teachers better salaries in order to make them stay at the university and fees are currently being discussed in Poland. In Russia 10% of all students pay fees.

Internationalisation, globalisation, and Europeanisation are terms that have been frequently used during the last decade. They all indicate that education is losing its characteristic national character. A shift can be observed from the individual level, where the focus was mainly on the mobility of students and teachers, to the institutional level where content and curriculum have also gained importance. There is additionally a tendency that is becoming internationally accepted, the American/Anglo-Saxon model of academic degrees like Bachelor's and Master's will be introduced in more and more of the countries concerned.

It is important to see the difference in *motives for internationalisation* between Nordic and Baltic countries. For Bremer (Kälvemark, p. 204) Western European internationalisation is a response to the globalisation of society, whereas in Central and Eastern Europe “it was the collapse of existing national structures that caused the development of new structures for higher education, in which the need for international co-operation is recognised”.

The European framework. Clearly, education is a very important means of forming, speeding up and strengthening European *integration*, even if the individual countries are fully responsible for their educational policies. The EU has no supremacy when it comes to *harmonising educational policy*. Nevertheless each meeting of the Ministers of Education, beginning with Sorbonne 1998 and Bologna 1999, tend to bring the systems of education closer to each other. Key attributes in building a *European higher education area* are quality, mobility, diversity and openness according to the background paper for the Bologna meeting. Nordic educational representatives in Europe strive to influence higher education policies and structures to adopt more decentralisation and openness, characteristic of the current Nordic model. A “European model” with three main levels of qualifications requiring 3 years for a Bachelor's, 5 years for a Master's and 8 years



Figure 150. Uppsala, Jacques Derrida's lecture at the university. Photo: Katarzyna Skalska

for a PhD was originally aimed at, but there was at the time too much variation between the systems to find a common solution, except in the case of Master's degrees as mentioned above. One important reason for reaching convergence and transparency in higher educational structures was expressed in the background paper: to meet the challenge of *trans-national distance education offered in English by foreign/overseas course providers, mainly over the Internet*. This expanding sector is claimed to be widely ignored by governments and universities alike.

Governments seem, however, to agree upon the need to *shorten and maximize the effectiveness of study periods*. The German magazine *Der Spiegel* thus reports (30, 2001, p. 44) that the East German Niedersachsen universities offer intensive studies, and students may get their Diploma in 8 terms instead of 13! Of course, the five months off for work or holidays shrink to six weeks for the so-called turbo-students. The ECTS, (European Credit Transfer System) is being introduced widely, and might in future *even function as a credit accumulation system*, increasing mobility and attracting students from abroad *in the same way that the US credit system is doing*. In the near future we might have independent European agencies to secure the European dimension of quality assurance and evaluation. These kinds of agencies would provide valuable assistance in the work of existing or future European-wide discipline-based or thematic networks. For a member or a candidate state, their future strategies will have to take the EU policy into account.

Nordic educational area. The Nordic countries have shared for quite some time a *Nordic educational area*, a kind of regional solution. The first agreement on Nordic cultural co-operation stems from 1971. Rules for Nordic recognition and the evaluation of studies, transferable between the countries, have been developed, and in the Action Plan from 1988 the traditional detailed scrutiny of study plans was replaced by a high degree of mutual trust. A student *exchange programme*, *NORDPLUS*, started in 1991. Since 1994 there has been an agreement on compensation for unequal exchange (some countries send more students than they receive). *Students may bring their grants and/or loans to the host country*. There have been discussions to widen the Nordic educational area to a Baltic one. The Nordic countries, and not least Sweden during their recent European chairmanship, pursue an eastward expansion within the EU and participate actively in various EU-projects that include countries within the former SU, with a particular focus on the Baltic States.

4. Nordic-Baltic academic co-operation

Scholarships. The Nordic countries offer different kinds of *bilateral scholarships* to Baltic students, researchers and teachers. For instance, the *Swedish Institute* (SI) promotes the internationalisation of Swedish higher education and research by awarding individual scholarships for short or long-term study visits and research stays in Sweden or the reverse, for stays in one of the Baltic countries. The *Nordic Grant Scheme* offers scholarships for long-term networking and the *New Visby Programme* supports academic and other educational co-operation in the Baltic area. Unfortunately the exchange is still uneven, but in the near future more Nordic academics will hopefully visit one of the Baltic countries.

A question concerning the effects of a study period abroad on their future was given to 130 Baltic Swedish Institute grantholders (ADMIT, 2000) upon their return. The answers show

that their expectations were high, more than 90 % believing that there were *positive effects for the individual academic in their working life or career*. Some reported immediate effects; new, or more responsible positions, mainly within the university. Others described how they were going to start up courses they had planned and developed in Sweden. Others intended to work with new techniques or methods that they brought home, and that they hoped to introduce and develop in their departments. The answers thus cover *personal career as well as hopes for the development of the home university or the country as a whole*. The importance of East-West academic mobility is emphasised by Cerych "...is certainly expected to assist economic growth and the overall transformation of society in the region" (Källemark, 1997, p. 205). *Brain drain*, a serious problem in many former Soviet countries, but seems to be *less problematic in the Baltic area*. A factor that surely has had some influence is a relatively strong national identity, especially among citizens of the three Baltic states.

Co-operation through European programmes. Since the Nordic-Baltic countries are either EU member states or candidate states they have channelled their efforts towards the Baltic countries in different EU programmes, with Baltic countries being put through the *Tempus Phare programme*, in operation since 1990. Poland (and East Germany until reunification) were among the first to enter; Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania became eligible for projects in 1992. Tempus financial grants made co-operation with Western countries possible; the first project phase aiming at the restructuring and development of curricula and teaching materials, and the upgrading of teaching facilities and libraries; with the second phase to improve university administration and management in higher education institutions. In the third phase Tempus supports Institution Building, focusing on the development of administrative and institutional structures, democracy and the legislative framework. Over the years, Tempus has grown to embrace 43 countries. In the candidate countries, Tempus focuses on the *implementation of the pre-accession strategy*, in view of their active participation in European Union education programmes such as Socrates-Erasmus. The Baltic countries are now in the last phase of Tempus, only approved projects are now being accomplished. They now continue their participation in the regular Community Programmes, mainly Socrates and Leonardo da Vinci.

5. Concluding remarks

The author, who has participated in different kinds of development projects in several Central and Eastern European countries has noticed that the process of change in the Baltic Area has been both rapid and profound. The Baltic guests who visited the Department of Education at Lund University in the framework of some exchange project, often amazed their Swedish colleagues by very often working late at night. Behaviour patterns and attitudes certainly cannot explain social change completely, but I have had reason to reflect upon what the motivation to learn, in combination with a deep love and dedication for one's own country, means, when turned into social and developmental activity. The strivings of people at all levels in the Baltic area have been successful, and in the future we will be able to *co-operate on an equal basis further developing the whole Baltic area*.

6. Equality in education

Marina Thorborg

Equality in education. In Scandinavia, particularly Sweden, public discussion has focused on a system of sex quotas to govern admittance to education as a way of attaining a better balance between the sexes. The main argument against it in the general debate was usually that this would be unfair, while projecting the image of less qualified women gaining an advantage over more qualified men. In practice however, the opposite was the case in Sweden. Because the school authorities saw the importance of pupils having both female and male role models in their teachers, a quota system has been in force for more than a generation to admit 50% of each sex to the Swedish teacher training colleges. Because many more women than men were applying, men got access to these colleges with lower grades, the same being the case with men's access to nursing and pre-school seminars. Hence for 3 types of education in Sweden men with lower grades than women got admitted, while so far the opposite has not been the case.

In the 1980s the educational attainment of the younger generation between the Nordic countries and those of the Soviet bloc was similar. In secondary education, women of Eastern Europe dominated as students in teacher training even more than in the West, in Estonia and Latvia for example almost all were women while in Finland and Sweden they represented about two thirds. In the Russian Federation well over 90% were female students, while Poland showed wide swings in admittance policy. (UNESCO *Statistical Yearbook*, 1999 (pp. II-58 ff.))

In the 1970s to the 1990s females just outnumbered males in general secondary education in the Baltic states, the Nordic countries, Germany, and Russian Federation, while in Poland two thirds of students were female, implying that more young males went into vocational training and/or left school at an early age. (UNESCO *Statistical Yearbook*, 1999 (pp. II-184 ff.))

In general more women went into higher education than men in the Soviet Union, while men went straight into work in heavy industry that was, in the long-term, better paid. Hence during the Soviet period women came to be highly educated for low paid work such as teachers, librarians or else medical doctors. The high rewards were reserved for those engaged in heavy industry, which according to the prevailing model of development was to be given first priority as a strategic sector, with fewer resources being channeled into light industry and the service sector. Therefore early on women came to make up the majority of those enrolled in tertiary education. In the West, Finland closely followed the Soviet lead, both also making structural changes to the labour market. (see chapter on "*Work and unemployment*" by Marina Thorborg).

Hence even after the dissolution of the Soviet Union women continued to make up the majority of those enrolled in higher education. In Sweden the expansion of higher education began in the 1960s with women enrolling in increasing numbers for the universities in the 1990s, so that today they make up three fifths of those undertaking higher education. Denmark has been undergoing a similar development though it started later.

Table 31: graduates from the tertiary level of education, in 1000's, 1999 for the Baltic countries, 1996 for the Nordic countries, by sex

Country \ Sex	Male	Female
Estonia*	2.3	3
Latvia	4.2	8.3
Lithuania	8.1	13.7
Finland	12.0	16.6
Denmark	14.0	16.9
Sweden	14.7	20.5

* excluding double counting (masters and doctors)

Sources: Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia, "The Baltic and the Nordic Countries", Riga, 2000

Table 32: Number of students in tertiary education per 100,000 inhabitants, 1996 (2000)

Country	Number
Belarus (1997/98)	3.180
Denmark	3.349
Estonia	2.965
Finland	4.418
Germany	2.603
Latvia	2.248
2000	4.280
Lithuania	2.251
Poland (1997/98)	3.520
Russia (1997/98)	3.000
Sweden	3.116
Ukraine	2.980

Sources: Statistical Bulletin, Education Institutions in Latvia at the beginning of the school year 2000/2001, Riga, 2001 and Statistical yearbook of the Republic of Poland 2000, Warsaw

Table 33: Number of pupils learning English, French, German and Spanish in general secondary education and adjusted number of pupils enrolled, 1998/99, (2000/2001) in %

Country \ Language	English	French	German	Spanish
Denmark	100	13.7	67.6	6.6
Estonia	85.3	2.5	36.3	0.2
2000/2001	89.5	2.61	36.3	0.1
Finland	98.9	14.2	32.3	2.2
Germany	93.5	23.8	X	1.7
Latvia	84.5	2.0	34.8	0.1
2000/2001	90.7	1.9	29.7	0.1
Lithuania	75.2	11.2	33.2	–
2000/2001	75.4	6.7	33.1	0.1
Poland	86.0	16.7	61.0	0.5
Sweden	100	22.8	45.0	12.0

Sources: Statistical Bulletin, Education Institutions in Latvia at the beginning of the school year 2000/2001, Riga, 2001



Figure 151. Riga. Old Town

Finland has most of its population engaged in higher education, followed closely by Latvia and then other Nordic countries (see table 32).

Foreign languages learning. The dominance of English in foreign language teaching has been even more conspicuous after the breakdown of the Soviet Union, while German is an important second foreign language in neighbouring countries (see table 33).

Hence, in all the countries around the Baltic Sea, regardless of their diversity in all other aspects, populations are highly educated, which is a very important precondition both for developing better communications and understanding as well as for deepening democracy.

Polish universities in transformation

Witold Maciejewski

During the communist period the universities in the so-called Soviet Block had a similar structure to other organizations; and they were controlled by the communist party in a similar way to all other institutions, industries and administrative organs. Apart from that, they were used as instruments of indoctrination. Development in the humanities was controlled by censorship. Similar rules were valid in the whole communist part of the world, and they are still in force in some countries, like China, North Korea and Cuba. The conclusion would be that the universities, as state-controlled institutions, could not play any distinctive role by themselves. The universities were – from the official point of view – a part of the socialist system.

On the other hand, universities are different from all other institutions. The university still is a “society of masters and pupils” with roots in the *studium generale*, created in the mediaeval Western, Latin-speaking world. Universality of education was based on the belief that the world was homogenous. The mediaeval degrees were respected all over Europe. The old idea has survived until modern time and, as one prominent historian (Aleksander Gieysztor) expressed it, the unique value of universities consists in its spirit of initiative and invention generated in a fraternity free from social and ethnic barriers.

The conclusion must be obvious: a university, defined as a voluntary and free society, should be impossible in a totalitarian system. Theoretically, the totalitarian universities would not be able to play any active role in the struggle for democracy. In the case of Poland this argumentation is not quite true.

Academic values were not forgotten there; however they were spread beyond the university buildings. They constituted the core of a more amorphous society, called *środowisko akademickie*, a ‘milieu’, or an ‘academic environment’. During the period of the postwar development, March of 1968 brought a common experience, which cemented an important and vivacious part of this society.

1968 was a year of student revolts almost all over Europe and the USA. It is hard to see any connection between these developments at universities in the West and in Poland; but there was possibly a prevailing atmosphere of protest all over the western world.

Anyhow, the message was quite different. Students of Polish universities protested against censorship and

in order to obtain reforms of socialism in the country. The party reacted brutally accusing students of being manipulated by a Jewish conspiracy. Demonstrating students were beaten by mobilized workers and police. The results of the March riots seemed to be devastating: several thousands people emigrated, among them many prominent professors, researchers and university teachers. The empty professorships were taken over by party-nominated docents. The riots of ‘68 were the only occasion when the Polish universities appeared alone on the political scene as the opposition.

Repression created however a social network outside the auditoriums, on the periphery of the universities. Outstanding scholars were forbidden to appear in the auditoriums; others could only barely survive as employees



Figure 152. Students in August 1981, Poznań

of the university, feeling themselves unsure about the future and with no chances of advancement. The “milieu” commented on these developments, accepting critical points, as well as producing and distributing forbidden literature. People who were too eager to obey the authorities were objects of ridicule and socially boycotted. The “milieu” also offered some safety for its individual members; it was not organized in a conspiratorial manner, but the conspiracy of 81-89 was formed inside this social group.

Rather than the formal universities, it was this broad, academic society which may be recognized as a factor in the political development. The university intelligentsia proved that they could learn from the lessons of -68. They would never again appear alone on the political scene. By 1976 a new organization, uniting different groups in society, was formed. The KOR (*Komitet Obrony Robotników*, Committee for Defense of Workers) became a central, well-known and popular organization with an explicitly formulated goal until the origin of Solidarity in 1980.

For the second time (since -68) the academic world appeared united during the Solidarity explosion of 80/81. The universities feverishly sought a way to maintain freedom. The key-word in the university debate became AUTONOMY. Autonomy was the central idea for the university law, developed at that time. As it was understood, autonomy was based upon two main values: co-option, as a principle for creating university staff, and the free election of university authorities. Both of these were brutally broken in the first months of -82 and quickly reintroduced by the universities after -89.

Summing up: The academic intelligentsia definitely played a decisive role in some important points:

- in formulating DEMOCRACY as an explicate goal for political opposition from 1976 onwards,
- in preparing the ground for the civil society over 13 years, namely during the period 1976-1989 through:
 - establishing connections with other partners outside the academic world,
 - breaking censorship in an effective way and creating room for free debate. Newspapers, magazines and books were mass-produced in an industrial manner and were generally accessible by everybody. Contemporary political discourse began this way.
 - avoidance of political extremism,
 - sharing information with the Western world,
 - educating a new generation to avoid the communist indoctrination,
 - preparing for the transformation towards democracy through:
 - contributing personnel to the renewed Polish state after 1989,
 - formulating visions of a free Poland, which included a reevaluated perspective of relations with neighbouring countries, traditionally treated as enemies,
 - adopting foreign models of economic and political transformation by 1989,
 - safeguarding academic identity (AUTONOMY) as long as possible.

The epilogue. A happy end? Neither history nor democracy seem to be the hottest subjects in our recent academic debate. The central concerns are rather the explosion in higher education: the number of university students has quadrupled during the last ten years; it has increased from 4 hundred thousand in 1989 to more than 1 million 4 hundred thousand (see also table 32). Almost a third of them are registered at new, private schools of higher education. During the last ten years 171 new schools of higher education have been approved by the authorities and about one hundred more are waiting in line. These non-public universities are operating outside the state-financed system and competing with the 92 public academies (The total number of universities in Poland is 317. Military- and police academies are not included). An absolute novelty are transborder universities – one German-Polish Viadrina, operating in Frankfurt a. Oder since 1991, and a Polish-Ukrainian university in Lublin (starting in October 2000).

This rapid development can be seen as a major success in the struggle for democracy: more than one third of the younger generation have got access to university studies (it was only 14% ten years ago).

However, the explosion in the sphere of university education has not been followed by a corresponding explosion in the sphere of academic organizational life. The student organizations, so active in the early 1980, are today almost non-existent. Organizational and financial questions seem to be the most important at the time being. Nevertheless the historical perspective is ever present and discussion on academic values has to be brought up in the context of ongoing changes. The point made by Włodzimierz Siviński, the rector of Warsaw University, can be seen as representative:

The university has always been a society of scholars and pupils. This entity is thus an antidemocratic institution. It is not the majority that is right, but the ultimate and decisive criterion is the criterion of truth. All progress in science consists of an individual's opposition to the majority (...) The opinions of young scientists and even students, if they come closer to the truth, may be more important than a professor's standpoint. (Rzeczpospolita)

These primary values have been deep-rooted in academia. Academia, the *studium generale* was founded in the 1360s on Polish soil and has been present there ever since. Besides the Catholic Church it is the oldest of Polish institution with an uninterrupted continuity.

The history of Poland and other neighbouring countries can be thought of as a history of European values under oppression. Polish universities have not been different from society as a whole; periodically the universities were even more passive than other important institutions. Oppression has distorted both people and their values, but some of the cultural heritage has survived and, under more propitious conditions, can flourish again.

44 Work and unemployment

Marina Thorborg

1. Background

In the current globalization process in which nation states are increasingly becoming subordinated to the dominance of the world market, the now independent states of the former Soviet bloc are exposed to countervailing forces: nationalization, regionalization, globaliza-

Glossary

Total labor force comprises people who meet the definition established by the International Labor Organization, (ILO) for the economically active population: all people who supply labor for the production of goods and services during a specified period. It includes both the employed and the unemployed. In general the labor force includes the armed forces and first-time job seekers, but excludes homemakers and other unpaid caregivers and workers in the informal sector.

Labor force participation rate refers to the ratio between the labor force and the population above age of compulsory education, usually 15 or 16 years and the current retirement age.

The economically active population refers to the labor force meaning individuals who are either employed or unemployed.

The economically inactive population includes people who cannot be referred to as either employed or unemployed.

The employed people are those who did any work during the reference period or were temporarily absent from work due to such reasons as an illness, care of the sick, leave of absence, strikes etc.

The employment rate refers to the ratio of the employed population in relation to the population above age of compulsory education usually 15 or 16 years and the current retirement age.

Unemployed: 2 types of measurement:

1 Registered unemployment refers to the segment of the labor force registered at the labor offices as unemployed. This administrative approach reflects national rules and conditions and usually generates figures, which are different from those resulting from surveys relying on the so-called ILO concept of unemployment.

2 International labor organization, ILO, concept of unemployment is based on 3 criteria and defines as unemployed those people who

- 1) have worked less than one hour in the last week
- 2) are actively searching for work during the latest month using any methods available
- 3) are currently available for work any time in the next 2 weeks.

(Compare for example in table 37 unemployment statistics for Belarus measured according to method 1 above with those of other countries using method 2 above)

The unemployment rate refers to the ratio between the unemployed population in relation to the labor force.

The level of economic activity is the share of the economically active population in the total population of the respective age group. It is measured in %.

The level of unemployment is the share of the total number of the unemployed in the economically active population. It is measured in %.

Working age population refers to individuals above the age of compulsory education and below the official retirement age.

tion, and transformation. On the one hand a trend of developing towards a resurrection of real national sovereignty, a striving towards the statehood lost during and after the Second World War, for countries such as Poland, the Baltic States, and erstwhile Czechoslovakia while simultaneously – also as a way of protecting that statehood – on the other hand an endeavor to join larger alliances emerged as in the case with the European Union, whose goal is further regionalization and localization with an implicit loss of autonomy for the nation state. Regaining the power of the state, adjusting to suprastate organizations and changing from a planned economy with administrative prices and “soft” budget constraints to a democratic, market economy with “hard” budget constraints have simultaneously been on the agenda during the last decade.

In the planned economy of the Soviet system, productive resources were allowed to be idle, but not the labor force, in contrast to a market economy where the opposite combination usually was at hand. A planned economy normally resulted in the hoarding of labor, overstaffing and therefore hidden underemployment leading to low productivity and efficiency. Unemployment did not exist as everyone was guaranteed work and hence no unemployment statistics were produced. Guaranteeing work, housing at nominal rents with no maintenance, heavily subsidized energy prices, free education, health, and childcare in combination with a contracted wage range increasingly lowered the motivation for work according to Russian researchers. Hence the recent transition for the labor force was becoming a *volte-face*, from a system where the state was in almost total command and control to a vacuum eventually filled in with new institutions, organizations, demands, and criteria.

2. Introduction

The Soviet economy was characterized by an increasingly slower growth rate in the 1980s. According to some Russian scholars the very success of the Soviet system in providing all the necessities of life for everybody, though at a low qualitative level, was the embryo of its demise. A number of independent estimates exist on the growth rate of the Soviet economy, its Gross National Product, GNP* (see Glossary), per capita GNP, productivity and per capita productivity.

Regardless of their different absolute estimates, based on different methods of definitions and calculations, however, all surveys still demonstrate the same two trends towards a decreasing growth rate of GNP and productivity and hence a decreasing rate per capita from that

Data and methods

This report is based on special surveys conducted in the Baltic states combined with official statistics from the bureaux of statistics in the Baltic Sea Region countries and from international organizations, such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, EBRD, the World Bank and different UN organizations. In Estonia the author was able to participate in the population survey, “Estonia 98” carried out by the Institute for International and Social Studies, Department of Sociology of Family and Culture. This survey “Estonia 98” included 2321 respondents aged 18-70, in which 1575 participated in the section on “Employment” and 119 in the section on “Unemployment” with open questions. In order to see the transformations within the preceding 5 years, data from the survey “Estonia 93” were included. In Latvia a smaller survey was carried out among unemployed women, and in Lithuania among entrepreneurs of small- and medium size enterprises. Since 1991 states of the former Soviet bloc have changed their statistical systems to make them conform to international standards and definitions. Most of the changes occurred in 1992.

of the “Gosplan” – the Soviet Government Plan – to the Soviet economist Kaluynin to his American colleague Steinberg and the CIA, the US Central Intelligence Agency. The very end of the 1980s showed a negative growth rate.

Being fully integrated into the Soviet economy the Baltic states experienced the same trends. Though the Baltic states had been assigned parts of the most advanced industry of the Soviet Union, and achieved the highest welfare indicators of the Soviet republics such as high literacy, low infant mortality, high frequency of medical doctors although much of this had already been accomplished during Independence in the interwar period – however, the standard of living was, in certain important aspects such as in housing space and food intake, still essentially lower than before the Soviet annexation in 1940.

About a tenth of the Baltic population had been deported to the Gulag, or otherwise perished or tried to survive in abysmal circumstances. The 1960s particularly witnessed a massive immigration of Russian labor, as part of a Russification strategy in Latvia and Estonia, where the best employment and housing was reserved for the Russians. When renewed Independence was gained in 1991 the Baltic states tried to turn towards a new system in all aspects as quickly as possible.

Because the Baltic states, like Poland in the interwar period, had experienced the growth of a civil society that was still in living memory of the older generation, one immediate aim was to regain that society and another goal was to become part of Central Europe again.

The most pressing aim was to make Independence irreversible. Ceasing to be “Homo Sovieticus”, a Soviet being supposedly without any national characteristics, and to become a private citizen in your own right cherishing your roots while modernizing into Europe was the new challenge.

Without understanding these forces at work – sometimes contradictory sometimes creating synergy effects – it is hard to understand views on and by women and men on their changing situations in life, family, and on the labor market.

This chapter will focus on the main structural changes in the labor market, on employment and unemployment. (Some definitions and explanations on labor market will be found in inserts here, others can be found in chapter 52 by Susanne Oxenstierna.)



Figure 158. Former kolkhoz in Zalavas, Lithuania. Photo: Alfred F. Majewicz

3. Main structural changes in the labor market

The structural changes in the labor market were particularly rapid in the Soviet Union in the 1960s and 1970s, with a drastic reduction of those employed in agriculture and a swift increase especially of those working in industry. During these two decades Latvia and Estonia experienced a massive influx of Russians when, during this heavy industrialization drive, a number of important industries were located and developed there. With a time-lag of one generation the countries of the former Soviet sphere – compared to those of North-Western

Europe – were exposed to a similar pattern of changes in their labor markets and this was further reinforced by the introduction of a market economy in the 1990s, where a decrease of labor in agriculture was rapid, particularly so in Estonia during the last decade.

Lagging in relation to the West, structural changes in Finland were closer in timing to those in the Soviet system. From a peak in the 1970s the proportion of those active in manufacturing shrank both in Finland and in the Soviet system.

A special feature of the planned economies was the underdevelopment of the service sector in both low and high skilled work compared to the market economies. Hence, with a change from a planned to a market economy, a surge in service sector employment could be expected which also occurred in the 1990s. Services consist of both low and high skilled work, in which, for example, some of the high-skilled work in education and health – totally dominated by female workers – and was and is located in the low salary range, while the new service jobs in banking, finance and information technology, IT – totally dominated by male workers – are located in the high salary range, the former being hired by the state and the latter by the private sector (see table 34).

4. Employment

The growth in the labor force in the Baltic Sea Region countries has been negligible during the last 40 years, with a negative growth rate for the Baltic states, while the Nordic countries have achieved their growth partially through the import of labor since the 1950s.

While West Germany experienced a growth in its labor supply through the influx of refugees from East Germany it also imported labor from Southern Europe and Turkey. Because so many East Germans fled their strict, regimented state this planned economy had begun to import labor from another country with even worse conditions, namely Vietnam, thoroughly devastated by war and a rigid, planned economy (see table 34).

Even a Siberian Gulag can be seen relatively as an attractive place for work depending on from where you come. While, as a way of increasing state income, the North Korean state was planning to erect lumber camps – as a Gulag for prisoners – in the remotest corner of Siberia, it realized, however, that this was only possible with a food standard of the Soviet Gulag system. Because of that the government decided instead to let people apply for this work, which meant living in strictly controlled camps behind barbed wire, when not working in guarded labor gangs. There were 200 applicants for every job available.

The growth in the labor force as well as the increase of women in the labor market – though starting from



Figure 154. At work. Photo: Katarzyna Skalska

Table 34. Employment by sector of the economy, 1960 1978, 1993, 1997 in countries of the Baltic Sea region, % of the labor force in agriculture, industry and service

Country \ Year	Agriculture				Industry				Service			
	1960	1978	1993	1997	1960	1978	1993	1997	1960	1978	1993	1997
Estonia			17	9*			33	34*			50	57*
Latvia*			20	19			28	26			52	55
Lithuania*			22	22			33	27			45	51
Russ.Fed.	42	17	15	14*	29	47	38	32*	29	36	47	54*
Belarus			22				36				42	
Poland	48	33		20	29	39		32	23	28		48b
W.Germany	14	4			48	48			38	48		
Germany			3	3			38	34			58	63
E.Germany	18	10			48	51			34	39		
Finland	36	14	8a	7	31	37	27a	27	33	49	65a	66
Denmark	18	8	5	4	37	37	26	26	45	55	69	70
Sweden	14	5	3	3	45	37	26	26	41	58	71	71

Sources: For the years 1960 and 1978 World Development Report, 1980, The World Bank, August 1980, tab. 19

For the years 1993 and 1997 Statistical Yearbook of Estonia, 1999, p.348

Explanations * = National sources

Agriculture includes forestry, hunting, and fishing

Industry includes construction, mining, electricity, gas and water supply, a incl. armed forces

b excl. regular military living in barracks and conscripts

For simplicity West Germany refers to Fed. Rep. of Germany, and East Germany refers to German Dem. Rep

Table 35. Average annual growth of labor force in the Baltic Sea region, in %, selected years

Country \ Year	1960-70	1970-80	1980-90	1990-98
Estonia			-0.3	-0.9
Latvia			-0.8	-1.6
Lithuania			0.6	-0.1
Russ.Fed.	0.7	1.2	0.2	0.1
Belarus			0.4	0.0
Poland	1.8	1.4	0.6	0.8
W.Germany	0.2	0.7		
Germany			0.9	0.5
E.Germany	-0.2	0.5		
Finland	0.5	1.0	1.0	0.2
Denmark	1.1	0.6	0.9	0.2
Sweden	1.0	0.3	1.2	0.5

Sources: For the years 1960-70 and 1970-1980, World Development Report, 1980, The World Bank, August 1980, tab.19.

For the years 1990-90 and 1990-98 World Development Report, 1999/2000, The World Bank, 2000, tab.2.

Table 36. Females in % of total labor force in Baltic Sea region countries, in 1963-68, 1973-78, 1980, and 1999

Year \ Country	1963-68	1973-78	1980	1999
Estonia		53*	51	49
Latvia		55*	51	50
Lithuania			50	48
Russ.Fed.		52*	49	49
Belarus			50	49
Poland	44	45	45	46
Germany	40	41	40	42
Finland	42	45	47	48
Denmark	34	40	44	46
Sweden	33	40	44	48

Sources: For 1963-68, 1973-78 World Bank, Social Indicators of Development, (hereafter SID) 1993, For 1980 and 1990 World Development Report, 1999/2000, The World Bank, 2000, tab. 3

* Most recent estimate according to SID-1993 above

Table 37. Unemployment rate in Baltic Sea region countries, selected years, as % of labor force

Year \ Age limit	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Estonia	6.5	7.6	9.7	10.0	9.7*	9.6		
15-69						9.9	12.3	13.5
Latvia			18.9	18.3	14.4	14.7		
15-69						14.0	13.5	13.0
Lithuania		17.4	17.1	16.4	14.1	13.5		
14+						6.4	8.4	12.5
Russ.Fed.	5.5	7.4	8.8	9.3				
15-72	5.9	8.1	9.5	9.7	11.8	13.3		
Belarus**	1.4	2.1	2.7	3.9	2.7			
Poland	14.0	14.4	13.3	12.3	11.2			
15+	16.4	16.0	14.9	13.3	10.3	10.4	12.9	14.0
			14.9	13.2	10.3	10.4	12.9	14.0
Germany	10.4	11.4	12.9	8.8	9.8			
15+								
Finland	17.7	18.2	17.0	16.1	14.5			
15+					10.8			
Denmark		8.0	7.0	6.9	6.1			
15-66					4.9			
Sweden**	8.7	8.8	8.7					
15-64					6.2			

Sources: Statistical Office of Estonia, "Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania in figures 1999", figures for those countries 1998, Statistical Office of Estonia, "Statistical Yearbook of Estonia 1999", Tallinn 1999

For Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland line 2 = H'kan Forsberg, "Arbetslöshet hot mot polskt EU-inträde" (Unemployment a threat against Polish EU membership) Dagens Nyheter, (Swedish newspaper Dagens Nyheter) 1 February 2001

For Poland line 3 from Polish Embassy, year 2000= estimate

For Finland, Denmark, Sweden line 2 from Nordic Council of Ministers, "The Nordic Countries in Figures 1998"

For Russian Fed. line 2= "Russijskij statistitsheskij eshegodnik, ofitsialnoye isdanye", (Russian statistical yearbook, official edition,) in Russian, 1999 tab. 6.2

* refers to national statistics

** refers to registered unemployment

a high level – has been small since the 1960s. In this aspect the Soviet system and the Nordic countries are alike, with only Sweden and Denmark experiencing a substantial increase of women in the total labor force since the 1960s. Hence with a low growth rate of the labor force and women already in the labor market for the last 20-30 years, any expansion and transformation of the economy would entail the retraining of those already in the labor market and/or import of labor and/or a prolongation of working life (see tables 35 and 36).

5. Unemployment

Though much was usually done in Western, democratic market economies to counter unemployment particularly when it was politically threatening – retraining and reeducating the unemployed, making it easier to achieve part-time pensions, pre-pensions and shorten the weekly work-time – simultaneously attempts were also made at a prolongation of working life when employment rates were high. These endeavors were in their turn offset by both the Trade Unions, relying on earlier agreements, and by the population that for example in the Nordic countries and West Germany tried as part of its high standard of living and increased quality of life to shorten its work time in various ways.

While the proportion of those employed out of the total population in the rich market economies has been decreasing over time as part of a higher quality of life, the same tendency towards lower labor force participation rates could also be observed in the former planned economies, but for other reasons. One cause was the structural transformation of the whole economy with a shedding of overstaffing and hoarding of labor characteristic of the old system, another the closure of plants when a regime of “hard” budget constraints was introduced replacing the old system of “soft” budget constraints, meaning administrative prices and a constant bailing out by the authorities of enterprises that did not fulfill the norms of the plan. However, while employment in the formal labor market has dropped over time, simultaneously its informal, “gray” and “black”, equivalent has been growing, particularly in former Soviet republics in Central Asia, and in Eastern Europe, except for Poland.

While, for example, Poland’s informal economy has decreased from an estimated 20% of its GDP in 1990 to an estimated 13% in 1995, the reverse trend can be observed in Russia, where the informal sector making up 15% in 1990 made up 42% in 1995, while in oil-rich Azerbaijan in Central Asia the informal sector grew from 22 to 61%.

During the same period the informal sector doubled in Lithuania, from 11 to 22%, while it almost tripled in Latvia from 13 to 35%. Its growing prominence in Latvia was closely related to Latvia becoming a transition country for Russian trade and energy flows.

Estimating the informal economy

One way of estimating the growth in the informal economy and its associated labor markets is to measure energy usage against reported economic output. If the former is increasing while the latter is decreasing this would imply a growing informal sector. Increased or reduced energy efficiency may to a certain extent be part of the picture. It is acknowledged worldwide that 3 factors contribute particularly to a growth of the informal sector:

- 1) prohibitive tax systems
- 2) costly bureaucratic procedures
- 3) corrupt bureaucratic procedures.

Hence it is hard to calculate if these trends – one towards lower labor force participation rates, the other the growth of the informal labor market – offset each other. For example, a survey of the unemployed in Estonia revealed that a tenth of those jobless enjoyed a higher standard of consumption than those in full-time work.

As unemployment did not formally exist in the former Soviet system, unemployment statistics were only starting in the early 1990s.

A low rate of registered unemployment can indicate a number of factors:

- a) a low level of unemployment,
- b) a low level of unemployment benefits,
- c) strict and/or complicated rules for defining unemployment
- d) strict and/or complicated rules for receiving unemployment benefits,
- e) the existence of an informal economy and hence an informal labor market,
- f) a slow structural transformation from a planned economy to a market economy
- g) a decline in GDP so large and abrupt that an equivalent fall in employment would not be politically possible, hence employment, but not real wages, are kept up, indicating a sharp decline in labor productivity, the standard of living of the employees and hence an increase of the working poor.



Figure 155. Transformation of the economy endangers some traditional professions. Modern heating systems do not need as much service as the traditional, coal-based systems. Polish chimney-sweeps, in 2001. Photo: Katarzyna Skalska

Of the Baltic Sea Region countries, Belarus and Sweden display the lowest rates of registered unemployment (see tab. 37).

While Sweden has relatively generous unemployment benefits, particularly for low income earners, and a high level of voluntarily unionized labor, the opposite would be more true of Belarus, implying that a higher percentage of the unemployed would also be more motivated to register as unemployed in Sweden than in Belarus. The low rate of unemployment may in the case of Belarus also indicate a low level of transformation of the economy as well as a decline in GDP and real wages, but not of employment for political reasons (see fig. 156).

In the transition index from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, EBRD, Belarus and Turkmenistan in 1998 scored lowest on 8 different dimensions deemed important for a transition to a market economy such as enterprise restructuring, banking, trade and legal reform, price liberalization, and privatization. In regard to privatization Belarus was placed lowest of the 26 countries of the former Soviet sphere. Furthermore, in the report on macro economic reforms by the EU Commission in 1999, Belarus lagged even more behind, while Hungary was most advanced followed by Poland and then Estonia.

Hence for Sweden factor a) above, while for Belarus factor f) and g) above, would have most relevance in explaining a low level of unemployment.

Hence in countries with a delayed restructuring process open, formal unemployment will usually remain low and Belarus is a good example of this.

In the Russian Federation factors b), e) and g) above, would have the highest explanatory value. While evaluating Swedish cooperation projects in North-Western Russia in 1998, the author encountered individuals living about 100 kilometers away from the bureau where registration for unemployment had to be made twice monthly, where unemployment benefits would not even pay the two bus trips to the unemployment registrars.

In 1998 Russia's GDP had contracted by 45% compared to its 1989 level, hence a hollowing out of real wages followed, with wage arrears and falling labor productivity being considered more manageable than massive unemployment.

Therefore, according to surveys, only one out of six families have managed to improve their lives during the last ten years in Russia, meaning that 62% of the families surveyed had been exposed to a lower family income, another 15% had managed to achieve higher incomes and a quarter remained on the same level. Hence open, formal unemployment could be kept down by a massive lowering of real wages and hence also of the standard of living for the majority of the Russian population.

Exposed to what experts from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, IMF, would call the curse of being endowed with abundant natural resources and hence a lesser urgency for thorough reforms, Russia's structural transformation had begun promisingly in 1992 with a rapid privatization in 1994-95, and stabilization in 1995, but was then stalled at mid-point. A sizeable part of the old "nomenklatura" – the Soviet elites of party hierarchy, managers, and bureaucrats – managed to benefit from Russia's voucher privatization schemes. By not being able to gain enough from further reform by exposing its economy to the world market, to the "hard" budget constraints which in the long run would be beneficial for the general Russian public, for generating growth and employment and, increasing competitiveness and efficiency, it managed to slow down the continued restructuring of the economy after the 1996 elections. Therefore a regime of "soft" budget constraints already existing as a left-over from the Soviet system managed to seep into all cells of the economy from enterprises not paying their employees and/or suppliers, debtors not their creditor banks to the state often being behind in paying pensions and wages.

A system of "soft" budget constraints is generally considered a most favorable breeding ground for corruption, while a legacy of secrecy and dictatorship make it worse. Independent estimates show that corruption generally is higher in former and present communist countries compared to non-communist countries with similar cultural backgrounds, raising corruption levels by 2 units on a 0 to 10 scale (see figures in chapter 26 and table 10)

"Hard" and "soft" budget constraints

"Soft" budget constraints refer to the common tendency towards over-investment in a centrally planned economy because of "soft" budget constraints by the bureaucratic-redistributive center in the public sector, which produces excessive demands for investment goods. This demand will in turn lead to a systematic occurrence of shortages, thereby forcing firms to substitute for products and raw materials which in turn will lead to decreased quality and an inability to compete in a high-technology oriented world market. This cause of crisis under state socialism, can only be solved by allowing the emergence of firms and/or an economy with "hard" budget constraints.

"Hard" budget constraints means that prices should not be administrative, but give information about the real cost of products and services. This means phasing out directed credits and budgetary support to enterprises, which in turn initially leads to higher unemployment.

This theory was developed by Hungarian economists, particularly Janos Kornai, mainly during the 1970s, in order to explain the difficulties of planned economies in competing with market economies. (See prof. Janos Kornai, *The Economics of Shortage* 1980)

As was already shown 20 years ago, rent seeking by vested interests was more profitable than productive activities in developing countries. This also turned out to be the same for some transition economies. Much higher profits could be made by acquiring privileges than setting up new industries. Side-payments and corruption were natural side effects of such a new rent-seeking system.

Hence the further a country has managed to transform its economy towards an open system, with transparency, with managers and politicians being held accountable and re-appointable, the less corruption this society experiences. Hence a close inverted correlation between the level of transformation and corruption can be observed, the more transformation the less corruption and vice versa. (compare fig. 156, figures in chapter 26 and table 10).

Surveys – such as the one carried out by the EBRD in combination with the World Business Environment Survey covering 10 000 firms in 90 countries – show that the costs of corruption fall disproportionately on the poorer segments of society and on smaller enterprises and also hinders growth and employment as smaller enterprises in particular generate employment.

The positive correlation between lack of corruption, growth and democracy has been established by, among others, the Nobel Prize Winner in Economics, professor of Economics at Harvard University, Amartya Sen.

The wish to join the European Union, EU, has worked as a great incentive for implementing structural reforms in applicant countries, while lacking this motive force reform has resulted in lagging or stalling and has hardly begun.

Though the structural transformation so far has been relatively successful for the Baltic states and Poland, unemployment has remained on a high level and is threatening to increase even further.

Turning to the Nordic countries, Finland's unusually high unemployment rates for the 1990s can be explained by two factors: its relatively high proportion of foreign trade in relation to GDP and the dependence of this trade on the Soviet market, particularly for exports. With the implosion of the Soviet Union, roughly half of Finland's export trade market vanished and a reorientation of foreign trade began with ensuing high unemployment (see table 37).

Being used to unemployment rates hovering around 4% from the 1950s onwards combined with a slow growth of the labor force and a fast growing economy, Sweden since the 1950s had become a labor importing country. However, through a self-induced crisis it experienced high unemployment in the early 1990s. Sweden then decreased some of its unemployment, initially cosmetically, by converting some of the unemployed into different categories, such as adult students, participants in retraining courses, pre-pensioners. After the mid-1990s the growing economy led to decreased unemployment and a boom and bust in the modern IT sector.


Being endowed with the most generous unemployment benefits of any country, in the end swallowing up more of the budget than social security, Denmark began tightening up its unemployment system in the 1990s and with every tightening of the rules unemployment lessened. Researchers discussed whether the decrease of unemployment was more caused by stricter regulations or by an upsurge in the economy, but the correlation in time between the tightening of rules and reduction in unemployment was indisputable, as was the economic upsurge.

6. Conclusions


In the Soviet system structural changes on the labor market were essentially the same as those in Western Europe but with a time lag of 20-30 years. Hence, the decrease of those working in agriculture began at a much later date, while the service sector, subdued in the planned economies, only experienced an accelerating expansion when the transition to market economies began. Industrial employment peaked in North-Western Europe in the 1960s, only to reach its top 20 years later in the Soviet system. Though being part of the Nordic area and a market economy, Finland with half of its trade with the Soviet Union, showed a development in time closer to that society. After the demise of the Soviet Union the exports of mineral and energy resources in the Russian Federation initially softened the shocks of transition while simultaneously contributing to delays in reforms and restructuring. Halfway through the reforms the new *nomenklatura* managed to halt further reforms.

Just as the robber barons of the era of wild capitalism during the industrialization period in the United States in the late 19th century were the predators over time turned conservators a somewhat similar development might be perceived for Russia. To protect recently acquired wealth, a system with the rule of law rather than lawlessness would be preferred. For example

Figure 156. Indicators of reform in transition economies, on a scale from 0-4, with 4 being the highest, 1998 and 1999.



Explanation



Sources: Data for 1998 from European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, EBRD, "Transition Report 1998: Financial Sector in Transition", London, 1998

Data for 1999 from Dagens Nyheter, (Sweden's largest newspaper broadsheet) Marknadsekonomiska reformer i Öst, (Market economy reforms in the East) 16 September, 1999, data from the EU Commission

the American robber barons became increasingly interested in following laws which aided them in protecting their new riches. Likewise, to make higher profits on ill-gotten capital, a stronger economy is needed that is more beneficial than barter trade. Hence rule of law, protection of property rights, price stabilization, privatization and economic expansion were, over time, in their interests.

Meanwhile as the economy contracted particularly for Russia and Belarus massive lay-offs and unemployment were not a political option. Hence roughly speaking the same number of people was producing half the amount of the production as in 1989, meaning real wages sank, labor productivity sank as did the standard of living of the employees.

Simultaneously the “gray” and “black” economy and labor market grew. Those in formal employment sank in number over time. Whether these trends outbalance each other or not is hard to calculate.

But open large unemployment was avoided, paid by a drastic lowering of the standard of living for two thirds of the population.

Though on the surface similar developments were visible in North-Western Europe such as a contraction of those in the labor force, the underlying causes were different, with a higher quality of life being the the main cause in the West.

The wish to join the EU has also acted as a prime motivation for applicant countries, while lacking this reform has been so much slower.

Corruption particularly hurts the poorer segments of society and the small entrepreneurs, the latter being those that create new employment particularly well. The further from Western Europe, the more years under communism and the less of secondary education the higher the level of corruption, that is the lesson of large surveys being carried out.

Hence democracy, transparency, the rule of law, making decision makers accountable and removable are essential and critical ingredients in building a successful market economy and in creating growth and employment.

45 Use and abuse of tobacco, alcohol and narcotics – a Baltic dilemma

Sture Korpi, Lars Rydén, Vera Segraeus

This chapter deals with public health questions in the Baltic Sea region. The first part presents health problems related to use of tobacco, alcohol and narcotics in the region. The second part deals with drugs and abuse patterns in the region, based on results from three research projects that have recently been completed.

1. Public health in the Baltic Sea region

The social situation in the countries in the Baltic Sea region shows a very heterogeneous picture. While the Nordic countries in the west have one of the highest life expectancies in the world, the former communist countries are rather on the lower end of this scale and among the worst in the industrial countries. These differences reflect a corresponding difference in public health in the countries, which in turn relates to, among other factors, differences in social situation, economies, health care, and social security systems. Here we will focus on the use and abuse of tobacco, alcohol and narcotics, and how this use and abuse relates to health, social conditions and economic development in the societies. All three are used as stimulants, and create, more or less efficiently, a dependence among the users. Alcohol is by far the most relevant and will be discussed in some detail. Tobacco might be less destructive but is used by a very large share of the population and has therefore serious consequences for public health, while drugs, used by much fewer, are on the other hand very destructive.

Public health is defined by the World Health Organisation as “a state of physical, mental and social well-being, not only absence of disease and handicap”. Public health work aims to “promote the best possible physical, mental and social health, and to prevent both disease and damages and social disturbances”. Public health depends on a series of factors outside traditional health care, all related to general life conditions.

Public health is most directly reflected in life expectancy. Life expectancy at birth in the region was, according to official statistics for 1998 highest in Sweden with 77 years for men and 82 years for women. The Russian Federation had the lowest values with 61 years for men and 73 years for women (Chapter 39). Other published figures for Russian men were even lower and it seems that the figures for St Petersburg were even lower than the Russian average.

The figures for men in Estonia and Latvia were 64 years. The difference between a Nordic welfare society and Post Soviet countries were thus close to 15 years.

A basic factor behind the low figures for post-Soviet countries is poverty. Poverty leads to a worsened status of nutrition, worsened hygiene in crowded homes and residential areas, and decreased health care and medication. Poverty in itself increased dramatically in the countries in transition after the systems shift, with a maximum around 1992 for the countries in the former Soviet Union. It is estimated (UNICEF) that aggravated poverty alone caused several hundred thousands of additional deaths in Central and Eastern Europe the first five years after the changes (1989-1994).

The abuse of alcohol, tobacco and drugs is among the most serious, or perhaps even the most serious of the several factors that lead to increased social misery, disease and mortality. Alcoholism increases with a weakening economy, increasing unemployment and lesser education.

The role of drugs in societies. Throughout all ages and all cultures, man has used drugs. Narcotics started to gain a great deal of attention in Europe at the start of the 19th century. Archaeological excavations suggest, however, that plants containing intoxicating elements were cultivated several thousand years ago. Similarly to e.g., alcohol in western culture, many of these elements were quickly integrated at an early stage into the cultures where they were cultivated. Such drugs often had a religious and a medical function, besides the fact that they were used as a stimulant. During the last century, stronger narcotics have been developed through the refinement of nature's existing elements or artificially in laboratories. Cannabis, coca and opium are cultivated plants that historically have had great importance alongside alcohol, which has existed in most cultures from time immemorial.

Whereas drugs in older times were reserved for the religious elite, it is mainly youth who use them today.

There are considered to be three alcohol traditions in Europe, each related to a geographical area. The Scandinavian countries (except Denmark), Poland and Russia belong to the so-called "vodka belt". The "beer belt" stretches through mid-Europe, while the "wine belt" is located in the area around the Mediterranean.

In many countries, there have been forces opposing the use of alcohol and drug abuse for years. In the Scandinavian countries, during the 19th century, a temperance (anti-alcoholism) movement grew, which aimed to suppress the increasing abuse of alcohol. With the increased abuse of drugs, a large number of voluntary organizations have now become involved in the campaign against drug abuse.

In almost all European countries, there is a lively political debate about drug issues. Opinions vary from the demand to legalize certain narcotic substances to adopting a much more restrictive position.

Tobacco smoking. Cigarette smoking is very common in all the Baltic Sea region, but dramatically much more so in the eastern parts (with the exception of Belarus). Central and Eastern Europe has the highest consumption of cigarettes in the world. During the 1990s first Poland and then Estonia held the world record of annual per capita cigarettes consumption for certain periods. Although it is possible to see a slight decrease in Poland, smoking is still extremely high in the eastern part of the region. In Finland and Sweden smoking is much less common, but still with an average consumption of some 1000 cigarettes per year and capita. Some 10-20% of the population are smokers on a daily basis, with the lower figures being valid for young men.

In Finland and Sweden antismoking politics is high on the agenda. Since 1993 smoking has been severely restricted in Sweden and for two years now not allowed at all in public space in Finland. Taxation on cigarettes is high. A packet of cigarettes in Sweden in 2001 was about 45 SEK, or 4.50 Euro. It is also illegal to sell tobacco to minors, below 18, and to advertise for tobacco in these two countries. Denmark has a much less restrictive tobacco policy. Recently, some anti-smoking areas existed in public spaces in Poland, such as in trains.

Cigarettes are smoked for their physiologically stimulating and relaxing effects, although social and psychological factors certainly make up part of the picture. The stimulating substance in cigarette smoke is nicotine, a very potent poison. It causes dependency which, for heavy smokers, may be very difficult to get out of. Cigarette smoke, however, contains several hundred other substances and some of them are major causes of the diseases connected to smoking. We should add that buying cigarettes worsens poverty in families that are already poor.

Smoking is a dominant cause of cancer, it is estimated to cause up to a third of all cancers, and also for a series of diseases in the vascular system, blood, heart and lungs, so called circulatory diseases. Cancer and circulatory diseases are the dominant causes of death in industrial countries. Smoking decreases physical fitness and increases receptivity for infections. Smoking is less of a societal problem than the other drug categories – alcohol and narcotics – discussed below, since it is not connected to socially maladjusted behaviour. Still, it is a considerable cost for society. It was recently estimated in Sweden that a smoker causes the state budget a net cost of about SEK 800,000 (80,000 Euro) over a lifetime. This is the difference between two large numbers. On the income side there is the considerable income from taxation on cigarettes and lower retirement costs due to a decreased life expectancy of about five to ten years. On the cost side there is the large increase in health care costs for the smoker.

We do not see much debate on smoking and its negative sides in the eastern part of the Baltic Sea region. Smoking appears to be seen as part of day-to-day life and is not questioned. When discussed at all, smoking seems to be understood as a conflict between smokers and non-smokers. However, as it was expressed succinctly, it is rather “a fight between profit and health”. Profit for the large tobacco companies, and loss of health of the individuals (and an additional burden on the health care system).

The role of smoking in societies is changing. In the western part of the region, smoking was everyday behaviour one or two generations ago, especially among men. When the negative health effects of smoking were widely discussed, physicians (in the 1950s – 70s) were among the pioneers who quit smoking. Smoking remained longest among uneducated and socially disadvantaged groups. Since the mid-nineties we have seen a new phenomenon when smoking among young women, also of school-age, increased substantially in Sweden. Taking snuff, which accounts for a large part of tobacco consumption in Sweden, is less damaging to health.

High taxes have caused a very extensive smuggling of cigarettes in the region, mostly from the Baltic States and Poland to Sweden, to provide cheaper but illegal cigarettes.

Alcohol and public health. Alcohol drinking is very considerable in the entire region although more so in the eastern part, and particularly in the areas of the former Soviet Union. Today Russia seems to have the highest per capita alcohol consumption in the world, although proper statistics are difficult to get.

Alcohol is used to ease social inhibitions, and promote a feeling of well-being and relaxation. As with every substance, quantity matters. Drinking larger amounts decreases motor

control – everyone knows how a drunk person behaves – and very large amounts may cause death.

In moderate amounts, however, alcohol consumption is not damaging. Thus for adults 50 grams of pure alcohol per week (or 3 lit pure alcohol per year) – corresponding for example to about 1/3 litre of 3.5% proof beer daily – does not lead to medical problems, although there is some individual variation. However, an amount corresponding to some 400 grams per week (or 24 litres of pure alcohol per year) does. This corresponds to 1 litre of vodka per week. The existing statistics may be understood using these values as a reference. A low value for the population is about 6 litres per year, and a very high one is 12 litres per year.

High alcohol consumption causes considerable damage in several organs in the body. In particular, the central nervous system and brain are often damaged as well as the liver, pancreas and digestive system. High alcohol consumption creates dependency, although not very fast.

Statistics in the west, certainly true for all countries, indicate that higher alcohol consumption leads to higher costs in the health care system. A considerable share of all hospital care in high-consumption countries is related to alcohol drinking. In France (with very high consumption), it is estimated globally to be 35%, although figures vary for the different clinics. Surgery has a high figure, about 60% only in Sweden, since a very large share of accidents are related to alcohol. There is consequently a clear correlation between alcohol drinking and reduced life expectancy.

Drunk people suffer a dramatically increased risk of accidents. Drunk driving is of course important, but it is valid for all kinds of accidents, e.g. drowning accidents are dominated by alcohol drinking. Alcohol drinking is also strongly related to violence. Drunk men are much more likely to commit violent crimes, and this is also valid for violence in the homes. When men abuse and even kill women, alcohol is a key factor.

In the western part of the Baltic Sea region the use of alcohol was at its peak at the end of the 18th and beginning of the 19th century. The methods for producing spirits by distillation of fermented wheat became common in the 1700s. When later in the century the potato was introduced and used for the production of alcohol the amounts increased substantially. Each household could make their own spirits. The male population in Sweden were “mostly drunkards”, and the social situation was very serious. In the 1800s, popular movements for combating alcoholism grew, state anti-alcohol politics, such as the state monopoly of production, developed and drinking decreased slowly. Swedish alcohol consumption was at its lowest during World War I. Since then, it has increased but not too dramatically.

Narcotics. The use of drugs has increased in recent decades and the explanation for this is to seek in an increased access and a demand that is growing because of youthful curiosity, unemployment and social maladjustment. Even if more and more youth use narcotics as a means of intoxication, it should be emphasised that alcohol is still the drug that creates incomparably the greatest health problems. Access to alcohol is for obvious reasons greater than other drugs because alcohol can be both used and abused. Drug use is, on the contrary, defined as an abuse, and the possession of drugs in many European countries is illegal. The selling of narcotics is harshly punished.

The use of heavier drugs is tightly connected to outcast of society. Dependency is often fast to come, only after a few occasions, and the user needs money to buy more. This typically leads to crime so as to finance the abuse. A drug-related criminal carrier is established. Social degradation and health problems typically follow. The use of injected drugs, heroine, is fur-

Statistics of alcohol and drug in the Baltic Sea region

This chapter on drugs and abuse patterns in the Baltic Sea Region is based on results from three large research projects that have recently been completed. The Baltica Project is a multi-disciplinary project comprising the countries around the Baltic Sea. It was started in 1990 by Professor Jussi Simpura (Alcohol and Drug Research STAKES) and Christoffer Tigerstedt (Nordic Council for Alcohol and Drug Research, NAD). The so-called ECAS (European Comparative Alcohol Study) project which is concerned with alcohol politics, alcohol consumption, drinking habits, etc in 14 European countries and ESPAD (European School Survey Project on Alcohol and Other Drugs) led by Björn Hibell from CAN (Swedish Council for Information on Alcohol and Other Drugs) a comparative study of the drug habits of youths in 30 countries.

The Baltica Project aims to understand different social problems during a period of deep social change and how different groups experience these changes. Part of this project, i.e., part 4, is concerned with problems of alcohol, drugs and crime. Some results from this study will be referred to here briefly. It is above all the period after 1980 up until the present day that will be presented.

The descriptions from different countries take up the politics of alcohol and drugs, attitudes and the development of alcohol and drugs, whose authenticity can often be questioned. Statistics are not a simple reconstruction of reality, rather they can be seen as socially constructed. Particularly in those cases one has reason to doubt the data's validity. This occurs more often during periods of change, when statistics perhaps take on a change in importance, are revised and changed.

The three Baltic states, Russia (here represented by St Petersburg) and Poland share the same experience in their statistics system(s) before and after the Soviet break-up. Previously, statistics were not used primarily to describe reality, but rather to provide a picture of how things ought to be. Statistics were ideologically, rather than scientifically, correct. Soviet statistics were called "success indicators" because they usually indicated advances. The production of statistics was intimately related with the state and, consequently, with the communist party. An awareness of this has made it difficult to engage citizens in the free states in the collection of statistics, which means that even now data lack integrity. The greatest changes came with Gorbachev during the 1980s. The systematic publication of data on alcohol consumption and alcohol-related problems started in 1985 in connection with a massive anti-alcohol campaign and "glasnost".

thermore connected to the risk of HIV infection. The mortality in the group of heavy drug abusers is high.

Drugs are distributed to the European market from drug-producing countries in Asia and South America, often by mafia-like organisations. Sometimes, people speak of a giant international drug industry, which is believed to have a turnover of thousands of millions of dollars annually. Open borders within the EU have prompted a fear of increased alcohol and drug problems in the Nordic countries.

2. The politics of alcohol and drugs in the countries around the Baltic Sea

All countries around the Baltic Sea have felt the enormous changes during recent years that have occurred as a result of the break-up of the Soviet Union. We have a new geopolitical landscape in Europe. Furthermore, countries such as Finland and Sweden have been influenced by these changes.

In Estonia, as in all Soviet Union, a large anti-alcohol campaign was launched in June 1985. One of the official aims of the campaign was to get people to change their drinking habits from vodka and cheap wines to better quality wines. The main questions were

- reduced production of alcoholic beverages
- increased prices for alcohol
- reduction in sales and licensed outlets

- an age limit of 21 years
- prohibition of alcohol in offices and at work places
- stricter sanctions
- massive anti-alcohol propaganda

The politics of alcohol in Estonia has changed many times during the last two decades. The relatively stable period at the start of the eighties was replaced in 1985 by the now well-known anti-alcohol campaign. Even though the campaign caused many problems, it had its positive effects too. Between 1985 and 1988, a temporary improvement occurred in all alcohol-related indicators. During the period 1988 to 1991, alcohol politics changed in a more liberal direction. After the monetary reform of 1992, the availability of alcohol increased radically and in turn consumption increased. In the mid-nineties, a negative tendency returned, but the consumption was still at a relatively high level. In recent years, a stabilisation has occurred.

During the 1985 anti-alcohol campaign, *Latvia* was rather a poor country. Between 1986 and 1990, a coupon system was introduced. The official restrictions on alcohol consumption were eased in 1991. Liberalisation reached a high point in 1994. At this time, a state monopoly system took control over the licensing, production and trade, of alcohol.

Alcohol politics in *St Petersburg* has gone through different phases, and these have been described. In the mid-nineties in St Petersburg, there was no functioning alcohol politics, but from 1994 to 1995, one can discern a movement towards a new phase in Russian alcohol politics.

In *Poland* in the eighties, the newly formed movement Solidarity, put forward its ideas for a more restrictive alcohol politics. New legislation on alcohol was introduced in 1982. In the mid-eighties, Polish alcohol politics again lost its political dimension. Alcohol politics was liberalized and many restrictions were set aside.

How have abuse questions been handled in the Nordic countries? If we start by looking at *Finland*, we can say that the Finnish welfare development after the Second World War has gone through three periods (Alasuutari 1996). The first period after the Second World War until the mid-sixties was characterized by a strictly regulated economy and can be called 'the period of moral economy'. The transition to the 'planned economy' consisted of a new way to tackle problems based on scientific knowledge that was specially prominent during the sixties. Even if efforts were made to continue to improve social welfare during the eighties, it was during this decade that the first signs of a 'competition economy' were seen, when private interests and market forces obtained a greater influence. Some of the most profound changes in Finland have taken place during the last ten years. The national economy is stronger again.

The changes that have taken place in *Sweden* during recent years are not nearly as dramatic as those in the Baltic States. Still, there have been considerable changes. First, Sweden has also been affected by the changed geopolitical landscape that has developed in Europe since the break-up of the Soviet Union. The second large change is the ongoing process of economic, political and social integration in West Europe, as Sweden entered EU in 1995. The third factor is the economic crisis that Sweden went through at the start of the nineties, which caused unemployment and national indebtedness throughout that decade. Sweden started to move away from a more restrictive alcohol politics during the seventies. The alcohol politics established in 1977 endured for the most part until the end of 1994. A new alcohol legislation became law in 1995. As a result of the EU entrance agreement, the import and export of alcohol outside the state became allowed, although the distribution and selling of alcohol may still be managed only by the state monopoly shops, the so-called

systembolaget. This limitation of the state monopoly constituted a clear break with traditional Swedish alcohol politics.

3. Changes in alcohol consumption

Estonia's Institute for Economic Research carried out a survey to measure the population's attitudes to the changes in 1985-86. Initially, the population accepted most of the proposals that were implemented. The only exception was the high prices for alcoholic beverages. Only every fifth person of those asked accepted this. On the other hand, the majority accepted an increased responsibility for crime against the general order and an increase in the age limit for purchasing alcohol. About half approved of a reduction in the number of licensed outlets, but this fraction decreased in a second survey carried out in 1986. A third survey in 1987 showed that criticism against the prices had become even stronger, and that the restrictions had led to increased production of home-made wine and beer. The campaign stopped in late 1987. At the end of the eighties, a coupon system for the purchase of spirits was introduced. It lasted until 1992, when the availability of alcohol increased considerably.

In Latvia during Soviet times, statistics on deviant behaviour and criminality were not public, although they were closely monitored by the political system. After independence, the quality of statistics improved. Data were collected and published according to recommendations by EUROSTAT and other international organizations.

Alcohol consumption in Latvia in the early eighties was 10.5 to 11 litres of pure alcohol annually according to available statistics, though probably the real figure was higher. The consumption decreased in connection with the anti-alcohol campaign in the mid-eighties, then increased again and stabilised during the nineties, when a level of about 7 litres was reached.

In Russia, as well as in the Baltic States, many different measures for alcohol consumption have been presented, suggesting different levels. At the start of the nineties, the official figure was about 6 litres of alcohol per capita, whereas indirect measurements of alcohol-related deaths and consumption state more than twice as much, 13 to 15 litres of pure alcohol (Nemstov 1995). If these figures are correct, Russia was one of the countries with the highest alcohol consumption in the world.

Alcohol consumption in Poland has fluctuated during the last fifteen years. In 1980, consumption was 8.4 litres of absolute alcohol per capita. In 1981, consumption decreased by 25% and continued to decrease in 1982 when new laws were introduced. The alcohol consumption increased and reached a level of about 7 litres pure alcohol. In the early nineties, another increase occurred and in 1995, the consumption of pure alcohol was estimated to be 11 litres.

Alcohol consumption in Finland during the post-war period was rather stable until the beginning of the sixties when it increased rapidly. In 1980, it reached slightly more than 6 litres and in 1990, closer to 8 litres. In 1997, the official consumption was slightly less than 6.9 litres. In Finland, which has a state monopoly, the quality of statistics on alcohol is reliable. Still, public sales statistics and consumption statistics do not say everything. Some alcohol consumption is not registered. Such non-registered consumption has been estimated to be 1 litre pure alcohol. In 1990, this started to increase and in 1995, it was estimated to be 2.1 litres pure alcohol per capita. This mainly depended upon increased import of alcohol from




Figure 157. Alcohol sale in Sweden per inhabitant aged 15 and more

Russia and Estonia and Finland's membership in EU. Thus when non-registered consumption is added, this Finnish consumption would correspond to 8.8 litres, which is rather high.

In Sweden, alcohol consumption has usually been high, particularly regarding spirits during the latter part of the 19th century. At the beginning of the 20th century, this decreased dramatically. This mainly depended on comprehensive achievements in alcohol politics and the existence of the first alcohol law in 1913. In parallel with strong legislation on alcohol that aimed to protect society, the tentative dialogue in the so-called temperance question between the developing social democratic movement and the temperance movement continued (see Holgerson 1977)

Alcohol consumption in Sweden increased during the sixties by 50% and the per capita consumption was 7.7 litres in 1976. Consumption increased mainly amongst the youth. This was an important reason for stopping the sales of medium-strong beer, which was mainly consumed by the young. The general public's interest in issues about alcohol took secondary place, after unemployment, in a survey carried out in 1980. Strong public opinion probably contributed to this reduction in consumption. During the nineties, there were no signs of a reduction. Data indicate, instead, an increase in the consumption among youth during the first half of the nineties and also an increase in binge drinking throughout that decade.

Regarding actual alcohol consumption per year (1996-98), for inhabitants older than 15 years, both registered and estimated non-registered alcohol consumption is summarised. Denmark's consumption is the highest of the Nordic countries at 11.9-13.9 litres, followed by Finland with 8.6-11.1 litres, Sweden with 6.1-8.1 litres and lowest, Norway with 5.3-7.1 litres. In general, it can be said that the non-registered hidden consumption is the highest and has increased most in the Nordic countries from about 1 litre per inhabitant to about 2 litres per inhabitant in 1990. If we include the hidden consumption, we can state that the differences in alcohol consumption between the countries has decreased. Still, however, consumption is lower in countries such as Sweden and Norway, which may be related to the restrictive alcohol policy that has been in force in those countries over the last decades.

Table 38. Recorded, and recorded plus unrecorded alcohol consumption per year and inhabitant aged 15 or more during 1996-98 (litres of pure alcohol)

Country	Recorded consumption	Recorded + unrecorded consumption
Sweden	6.1	8.1
Finland	8.6	11.1
Denmark	11.9	13.9
Russia	6.0	13 – 15
Poland	11.0	
Latvia	7.1	
Norway	5.3	7.1

4. Drug development

It is more difficult to say something about drug development than alcohol development that is conclusive about the Baltica Project. In general, no statistics are available. This is all the more true for former communist countries where no information on drugs was published. Data are also rather scant in Finland. On the other hand, Sweden has more data.

During the eighties, no explicit policies on drugs in the Baltic States existed. Politics was dictated from Moscow and was the same throughout the Soviet Union. All information on drug abuse, drug-related crime and other drug questions was strictly private. Drug politics was not discussed publicly and information on drugs was restricted. No data were published which could make possible an estimation of the drug problem within a given region. Not even medical personnel had access to such information. Drug abuse was treated as a moral problem. It was considered to be an inheritance from the pre-socialist society. Drug abuse did not exist as a social problem in any socialist society. A special committee under the Soviet ministry of health established an official list of narcotic substances.

Estonia, as well as Latvia and Lithuania, was forced to send reports to Moscow on the drug situation. This ended in 1990. In the early nineties Estonia had difficulty in introducing effective measures to prevent increased drug abuse. There was neither drug politics nor effective coordination between different, relevant organisations. Since the mid-nineties, the situation has improved. A ministerial committee for drug politics under the auspices of the minister of social services was established in 1996. "Principles for drug politics, 1997-2007" was approved by the government in 1997. Regarding drug development, experts state that all types of drugs exist in Estonia today. The consumption of drugs will continue to increase particularly among the young. Some think that drugs have partly taken over the roll of alcohol among the young.

In Latvia, the drug problem was not acknowledged before the mid-nineties. The general public was poorly informed about the problem. During the nineties, legislation was developed in Latvia, as well as in Estonia and Lithuania. In May 1993, the Latvian parliament ratified three drug-related UN conventions. Between 1993 and 1998, several other laws on drugs gained force. During the last decade, the fight against drugs has gained momentum. The abuse of opiates is widespread, and stimulants (e.g., ecstasy and amphetamines) are increasing, particularly among the young.

In Lithuania, legislation was initiated at the same time. The most important tools aimed at controlling the spread of drugs were “The Criminal Code” and “Code of Administrative Transgressions of Law”. Both laws date from 1994. Of all registered drug addicts in 1997 that sought help from the medical system, 90% (1610 individuals) were opiate users, using homemade “poppy straw”, an opiate derivative for intravenous use. One third used more than one drug.

Drug statistics are also limited in Finland. The first national prevalence study was carried out in 1992. It showed, e.g., that 1% of the population had used cannabis in recent years. In Finland, drug abuse is seen as a marginal problem compared to alcohol abuse. However, even if drug abuse has been rather low in Finland compared with other European countries, the drug situation has gradually worsened in recent years. Drug availability has increased. Hashish is still the most common drug in the country.

Amphetamines are the most popular of the so-called hard drugs, but there are indications of an increase in heroin smoking, and the use of LSD and ecstasy. Experimenting with drugs has become more common among the young. Mixing pharmaceuticals and alcohol is also common in Finland, particularly among girls.

Sweden has a restrictive drug policy. From 1977 onwards, when parliament decided that the aim was “a drug-free society”, it has become more and more restrictive. The consumption of drugs was criminalised in 1988. In principle, Swedish drug legislation comprises prohibition and sanctions against all handling of drugs.

The Swedish development of the drug problem between 1979 and 1997 can be summarised in the following way:

- increased drug control, both through more restrictive legislation
- U-formed trend in experimental use of drugs amongst youth
- a larger group of older, heavy abusers
- increased drug-related deaths
- more drug abusers in treatment
- a decrease in HIV and hepatitis amongst drug abusers.

5. The homogenisation of alcohol consumption and alcohol politics

The so-called ECAS project concerns alcohol politics, alcohol consumption, drinking patterns and their economic, social and cultural background in 13 EU countries and Norway since 1950. One question asked is whether increased integration and increased internationalisation has led to a homogenisation of alcohol consumption and alcohol habits. Preliminarily, it states



Figure 158. Drug abuse is not restricted to sub-cultures, but some sub-cultures use drugs as a sign of protest against the establishment. Photo: Katarzyna Skalska

Table T3. Restrictions on alcohol policy in 15 European countries 1950-2000

	1950	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000
Austria	4	7	7	6	7	7
Belgium	6	7	8	8.5	10.5	11.5
Denmark	4	4	6	7	7	8.5
Finland	17	17	15.5	18.5	18.5	14.5
France	1	6.5	9.5	9.5	10.5	12.5
Germany	4	4	5	6	7	8
Greece	2	2	2	2	6	7
Ireland	8	8	12	12	12	12
Italy	7	7	8	12	12	13
Netherlands	6	6	6	11	13	13
Norway	17	17	17	19	19	17
Portugal	1	2	0	4.5	10	10
Spain	0	0	0	4.5	10	10
Sweden	17.5	18.5	18.5	18.5	18.5	16.5
United Kingdom	8	9	14	14	14	13

Source: Alkohol & Narkotika 2001:01, p. 27

that a certain homogenisation of per capita consumption has occurred, but that drink preference has changed (previously spirits in northern Europe, beer today, in mid-Europe beer, and in south Europe, wine). Drinking patterns are continuously changing in all countries, all the more so their qualitative character (e.g., regarding intoxication and drinking frequency), but slowly. The natural time period for the changes can be measured in generations and decades, which means that changes in living standards, economy and alcohol politics are not regarded as large changes in drinking patterns. This may mean that efforts to change drinking patterns using measures related to alcohol politics have less effect than many would like to believe. (See Rehm 1999 and Simpura 1999.)

If we try to summarise different indicators for the scope of alcohol politics and rigour in the European countries from the fifties onwards, we find that efforts doubled between 1950 and 2000. If we compare different countries included in this survey of countries around the Baltic Sea, we find that Denmark is lowest, i.e., has the most liberal alcohol policy. Finland, Norway and Sweden have been the highest all the time, that is, pursued a restrictive and comprehensive alcohol policy even if a certain reduction can be observed, particularly in the scope of the Finnish alcohol policy and rigour. Here, we have a very interesting difference in the Nordic countries. Denmark differs considerably from other Nordic countries.

Alcohol and drug development among the young. What this survey shows is that it is particularly important to follow drug development among youth. Much is happening in this area now. In the so-called ESPAD project (The European School Survey Project on Alcohol and Other Drugs) data were collected from 26 European countries in 1995 on schoolchildren's habits with alcohol and drugs. A second data collection took place in the spring of 1999. The number of countries has now increased to 30. All countries presented here are included. Comparison between the two data collections shows that the use of narcotics amongst 15- and 16-year-olds has increased in many countries in Europe. However, no drastic change in alcohol habits has taken place, so-called binge drinking (getting drunk) is still highest in northern Europe.


What does alcohol and drug consumption look like for countries around the Baltic Sea that are included in the ESPAD project? Denmark has the largest fraction of young people that have drunk at some time (98%). Countries where 95% have drunk alcohol include Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Russia. In Sweden, 90% of school children have drunk alcohol. If we compare data from 1999 on the fraction of school children that have drunk alcohol 10 times or more during the last months with the fraction that have been intoxicated three times or more during the last months, we find that Denmark is again top (18%) among the Baltic Sea countries, followed by Lithuania, Poland and Russia.

A comparison between 1995 and 1999 shows that consumption for intoxication has increased in some countries, e.g., Denmark. Interestingly, it is a considerably more common form of behaviour among girls than boys in almost all ESPAD countries.

If we compare the consumption of beer, wine and spirits at the last drinking occasion for countries around the Baltic Sea included in the ESPAD project, we find that schoolchildren in Denmark had the highest average consumption (10 cl), followed by Poland (about 9 cl). The lowest consumption is reported from Estonia (slightly more than 5 cl). Schoolchildren in Sweden had drunk 8 cl pure alcohol. In most ESPAD countries, the most common drink among boys is beer, followed by spirits, whereas spirits is the most common drink among girls, followed by beer. Highest on the list for alcohol-related problems of the included Baltic Sea countries in the ESPAD project are Denmark, Finland, Lithuania and Russia, whereas Estonia is slightly below the average.


Regarding drug use, one-quarter of youth in Denmark and Russia have tried drugs. The lowest fractions were found in Finland and Sweden. Generally, the boys are in the majority, but in some countries, the difference between the sexes is small or insignificant. In nearly all ESPAD countries, the fraction of schoolchildren who had tried narcotics had increased between 1995 and 1999. Most of them who tried narcotics used hash/marijuana. The highest fractions of schoolchildren who had used a drug other than hash were from Latvia, Poland, Estonia and Lithuania. Of these, amphetamines were most common in Estonia and Poland, and ecstasy and heroin smoking in Latvia. If we look at the fraction who at some time during 1999 had taken a tranquiliser without a doctor's prescription of, we can state that girls are higher than boys in general. Highest were girls in Poland (24%), followed by Lithuania (17%), Finland (9%) and Sweden (6%). Lowest were girls in Estonia (1%).

The consequences of alcohol and drug use. It is difficult to single out a single factor and define its effect on public health or the social situation. However, alcohol is such a dominant factor that some such connections may at least be indicated.



Map 37. Alcohol consumption in the Baltic countries. Ill.: Sture Korpi

Changes between 1995 and 1999 in lifetime experience of any illicit drug other than marijuana or hashish. Countries above the line have increased prevalence rates, and countries below have decreased. All students.



Changes between 1995 and 1999 in lifetime experience of any illicit drug other than marijuana or hashish. Percentages among boys and girls (values within brackets refer to all students 1995, 1999). Data sorted by all students 1995.




Figure 159. Change in the use of alcohol and other drugs 1995-1999

Increased alcohol consumption is, in statistics and the Baltica Study, related to disease, mortality, accidents, crime, and suicide. But since no statistics on all these parameters in the Baltic Sea region are easily available, estimates may only be done based on some general data.

In France, with a very high alcohol consumption, (recent statistics is 13 litres of pure alcohol per capita and year), about one third of hospital places are directly related to alcohol consumption.

From western statistics we know that more than 50% of accidents requiring surgery are related to alcohol consumption.

In Latvia from 1984 to 1987 the number of so-called unnatural deaths per 100,000 decreased from 91 to 64, which coincided with decreased alcohol consumption in connection with the campaign. In Latvia court statistics from around 1990 indicate that about 50% of the crimes were related to drinking alcohol (the Baltica Study). In other countries where such estimations were available the figures were about half.

A more detailed study is needed to understand what are certainly more complicated relationships between the use of alcohol and drugs, on the one hand and economy and social conditions on the other.

6. Care and treatment

From the Baltica project, some information on care of treatment of abusers exist. The question of whether to abandon the system of obligatory care was taken up in the late eighties in Estonia. Between 1984 and 1988, 1300-1500 people were taken into compulsory care annually. This decreased to 800 in 1989. Obligatory care was abolished in 1990 and the institutions were closed in 1991. In Russia, drug abusers were cared for by the medical service and the military sector. Compulsory care existed. These institutions were located in the central Asian republics. The traditional obligatory care of alcoholics in Russia has now been abandoned. Drying out units were closed down, and the habit of drinking at work and in public places has resumed. A new law in Poland in 1982 included a number of detailed rules on the treatment of people with alcohol problems. In contrast with earlier regulations, a focus on voluntary treatment was emphasised. There was still, however, legislative support to enforce people to take treatment if alcohol abuse led to the break up of families, an unwillingness to work or in some cases, people disturbing the general order. The law encouraged the development of specialised care of alcoholics and commitment within primary medical care. The importance that performance should be differentiated and that better treatment method should be developed was emphasised.

In Sweden, we have had institutions for alcoholics since the early 20th century. During the seventies these institutions have been reorganised into more modern, open, environment-therapeutic-oriented institutions. Inspiration first came from England where Maxwell Hones was a leading director. Next came the influence of the so-called "Daytop model" in the USA. These two models were introduced into two of Sweden's largest treatment centres during the seventies: Vallmotorp and Daytop Sweden. During the eighties, care in institutions was developed both qualitatively and quantitatively in Sweden. Sweden initiated with the participation of Lars Bremberg (founder of the treatment centres above) the formation of the WFTC (World Federation of Therapeutic Communities), which played an important role in the development of institutional care.

For youth with abuse problems, the so-called Hassela movement has been significant. The Hassela model was created by K-A. Westerberg with inspiration from the Swedish workers' movement. Hassela has also established itself internationally. The proliferation of institutional care during the eighties can mainly be ascribed to the HIV and AIDS question. The increased risk for contagion contributed to large resources being allotted to this form of care. During the early nineties, institutional care, on the other hand, was reduced dramatically. One reason for this was economic problems; another, an increased belief in open forms of care.

Today, the treatment of drug problems mainly takes place in open, social care, but private and voluntary organizations, as well as special treatment departments within prisons, are also included. Treatment is usually voluntary, but compulsory care does exist. Compulsory care for drug abusers was implemented in 1982 in "Lagen om vård av missbrukare i vissa fall" (LVM).

The law was changed in 1989. From then on, a person can be committed to compulsory care for up to six months. In 1994 the state, and Statens Institutioner Styrelse, SiS became the responsible authority for compulsory care. The number of institutions for compulsory care then decreased from 25 to 14, and the number of places from about 1000 to about 340. People in compulsory care today are usually drug addicts and mixed abusers. Pure alcoholics are becoming fewer in number. People in compulsory care often have a complicated psychosocial situation and can only be treated as a very socially vulnerable group. The aim of the care is to motivate people to enter voluntary forms of care. Many come today in emergency situations for short-term detoxification and subsequently leave compulsory care. The question of compulsory care has been a subject for heated debate in Sweden.

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Section VIII

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Figure 160. Photo: Katarzyna Skalska

VIII

Section

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

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INTRODUCTION

Hans Aage

The transition from plan to market following the revolutions of 1989 in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics has been a major challenge for economics as a scientific discipline. Western economists were traditionally mostly concerned with predicting the effects of small, marginal changes in the western-type mixed market economies, and they were not well prepared for giving advice concerning deep and fast systemic changes of the basic structures of the economy.

However, contrary to previous revolutions, the transition in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics apparently was not fuelled directly by requests for redistribution of power and wealth, but first of all by a desperate wish for economic growth. Therefore, the advice of economists has been asked to an unprecedented degree concerning the account of symptoms, clarification of diagnosis, and prescription of medicine. The advice of economists is sometimes compared to medical treatment in the days of old (Krugman, 1994:9), and the comparison is particularly incisive for the transition economies, which have consulted western economists not only concerning details of economic policy, but also concerning the transplantation of vital internal organs of society. The recommendations have been characterised by strong opinions in spite of theoretical perplexity, by general support to the prevailing view in spite of contemporary dissenting evaluations, and by willingness to accept radical treatment with harsh methods in spite of the admitted immediate relapse due to economic bleeding. Thus the issue comes up, whether the disease or the treatment causes most harm. All this is very much like medical treatment in the first half of the 19th century, before the great advances in medical science.

The cardinal question concerns the proper balance between individual decisions in the market and collective, hopefully democratic, decisions in the political system, i.e. the question of the market vs. the state, and the gist of the economists' message was that "the government must stop restricting and directly controlling private commercial activity" as stated in the World Development Report in 1996 (World Bank, 1996:110). Subsequent events and extensive economic research, theoretical as well as empirical (cf. Chap. 46 for more details), has shown that this conclusion was probably premature or at least too simplified.

The content of the following chapters is mostly devoted to the topical issues of economic policy and systemic change in transition economies in the Baltic region, with occasional references to the system of economic planning before 1989 and to western-type market economies (e.g. in Chap. 50 on EU enlargement), but systematic treatment of economic policy and the Scandinavian welfare states is missing. The reader will find information on these issues in other parts of the book, particularly in the section on social conditions and on democracy. For systematic, theoretical descriptions of different economic systems the reader is referred to broader texts on comparative economics (Gregory & Stuart, 1992; Rosser & Rosser, 1995; Isachsen et.al., 1992).

Economics is not an exact science, and its subject is so intertwined with purely political preferences that it is particularly difficult – and important – to draw a distinction between 1) what we know, 2) what we believe, and 3) what we wish and hope for. Indeed, this is the main precondition for scientific analysis, and when this distinction is given up, then there emerges a mixed product called ideology, which was well-known in the former planned economies and

which is not unknown in western democracies either. Therefore, it is recommended that the reader appraises the following chapters (as well as other treatments of economic questions) with a critical, open mind. The authors of the following chapters also present their different evaluations of various matters, but hopefully in a sufficiently transparent and well-founded way, so that they will prove useful for the reader.

Chap. 46 summarises the 10 years of transition experience, and its evaluations take issue with prevailing views concerning the growth performance of the former planned economies and the transition economies. It is argued that the large differences in production experience during and following the unprecedented deep transition depression can be mainly ascribed to differences in initial conditions and economic policy, rather than to differences in the speed and scope of market reforms.

A main element of market reforms is analysed in Chap. 47, namely privatisation, which means that the rights of control and of residual income are transferred into private hands. Various methods of privatisation (direct sale, voucher mass privatisation, insider ownership by managers or employees) in the Baltic countries, Poland and Russia, as well as institutional reforms and changing governance structures are described. Restructuring and economic performance are usually considered superior, when ownership is private, preferably by foreigners or other outsiders rather than by insiders, but empirical data demonstrate complications in this general picture.

An increasingly important source of investment and restructuring is foreign direct investment, the topic of Chap. 48. Particularly in Estonia and Poland, foreign direct investment has increased steadily in recent years. The various effects, such as the transfer of technology and knowledge and the generation of exports, and conditions for beneficial spillovers are discussed. As motivations for foreign investors, low labour costs and natural resources are often secondary to gaining access to large, unsaturated markets. Two cases of foreign direct investment are presented, in Latvia by a Danish textile enterprise, and in Poland by a Danish manufacturer of packaging for the dairy and fruit juice industry.

Chap. 49 discusses a closely related aspect of international integration, namely trade. The transition has had a strong impact upon the amount and composition of international trade. Particularly the Baltic countries and Poland have redirected their trade towards western countries, and imports have increased more than exports, so that substantial foreign trade deficits have materialised. Trade patterns of all the countries in the Baltic region are described, and more general observations on welfare gains from trade, on trade restrictions and on possible effects of EU membership are discussed.

EU enlargement is further considered in Chap. 50, with special reference to the motivations and interests of the various parties. It is argued that for existing EU members, advantages of enlargement are mainly political, but that accession countries have economic interests that are dependent upon EU policies concerning the common agricultural policy and the EU budget for structural funds. EU membership also entails costs, and in relation to EU requirements for environmental protection the costs could be substantial.

The environment – the topic of Chap. 51 – is an increasingly important and costly policy area. Before 1989, energy consumption per capita in the socialist countries was on a par with countries in Western Europe, but efficiency was lower, pollution higher, approximately as in western countries 20-30 years earlier, and more concentrated in a few heavily polluted areas. After 1989, pollution and resource consumption declined following the decline of production. The Baltic states, Russia and Poland contribute significantly to the pollution of the Baltic Sea, although not more than the Nordic countries, and in the 1990s the amount of pollution has decreased, partly because of falling production in the Baltic states and Russia, and partly

because of improvements in environmental protection due to environmental investments, the introduction of new policy instruments, and international environmental cooperation.

The decline of production in the early phases of transition became larger than expected, particularly in the former Soviet republics, and the necessary restructuring of production also required flexibility and relocation of the labour force. This is addressed in Chap. 52, based upon a theoretical analysis of the labour market. Employment decreased, but mass unemployment did not appear, because it was mitigated by other types of adjustment: some employees were not laid off, but received low wages; others left the labour force; still others worked in the unofficial sector; and generally real wages were reduced as a means of labour market adjustment. Consequently, a serious poverty problem has emerged. Still, unemployment is a political issue, and there is a need for more active, rather than passive, labour market policies.

Besides the chapters mentioned above, some chapters in other sections of the book are relevant for the analysis of economic issues, of which two should be mentioned briefly here:

Chap. 40 analyses population trends in the whole Baltic region, including Germany, as well as some observations concerning the development of living standards. In the region it is only Denmark, Finland and Poland that have small positive rates of natural population increase; in all the other countries it is negative, but in some cases it is mitigated by positive net immigration. The transition has had disruptive effects upon the demographic processes, and fertility rates have declined, particularly in the former Soviet republics. Mortality rates have also increased in some cases.

Chap. 24 directly addresses the cardinal question of transition, namely the question of the market vs. the state. The economic system is discussed in relation to the general problem of democracy and four types of democratic decision are described: individual decisions in the market, collective decisions in the political process, self-management democracy, and a fourth type labeled professionalisation, i.e. that decisions are entrusted to independent bodies subject to strict regulations. The basic economic functions of government are considered, and it is argued that the virtues of liberalism and private activity might well be overrated at this time and that the role of the state needs to be considered.

46 Trends in economic transition

Hans Aage

1. The planned economies before 1989

It is still conventional wisdom that the planned economies of Eastern Europe and Russia were failures in all important respects: they could not generate economic growth, they wasted resources and created ecological disasters, their agriculture was inefficient and could not supply sufficient amounts of bread grain, and their leaders were kleptocratic and concerned mainly with personal enrichment. But in reality, “real existing socialism” was quite different.

Planned economies vs. market economies. Concerning economic growth, the achievements were rather similar in the planned economies and in western countries. Thus in “the golden age” of economic growth from 1950 to 1973 average annual growth rates of GDP (Gross Domestic Product – an indicator for total production in the country) per capita were 2.2% in the USA, 3.6% in the USSR, and 2.9% in Denmark, and in the period 1973-1989 the growth rates were 1.6%, 1.0% and 2.5% respectively. In Japan and China per capita annual growth rates were 8.0% and 3.7%, respectively, from 1950 to 1973, and 3.1% and 5.7% from 1973 to 1989. Since 1980 the Chinese GDP growth rates have been among the highest in the world, about 10%, and at the same time population growth has slowed from more than 3% to about 1% annually. With the exception of Romania and Albania, the populations of Eastern Europe and the USSR belonged to the wealthiest quarter of mankind.

Therefore, in the late 1980s two outstanding American textbooks on comparative economic systems concluded from a comparison of planned economies and western market economies that the “... dynamic efficiency of the two systems appears similar. ... The important differences in growth rates appear not between the systems but rather among the nations within the same economic system” (Pryor, 1985:101; cf. Gregory & Stuart, 1989:414).

Ecological damage. The planned economies consumed the same amounts of natural resources per capita in the late 1980s as did western countries, and pollution levels from greenhouse gases were also similar, but the efficiency was less, and energy consumption per unit output was 2-3 times higher than in Western Europe; air pollution was heavier, even per capita, particularly sulphur pollution, which was approximately as it was in Western Europe 20-30 years ago and furthermore more concentrated in the big industrial centres. But agricultural pollution with nitrogen and pesticides was less.

The fact that economic planning contrary to the market causes ecological disasters is a popular, often repeated illusion. In any system, ecological damage is related to productive activity and thus to political and economic priorities. However, basic economic theory tells us that pollution and other environmental effects are often external to the polluter, so that



Figure 161. Clean water is one of the most important natural properties necessary for our survival (Gothenburg, Sweden). Photo: Katarzyna Skalska

no market agent will notice it. The planned economies had the necessary policy instrument to control environmental damage, but failed to use them. The ecological crisis is not caused by any economic system, but by our common wish for economic growth which is also completely dominant in Eastern Europe and Russia: “For all the apparent gulf between the market-dominated economies of the West and the centrally planned economies of the communist world, when it comes to attitudes to the natural world their outlook turns

out to be remarkably similar” (Ponting, 1991:153; cf. Aage, 1998b).

Economic inequality was not so great in Eastern Europe and the USSR than in western countries, in part because of the absence of the small and exorbitantly rich economic élite of western countries. Members of the *nomenklatura* had privileges like a dacha, a four-room flat and a car, all typical middle-class goods in the west, and the privileges were not inheritable. Free public services, including health care and education, as well as cheap public transportation and full employment also contributed to income equalization.

It is true that the USSR was not self-sufficient with grain, which was imported in increasing amounts. However, the reason was not lack of bread, but rather that consumption of meat, and thus the use of grain for fodder, increased by 63% per capita from 1965 to 1990, because the population became more wealthy. The grain harvest increased from 130 million tons annually in 1961-65 to 209 million tons in 1986-90, while the share of the labour force employed in agriculture decreased simultaneously from 29% to 18%.

The planning system functioned. It did not collapse as is often asserted; it was dismantled. But the problems were enormous, and furthermore they were instructive concerning one of the major questions of economics, namely the proper balance between private activity and central control, i.e. the economic role of the state. One conclusion is about the difficulties of creating efficient economic incentives in a politically controlled system as demonstrated by the attempts at using wage incentives, which are in many respects similar to the wage systems now being introduced in the public sectors in western countries.

The principle in the so-called bonus systems was to reward fulfilment and overfulfilment of one or more success indicators, first of all gross production, in relation to the plan, provided that a number of other plan requirements were fulfilled as side conditions. These immediately followed many problems of the planning system: defective information from enterprises in order to obtain an easy plan, poor plan fulfilment in order to prevent plan increases next year (the ratchet effect), wasteful use of resources, poor quality and neglect of consumer preferences, late or failing deliveries of inputs, lack of technological innovations, missing or distorting work incentives. The problems originate in disregard of everything except the success indicators, but there are other explanations as well, among them that responsibilities were not clearly defined, that relative prices were not realistic for political reasons, and that sanctions like the closing down of enterprises and ensuing unemployment were avoided for social reasons, so that enterprise restructuring was not compelling, because

enterprises had soft budget constraints and could count on being bailed out by the government in case of difficulties.

The planning system was “further perfected”, as it was officially announced, several times after 1965, but the reforms did not solve the problems of efficiency, which were presumably primarily related to unclear assignments of responsibility, inside and between enterprises. Employment policy and work discipline were presumably less austere in socialist enterprises as compared to capitalist ones, and enterprises had no well-defined competitors, but were parts in a political game with planning authorities and ministries, where rules were obscure and budget constraints soft. Political infiltration was omnipresent, and the degree of honesty and social consciousness in the system was not sufficient to prevent considerable problems. A further economic strain was that military production absorbed a significant share of the resources, probably 15-20% in the USSR.

2. The transition economies

Actually, all the miseries usually ascribed to the planning system – poor economic growth records, ecological disasters, agricultural crisis, and kleptocratic régimes – have become much more genuine in the transition economies than they were in the former planned economies, with the exception that the environmental situation has improved since 1990, because of the decline of industrial and agricultural production, which in the Baltic countries reduced energy consumption as well as pollution from sulphur and carbon dioxide by half and eliminated the use of fertilizer and pesticides in large areas (Aage, 1998b).

Concurrently, with far-reaching institutional changes and progress towards marketisation and democratisation (cf. Table 39) the European and former Soviet transition countries have experienced a historically exceptional, deep depression. Output declined by 17-60% during the years after 1990 (cf. Table 40). In most East European countries production has now recovered to the levels of 1989, in Poland it is even 22% higher, but in the former Soviet republics GDP is still much below the 1989 GDP, thus 23% below in Estonia and 43% below in Russia. In several respects the transition countries achieved impressive reductions of the macro-economic imbalances in the early 1990s. Government deficits have been reduced, and annual inflation rates are about 5% or lower, except in Russia and Belarus where inflation rates in 2000 were about 100% and 200% respectively, but there are still considerable unemployment rates and serious current account deficits (cf. Table 40 and tables in Chap. 50 and 24).

The production structure has changed, as the production decline is most pronounced in industry. This was partly intentional, because large parts of industry had a negative value added according to international prices. Presumably, this applied to 20-24% of industrial production in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia in 1989 and even more in Russia (Aage, 1998a). But service production, which was very low under communist rule, has increased, particularly due to the growing number of small, private enterprises. Agricultural production has declined in some countries even more than industrial production for many reasons, including lack of inputs and adverse prices. In some areas in the Baltic countries restitution of agricultural lands to former owners has created a structural problem with small unprofitable farms with inexperienced owners. In Russia the grain harvest has declined from about 100 million tons in 1986-90 to a level of about 65 million

tons. The private plots, which were also important in the Soviet era, contribute increasingly to the survival of the population.

Table 39. Production and institutional reform in Baltic area transition economies 1989-2000

	GDP	Institutional			Private	
	per capita	large	int.	total	share of GDP	
	1989 USA=100	priv.	trade		1989 pct	2000 pct
Russia	31	3.3	2.3	2.5	5	70
Belarus	26	1.0	1.0	1.5	5	20
Estonia	37	4.0	4.0	3.5	10	75
Latvia	35	3.0	4.3	3.1	10	65
Lithuania	32	3.0	4.0	3.2	10	60
Poland	29	3.3	4.3	3.5	15	70

Notes: Figures for GDP per capita in 1989 are an attempt to rank countries using different and contradicting computations of GDP in purchasing power parities. The following three columns indicate various indices for degrees of institutional reform in 1999 as computed by the EBRD based on subjective estimates on a scale from 1 to 4, for large scale privatisation, liberalisation of foreign trade, and a total index for the scope of market reforms, which is an unweighted average of several indices (large and small privatisation, enterprise restructuring, price liberalisation, foreign trade liberalisation, competition policy, banking and financial institutions). The last two columns show the share of private production in GDP in 1989 and 2000.

Sources: EBRD, 2000:14; IMF:2001:134; Aage, 1998a

Table 40. Economic growth in Baltic area transition economies 1989-1999

	Smallest GDP		GDP	Invest-	Unemploy-
	1989	1999	1999	ment	ment
	year	=100	1989=100	1999	pct
				1989=100	
Russia	1995	55	57	17	12
Belarus	1995	54	80	59	2
Estonia	1994	64	77	137	12
Latvia	1993	52	60	45	14
Lithuania	1993	39	62	149	14
Poland	1991	82	122	171	13

Notes: The two first columns indicate year and size of the smallest GDP in the years 1989-1995. The following two columns indicate real GDP and real fixed gross capital formation, both as a per cent of the level in 1989. The figures should be evaluated in relation to their trends; thus GDP is generally increasing and unemployment decreasing and the figures are already outdated, e.g. the unemployment figure for Poland, which is likely to have decreased.

Sources: EBRD, 2000: 65; ECE, 2000:161; Aage, 1998a

Poverty is not extreme because of a functioning social safety net, but the number of people living below the poverty line of four USD at the 1990 exchange rate (i.e. the real value that 4 dollars had in 1990) a day increased from 14 million (3% of the population Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics) in 1987-1988 to more than 150 million (30%) in 1998 (IMF, 2001:100; EBRD, 1999:13-19). In Central and Eastern Europe the percentage of poor people is about 10%, in the Baltic countries 35%, and in Russia 45%. The reason is first and foremost the depression of production rather than the simultaneous escalation of inequality; the Gini-coefficient, which measures inequality on a scale from .00 to 1.00 has increased everywhere (and also in western countries), and in Russia it has increased from about .25 in 1989 (as in the Nordic countries) to above .50

(as in some Latin American countries), that is from one end of the global spectrum to the other. Mortality has increased in many countries.

A wealthy new élite has emerged swiftly. Everywhere in the transition economies, with the Czech Republic as a possible exception, privatisation has given members of the former élite an opportunity to gain a degree of control over the wealth of society that they did not even dream of during the former regime. The nomenklatura has transformed itself into a kleptoklatura. The profound transition of society has been a fertile soil for corruption and, particularly in Russia, also for extensive, organized and most violent criminality.

Privatisation has progressed rapidly everywhere with few exceptions, notably Belarus and other former Soviet republics (cf. Table 39). The privatisation of small enterprises has been fast and successful and a large number of new firms have been created. Some large enterprises have been privatised as well and the Baltic countries and the Central European countries have succeeded to some extent in dispersing ownership rights and in improving corporate governance.

Privatisation was implemented by means of various mixtures of a variety of methods:

- 1) *spontaneous privatisation* (in many places in the initial phases),
- 2) *mass privatisation* through distribution of vouchers to the public (main method in Lithuania; Russia 1992-94; also used in Poland, Estonia, Latvia),
- 3) *insider privatisation* or management-employee buy-outs (predominant in Russia 1992-94; also in Poland; some sales to employees on preferential terms in most countries),
- 4) *direct sales of shares* by tender, usually with restrictions for foreign investors (main method in Poland, Estonia, Latvia; also used in Lithuania; Russia 1994-96),
- 5) *restitution to former owners*, mostly concerning agricultural lands (partly used in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania),
- 6) *political privatisation* (as in the Russian shares-for-loans scheme in 1995 where a small group of financiers with political ties, the so-called oligarchs, financed government activities and received shares in return).

Generally privatisation has boosted enterprise restructuring in Central and Eastern Europe, especially where ownership is concentrated to strategic, domestic or foreign, investors, but it has been less successful in Russia and other former Soviet republics. In Poland, the most successful transition economy, large scale privatisation started late and progressed gradually (as it did in Hungary), but in Russia the early and fast privatisation has turned out to be chaotic (cf. Reddaway & Glinski, 2001). So there is no clear relationship between privatisation methods and later outcomes.

It is increasingly acknowledged that privatisation is not sufficient for restructuring and growth. An elaborate institutional framework, which is not easily created, is required, including legal institutions and mores, financial institutions and financial discipline, institutions and standards for competition and corporate governance (IMF, 2001:105-106).

In addition to macro-economic stabilization and privatisation the transition reforms also include liberalisation, internally (free prices, competition, elimination of subsidies) and externally (free trade, liberalisation of capital movements, currency convertibility). Political democracy was also an important element in the institutional reforms. Together, this was intended to create prosperous, democratic market economies.

Even when institutional preconditions are created, future growth is not possible without the necessary investments, and in this regard also prospects differ between countries. In Poland the current account deficit is about 7% of GDP, but the inflow of foreign direct investment is almost of the same magnitude, and the level of investment has nearly doubled compared to 1989 (cf. Table 40). Russia, on the other hand, has experienced

a decade with dwindling investment, despite a comfortable current account surplus of 5-10% of GDP, but capital flight has moved large private funds out of the country, probably about 20 billion dollars a year since 1994, so that total private, external assets may now exceed the Russian (public) external debt of 160 billion dollars. The disappearance of investment is a direct and, to a large extent, quite legal consequence of the reforms: when property is privatised, when capital movements are liberalised, and when domestic political and economic prospects are risky, rational capital owners tend to move investment abroad.

A protracted drop in production, particularly technologically advanced production, erodes not only physical capital, but also human capital. It is more simple to transform a doctor of science into a street vendor than the other way round.

3. Transition and economic growth

What are the lessons from the ten years of transition? The prevailing view is that “liberalization has indeed been a good investment” (World Bank, 1996:29), and “that more and faster reform is better than less and slower reform” (Fischer & Sahay, 2000:17). In the light of Table 40, this conclusion may appear strange, and it is certainly not undisputed. The view has been vindicated that the correlation between growth performance and scope and speed of reforms is a spurious one, because it materialises when initial conditions in 1989 are omitted from the analysis, when only growth after the bottom of the depression is considered, and when government expenditure is omitted. Also, the validity of conclusions from comparisons of transition countries should not be overrated, because their reform strategies were rather similar, with minor differences in scope and speed. Thus, the former GDR is the only example of genuine shock therapy, and China is a highly successful example of a gradual strategy, but they are normally excluded from statistical analyses.

The important variables of transition are economic growth, democracy, economic reform, stabilization (low inflation), government expenditure, external agents (particularly anticipated EU membership), and initial conditions in 1989 (size of countries, cultural traditions, historical experiences, earlier dependence on CMEA trade, mineral wealth, economic structure, prior reform experience as well as foreign assistance, cf. Aage 1998a). The statistical correlations can be roughly summarised as follows: (Fisher & Sahay, 2000; Popov, 2000)

- 50-60% of the variations in GDP performance 1989-98 are explained by different initial conditions; the explanatory power of initial conditions disappears in the late 1990s;
- comprehensive and fast reforms explain 30% of GDP variations, but this correlation disappears when initial conditions are introduced;
- together with initial conditions, government expenditure explains 70% of GDP variations;
- there is a strong correlation between stabilisation (low inflation) and high GDP growth, and if inflation is introduced in addition to initial conditions and government expenditure, 80% of GDP variations are explained;
- democratisation is positively correlated with economic reforms, but has no direct effect upon GDP growth.

The effect of economic reforms was initially (1990-1991) to trigger the depression together with stabilization policy, as both reduced government expenditure and investments: “There can be no doubt that during the early transition there was a causal relationship between the rapid shrinkage in the size of government and the significant fall in output” (Kołodko, 2000:259).

Thus, it is remarkable that in 1999, among the former Soviet republics Uzbekistan, Belarus and Estonia came closest to the GDP levels of 1989, namely 94%, 80% and 77%, respectively; concerning the scope of reforms they were at opposite ends of the spectrum, with EBRD index values of 2.1, 1.5 and 3.5 respectively (cf. Table 39), but all had relatively small declines in government expenditures (Popov, 2000:35). In the period from 1992-1996 there is presumably no effect of reforms upon GDP performance, but in the most recent years there is some positive effect.

Differences between countries concerning institutional reform, stabilisation and GDP recovery are rather closely associated with the geographical distance between the respective capitals and Brussels, which is a strong predictor, probably because it reflects initial conditions, but presumably also because EU membership aspirations might have supported the political practicability of stabilisation.

Generally, determinants for economic growth are still not well understood despite intensive research, theoretical (on endogenous growth) and empirical (on convergence and international comparisons) in the past two decades. Widespread convergence, in the sense that poor countries tend to catch up with rich countries, has not been established, and growth is not correlated with inequality (cf. Aage, 1998b). Furthermore, historically there is not a very pronounced correlation between marketisation of the economy and economic growth (Gregory & Stuart, 1989:414; Pryor, 1985:101). Among the more robust determinants for economic growth is absolute latitude, i.e. distance from the equator, with Singapore as a conspicuous exception. A strong, efficient and uncorrupted government seems to be a characteristic associated with economic growth. On the other hand, rule of law in the sense of respect for human rights is not a necessary condition for growth. And although democracy is almost exclusively found in wealthy countries, democracy and economic growth are not closely correlated. Actually, the correlation is weakly negative (Barro, 1996:6).

There are strong arguments for an active role of government, not only as a guardian of economic freedom, but also as an agent of active economic policy. In two remarkable articles in the Russian newspaper *Nezavisimaja Gazeta* a number of distinguished Russian and American economists, including three Nobel Laureates, called for a much more active government policy, including government control over natural resources and capital movements. They criticise the IMF and the World Bank for “tying the governments’ hands concerning action to overcome depression and capital flight” in return for relatively small amounts of finance (Klein et.al., 1996, 2000).



Figure 162. Modernization (Europeanization) of cities in Central Europe shows itself to be superficial when getting out of the centers. Familok houses, built for coal-miners’ families in Silesia (Álask) are still in use. Photo: Paweł Migula

4. Transition theory

The ten years of transition has been a challenge to economic theory, and it has initiated large-scale theoretical and applied research which has left its mark in various parts of economic theory.

Concerning *stabilisation* and macroeconomic imbalances, particularly inflation, the experiences of transition countries are fairly well understood in terms of conventional theory, where three main, complementary views can be identified: the orthodox emphasising the supply of money and budget deficits, the structuralist emphasising prices and real effects, and the heterodox emphasising expectations.

In spite of the fact that determinants for *economic growth* remain rather mysterious, international advice was given and reform strategies were designed precisely with the aim of supporting economic growth. Strong economic incentives are widely considered to be an efficient spur of economic growth, and this is the rationale of the global trend towards limiting the role of government in the economy, and particularly towards privatisation. The idea is that efficiency increases when risk follows the right to residual income. Whether this is true, has been



Figure 163. A main street in Vilnius exposes obvious signs of economic transition. Photo: Alfred F. Majewicz

investigated on the micro level by comparing public and private companies and on the macro level by comparing economies with different degrees of private enterprise. The results are not unambiguous, and a general conclusion is that the effects of ownership rights depend crucially upon the amount of market competition and upon the amount and type of government regulation that currently exists.

The firm faith in economic incentives and in the private market economy has had a strong ideological impact. Ideology presumably also played an active role through the adoption of what Stiglitz labels a widespread western “folk theorem”, namely that “anything the government can do the private sector can do as well or better” (Stiglitz, 1995:31; jf. World Bank, 1996:110).

Oddly enough the strong confidence in the market as an economic institution has appeared concomitantly with the development of institutional theory, which has highlighted the preconditions and limitations of the market and explored other types of institutions from various points of view: economic history, game theoretical experiments where purely economic incentives have proved insufficient for explaining the results, and the theory of economic organisation which describes transaction costs and principal-agent problems (i.e. the problems of constructing efficient economic incentives; for example, the bonus for overfulfilling the plan for gross output, used in the former planned economies, was not an efficient incentive) as motivations for other institutions than the market, especially enterprises (cf. Milgrom & Roberts, 1992).

The *new political economy* is also concerned with institutions, and it extends economic analysis to more fundamental political decisions, as well as the formation of institutions. The



Figure 164. “Barter trade”. Woodcut from *Historia de gentibus septentrionalibus* by Olaus Magnus, published 1539 in Venedig

point of view has often been that institutions emerge more or less spontaneously. There is an interesting trend of regarding emerging organized crime as an acceptable phenomenon, as it provides the missing services of contract enforcement, although by unauthorised means, despite adverse effects such as migration, privatisation of tax collection, low investment rates and capital flight. It is argued that institutions should be “incentive compatible” and therefore that “legal reform should begin with the adoption of legal rules that the courts find usable and that private parties find cheaper to rely on than other methods of resolving disputes” (Hay, Shleifer & Vishny, 1996:562, cf. Shleifer & Treisman, 2000; Reddaway & Glinski, 2001).

Sociological theory has also been invoked in order to improve the understanding of transition, including Habermas’ distinction between life world and system world as well as the triad – very popular among sociologists – of state, market and civil society.

In the application of sociological theory, the formation of social norms is the central question, and this also applies to the growing literature on the concept of *social capital*, which is an attempt at establishing a missing link for understanding social trends and very much adopted by the World Bank. Social capital is vaguely defined as mutual trust and ability to cooperate among members of society, and it fits nicely as a counterpart to physical, human and natural capital, but exactly how it is a concept of capital or how it is a factor of production is not obvious. Physical capital is characterised as a factor of production by being accumulated in the form of investment, by being used during several periods of time, and by depreciating when used. Natural capital is not accumulated, and human capital does not depreciate when used. Concerning social capital it is not known how it accumulates, and it does not seem to depreciate when sensibly used. In any case social capital is closely related to well-known concepts, notably social norms, with which sociology has grabbed for many years without reaching particularly definitive conclusions.

In 1989, on the eve of the period of transition, the prevailing view among large parts of the economics profession was that the planned economy was a perversion of economic life, the elimination of which was not only a necessary, but also a sufficient condition for returning to the natural state of economic life, namely a well-functioning, democratic market economy.

Subsequent events have modified this simplistic view, and a broader geographic and historical perspective revealed that the well-functioning market economy is, maybe, an exception rather than the rule. It is not an original, natural state of economic life, but requires a complex system of legal, political and social structures which are not easy or quick to establish. Thus, from the precarious years in thirteenth century Northern Italy, it took 500 years for western European capitalism to develop, and it required another 200 years to become a civilized, socially acceptable system, as described in the institutional approach to economic history.

5. Conclusions

The prevailing view among economics professionals concerning the decisive question of the proper balance between *market* and *government* in the economy has changed through history. Perhaps the current change of mind is best understood as an ideological surge. Of course, the perception of the real world is always structured through a theoretical filter, but theory transgresses the borderline between science and ideology when it no longer helps to understand reality, when it no longer tries to draw a distinction between 1) what we know, 2) what we believe, and 3) what we wish and hope for.

The current faith in liberalism and private activity is not the first one in the history economic thought. About 1870 the strongly liberalistic and ahistorical Manchester-school of economics was dominating. Government should restrict itself to establishing the legal framework for certain institutions, notably for private property. Even the use of language gives strong contemporary impressions of *déjà-vu*. During the following decades the extreme liberalism lost momentum, e.g. in Germany where the government had an active role in industrialisation and in social policy, but once more it became strong about 1930, and now – after a prolonged Keynesian spell – about 1990. It is embarrassing for a social science that in a fundamental question it is subject to oscillations of fashion with a period of approximately 60 years and an amplitude that apparently increases explosively.

47 Privatisation, governance and enterprise restructuring in the Baltic rim

Niels Mygind

1. Introduction

One of the main elements in the transition from a command economy to a market is the change from state ownership to private enterprises. This means a change in the incentives facing the agents in the enterprises. The distribution on different stakeholders of the rights to control, to the income flows, to the accumulated wealth and to the information in the enterprises changes hands. The actual distribution of these ownership rights must be understood in a broader framework of the legislation, the judiciary system, state regulation, the financial sector, and the labour and product markets (Mygind 2001). The development of this new institutional system is closely connected to the quality of the governance of the state. The quality of the state differs very much from country to country and also the paths taken in the privatisation process show quite a high divergence. It is therefore no surprise that the resulting governance structure of enterprises differs in quality and that the resulting depth and speed of restructuring of the enterprises also show large differences.

The governance structure is a question about who takes the decisions and what the incentives are for different groups to supply their resources and effort in improving the efficiency of the enterprises. The test of how the governance structure is functioning is the economic performance of the enterprises. In the context of transitional economies it is of special interest to evaluate their progress in enterprise restructuring – the development of new products, production methods and new markets.

This chapter is an overview over the privatisation process in the Baltic Rim countries and the resulting corporate governance structures. Based on data from the three Baltic countries it will then show some trends in the development of the ownership structure and present some preliminary results on enterprise restructuring. Documentation can be found in Mygind 2000.

2. Overview of privatisation

The results of privatisation in the Baltic countries, Poland and Russia are summarised in Table 41. There have been important differences in starting conditions and in the political development in the five countries. Therefore, they have chosen different paths for changing the ownership structure from a planned system to a market system based on pri-



Figure 165. English loans have increased in all languages around the Baltic Sea in the time of transition. Cash in Penglish (Polish-English) spelling. Photo: Katarzyna Skalska

vate ownership (for a deeper analysis of the Baltics see Mygind 1994). In Estonia and Latvia, the nationalist-oriented policies in relation to the large Russian speaking minority meant that the period supporting broad employee takeovers of enterprises was very short and only covered the privatisation of small enterprises. Before independence, employee takeovers implied that control was taken away from central authorities in Moscow to the Baltic Republics. When this goal was accomplished the next goal was to strengthen the position of the titular population and to find the most

efficient ownership structure.

In Lithuania, with a negligible Russian speaking minority, the workers and employees in general had a much stronger political role. The early ideas of insider-takeovers were further developed in the early years of transition with the implementation of the LIPSP programme. At the same time, there was strong resistance against selling out Lithuania to foreign investors. Lithuanians feared Russian takeovers. Thus, Lithuanian policies for a long period were quite restrictive towards FDI. Estonia, on the other hand, implemented very liberal rules for foreign capital, opening up for the inflow of especially Finnish and Swedish investors.

In Poland early privatisation plans were based on share offerings through the newly established stock exchange. However, it soon became clear that fundamental conditions for this type of privatisation had not been fulfilled. The stock exchange was not developed and the lack of information, capital and management-experience meant that the sale was very slow. Instead Polish privatisation was based on small privatisation and first of all start ups of new enterprises. A considerable number of medium-sized enterprises were privatised through liquidation so that the assets of the enterprises were taken over by the employees. In most other privatisations, including the voucher-program, employees got 10-20% of the shares in their companies (Nutti 1997).

In Russia insider takeovers were also a key feature of privatisation. In fact Russia performed a voucher scheme with some similarities both in timing and context with the Lithuanian privatisation (see below).

In the Soviet Union there were in the second half of the 1980s the first movements in the direction of private enterprises in the form of new cooperatives, individual firms and in the end of the period leasing and joint ventures. This development was strongest in Estonia which functioned as a lab for market reforms in the USSR. The “small state enterprises” with semi-private spin offs from state owned enterprises were part of this development. Also in Latvia a fast development of new-cooperatives made an early start of private entrepreneurship. In Poland where most of the agriculture was never nationalised, in the 1980s small service-oriented firms were opened up, restaurants, shops etc. Reforms in the second half of the 1980s with so-called nomenclatura privatisation gave the possibility for high-positioned officials and managers to take over small lucrative spin offs from state owned enterprises (Lipton and Sachs 1990).

Table 41. Overview of privatisation

	Private % GDP	Large priv.	Small priv.	Gover- nance	Main method	Secondary method	Peak years
Estonia	75	4 .	4+	3 .	direct sale	voucher	1994-95
Latvia	65	3 .	4+	3 –	direct sale	voucher	1996-97
Lithuania	70	3 .	4+	3 –	insider/voucher	direct sale	1992-94
Poland	65	3+	4+	3 .	insider/voucher	direct sale	1997
Russia	70	3+	4 .	2 .	insider/voucher	direct sale	1993-94

Source: Mygind 2000, EBRD 2000, scores for privatisation and governance: 1 none, 4+ full

All five countries have had large voucher schemes involving most of the residents. However, in both Estonia and Latvia the bulk of vouchers were related to the privatisation of land and housing. In Lithuania 65 per cent of the vouchers were used in enterprise privatisation in the LIPSP programme – in Estonia only 28 per cent and in Latvia 42 per cent. In Estonia and Latvia most of these vouchers went to broad public offerings of minority holdings after the sale of the majority to a core investor. A core investor could also finance a big share of the down payment by vouchers in the tender privatisations. In Lithuania, vouchers could only be used in the LIPSP-programme. Often majority share holdings were bought mainly for vouchers. Although the LIPSP privatisation resulted in a more diversified ownership structure than the tender privatisations in Estonia and Latvia, in most cases a core group of owners, most often insiders, acquired a majority of shares. In Poland the voucher scheme covered only a specific group of enterprises. In Russia vouchers were used for the large mass-privatisation in 1992-94.

Because of the limited role of vouchers in enterprise privatisation in Estonia and Latvia investment funds played only a limited role in these countries. In Lithuania around 300-400 investment funds were started in relation to the LIPSP-programme. Most of them were used as leverage for a group of insiders to take control with their companies, but a few developed to investment funds representing a high number of investors and with a diversified portfolio in a large number of companies. However, there were severe governance problems, giving the shareholders too little influence on the administrators, resulting in asset stripping of many funds. When the regulation was tightened in 1997 most of the investment funds were dissolved. In Russia similar scandals developed with some investment funds, but restriction on their scope limited their influence. In Poland the investment funds were defined explicitly in the mass privatisation programme and they were under strict regulation.

In Poland the main elements of the mass-privatisation based on vouchers were already defined in 1990, but political deadlock meant that it was not implemented before 1996-1998. 512 relatively large enterprises representing 10% of the employment in industry were included and taken over by 15 National Investment Funds. In a complex bidding process one of the funds got a dominating ownership position with 33% of the shares; other funds got 27%; 25% went to the treasury reserved for the pension system; and 15% went to the employees. Most of the eligible persons got vouchers which were later transferred to one share in each of the funds. Both the vouchers and later the shares were listed on the stock exchange.

In Russia the mass privatisation scheme based on vouchers was already run from October 1992 to July 1994. Each Russian citizen received for free a voucher with the nominal value of 10000 Rb. The vouchers were tradable and many sold out in the early stages. The vouchers were used as payment for bids at firm-level auctions where mostly minority holdings were

Table 42. Overview of privatisation of enterprises, 1989-2000

	Estonia	Latvia	Lithuania	Poland	Russia
Early	Small state firms, new coops most management owned, Soviet leasing, 12 to emplo. Estonian leasing: 200 firms most management owned	New cooperatives most owned by management Soviet leasing to employees	New cooperatives most owned by management Soviet leasing, 60 to emplo. 1990-91 employee-shares, around 3% of assets	1987-89 nomenklatura privatisations 2000 small spin-offs	New cooperatives most owned by management Leasing to employees
Small	1990 law: insider advantage 360 employee-owned, 90 management-owned advantages cut 1992-93 Most privatised end of 1992 1200 firms sold by 2000.	1991 law, insider advantage 85% privatised 1994 by local municipalities most to management some to other employees	Privatisation by auctions, Possible to use vouchers Sold 1992 1993 1994 1995 57% 70% 76% 100% no advantage for employees	From 1980 leasing of service firms Privatisations by auctions 1990-92: 100 000 firms most taken over by insiders	Regional differences, advantages for employees start 1992, by June 1994: 100 000 firms = 80% of firms privatised of which 60% employee-owned
Large	1989: 7 peoples enterpris-es 1991: 7 SOE, experiments most employee-owned ----- 1992: Estonian Priv. Agency Eastgerman Treuhandmodel Plus for outsiders/foreigners Tenders based on price, and investment-, job-guarantees End of 2000 500 firms sold 5.5 bill EEK (450 mill \$) 4.9 bill EEK invest. guarant. 56000 job guarantees Peak of privatisation 1994 Most privatised 1995 Nearly all by end of 1998 Public offering min. shares for vouchers start au-tumn 1994, by the end of 97: 39 holdings for 2.3 bln EEK (most vouchers for housing) most utilities sold end 2000	1991, 6 SOE sold to insiders 1992-94 decentral privatisat. by sector ministries 50 firms privatised, 78 firms corporatised 234 leased, most to insiders ----- 1994 Latvian Priv. Agency by the end of 1998: 1009 tender privatisations 190 mill LVL (350 mill \$) 244 mill LVL debt take over 127 mill LVL invest.guarant. 47 735 job guarantees Peak of privatisation 1997 Most privatised 1997 Nearly all by end of 1998 Aug. 1994 voucher market 1995/00 88 public offerings 1 bill LVL vouchers End 2000 only few utilities and large enterprises left	1991 LIPSP privatisation Sale of shares for vouchers Employee share increased from 10% 1991, 30% 1992 to 50% 1993 Of around 3000 LIPSP firms sold 1992 1993 1994 1995 38% 62% 75% 99% 46 SOE "hard currency sale" Peak of privatisation 1992, Most large privatised 1994 Slow privatisation of rest shares and very large firms ----- 1996 Lithuania Priv. Agency Privatisation for cash ministries slow process 1998 State Property Fund, => privatisation faster including largest firms End 2000 some utilities and large enterprises left.	8441 firms to privatise 1990 1999: in process: finished: indirect 1466 912 direct 1846 1723 closed 1641 820 total 4953 3455 Direct priv. by liquidation around 900 to employees by leasing with buy-option Indirect privatisation: public offering of shares: (15% free to employees) 400 by December 1999 512 privatised by vouchers: 15 National Invest. Funds 33% fund, 27% other funds 25% Treasury, 15% employ. 1995 voucher distributed to 25.8 mill out of 28.3 eligible converted to shares in 1997 utilities, coal, steel, public transport not privatised	Oct.92-July 94: mass-priv. 14 000, 70% of production OPTION 1: 25% no vote-shares free to employees, 10% voting shares buy by employee at 30% discount, 5% manager buy book value 10% development fund. rest remain in property fund OPTION 2: 66% of firms ! 51% first buy by employees 1.7 times book value OPTION 3: 20% investor, 30% employ. Postponed: strategic firms most natural resource/energy 1995/96: loans for shares, 11 very large firms 1995- direct sale quite slow 1997-2000 minority shares in energy, tele, slow priv.

offered for sale. The auctions were held after the firms had chosen one out of three options for privatisation, see table 42. Option one gave 25% of the shares for free to the employees, but non-voting. The goal was to open up for a majority outside owner. However, in 66% of the cases the enterprises chose option two, implying that the group of employees bought 51% of the shares at a relatively low price (the adjustment of the book value did not correct for the high inflation at that time) (Boycko et al 1995).

The timing of the privatisation for small enterprises was quite similar for the five countries except that Poland started the whole process earlier. The majority of small enterprises were privatised 2-3 years after the start of transition. However, for the medium and large enterprises there have been marked differences. With the implementation of the LIPSP-programme, Lithuania was at its peak of privatisation in 1993 and most larger enterprises were privatised by the end of 1994. Note, however, that in most companies some shares remained state owned, and especially in some very large companies only around 10 per cent of the shares were privatised, so in total only around 50 per cent of the capital was privatised in the companies involved. In Estonia the privatisation had the highest momentum by 1994 and most larger enterprises were privatised by the end of 1995. In Latvia the privatisation gained momentum in 1995-96 to peak in 1997, and large privatisation was nearly accomplished by the end of 1998. Russia's mass privatisation peaked in 1994 and then the remaining part of privatisation was rather slow like in Lithuania.

In Poland the limited mass privatisation peaked in 1997. Poland had a remarkably slow process of large privatisation considering that the country has been very fast in other fields of transition. According to the official statistics, out of 8441 enterprises to be privatised by 1990 only 3455 or 41% had finalised privatisation or had been closed down by the end of 1999. Around 2000 or 24% were in the process which included companies where not all shares had been privatised. The fastest process took place in so-called direct privatisation "by liquidation" where the assets were purchased or leased mainly by the group of employees, Nuti 1997. In the indirect privatisation, with a stage of commercialisation before the final sale of shares, 400 enterprises had been sold by the end of 1999 mainly over the stock exchange and 512 were privatised through the mass-privatisation programme.

Looking at the largest enterprises in utilities and infrastructure, Estonia has been the fastest followed by Latvia. While being fastest in the first round, Lithuania, Russia and Poland, are slowest in the last round of privatisation. However the privatisations in Lithuania and Poland gained momentum in 1998 and a similar development can be expected in Russia.

Foreign investors played only a minor role in the privatisation of small enterprises. The advantages for insiders crowded out the possibilities for outsiders, especially foreign investors. After 1992, they had some possibilities in Estonia. That was to some extent also the case in Latvia. However, for Lithuania, Poland and Russia the foreigners had a very weak position in the mass-privatisation programmes.

Estonia was the first country to use privatisation for the promotion of foreign investment in relation to large privatisation. In the tender process foreign capital had a strong position because of its access to capital, management skills, and international business networks. From 1993 foreigners took over some of the largest enterprises under privatisation. By the end of 1998 foreigners had taken over approximately one third of enterprise assets included in large privatisation.

Latvia started the same process in the autumn of 1994 and the foreign share of purchase was 38 per cent for the years 1994-1998. In Lithuania the LIPSP-privatisation gave very little room for foreigners, and only 4 enterprises out of 46 were taken over by foreign investors

in the privatisation for hard currency up to 1995. After LIPSP there followed the period of stagnation and not before 1998 did foreign capital start to play an important role in privatisation in Lithuania. Poland, like Lithuania, was a bit hesitant concerning foreign investors, but foreigners have been strongly involved in privatisations of large enterprises in the latest years. In Russia foreign involvement in privatisation has been negligible except for some minor shareholdings in the energy sector.

3. Developing a new corporate governance structure

The methods of privatisation have had a great impact on the ownership structure. However, privatisation can only be considered to be the initial stage of developing the ownership and corporate governance system. When special groups have been given specific advantages to acquire the assets, it can be expected that they have not got the preferred portfolio-combination through the privatisation process. Many new owners will be interested in selling their shares and some other groups may want to take over. Quite intense trading in the period after privatisation is expected. However, in the transitional economies the system for trading shares – the market for ownership – is not highly developed and lack of transparency, uncertainty about registration and implementation of ownership rights might be an important barrier for the post-privatisation dynamics.

The most important institutions for the dynamics of ownership are: competition on the product market; enforcement of ownership rights; bankruptcy procedures; and the development of the financial system, banks and the stock exchange.

Table 43. Overview of corporate governance institutions

	Estonia	Latvia	Lithuania	Poland	Russia
Bankruptcy system	Strict legislation 92, tough enforcement	Strict legislation 96, tighter enforcement	Strict legislation 97, tighter enforcement	Strict legislation 98, tough enforcement	Strict legislation 98, enforcement?
Shareholder rights (Commercial law) ¹	Extensiveness 4– Effectiveness 3+	Extensiveness 4 Effectiveness 4–	Extensiveness 4 Effectiveness 3+	Extensiveness 4– Effectiveness 4	Extensiveness 4– Effectiveness 3
Financial system 2 no banks (foreign) firm credits % GDP regulation EBRD-score ¹	7 (2) 26.3% strict regulation 92 4–	23 (12) 16.7% strict regulation 94 3	13 (4) 10.1% strict regulation 95 3	77 (39) 18.8% strict regulation 93 3+	2376 (33) 11.7% loose regulation 2–
Stock market ² Start	May 1996	July 1995	September 1993	April 1991	1991
Listed firms capitalisation % GDP Turnover/capitalisation EBRD-score ¹	25 37.1% 1.61 3	69 6.3% 0.16 2+	611 all lists 10.7% 0.21 3	221 20.0% 0.76 4–	250 44.4% 2–

1) EBRD Transition Report 2000. 2) 1999. The score with maximum 4+ covers the result of a survey of experts and law firms on bankruptcy and commercial law. Capital market data from central banks and stock exchanges.

The legislation on bankruptcy procedures was developed quite early in Estonia, September 1992. The law was strictly enforced so by 1995 more than 1000 bankruptcy procedures had already been implemented. Therefore, takeovers of liquidated assets can be assumed to have an important role in the ownership dynamics in Estonia. Also in Poland bankruptcy legislation and enforcement have been rather tough. This is not the case in the three other countries. In Latvia and Lithuania bankruptcy laws were passed in 1992, but the implementation was relatively weak. The legislation has been strengthened in Latvia in 1996 and in Lithuania in 1997 and the implementation has been tightened in the latest years. In Russia the strengthening was not yet enforced in 2000. The legislation on registration, transfer and enforcement of ownership rights connected to commercial law are quite developed in all five countries. However, according to an EBRD-survey, the implementation of the laws is somewhat behind in Latvia and Lithuania and especially in Russia.

Quite early in the transition process the state-owned banks were split in a two-tier system with a Central Bank and a number of commercial banks to be privatised later in the process. This bank privatisation was performed fastest in Estonia in 1995, in Latvia in 1996, in Lithuania in 2001. In Poland the large commercial banks were divided in regional units and gradually privatised over the period 1990-99, but still the largest bank PKO remains to be privatised. This is also the case for Russian Sberbank. A high number of new private banks were established in the early years of transition to service some of the large enterprises. Many of these banks had quite a weak capital base, and in all countries the development of the financial sector shows a consolidation, a fall in the number of banks and a development of banking activities from simple money transfers to deepening the main activity of channelling savings from the population to investments in companies. However, this development has been quite unstable and most of the countries have been through severe financial crises.

The financial system developed relatively fast in Estonia. As early as 1992-93 the system was strengthened after a major financial crisis. In Latvia there was an even more serious banking crisis in 1995 involving the largest commercial bank in Latvia. In Lithuania three of the largest banks were in crisis at the end of 1995 and 1996. In all three Baltic countries the largest banks are now owned by Scandinavian banks and the importance of the banks for supplying capital to enterprises is increasing steeply. Poland shows the same tendencies, although foreigners in general play a smaller role. The August 1998 crisis in Russian meant that most of the leading banks became insolvent and the following restructuring has been slow and in 2001 the financial sector is still in rather bad shape.

The Tallinn Stock Exchange opened in May 1996. Before that time some trading of shares had taken place in the over-the-counter market. The privatisation of the public offerings for minority shares facilitated the development of the exchange, but there has been no strong relation between the privatisation process and the development of the stock exchange. The Tallinn stock exchange is characterised by a small number of companies and only a few of them are heavily traded. There has been quite high volatility since the start in 1996. Foreigners are strongly involved both with portfolio investment and in the control of core holdings.

Capitalisation and turnover on the Riga Stock Exchange are considerably lower than in Estonia. However, the Latvian stock exchange has developed quite rapidly in recent years in close connection with the acceleration of privatisation of large companies and of public offerings of shares. The National Stock Exchange of Lithuania (NSEL) was established in September 1993, closely connected to the LIPSP-privatisation. Even there, including all the more than 600 enterprises listed in Lithuania, the capitalisation in rela-

tion to GDP was not higher in Lithuania than in Estonia and the turnover is low with thin trading of most companies. The three Baltic stock exchanges have started a cooperation with the aim of a high degree of integration including the start of a common Baltic list of blue-chip stocks. The three exchanges are connected to NOREX, dominated by the stock exchanges in Stockholm and Copenhagen. This integration will probably further accelerate the strengthening of regulation and transparency, which has happened in recent years in the Baltic exchanges.

The Warsaw Stock Exchange started in April 1991. It was boosted by the listing of some of the first large enterprises for privatisation. It has developed quite fast to be the largest Central European stock market both by capitalisation and turnover, and it is rated very positively by the EBRD (2000) for its level of supervision and transparency. The Moscow Stock Exchange has recovered after the crisis in 1998, but the turnover is concentrated around a few large companies mainly in the energy sector, and the role for governance is limited because of a lack of transparency.

The development of the stock exchanges is only relevant for the few very large companies. For all the small and medium and most of the larger enterprises the development in competition, the general development in legislation and enforcement, and the development of the credit system are decisive for corporate governance. In these areas Estonia has had a reasonable functioning system since the mid 1990s, while for Latvia and Lithuania the same level was not reached before around 1997-98. In the following sections we will look into the effects on the dynamics of ownership and on the economic performance and restructuring.

4. Ownership, restructuring and economic performance in the Baltic countries

The following sections are based on ongoing research in the Baltics. Many of the results are parallel to results from Russia and Poland, but these results will not be referred to. The section is divided in three parts: 1) ownership structure resulting from privatisation and the establishment of new firms, 2) ownership dynamics after privatisation, 3) governance structures and economic performance/restructuring.

Ownership structure resulting from privatisation and the establishment of new firms. The ownership structure now existing in the Baltic countries is both a result of privatisation/start-ups of new enterprises and of dynamic change in ownership after the establishment as private entities. Management ownership is dominant for small enterprises, both for start-ups and for privatised. Like in the West most small enterprises in trade, small manufacturing etc. have been started by a sole proprietor. The new cooperatives have been a special way of running early private start ups giving the broader group of employees a more formal role in the ownership structure, but most of these enterprises were transformed to management-owned enterprises. In the privatisation process managers of small enterprises or smaller entities of larger enterprises have got good possibilities to take over their units. This was the case in the early period of transition in all three countries. In some cases, especially in Estonia and Latvia broader, employee ownership was encouraged in the early small privatisation. In Lithuania the privatisation of small enterprises had less advantages for employees than was the case for large privatisation in the LIPSP programme.

The result on the ownership structure was a high proportion of manager-owned small enterprises in Estonia and Latvia and a somewhat lower proportion in Lithuania where ownership of a broader group of employees also included medium and large-sized enterprises. The total proportion of insider ownership after privatisation was on quite a high level compared with international standard. Thus in January 1995 it is estimated that in 30 to 60% of the private companies in the three countries insiders owned at least 50% of the firm. In Lithuania around 75% of the employees own shares. In Estonia, we find a higher incidence of employee ownership, with one in four employees owning shares in private firms in 1995.

In Lithuania, nearly all enterprises have at least an element of employee ownership, the broad group of employees has a quite strong position versus management, and there are fewer non-owners among the employees than in Estonia and Latvia. In Lithuanian industry the employees dominate managers in relation to ownership. In Estonia and Latvia the two types of ownership have about the same weight when measured in January 1995.

Foreign ownership has been most important in relation to some of the very large privatisations in all three countries. This type of privatisation started some years earlier in Estonia than in Latvia and first took off in Lithuania in 1998. This is a major reason why foreign ownership up until 1996 was very important in Estonia while of minor importance in Latvia and of negligible importance in Lithuania. Because of the proximity to Finland and the general international openness, Estonia has also seen quite a high proportion of foreign ownership in small enterprises especially in trade. There are also some tendencies in this direction in Latvia, while in Lithuania the share of foreign ownership is lower than in the two Northern countries.

One of the main barriers for establishing insider ownership is the lack of capital. Foreign investors on the other hand have a strong advantage in access to capital. Special advantages for insiders in the privatisation process might change this relation. In the Baltics, this was the case in Lithuania. In Estonia and Latvia there is a strong tendency for a relatively low capital intensity in insider-owned enterprises. Insiders could not afford a takeover when nominal capital per employee was high. Because of insider advantages in Lithuania, total assets per employee are on the same level in insider as well as in outsider-owned companies.

Post-privatisation ownership dynamics. The initial ownership structure after privatisation cannot be expected to fit the long-term preferences of different stakeholders and to the most efficient distribution of ownership in different owner groups. However, trading of shares, enforcement of ownership rights and other elements in the institutional framework for corporate governance might hamper the dynamic adjustment, resulting in a high degree of inertia in the ownership structure.

In fact, some degree of inertia characterises all three countries. Except for the continuing privatisation transferring ownership from the state to the other groups, there is only little dynamic between the broadly defined private ownership categories such as insiders, domestic outsiders and foreign outsiders. However, the main change takes place within the group of insiders. In all three countries there is a strong trend of transferring broad employee ownership to management ownership. The tendency away from employee ownership can also be found on the personal level in the enterprises.

Dynamics with foreign owners taking over privately-owned enterprises can also be found in the material although the frequency is rather low. Here we find some indication of gradual takeovers to a higher extent than takeovers in one blow.

Ownership structures and economic performance. The general conclusions in most theoretical literature on the relation between ownership and economic performance/ restructuring is that private performs better than state, outsiders better than insiders, and within these groups managers better than employees and foreigners better than domestic investors (see table 44).

Foreign ownership is considered to have the highest potential for efficient economic performance and restructuring because of the access to capital, management skills, including corporate governance abilities, and access to international business networks. All the companies in the transition economies will meet strong barriers because of the lack of developed institutions and high market uncertainty, but foreigners have an advantage because of their strong links to Western markets. This is the main advantage in relation to concentrated domestic outside ownership. On the negative side, foreigners meet strong cultural barriers and they do not have access to local networks.

Insider ownership on the other hand, and especially employee ownership, are considered to have specific disadvantages because employees might have special objectives of having stable jobs and high wages differing from profit maximisation. They might lack the necessary management skills and they have limited access to capital. On the other hand, participatory ownership can increase employee motivation and align the interests of the employees with the company. Management ownership lies somewhat between employee ownership and outside domestic ownership.

Table 44. Theoretical predictions on efficiency for different owner groups main stream prediction: higher efficiency

State	Employee	Manager	Foreign
-information and incentive problems	-specific goals -lack of skills -lack of capital	-risk concentration -lack of capital	+profit-maximisation +capital +manage skill +networks
+soft incentives +benchmarking	+motivation +interest alignment +control managers	+strong manager motivation	- culture - local networks
	specific barriers on the domestic market lack of efficient financial market etc.		+access to well functioning international markets

Before evaluating the actual performance of the different owner groups it must be checked whether they have the same starting conditions. Management ownership is especially found in small enterprises, while employee ownership tends to be larger on average. Insider-ownership has a quite low capital-intensity and foreign owned a rather high intensity and this concerns both privatisations and start-ups. For privatised enterprises, an important question is if specific owner groups can “skim the cream” when choosing the companies for take-overs, while other groups are left with the low-performing enterprises. Data for the very early years before privatisation are difficult to get and not very reliable, but our indicators show that there is no significant variation in the level of pre-privatisation profitability between owner groups. There is no evidence of “cream skimming”. However, both the description of the early privatisation process and the data on capital-intensity give some indications that insiders might have acquired their enterprises for a relatively low price.

Looking at the economic results for different ownership structures quite strong general trends in all countries are apparent. Some of the results are based on deeper econometric analysis, e.g. factor productivity for Estonian panel data, but much of the results are based on

simple descriptive data and shall be taken as preliminary. Table 45 gives a simplified overview contrasting insider and foreign ownership.

The performance of foreign owned enterprises has the following characteristics:

- high capital intensity from the start,
- high sales per employee, and high growth rate of sales,
- high export share (only documented for Estonia),
- high labour productivity, measured as value added per employee, (difference to other groups lower when measured as sales per employee),
- high investment level,
- relatively high level of debt and good access to bank loans (bank loans per employee much higher than for other owner groups).

These figures show that foreign-owned enterprises take the lead when it concerns proactive restructuring, that is developing new markets, new products and new production methods. In this way the foreign-owned companies used their advantages in relation to access to capital, and market networks.

The other side of the coin is that foreign owned enterprises have:

- relatively high wages,
- higher cost of capital connected to the high capital intensity,
- factor productivity on the same level as insider ownership ,
- relatively low return on assets.

The results indicate that the high level of assets have not yet paid off in foreign-owned enterprises. Profitability is lower and factor productivity on the same level as in insider-owned enterprises, although foreign ownership has advantages in management and easy access to international market networks.

If we look at insider-owned enterprises, they seem to be examples of more defensive restructuring:

- cutting down employment – sometimes somewhat sluggish,
- paying relatively low wages,
- having problems of getting bank loans,
- implementing relatively low investments.

However, at the same time they show relatively good results on profitability and factor-productivity. This is connected to relatively low capital intensity at the starting point, but it also indicates that they have done some restructuring and improved their use of scarce resources in a direction of higher efficiency. Compared to domestic outsider-owned enterprises, insider ownership is doing surprisingly well in most measures across the three countries. This is the case for factor productivity for Estonia – no significant differences for the other countries can be found.

Table 45. Evidence on restructuring – Baltic data

Defensive restructuring	Deep/strategic restructuring
insider ownership	foreign ownership (strategic investor)
employment cut (sluggish)	high growth
low wages	high wages
moderate sales growth	high growth, high exports
labour productivity, middle	high labour productivity
low capital intensity	high capital intensity
low investments	high investments
low level of bank loans	high bank loans per employee
factor productivity, middle	factor productivity, middle level

insider ownership has higher return on assets than foreign ownership
domestic outsider ownership perform worse than insider ownership

Based on Mygind (2000)

5. Final remarks and perspectives

The Baltic countries show many similarities in the development of new ownership structures, but they have followed different paths of privatisation and this has to some extent resulted in differences in the structures of enterprise governance. All countries have a high degree of insider ownership in small enterprises. In Lithuania and also in Russia and Poland employee ownership also plays a considerable role in larger enterprises. Foreign ownership is especially important in Estonia, but Latvia, Lithuania and Poland have been catching up in recent years.



Figure 166. Tourism generates profits for industrious minorities. A Saami marketplace in Sweden. Photo: Andrzej Szmaj

The strongest post-privatisation dynamics has been managers taking over the ownership from other employees. Although this process will probably continue for a longer period, the ownership structure of all the Baltic Rim countries will for the foreseeable future have quite a strong element of employee ownership, and management ownership will continue to be on a high level especially in small and medium-sized enterprises. At the same time, foreign ownership will play a strong and increasing role. Although mainstream

theory predicts relatively bad economic performance by insider-owned enterprises, such negative results are not found in the data for large samples of Baltic enterprises. However, the results confirm the predictions about strong strategic restructuring in foreign-owned enterprises.

48 Foreign direct investment in the Baltic Sea Region

Camilla Jonsson, Klaus E. Meyer

1. Introduction

Foreign direct investment (FDI) can be a major force of economic integration, even where barriers to trade are still in place. FDI brings economic activity in different countries into one organization, the multinational enterprise (MNE). It generates intensive exchanges between the business units in different countries, such as trade, managerial knowledge transfer, and financial investment. Consequently, MNEs influence their host economies through a variety of direct and spillover effects.

In this chapter, we review the role of FDI in economic integration processes, and consider its potential for the Baltic Sea region. We first introduce the driving forces of FDI and the spillovers that may benefit host economies. On this basis, we discuss the empirical evidence of FDI in the Baltic Sea region. Finally, we illustrate the role of FDI with two case studies of Danish investors in Poland and Latvia.

2. FDI, trade and economic growth

FDI has received increasing attention in developing and transition countries because it is widely seen as a catalyst to economic growth and development. Expectations are particularly high in the Baltic Sea Region where countries at different stages of development co-exist in close proximity, and where economic integration had been artificially disrupted from the 1940s to the 1980s. The diversity of comparative advantages raises considerable potential for integration, because multinational firms can locate different production processes where skilled labour is available at comparatively low cost, while incurring only limited transportation costs and cross-cultural frictions (Meyer 2001b).

FDI influences growth in many ways. Firstly, investors transfer financial capital, which can help in overcoming bottlenecks particularly during the investment-driven stages of growth when capital is a scarce factor (Dunning, 1993, 2001). Moreover, they transfer bundles of other factors and resources, such as technology and other types of knowledge including managerial experiences and organisational templates or designs. Combining this with skilled labour at favourable costs, FDI can enhance the host country's exports, activating advantages in existing endowments and linking with local suppliers. FDI is most advantageous when virtuous circles and positive feedbacks are generated as a result of foreign entry, leading to dynamic industrial development in the host economy. For this to happen, foreign technology has to be absorbed in the host country through spillovers, learning processes and linkages developed with domestic firms (Blomström et al., 2000). Under

favourable conditions, FDI may thus contribute to agglomeration effects and the development of industrial districts.

In transition economies such as the Baltics, Poland and Russia, FDI moreover facilitates the microeconomic transition from plan to market economy (Kogut 1996, Meyer 2001a). Foreign investors can act as an example for local firms unacquainted with the functioning of a market economy. They demonstrate how new ways of organising production can increase efficiency, and how new forms of network or market-based interaction between firms can improve allocation of goods and services. Moreover, FDI can speed up the process of international knowledge acquisition not only of technology but, more important in this context, management and marketing expertise.

However, the positive effects cannot be taken for granted. Knowledge transfer benefits the host economy best if it diffuses beyond the MNE and is absorbed in the host economy. Spillovers are limited if foreign investors operate in enclaves isolated from the rest of the economy or at great technological distance from local firms. Negative ramifications may occur if, for example, foreign investors crowd out domestic competitors or attain a dominant market position. Sometimes, FDI is also criticised for its footloose nature, especially in wage-sensitive industries such as textiles. Sudden relocation of production may have negative consequences for employment in small countries or regions.

FDI thus affects host economies in multiple ways. The spillover effects vary depending on specific characteristics of the project, including investment motives, relations with local suppliers and distributors, investment in training, and industrial dynamics. However, equally important is the host country's ability to absorb received technology, which in turn depends on the financial and technological resources of local firms, and the competitiveness of the pertinent markets.

The long-term or structural effects of FDI on economic development are highly complex, because it influences the host countries' place in the international division of labour and in the value chain of production. Moreover, FDI influences the pattern of regional integration by promoting trade specialisation, although there is no simple way to describe the relationship between trade and FDI. FDI can both substitute and complement international trade, and may accelerate changes in comparative advantage of the home and host country.

Now, more than half of international trade takes place within the umbrella of ownership. Hence, FDI facilitates trade through both the horizontal and vertical division of labour within MNEs. Through trade, countries, especially small ones, may grow faster by catering to larger markets. Trade enables countries to specialise where they have comparative advantages and thereby reap static and dynamic economies of scale from specialisation.

Estonia has already joined a distinct group of small open economies that have been growing rapidly in the 1990s, arguably due to the benefits of inward FDI. Singapore and Hong Kong are the leaders in this category, while Ireland is a recent European success story. Combining openness with inward FDI appears to generate higher growth rates.

On the other hand, the costs of openness are much less documented. If exports are generated by MNE in one or a few industries, this may create dependencies, and thus risks for the host economy. Also, a large MNE can dominate the structural change in a small open economy. Larger host countries, such as Poland and Russia, may obtain benefits from hosting MNE without the risk of dependency. At the same time, they receive more market-oriented FDI, which is less likely to relocate in response to the changing cost structures.

Several empirical studies have attempted to evaluate the impact of FDI in the Baltic Sea Region. With only ten years of experience, such studies have as yet been limited to short-term

and direct effects in Estonia and Poland. In Estonia, Varblane (2000) finds that efficiency is generally higher in industries with higher foreign participation. Furthermore, foreign-owned firms in general are of bigger size, and more capital and export-intensive than domestic-owned firms. But Varblane also concludes that the gap between foreign and domestic-owned firms tends to decline over time. Mygind (2000) observes similar differences across different types of ownership in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. He concludes that foreign-owned firms are more likely to engage in deep restructuring because of their better access to capital and market networks. They achieve higher labour productivity, which can however be explained entirely by their higher capital intensity.

Similar results are observed in Poland, where foreign-owned firms have a higher capital and export intensity. However, in Poland domestic firms are often larger than their foreign competitors. In a panel of Polish manufacturing firms, Jensen (2001) finds that total factor productivity, a measure of productivity, is on average (across all industries) higher in foreign owned firms. Zukowska-Gagelmann (2000) provides a first attempt at estimating spillovers at the industry level in Poland, and finds that local firms competing with foreign investors experience slower productivity growth. She suggests that these local firms see demand for their produce drop, leaving them with costly excess production capacity.

3. Motivations and obstacles to FDI in the Baltic Sea Region

FDI to the transition economies surged in the 1990s after having been blocked for five decades. Hungary has been an early leader, but the Baltic States and Poland have received substantial amounts of FDI, especially when the size of the economy is taken into account. Russia, on the other hand, received relatively little FDI. What accounts for these differences?

Most foreign investors in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) pursue local markets (Meyer 2001a). Investors expect considerable long-term growth of demand, especially as the income of the middle class, their prime customers, grows faster than the average measured by GDP. Beyond growth, the attraction of these emerging markets arises from the specific patterns of demand and competition. First, there is considerable pent-up demand as consumers in CEE previously had little or no access to consumer goods and brands available in other countries at similar levels of per capita income. Second, entry in CEE may enhance the investor's global strategic position. Third, several underdeveloped sectors of industry are being re-established, creating considerable demand for investment goods and other business-to-business markets.

Factors of production have been less crucial for many of the early investors. As motives, low labour costs and natural resources were often secondary to gaining access to large and unsaturated markets (Meyer, 2001a). However, labour costs are relatively more important for small and medium-sized enterprises from neighbouring countries, e.g. for German investors in Poland and Finnish investments in Estonia. Market-seeking investments may also serve as a learning platform that facilitates later establishment of local production. Over time, labour-cost-seeking investment is expected to become more common (Lankes and Venables, 1996). Moreover, the Baltic States and Poland may serve as a bridge between the East and West, with access to both Russian and European Union markets.

Hazley and Hirvensalo (1998) analyse investors' motives in the Baltic Sea Region, finding no significant differences in the general motives of investors in the five host countries. Market




Figure 167. Cumulative inflows of FDI to the Baltic Sea Region, 1990-99
Sources: UNCTAD (1997, 2000)




Figure 168. FDI relative to population, GDP and capital formation, 1999
Source: UNCTAD (2000), World Bank (2000).

this has been much less the case in Russia (Boycko et al., 1995). At the same time, much larger and more persistent obstacles to undertaking investments explain in part the lower level of FDI in Russia. Problems with crime and corruption in Russia are very severe obstacles compared with the more mundane obstacles experienced by investors in the Baltic Sea Region in general. At the same time, mundane obstacles also loom large in Russia. The most common obstacles include unclear legislation, especially concerning accounting and taxation, the right to purchase land and problems with finding human resources with the necessary skills to run a modern firm (Hazley and Hirvensalo, 1998, Varblane, 2000). Recently, taxation has also been turned into a tool for attracting investors to a specific location (Hirvensalo, 2000). Since the locational advantages offered by the five countries are similar, they must find new ways to differentiate their specific location.

access is most widespread, followed by the opportunity to learn and gain knowledge about the conditions in the host country. Low costs and access to raw materials are, on the other hand, relatively rare motivations among investors in the Baltic Sea Region. Thus, the different attraction of the five countries for foreign investors cannot be explained by market size and factors of production alone.

An important opportunity for foreign investors has been their participation in the privatisation process. Estonia has used the privatisation process to attract foreign investors, similar to Eastern Germany and Hungary. The lack of a capitalist class in these societies makes FDI an attractive mode of privatising industry. The Estonian example has been followed somewhat later in both Latvia and Lithuania (Mygind, 2000). The privatisation process in Poland has also become more open to foreign participation, while

4. Recent trends of FDI in the Baltic Sea Region

To compare FDI in large and small Baltic Sea countries in the 1990s, we have adjusted FDI inflow data to the size of the economy, using three different indicators. Estonia leads, having attracted far more FDI than other Eastern European countries. Russia received far less FDI than could have been expected, mainly because of the slow progress of building the institutions of a market economy. A large FDI inflow was recorded in one year only, 1997, the year of major privatisation projects. Latvia, like Estonia is above the Eastern European average while Poland and Lithuania received FDI on par with the regional average. However, Lithuania is quite dependent on FDI for new capital formation, indicating that domestic capital has been particularly scarce there. Compared to Western Europe, all the Baltic States are attracting large amounts relative to GDP or gross fixed capital formation, but per capita East European levels are far below West European ones.

Geographic and cultural proximity facilitate the flow of FDI among individual countries. Table 46 shows the origin of FDI in the Baltic Sea Region by the investor's home country. Estonia, Lithuania and Poland are already strongly integrated into EU multinational networks, while this is much less the case for Russia. Latvia has little geographical concentration of her FDI stock, with Danish FDI representing the largest share. Finnish and Swedish investors are leading in Estonia and Lithuania. Cultural affinity is important, notably between Finland and Estonia. Latvia receives more Russian FDI related to transit trade via her Baltic Sea ports.

Table 46 shows moreover that investments are more likely to take place between countries of similar size. German, French and American investors prefer host countries of a larger size such as Poland and Russia. Finally, 22.6% of FDI in Russia comes from Cyprus, indicating the virtual nature of much of this FDI. Anecdotes suggest that Russian businesses (legal and illegal) use Cyprus as a shelter to take advantage of tax benefits or to launder money. In interpreting these data, one should, however, keep in mind that a single large project can dominate any particular data point in FDI statistics.

The FDI stock in the five countries also varies greatly by sector and industry. Russia exhibits a breakdown of inward FDI typical for developing countries with restricted openness to foreign investors. FDI is concentrated in a few industries. Russia also has a relatively large share of FDI that goes into natural resource extraction such as mining, petroleum and gas. Estonia, Latvia and Poland show a much more diversified pattern.

Poland represents the typical re-industrialising host country where the manufacturing sector takes the largest share. But FDI into services and infrastructure projects is also important in Poland, especially in recent years as service industries such as banking and telecommunications have been privatised. Estonia and Latvia have a peculiar pattern, with the lion's share of FDI in the service economy. This is rather unusual, even until quite recently among the EU countries and may be explained by the privatisation of banking and other service industries. When this process has been completed, a resurging of the share of manufacturing FDI can be expected.

Table 46. Breakdown of the FDI stock by investor's home country, 1999

Percentage of total	Est	Lat	Lit	Pol	Rus
<i>European Union</i>	<i>84.6</i>	<i>50.8</i>	<i>71.9</i>	<i>63.8</i>	<i>24.7</i>
Denmark	4.1	13.7	10.5	1.5	–
Finland	30.1	5.1	23.6	0.6	2.2
France	0.2	–	–	11.0	1.4
Germany	2.5	8.4	2.0	17.3	8.1
Ireland	0.3	3.9	1.2	2.3	–
Netherlands	1.6	2.9	1.0	9.2	3.8
Sweden	41.1	8.2	28.1	2.2	1.9
UK	2.8	7.4	1.3	5.9	6.0
<i>Other</i>	<i>15.4</i>	<i>49.2</i>	<i>28.1</i>	<i>36.2</i>	<i>75.3</i>
Norway	3.4	3.7	2.7	1.3	–
US	3.9	9.7	20.7	14.7	35.1
Russia	1.4	7.3	–	3.2	–
Cyprus	0.1	–	–	–	22.6

Source: UNCTAD (2000)

While the countries on the Eastern shore of the Baltic Sea have received FDI for over a decade now, they are only very gradually emerging as a source of FDI. A recent study by Liuhto (2001) shows that outward FDI is of increasing importance to the international business of local firms from the Baltic States. Of the companies surveyed by Liuhto, 40% have undertaken some kind of investment abroad. However, most of these operations are related to export sales of goods produced in the home country. UNCTAD statistics suggest that Latvia and Russia are the largest outward investors among the Baltic Rim countries in terms of total gross fixed capital formation. This is confirmed by Liuhto, who has found that 50% of Latvian companies already operate abroad, compared to only 43% from Estonia and 35% from Lithuania. The numbers for Poland and Russia are believed to be lower, though no actual estimates are available. Outward FDI from the Baltic Rim countries focuses on regional markets, while few firms are competitive enough yet to invest in the EU. For example, Liuhto observes that most of the Baltic State's FDI is undertaken amongst themselves or within the former USSR. Most Polish outward FDI is in marketing and sales with the exception of some projects in manufacturing in Russia.

For further study, data of FDI can be obtained in the annual publications "World Investment Report" by UNCTAD, "Foreign Direct Investment Handbook" by OECD, balance of payment statistics published by the IMF or data from local statistical offices and central banks. Meyer and Pind (1999) critically evaluate the data for former Soviet Union states.

5. Case studies

The two following case studies of Danish FDI illustrate the different motivations and the actual experiences of investors in the Baltic Sea Region. Spectre A/S uses labour cost differentials to manufacture textile products for West European markets. Schouw Packing, on the other hand, is an example of a market-seeking investment.

Spectre A/S in Latvia. Spectre A/S is a small entrepreneurial firm with roots in the textile district of Herning-Ikast in Jutland, Denmark. The firm operates in two niches of the textile industry, ready-made clothing sold under Spectre's own brand names, and custom-made clothing manufactured to order for major European brands. In these niches, Spectre's competitive advantage is based primarily on two factors:

- its access to quality yet cost-efficient production capacity in Latvia, and
- its ability to deliver produce soon after receiving an order, which in turn depends on its ability to handle logistics and its integration to international business networks.

Geographically, Spectre A/S has located design, marketing and administration tasks in Denmark, while the production of all clothing types (mainly sewing) has been relocated to factories in Latvia. The operation was established at the beginning of the 1990s, when rising costs made sewing processes in Denmark uncompetitive. Spectre A/S had experimented with a subcontracting arrangement in Poland, but was not satisfied with the quality of the produce. In these market niches, quality is a key competitive parameter. Yet a contractual arrangement did not provide the necessary framework for knowledge transfer and control over the local operation.

The Danish entrepreneur visited several facilities in the Baltic States in view of establishing an affiliate, and chose the partially privatised firm Saiva in Latvia. He was motivated by the skills of the work force and by the fact that he got along well with Saiva's top manager. Moreover, he found the Latvian labour market to be advantageous for Spectre's operations. Employees and management of Saiva owned 70% of the shares and the state still owned the remaining 30%. Spectre purchased the remaining shares from the state in an auction.

After the purchase Spectre had to engage in deep restructuring of Saiva. The Latvian firm had more facilities and employees than the Danish entrepreneur had been aware of prior to the purchase. At the same time, however, much of the existing technology was obsolete. In this way Spectre used the acquisition to learn about local business opportunities and over time created the type of facilities that were needed in suitable locations in Latvia. Productivity has been improved by technological upgrading and by introducing new motivation schemes such as job rotation, free lunches, and materials for home sewing. Currently, Spectre owns two sewing facilities with 500 employees in Latvia and has further plans for expansion.

Overall the investment in Latvia has been a success for Spectre and it has sustained the firm's growth strategy. The participation in the privatisation process provided a unique opportunity, yet also unforeseen risks. Labour productivity has been raised in Latvia while costs remain competitive. Through the commitment of the Danish entrepreneur, the upgraded factories in Latvia today supply quality clothing to major brands and retailers across Europe.

SCHOUW Packing in Poland. SCHOUW Packing has roots in the packaging industry around Aarhus in Jutland, Denmark. It was established in 1910 and is today a joint venture between the Danish conglomerate A/S SCHOUW & Co. and Elopak A/S in Norway. Elopak is a global supplier and manufacturer of machinery and Pure-Pak cartons for the dairy and juice industry. SCHOUW Packing has a core competence in supplying complete filling systems for milk and juice in Pure-Pak carton and plastic bottles, for which it is a leader in its home market. Together, Elopak and SCHOUW Packing use a 'Total System Approach', including the transfer of technology and know-how to their customers.

The investment in Poland is driven by the global expansion strategy of its parent firms. Due to a strong focus on customer relationship building, it is necessary for Elopak to be represented through own subsidiaries in all its major markets. Poland has been attractive due to its market size as the largest of the transition economies. Moreover, Poland has an important agricultural base with 400 dairies, which are the primary customers for SCHOUW Packing's packaging technology.

SCHOUW Packing had business contacts in Poland before 1989, via a Finnish affiliate. In 1991 it inaugurated its affiliate under the name Elopak S.A., shortly after the entry of their major competitor Tetra Pak. Worldwide, Pure-Pak is the number two brand in milk cartons after Tetra Pak. Their entry into the Polish market induced SCHOUW Packing to increase its commitment in the region to prevent its main competitor from achieving a dominant market position. Elopak S.A. has developed gradually around supporting activities such as the installation of new filling machines, distribution, marketing and customer relationship building.

The Polish operation serves to build customer relations, and to adapt the product to local needs. The Pure-Pak cartons are imported from Denmark, Germany and Holland. The operation has been established as a greenfield investment because no local firm had the necessary competence in the specific business of carton production. Prior to 1989 milk was distributed in plastic bags only. The recruitment of Polish CEO Edward Zakrzewski, a scientist and expert in the field of milk fermentation, was a cornerstone in the entry strategy because he was able to establish credibility and contacts with key customers.

The expansion of Pure-Pak cartons has been slower than expected. Obstacles arose with both business culture and customer preferences in Poland. It has been more difficult than anticipated to persuade the co-operatives to replace the plastic bags with the cleaner and environmentally safer milk cartons. Marketing has, then, to focus on persuading potential customers of the benefits of new types of packaging. Yet adaptation is also important. In response to customer concerns, the user-friendly opening mechanism used on some juice cartons was transferred to the Polish milk cartons.

SCHOUW Packing's investment is an example of a market-seeking investment in the Baltic Sea Region. SCHOUW Packing became engaged on the Polish market in view of the large dairy industry. The spin-offs generated by a market-seeking investment like this one are normally smaller than those of a production relocation investment like Spectre A/S. However, in addition to direct employment effects, we can observe potentially substantial improvements in quality of milk delivered to consumers in Poland as a result of improved packaging technology.

6. Conclusion

FDI can be a considerable force facilitating economic integration in the Baltic Sea region. Since 1990, FDI from the Western side of the Baltic Sea to its Eastern shore has surged. It has been motivated by both the search for new markets and the opportunities of integrating production at locations with different comparative advantages. This FDI can potentially benefit the host economies by contributing investment capital, transferring knowledge, generating exports, and promoting the development of related local businesses.

49 International Trade

Alari Purju

The purpose of this chapter is to identify the role of international trade in the countries and regions covered. The role of economic and political conditions in the creation of the framework for international trade is described. Also, some basic statistical figures on the structure of exports and imports are provided.

1. Reasons for foreign trade

There are also other explanations for trade. The concept of *intra-industry trade*, where countries exchange similar goods, is based on economies of scale in production and larger international co-operation within multinational companies. Some operations are then subcontracted out for countries, which have special advantages concerning some factors of production. Low labour costs are one of the factors that attract labour-intensive industries to move some operations from their homeland to other areas. The practice of Scandinavian companies to move some production of components and semi-final products to the Baltic States, where labour costs are several times lower compared to the homeland of those companies, is one example. Intra-industry trade is part of exports and imports of all countries involved in that division of labour. That type of connection is defined as *vertical intra-industry trade*.

Another reason for exchange of similar products is related to different tastes and a wide spectrum of consumer preferences. For that reason, the Scandinavian states produce and exchange a wide set of goods that are produced in every country. Examples of this kind of *horizontal intra-industry trade* are works of art, clothing articles and others.

Comparative advantages of production

According to traditional international trade theories, countries differ with respect to the conditions of production, such as weather conditions, amounts of labour, capital and natural resources. This provides each country with a set of comparative advantages. On the basis of these advantages, countries tend to specialise in the production of particular goods and services. Specialisation in production also causes exports of goods and services for which the conditions of the particular country are best, and imports of other products that are more effectively produced in other countries. Traditional trade theories assume that factors of production are immobile and that goods can be freely exchanged across national borders.

2. Foreign trade policy tools

Although the free trade of goods increases global welfare, individual countries have often intervened against free trade. Countries use several trade policy tools to protect domestic companies from competition of foreign companies. Two classic types of trade barriers are *customs tariffs* and *quantitative restrictions*.

Customs tariff is a duty imposed on a product. It may be a fixed duty per unit or an *ad valorem* duty charged as a percentage of the value of the product. In most cases tariffs are imposed on imports.

Quantitative restrictions such as import quotas restrict the imports of a certain product to a specific volume per year. An example could be quotas for the export of food products to the EU market that EU accession countries have been provided with.

Another type of non-tariff restriction is *local content requirement* (rules of origin), which determines the share of value added that should be produced in a particular country to make exports acceptable to the other country. In the case of textile and some other products of accession countries, the local content requirement protects the EU from imports from third countries that would otherwise be channelled through accession countries without that requirement.

There are also *anti-dumping rules* that are targeted to restrict the sale of products with injurious price levels. Anti-dumping rules are first of all applied against importers to a particular country or economic area.

Various kinds of *export subsidies* have been increasingly used in recent years, despite the fact that several international agreements in principle prohibit export subsidies on industrial products. For that reason, most subsidies do not specifically relate to exports but to domestic production. Those subsidies would increase exports, but at the expense of domestic taxpayers, and the welfare effect of export subsidies is negative.



Figure 169. Trans-boundary, small-scale trade creates a large market. Building materials warehouse at the Polish-Slovak border. Photo: Alfred F. Majewicz

3. Regional integration

The GATT – General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade – signed by 23 countries in 1947, came to provide a framework for post-war trade liberalisation. A new organization, the World Trade Organization (WTO), has been established and the WTO Treaty was signed on 15 April 1994. That treaty includes the GATT Treaty and agreements reached during the latest round of negotiations.

There are several forms of economic integration based on similar rules upon foreign trade. A *free trade area* consists of a group of countries among which trade takes place freely, i.e. without tariffs or quantitative restrictions. At the same time each country retains its individual tariffs and quantitative import restrictions against countries outside the free trade area. The European Free Trade Association (EFTA) is an example of a free trade area. The EFTA

was established in 1960 by countries staying outside the European Economic Community (EEC) founded by the Rome Treaty in 1958. Later several members of the EFTA joined the European Union (EU). An important free trade area is also the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), signed in 1993 and consisting of Canada, the United States and Mexico.

A *customs union* presents a higher degree of economic integration due to a common foreign trade policy. The members of a customs union have a common external tariff wall and other common external import restrictions against countries outside of the customs union. The EU is first and foremost a customs union. The tariffs and quantitative restrictions on trade among member countries were banned and after a period of transition a common external tariff wall was set up. The further developments have made the EU a common market also with the free movement of capital and labour in addition to the free movement of goods and services.

There are two types of welfare effects related to joining a customs union. The *trade creation* effect is due to the volume of new trade created by forming the trade bloc. The *trade diversion* is the volume of trade diverted from lower cost outside the customs union suppliers to higher cost partners of the customs union suppliers. Whether a customs union is good or bad depends on the difference between its trade creation effect and its trade diversion effect. In the case of the EU, most economists think that its trade creation has outweighed its trade diversion.

4. Foreign trade agreements in the Baltic Region

The foreign trade between the countries located on the shores of the Baltic Sea took place back in historical times. Several cities of the area belonged to the *Hanseatic League* in the 14th-15th centuries when trade flourished and there were many contacts between the cities.

After the Second World War, the iron curtain divided the area and conditions for foreign trade were very different. The Scandinavian countries, at different speed, integrated with the Western World. Russia, Belarus and the Baltic States were part of the Soviet Union and participated mainly in the distribution of production between the republics of that state. Poland was a satellite of the former Eastern bloc and this determined the geographical pattern of foreign trade dominated by the Soviet Union and other East European countries.

After the collapse of the Soviet economic system, regained independence of the Baltic States and transition to market economy in Poland, very rapid changes also took place in foreign trade. The transition countries orientated their foreign trade rapidly toward Western Europe, with special emphasis on integration with the EU. Russia also partly deregulated its foreign trade. Belarus remained strictly regulated and oriented on contacts with its Eastern neighbour. The trade with Baltic Region transition economies achieved a larger share also in the trade balance of Scandinavian countries, but those changes were proportionally several times smaller than changes in the trade balances of those countries.

The Baltic Region includes countries with quite different levels of economic development and foreign trade patterns. There are rich Scandinavian countries such as Denmark, Finland and Sweden, transition economies like the Baltic States Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, and Poland. Also Russia (especially the St-Petersburg area) and Belarus belong to this region. The big differences in welfare and production capacities have a strong impact on foreign trade as well.

The countries differ also in their position in the regional integration process. The three Scandinavian countries are *members of the EU*, Denmark joined in 1972 and Finland and

Sweden as late as 1995. The Baltic States and Poland are *accession countries*. Poland has had a Free Trade Agreement with the EU in force since 1992 and the European Agreement, which also contains the Free Trade Agreement and regulates its associated member of the EU status, since 1994. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have had these agreements in force since 1995 and 1998 respectively. These agreements created free trade between the EU and associated countries of industrial products, while agricultural articles are subject to modest restrictions.

The association countries have also signed free trade agreements between themselves. There is the *Baltic Free Trade Agreement* between the Baltic States and the *Central European Free Trade Agreement* between the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, the latter agreement is known also as the Višegrad agreement after the place where it was concluded.

Twelve countries of the former Soviet Union formed the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The 12 CIS countries signed the *Agreement on Creation of a Free Trade Area* in 1994. In March 1996, Belarus and Russia, together with Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic, signed the *Customs Union Agreement*. Further, the *Union of Belarus and Russia* was signed in 1997. That agreement sets out, as a long-term goal, the free movement of goods, services, capital and people between the two countries.

All the Scandinavian countries, Estonia, Latvia and Poland are members of the WTO.

5. Geographical and commodity pattern of trade

The transition from planned to market economy and liberalisation of foreign trade has also had a strong impact on the geographical and commodity pattern of trade, especially in the former socialist countries. On the basis of the figures in Tables 47 and 48, it is possible to see that values of exports and imports increased in Scandinavian countries modestly and that the foreign trade balance was in surplus, which means that exports exceed imports. The reason for this is strong competitiveness of those countries in world markets of several products such as machinery and equipment, chemical products and some others. Also the geographical trading pattern of Denmark, Finland and Sweden has been quite stable, with the domination of Germany, the United Kingdom and other Scandinavian countries. A new phenomenon of the 1990s was increasing trade with transition economies, particularly with the Baltic States and Poland.

At the same time the Baltic States and Poland had a very great increase in foreign trade flows and rapidly increasing foreign trade deficit. The imports of those states have been dominated by the need for oil and raw materials. As there was a big shortage of consumer goods, the import of those items was important, especially at the beginning of the 1990s when foreign trade was liberalised and convertible currencies were introduced in the Baltic States and the convertibility of the currency was re-established in Poland. The role of machinery and equipment increased rapidly in the middle of the 1990s when, after ownership reform, big structural changes started in transition economies. Foreign direct investments also had a great role in promoting imports of investment goods.

As the export potential of those countries was quite modest, especially during the first half of the 1990s, big foreign trade deficits emerged. That deficit has partly been covered by surplus of services. Another source of financing that deficit was the inflow of foreign capital in the form of share capital and credits to the private sector. Nevertheless, the fast growth of exports has also been characteristic of that group of countries. Exports increased in Poland and Latvia more than twice, in Lithuania more than three times and in Estonia more than six times from 1992 to 1999.

Imports increased in the Baltic States and Poland even more than exports. One reason for that was relatively liberal foreign trade policy. Import liberalisation was considered an important instrument for accelerating price reform, encouraging competition, overcoming the inefficiencies inherited from the central planning system. Increased competition resulting from import liberalisation was considered to speed up de-monopolisation, improve resource allocation, generate economies of scale, attract foreign direct investments and thus contribute to faster growth. It was also expected that import liberalisation would stimulate the upgrading of the national economies' technological level and through that improve export potential.

By contrast, the trade of Russia, Belarus and other CIS members did not grow much. Various factors contributed to that: the collapse of the payment system and due to increasing barter trade that basically means the natural exchange of goods with very limited use of financial payments, the introduction of foreign competition and conscious shifting of exports of raw materials and especially oil away from CIS countries that were unable to pay. The financial crises of August 1998 and deep devaluation of the rouble also had a great impact on CIS trade supporting, at the same time, exports from the CIS to other areas. The high price of oil supported Russian export revenues greatly in 1999 and 2000.

Table 47. Exports (million US dollars), 1992, 1995 and 1999

Country	1992	1995	1999
Denmark	44136	49763	48151
Finland	24058	39573	40666
Sweden	45809	79816	84735
Estonia	444	1840	2938
Latvia	843	1305	1724
Lithuania	852	2706	3004
Poland	13187	2288	27362
Belarus	...	4707	5922
Russia	...	79869	72902
St-Petersburg*	...	779	1619

Source: Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, December 1999, United Nations

* St Petersburg figures for 1995 and 1998

Table 48. Imports (million US dollars), 1992, 1995 and 1999

Country	1992	1995	1999
Denmark	38193	45090	43881
Finland	60179	28114	30727
Sweden	40810	64652	68383
Estonia	406	2546	4108
Latvia	794	1818	2947
Lithuania	602	3649	4835
Poland	16141	29043	45885
Belarus	...	5564	6664
Russia	...	46709	31026
St Petersburg*	...	4991	3545

Source: Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, December 1999, United Nations

* St Petersburg figures for 1995 and 1998

The most important commodities and foreign trade partners of the Baltic region countries are the following:

Denmark. Denmark is an open economy with the share of exports to GDP at a level of 27-28% in 1990s of merchandise exports. Germany, with 20% of exports and 22% of imports is the most important partner of foreign trade, followed by Sweden with 12% of exports and 12% of imports, United Kingdom with 10% of exports and 8% of imports. The share of Poland was 1.9% of Danish exports and 1.7% of imports, the share of Russia was 1.4% of exports and 0.7% of imports, share of the Baltic States was 1.1% of exports and 0.7% of imports. The share of the EU was 66% of exports and 72% of imports.

The important export articles have been machinery and equipment and food products. Among imported articles, raw materials, consumer goods and machinery and equipment were dominant product groups.

Sweden. Sweden is an open economy with the share of exports to GDP at a level of 33-35% in the 1990s of merchandise exports. Germany, with 11% of exports and 18% of imports is the most important partner of foreign trade, followed by Norway with 9% of exports and 7% of imports and Denmark with 6% of exports and 6% of imports. The share of Poland was 1.6% of Swedish exports and 1.1% of imports, the share of Russia was 0.9% of exports and 0.6% of imports, share of the Baltic States was 1.1% of exports and 1.4% of imports. The share of the EU was 58% of exports and 70% of imports.

The important export articles have been machinery and equipment with a share of more than half of total exports and wood and articles of wood with 13%. Among imported articles, machinery and equipment also created close to half the imports, followed by chemicals with 13%.

Finland. Finland is an open economy with the share of exports to GDP at a level of 32-34% in the 1990s of merchandise exports. Germany, with 12% of exports and 15% of imports is the most important partner of foreign trade, followed by Sweden with 9% of exports and 12% of imports and United Kingdom with 9% of exports and 7% of imports. The share of Poland was 1.8% of Finnish exports and 0.9% of imports, the share of Russia was 4% of exports and 7% of imports, share of the Baltic States was 4.5% of exports and 1.4% of imports. Among the Baltic states, Estonia had the greatest proportion, with 3.3% of exports and 1.8% of imports of Finland. The share of the EU was 58% of exports and the same of imports. Among the Scandinavian countries, Finland had the greatest share of trade with countries on the Eastern coast of the Baltic Sea in the 1980s and that tradition has continued partly also through the 1990s.

The important export articles have been machinery and equipment with a share of around 40% of total exports, followed by and pulp and paper articles with 23%. The electrical machinery and equipment related to telecommunications should be underlined as an important subgroup of machinery and equipment. Raw materials, machinery and equipment and consumer goods made up the lion's share of imports.

Estonia. Estonia is a very open economy even compared with Scandinavian economies, with the share of exports to GDP at a level of 60-65% in the 1990s of merchandise exports. Finland, with 19% of exports and 23% of imports, is the most important partner of foreign trade followed by Sweden with 18% of exports and 9% of imports and Russia with 9% of exports and 13% of imports in 1999. The share of Poland was 0.5% of exports and 1.3% of imports. The share of other Baltic States was 12% of exports and 4% of imports. The share of the EU was 63% of exports and 58% of imports.

The important export articles have been machinery and equipment with a share of 21% of exports, followed by wood and articles of wood and textile and textile articles. Among imported articles, machinery and equipment also made up the largest proportion.

Latvia. Latvia has a share of exports to GDP at a level of 28-30% in the 1990s of merchandise exports. Germany, with 17% of exports and 15% of imports, is the most important partner of foreign trade, followed by United Kingdom with 16% of exports and 3% of imports and Russia with 7% of exports and 11% of imports in 1999. The share of Poland was 1.8% of exports and 3.5% of imports. The share of other Baltic States was 12% of exports and 13% of imports. The share of the EU was 57% of exports and 53% of imports. There is practically no difference in the proportion of the trade with the EU in total trade in Estonia and Latvia compared to the Scandinavian countries.

The important export articles have been wood and articles of wood and textile and textile articles and machinery. Among imported articles, machinery and equipment also made up the largest proportion.

Lithuania. Lithuania has a share of exports to GDP at a level of 30-35% in the 1990s of merchandise exports. Germany, with 16% of exports and 17% of imports, is the most important partner of foreign trade, followed by Russia with 7% of exports and 20% of imports. The share of Poland was 4.5% of exports and 5.7% of imports. The share of Latvia was 11% of exports and 2% of imports, the share of Estonia was 2.6% of exports and 2.7% of imports. The share of the EU was 38% of exports and 50% of imports. Lithuania is more orientated to Central Europe and Poland in comparison with the other Baltic States.

The important export articles have been wood and related articles, textile and textile articles, mineral products and machinery. Among imported articles, mineral products (particularly oil), machinery and equipment also made up the largest proportion.

Belarus. Belarus had an economic policy quite different from the Baltic States. There are still price controls and export permits on a number of goods are required. Belarus has also been quite a closed country with a share of exports to GDP at a level of 20-25% in 1990s of merchandise exports. The CIS trade created 61% of exports and 36% of imports. The most important single foreign trade partner was Russia. The share of the EU was around 8% of exports and imports.

The important export articles have been wood and related articles, textile and textile articles, food products and machinery. Among imported articles, mineral products (particularly oil), machinery and equipment also made up the largest proportion.

Russia. Russia as a big country with a large population and for that reason is also less open than the smaller countries of the region. As Russia has several domestic prices substantially lower than in developed countries (oil and oil products first of all), the export tariff on oil has been used. Some exported products are subject to self-restraints under agreements with the EU and other partners. Temporary price and trade controls were imposed following the August 1998 financial crises. The CIS trade created only 15% of exports and 27% of imports of Russia. The share of the EU was 33% of exports and 37% of imports.

There is a big difference between Russia and other transition economies in terms of the commodity pattern of trade. Russian exports are dominated by raw materials and oil. In 1999, crude oil made up 19%, natural gas 16%, petroleum products 6% and metals 14% of exports.

The share of machinery and equipment was 11%. Such an export pattern means great vulnerability of a country to price and demand changes on the world markets.

From imports, machinery and equipment made up 32% and food products 13%, followed by consumer goods and other industrial commodities.

St Petersburg. St Petersburg used to be historically the Russian window to the Western world. Also nowadays the share of EU exports and imports is higher than average for Russia. Due to closeness to the Scandinavian and Baltic countries, that area has been considered for partnerships in education, culture and tourism. Also in foreign trade contacts St Petersburg, as the most important centre of Northwest part of Russia, plays an important role.

6. Perspectives of foreign trade and integration with the EU

If the Baltic States and Poland join the EU, trade policy becomes an EU competence, and all those countries will have to implement the external trade policy of the EU. This will have different influences on enlargement countries. As Estonia currently has practically zero protection, it cannot reap further gains from trade liberalisation. On the other hand, other enlargement countries, which have higher levels of tariffs, will gain from tariff-free trade inside the EU.

EU integration will lead to an increase in the level of protection toward non-EU suppliers and, hence, to trade diversion.

However, the effect of implementing EU tariffs will be fairly small because the majority of trade will be with EU members and the protection level of the EU is not high in raw materials, which are currently the major import articles from non-EU members.

Joining the EU means also that the enlargement countries have to implement the EU's anti-dumping and other non-tariff measures. The effects of these measures on the protection level are much more difficult to predict. They may cause trade diversion from Japan, other Asian countries, Russia and Ukraine, with which the EU has higher protective barriers, to more expensive EU importers. It can also cause a rise in import prices of iron and steel if the EU adopts anti-dumping measures against CIS imports.

On the other hand, market access will be much better guaran-



Figure 170. Gdańsk, one of old trade cities of the BSR. Photo: Katarzyna Skalska



Figure 171. The role of the Belarusian capital, Minsk, as of a trading centre, is reflected in its name that comes from the verb 'meniat', to barter. Photo: BUP archive

ted by joining the EU, because measures of contingent protection will not be used against imports. In addition, trade with the EU countries will be without tariffs, quantitative restrictions, and measures having equivalent effect with quantitative restrictions. Various cost-creating barriers will disappear after joining the EU, because national regulations that are not covered by the Association Agreements, and which currently restrict entry into the EU market, will no longer be in effect. EU membership will mean joining the Single Market, which will remove various technical, physical and fiscal barriers to trade. Because the Baltic States and Poland currently conduct close to two-thirds of their total trade with either present EU members or countries that have applied for membership, the trade creation from improved market access will outweigh the trade diversion from increased protection toward non-EU suppliers. EU membership will give additional advantages by locking in reforms and adding credibility to the government's liberal policies.

The EU has a Partnership and Co-operation Agreement with members of CIS, i.e. with Russia and Belarus. There is a Northern Dimension agenda, whose one target is to support developments in the Baltic Sea region as well. The Northern Dimension is not a policy of any single EU country but the policy of the entire EU. Functionally, the Northern Dimension contains the northern parts of Europe, Northwest Russia, North Russia and the Baltic States. The Northern Dimension is primarily a long-term process that aims at supporting the accession of the Baltic States into the EU and deepening relations between the EU and Russia. The strategic issues of that policy are energy integration within the northern dimension zone, development of transportation and transport networks, and organising financial sources for the economic development of that area.

50 EU enlargement

Hans Aage

1. Enlargement – economic and political interests

The prevailing view in the EU as well as in Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) is that enlargement not only provides a unique possibility for realizing the long lasting dedication of the peoples towards European unification and for the EU to contribute to economic and democratic development in the CEECs. Enlargement is also expected in due course to bring economic and political benefits to all parties: free trade and integration will create new markets and economic growth for the benefit of consumers; integration will improve the environment, reduce criminality and corruption and stabilize democracy.

However, analysis of the economic and political interests motivating the enlargement process forces one to realize that EU enlargement is more correctly comprehended as economic assistance to new members at the expense of the old members, which in return obtain political advantages.

2. The enlargement process

At the EU council of ministers' meeting in Luxembourg on 13 December 1997 five CEECs as well as Cyprus were formally accepted as applicants for EU membership, namely Estonia, Poland, The Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia, and negotiations commenced on March 30th 1998.

At the Helsinki meeting on 10 December 1999 six more countries were recognized for membership, namely Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania and Malta, and they began full negotiations on February 15th 2000. Later on the enlargement process is supposed to include Turkey and Croatia. The first new members are expected to join in 2003, in time to take part in the next elections to the European parliament in 2004, but it might prove difficult as no country so far has begun the really tough part of the negotiations, namely those concerning agriculture, structural funds and the free movement of labour and capital, including the purchase of land.

Now bilateral negotiations are going on with 10 Central- and East European countries, that is all the countries except Albania and the former Yugoslav republics apart from Slovenia. Central- and Eastern Europe has a population of 105 million with a GDP per capita about 30% of the EU average (cf. Schreyer, 2001:3). Enlarging the EU with 10 CEECs increases the number of member countries from 15 to 25 or by 66%; total production will increase by 8%, population by 28%, agricultural area by 44% and employment in agriculture by 116%. In the CEECs, agriculture employs about 22% of the population as compared to 5% in the

EU, ranging from 4% in The Czech Republic, to 27% in Poland and 37% in Romania, cf. Table 49.

The five countries first in the line for EU membership are not only the most well-off, but also those that most closely fulfill the Copenhagen criteria, formulated at the EU council of ministers' meeting in Copenhagen in June 1993: institutional stability including democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights; functioning market economy with ability to cope with the pressure of competition in the EU; capacity to take on EU responsibilities including membership of the EMU. A fourth condition for enlargement was that it should not reduce the speed of the deepening of integration among the existing EU members.

Table 50 shows that the CEECs do not yet fully satisfy the EMU convergence criteria, but most accession countries have achieved impressive reductions of inflation rates as well as government deficits since that period, with extreme macroeconomic imbalances in the early 1990s.

Table 49. Economic growth in Eastern Europe and Russia 1989-2000

	GDP per capita 1989 EU=100	GDP 1999 1989=100	EBRD transition index 2000	Agricultural employment % 1997	Trade balance 1998 % of GDP
Slovenia	70	109	3.3	6	-4
Czech Republic	64	95	3.5	4	-5
Estonia	54	77	3.5	9	-21
Hungary	49	99	3.7	8	-5
Poland	42	122	3.5	27	-9
Latvia	51	60	3.1	15	-19
Lithuania	46	62	3.2	24	-14
Slovakia	41	100	3.4	6	-11
Bulgaria	36	67	3.0	23	-3
Romania	33	76	2.8	37	-7
Russia	45	57	2.5	15	6
Belarus	38	80	1.5	19	-10
Croatia	43	78	3.2	16	-19
Albania	29	95	2.6	70	-20

Notes: GDP (Gross Domestic Product) measures total production. In 1989 GDP per capita in Eastern Europe was 42% of the EU average and 29% of the USA level (as GDP per capita in the USA exceeded the EU average by 45%). In Eastern Europe GDP per capita in 1999 reached 97% of the 1989-level, while in the EU it had increased by 19% from 1989 to 1999. The Eastern European average declined from 42% of the EU average in 1989 to 34% in 1999. In the least well-off EU-members, Greece and Portugal, GDP per capita is about 70% of the EU average. These numbers are all uncertain and very sensitive to choice of prices and exchange rates, but trends are reliable.

The EBRD transition index is a simple average of several subjective estimates of the scope of market reforms on a scale from 1 to 4 in various areas (large and small privatisation, enterprise restructuring, price liberalisation, foreign trade liberalisation, competition policy, banking and financial institutions). Countries are listed according to their GDP per capita in 1989, except Russia, Belarus, Croatia and Albania which are included for comparison.

Sources: EBRD, 2000:14, 21, 65; EIU Country Reports and Country Profiles; UN (ECE): Economic Survey of Europe (various issues); Aage, 1998

Table 50. EMU convergence criteria: performance in Eastern Europe and Russia 1999

	Inflation rate % p.a.	Public budget deficit % of GDP	Public debt % of GDP	Long term interest rate % p.a.	Exchange rate regime
Slovenia	6	1	25	15	flex
Czech Republic	2	3	15	8	flex
Estonia	3	5	7	9	CuBo
Hungary	10	6	61	15	peg
Poland	7	3	43	14	flex
Latvia	2	4	14	13	peg
Lithuania	1	9	28	13	CuBo
Slovakia	11	4	28	14	flex
Bulgaria	1	1	97	14	CuBo
Romania	46	4	35	62	flex
Russia	86	1	13	38	flex
Belarus	294	6	5	51	dual
Croatia	4	6	32	14	flex
Albania	0	11	62	26	flex

Notes: Exchange rate regime is designated as peg (fixed rate in relation to a foreign currency, in Hungary Euro, in Latvia SDR), flex (flexible, in most cases a controlled floating rate), CuBo (Currency Board, i.e. issue of money is fully covered by foreign currency reserves, in Estonia and Bulgaria Euro, in Lithuania US dollars), or dual (in Belarus where foreign exchange is still controlled, despite some liberalisation in 1999 with a dual system and an official exchange rate much lower than a market rate).

The EMU convergence requirements in 1999 were: inflation 2.0%, public budget deficit 3.0%, public debt 60%, long interest rate 6.77%, exchange rate regime ERM II. The very high inflation rates in Belarus and Russia has decreased considerably since 1999.

Sources: EBRD, 2000; Nuti, 2000:16; Lavigne, 1998

3. Gains from free trade

Gains from free trade for Eastern Europe. Admission to EU markets, particularly for agricultural products, will benefit the CEECs, since membership of a customs union provides an advantage at the expense of outsiders. For industrial products free trade has already been largely realized, except for a certain few but important sensitive products like coal and steel, textiles and chemical products.

The advantages may not be totally unambiguous, however, as EU competition could inflict serious problems upon local industries in the domestic market as well. When Germany was reunited, demand for goods produced in the former DDR vanished, at the outset also for goods, like food products, of comparable quality except for packaging etc. The unification was followed by a prolonged depression in the former GDR despite massive assistance from the West German Länder amounting to approximately 5% of West German GDP and almost 40-50% of total resource consumption in the former GDR, and it has proved difficult to initiate sustainable economic recovery.

For agriculture another potential problem is that EU common agricultural policy subsidies could preserve a production structure which is not competitive in world markets, including the structure with many small farms partly created by privatisation during the 1990s. This problem is, however, common to the whole EU area, and there might be many good reasons for preserving traditional agriculture.

The CEECs are more dependent upon trade with the EU than vice versa; exports to the EU typically amount to 50-70% of total exports in the CEECs, but trade with the CEECs is only 11% of the total outside EU trade of EU countries.

Trade between the CEECs and the EU has doubled since 1992, but imports from the EU have increased more than exports. Until now free trade has created large balance of payments deficits in CEECs, typically in the range of 5-10% of GDP, cf. Table 49, not least vis-à-vis the EU and also concerning agricultural products. Free trade has certainly benefited EU enterprises exporting to the CEECs.

Gains from free trade for existing EU members. The long term advantages for existing EU member states are more hypothetical. One advantage would be the emergence of new markets and customers for EU products, but the magnitude of the new markets depends critically upon future economic growth and catching up in the CEECs. Another advantage is access to inexpensive factors of production, labour and land, and both are politically very difficult and sensitive. Wages in the CEECs are on average 14% of the average in the EU in nominal terms, 40% if adjusted for purchasing power. Clearly, the political intention is to reduce this huge gap, which also has implications for the migration of labour. The purchase of agricultural lands and other types of fixed capital by foreigners is also politically controversial in the CEECs, particularly concerning the formerly German areas in western Poland. The Polish government wants an 18-year transition period before foreigners can buy land. The Czech and the Hungarian governments are both asking for a 10-year moratorium (*The Economist*, 19 May 2001, survey p 12).

Generally, according to economic theory free trade and liberalisation normally improves total output, at least if potential, negative long-term effects are not considered. Thus, in the early 1990s it was computed (cf. *The Economist*, 1 May 1993 p 34) that doubling agricultural exports from the CEECs to the EU as compared to the 1989 level would entail several gains and losses, assuming that EU production would decline by the same amount and that consumer prices would decrease by 1-8%: losses for EU farmers (3.5 bn EUR), gains for EU consumers and taxpayers (5.5 bn EUR), gains for farmers in the CEECs (1.8 bn EUR). Thus, total net gain is about 4 bn EUR. Gains from free trade for steel, textiles and chemical products would be even smaller.

The order of magnitude is small, and the CEEC's share of EU consumption is very small for most agricultural products, below 1 or 2%, and will remain small even after enlargement, when only a few products like bovine meat products and grains other than wheat are expected to reach market shares exceeding 5%.

Moreover, these sorts of computations would be an argument for accepting any country as an EU member, for there are always benefits from liberalising trade and adjusting production structures. Thus, far larger economic benefits would be obtained for the EU if trade with agricultural products were liberalised globally. Nevertheless, there are still many barriers to trade, and the reasons are obvious, namely that adjustments are costly and furthermore hit selectively in certain geographical areas and certain sectors. Notably, in any situation involving unemployment, adjustments can become so costly that they turn costs and benefits upside down.

Certainly, computations exist demonstrating economic gains under favourable assumptions concerning economic growth. Thus, for Denmark official computations demonstrate that economic integration of the CEECs into the EU after 25 years would increase the annual Danish consumption per capita by 1.25% and the GDP per capita by 0.75%, i.e. figures very close to zero.

4. Enlargement and the EU budget

Direct economic gains for the CEECs from EU membership are related to agricultural subsidies from the common agricultural policy and to payments from EU structural funds, although there are also costs associated with EU membership; one example is the investments required if the CEECs are going to fulfill the EU environmental policy rules, estimated by the EU Commission to an order of magnitude of 120 bn EUR. Another 90 bn EUR are required for investments in the transport sector. If distributed over 10-20 years, annual investment requirements are equivalent to 4% of current GDP in the CEECs. Adding expenditures in other sectors, annual costs could rise to about 10% of GDP (EBRD, 2000:56).

Whether the gains will meet initial expectations is, however, dubious as it could charge EU budgets considerably. In 1995 it was estimated that with the then current norms for agricultural and structural policy the budgetary charge of full integration of just the four Višegrad countries (Poland, The Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary) in the year 2000 would be 58 bn EUR, corresponding to a 60% increase of the expected EU budget for the year 2000 (Baldwin, 1995:477). Later, official Danish estimates stated that the budget effect of enlargement with 10 new members would be considerably less, namely 22-37 bn EUR.

With the EU Commission report Agenda 2000 from July 1997, figures appeared for the political willingness to pay, and the order of magnitude was 16 bn EUR (in 1997 prices) annually in 2006, if five CEECs and Cyprus became members in 2002, that is considerably less than the applicants had hoped for. The total EU budget for 2006 was estimated at 115 bn EUR. The common agricultural policy accounted for 50 bn EUR, of which the new members would receive 3.3 bn EUR. The structural funds accounted for 43 bn EUR, including 12 bn EUR to new members. Recently, the commissar of the budget, Michaele Schreyer (2001) stated that the budgetary effect of enlargement with 10 new members (not 5 as in Agenda 2000) would be between 16 and 25 bn EUR annually. In January 2002 the EU Commission proposed that new members should receive 25% of full agricultural subsidies in 2004, increasing to 100% in 2013. The total annual budget for agricultural and structural policies for new members would be 13 bn EUR in 2004-2006. The proposal was received with very little enthusiasm.

The reduction of expected direct payments to future member countries is mainly due to reforms of the common agricultural policy, which in turn are partly motivated by the enlargement. The MacSharry reform, initiated in 1992 and still going on (cf. *The Economist*, 13 March 1999, p 40) decreases agricultural prices and to some extent transforms price subsidies into income support for individual farmers. As agricultural prices in the CEECs were generally 20-60% lower than in the EU, the MacSharry reform implies lower payments to farmers in the CEECs; they would not, contrary to farmers in the old EU countries, be entitled to income compensation for price reductions, because they did not enjoy the high prices in the first place, so for them there would be no price reductions.

Also the structural funds will be rearranged in order not to break the EU budget limit of 1.27% of total EU GDP (Schreyer, 2001:4). But this is a matter of political controversy, as enlargement will cause many regions receiving EU aid, especially in southern Europe, to exceed the limit for qualifying for structural aid, namely a GDP per capita below 75% of the EU average. Thus structural funds will be redirected from regions in southern Europe to regions in the new member states (*The Economist*, 26 May 2001, p 33).

In the period before EU membership, the EU intends to use 3.1 bn EUR as pre-accession assistance to the CEECs, partly through the PHARE-programme (Poland and Hungary Assistance to the Reconstruction of the Economy) initiated in 1991 (1.6 bn EUR), partly

through two new programmes, SAPARD (Special Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development, 0.5 bn EUR) and ISPA (Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession, 1.0 bn EUR). This is about 1% of current GDP in the CEECs, and 0.03% of total EU GDP. In comparison, the USA paid about 1% of its GDP annually during 1948-51 to Europe through the Marshall-programme, and annual transfers from western Germany to the eastern Länder is about 5% of GDP in western Germany.

It is generally assumed that the maximum assistance which new members can absorb is 4% of their GDP. Under EU rules no country can receive more than this amount in EU aid (EU European Commission, 2001:XXXVII; Schreyer, 2001:7). The Marshall-programme amounted to 2.5% of receivers' GDP annually in the years 1948-51, and assistance from western parts of Germany to the eastern Länder is currently about 40% of the GDP of eastern Germany. Another inflow is foreign direct investments, which have increased considerably in the last years, particularly in the Czech Republic and in Poland; the total annual inflow into applicant countries amounted to 6% of their GDP on average and 20-25% of total fixed investment (*The Economist*, 19 May 2001, survey p 13).

5. The catching-up process in Eastern Europe

The economic burden upon old EU members from CEEC membership depends crucially on the speed of the economic catching-up process in the CEECs. Transition to the market economy provoked a deep depression in the CEEC, historically unprecedented in peacetime. Production decreased by 17-60% after 1990. Poland hit the bottom in 1991 and other countries in 1993-1994, and in 1996 Poland was the first country to regain the production level of 1989. Currently, GDP per capita is close to the 1989 level in The Czech Republic and Slovakia, as well as in Hungary and Slovenia. In Poland, GDP per capita is 22% higher than in 1989, but in Estonia it is still 23% lower, and in Russia it is 43% lower, cf. Table 49.

Contrary to expectations at the outset of transition, agriculture did not become a driving force for economic recovery in the CEECs, as it did especially in China, and in the most successful CEECs agricultural output decreased as much or more than industrial output. Among the reasons are that agriculture is much more developed and capital-intensive in the CEECs than in China, that investments have disappeared, that prices have changed unfavourably for agriculture, that the number of livestock has been cut by 25-50%, and that privatisation has created a large number of small and unprofitable farms with new owners lacking agricultural education and experience.

As appears from Table 49, developments since 1989 have differed sharply among countries, and there is a rather clear correlation with the distances between the respective capitals and Brussels: the closer to Brussels a country is situated, the more successful it is likely to be



Figure 172. Agriculture is probably the most backward sector of the post-communist economies (Zalavas, Lithuania). Photo: Alfred F. Majewicz

concerning economic performance as well as economic reforms. A possible explanation is of course, that fast and deep liberalisation is the reason why the depression reached the bottom in most western CEECs relatively soon (cf. Aage, 1998).

An obvious alternative is, however, that distance from Brussels explains both economic recovery and successful reforms. Most western countries had relatively better initial economic conditions, and this is an important determinant of economic performance. Furthermore, these countries could realistically apply for EU membership, and this could be an independent stabilising factor enabling these countries to conduct responsible economic policies. The accession countries among the CEECs have to a large extent adjusted their legal systems to the EU *acquis communautaire* in order to fulfill two basic political and economic conditions for admission, namely political democracy and free market economy.

It is, however, certain that economic catching up with the EU will be a prolonged process. According to fairly optimistic, official computations, GDP per capita in the CEEC can be expected to increase from 30% of the EU level in 1997 to 37% in 2017, if annual investments amount to 15% of GDP. If the share of investment becomes higher, e.g. 25%, the GDP per capita level could increase to 45%. Experience from the eastern German *Länder* is not encouraging; despite massive support from western Germany there are few signs of self-propelling economic growth. Experience from earlier enlargement is mixed. In just 30 years Ireland (population 3.6 m) increased its GDP per capita from 61% of the EU average in the early 1970s to an impressive 115% to day. On the other hand GDP per capita in Greece (population 10.5 m) declined in relative terms from 69% of the EU average in 1981 to 67% now. Spain and Portugal have narrowed the gap, but are still about 20% below the EU average (*The Economist*, 19 May survey p 12; 26 May, 2001, p 34).

The recent strategic report on economic and social cohesion from the EU European Commission (2001) expects increased regional income inequality in the enlarged EU. The 27 countries can be classified into three groups: 12 countries with 71% of the total EU population, i.e. the current member countries except Portugal, Spain and Greece, will have an average GDP per capita at 125% of the EU average; 7 countries with 13% of the population, i.e. Portugal, Spain, Greece, The Czech Republic, Slovenia, Malta and Cyprus, will have an average GDP per capita at 80% of the EU average; and the remaining 8 accession countries with 16% of the population will have a GDP per capita at 40% of the EU average, that is about half the level in the least well-off current EU members.

6. EU enlargement: motivating forces

It must be concluded that enlargement of the EU towards the CEEC is a kind of economic assistance, but if political consequences are also considered there are benefits as well as costs for the new and for the old EU members. For the future members there are economic benefits, although they will probably not meet initial expectations; the political costs are that political sovereignty must be surrendered to the EU, but this may indeed be welcomed by some, maybe large, groups in the CEECs as a guarantee for continued stable, capitalist and liberalistic policies, because these groups have more faith in central EU government in Brussels than in their fellow countrymen, as is precisely the case in old EU member countries, for instance for some groups in Denmark.

For existing EU members there are hardly any economic gains from enlargement. On the contrary, there are economic costs, directly through EU budget expenditures and indirectly

in the form of adjustment costs in afflicted sectors and areas, especially in agriculture and in Southern Europe. And there are political costs in relation to necessary changes in EU institutions and procedures, as agreed at the European summit in Nice in December 2000 (*The Economist*, 16 December 2000, pp 23-26; van Brabant, 1998).

Free movement of labour between eastern and western Europe could give rise to problems in some areas, especially near the former borders, but the EU Commission estimates in a recent report (Boeri & Brücker, 2001) that total migration will be limited and that the number of immigrants from the CEECs will never exceed 1.1% of the population in the existing 15 EU members.

Furthermore, the EU will acquire direct responsibility for political and economic developments in the CEECs which are in the middle of a risky transition process.

What do the existing EU countries receive in return? There are some benefits concerning the environment and security. It can also be argued, as it often is in Danish debate, that the EU should undertake the costs of enlargement as a reasonable use of the – doubtless limited – financial means which the EU is ready to spend to support less fortunate countries in world, because this would reduce economic inequality in Europe. But the argument is not compelling. There are good, maybe even better, reasons to assist countries in for example North Africa and the Middle East. Also in these regions there are huge tasks ahead concerning environmental improvements and “democracy, the rule of law and protection of minorities” (Schreyer, 2001:2).

Apparently, the EU does not gain much from enlargement, but there is one benefit, and this is enlargement itself. When the number of EU citizens is increased from 373 million to about 480 million due to the entry of 108 million eastern citizens, who on a global scale are well-educated and also well-off, the role of the EU as a superpower will be strengthened, and the power of the central EU leadership will be strengthened in relation to governments in individual member countries. These are the basic motives behind all EU policies. If one wants to comprehend what goes on in the EU, one should make this point perfectly clear.

Centralization and enlargement are strongly supported by the political and economic élites, but the populations are less enthusiastic. However, some opponents of EU federalism support enlargement because of the expectation that an enlarged EU also implies a looser, less coherent EU that will find it difficult to act as a powerful force on the world stage (*The Economist*, 19 May 2001, survey p 18).

Popular support for enlargement is declining, both in western Europe and in eastern Europe. Among EU citizens there are large majorities in favour of EU membership for Norway and Switzerland whose governments do not want admission (70% yes, 13% no); concerning the five CEECs first in line for membership, 35-45% says yes, 30-40% no; concerning the remaining applicants, a small majority says no. In Germany, two thirds of the electorate is opposed to enlargement, while the political and economic leadership is in favour of enlargement, particularly stressing the membership of Poland. Popular support of enlargement is strongest in Denmark, Greece and Sweden.

Among the CEECs the initial enthusiasm has also faded. In Poland the share of the electorate favouring EU membership has declined from 80% to 55% since 1996 (Eurobarometer 2000/52; *The Economist*, 13 January 2001, p 31), and in Estonia opinion polls have already shown a majority opposed to EU membership (*The Economist*, 26 May 2001, p 12).

The real benefit for the EU of enlargement towards the east is political: it contributes to creating a great EU superpower. The enlargement resembles the other big current EU project, the EMU. None of them have direct economic justifications (for the old EU members), and both are risky undertakings that might jeopardise political and economic stability. But

both are instruments for strengthening the EU as a superpower, the enlargement because of increased size and the EMU because of necessary political centralization required by any monetary union.

The EU vs. Austria affair last year, provoked by the participation of Jörg Haider's Freedom party in the Austrian government with 27% of the vote, also fits into this pattern. On January 31, 14 EU leaders preached to Austria concerning its internal policies and declared diplomatic sanctions. This unprecedented move came as a big surprise to the public all over the EU. But the consequences were entirely predictable: no political impact in Austria, EU-wide consternation in the media (a big union telling small countries what to do and what not to do might ring a bell in the CEECs too), as well as worries on the part of the government of Turkey over violations of human rights in Austria. The 14 EU leaders could anticipate this in all areas possible. Which motives did they have? An intelligible purpose would be the media consternation itself. The interference with Austrian politics serves to accustom the EU public to political centralisation, to pave the way so that it is more easily swallowed next time. The problem for EU superpower builders is the sad lack of popular enthusiasm and support and the lack of a common European political debate and identity. Here Jörg Haider is useful for a media-massage, because nobody likes him (except the 27% erring Austrians, but the remaining 73% are still a comfortable pro-EU majority). All opposition against EU centralisation is identified with right-wing populism. If you cannot get a European footballteam, at least you can get a European Prügelknabe.

The sanctions against Austria were lifted on September 12th, following a report from an independent group of experts. The whole operation had no basis in EU legislation. However, the summit in Nice in December 2000, which prepared the entry of new members by revising rules for the number of members of the European parliament and number of votes in the council of ministers, also established a legal basis for EU intervention in internal policies in member states. An amendment to Article 7 of the treaty of Rome allows an 80% majority of the European Council to criticise a member country, if there is a danger of violating the principles of freedom, democracy, human rights and rule of law as described in Article 6. Possible sanctions include that the criticised country may be deprived of its right to vote in EU bodies.

Concluding remarks

The outcome of tight political integration and centralisation in an enlarged EU could well be political tension, when serious conflicts of interest surface in the future, and the question is whether social and cultural cohesion among the peoples of the EU are strong enough to handle this in a civilised way.

51 The environment

Hans Aage

1. The Baltic Sea

In the days of old, when transport by land was very expensive, the Baltic sea was the main unifying force of the region. This is still visible, for example in Gotland where 92 big and beautiful stone churches built in the XII century and the impressive 3.5 km medieval wall surrounding Visby are remnants of times, when this island far out in the Baltic Sea was a flourishing centre of cultural and material exchange.

Today, the Baltic Sea is still unifying the Baltic Region, but in addition the Baltic Sea has become a common responsibility because of the vulnerability of its brackish waters as a recipient of increasing amounts of pollution originating from human economic activity.

Until about 1960, the Baltic Sea was considered as being in a rather healthy condition, but this has changed dramatically since then concurrently with high economic growth rates in the bordering countries and huge increases in energy production, industrial output, transportation, waste disposal and the agricultural use of fertilizers and pesticides. Today, life is threatened in the Baltic Sea, and parts of it, e.g. in the inner Danish waters and in the Riga Bay, are almost dead. In the 1990s the environmental pressure was lifted somewhat because of the decline in production in the eastern parts of the region and more recently due to improved environmental policies and investments.

Pollution of the waters of the Baltic Sea is a common concern for the whole Baltic region. Poland, the Baltic states and Russia contribute significantly to the total pollution load in the Baltic Sea, although not more than the Nordic countries, and the water from the Baltic Sea entering the inner Danish waters is presumably less polluted than the water it replaces, partly due to the hydrographical conditions, namely that polluted water can be retained in the profound areas of the Baltic Sea. According to data from the late 1980s, Poland contributed 33% of the total nitrogen pollution, the Soviet Union 25% and Denmark, Sweden and Finland together 39%. Concerning phosphorus, the contributions were 39% from Poland, 25% from the Soviet Union, and 31% from Denmark, Sweden and Finland. Concerning organic matter



Figure 173. Fishing in central Stockholm is a symbol of the successful Swedish environmental policy. Photo: Katarzyna Skalska

(BOD, that is biochemical oxygen demand) the contributions were 19% from Poland, 32% from the Soviet Union, and 49% from Denmark, Sweden and Finland. The corresponding numbers of population are 37.9 million in Poland, about 16 million in the former Soviet coastal areas, including 8 million in the Baltic countries and 5 million in the St Petersburg area, and 18.6 million in Denmark, Sweden and Finland. This refers to pollution via rivers, from urban areas and from industries. For nitrogen another 25% should be added originating from the air and from the production of algae in the Baltic Sea itself.

The relative contribution to the pollution load of the Baltic Sea with heavy metals from Poland, the Baltic states and Russia is probably higher, but reliable data are lacking. The discharge of chlorines from the paper and pulp industry in Sweden and Finland is also a very harmful type of pollution.

Entirely new ecological disturbances have been actively created by the construction of a combined tunnel and bridge for railway and highway transport between Malmö and Copenhagen across the Sound, completed in 2000. It was concluded by the joint Swedish-Danish environmental evaluation report that the connection would increase air pollution, but the new problem is that the tunnel-bridge connection could disturb the salt water inflow from the Kattegat into the Baltic Sea and thereby reduce the content of salt in the Baltic Sea. The ecological balance is highly vulnerable even to small changes in the water inflow, and several species, for example the Baltic cod, could hardly survive any decreases.

The connection is estimated to reduce the water inflow by 1%, but this nevertheless caused the Swedish government's advisory board on protection of the environment (*Koncessionsnämnden*) to advise against the project, and the Swedish Water Court (*Vattendomstolen*) only accepted the project on the condition that it would be completely environmentally neutral. However, an environmentally neutral solution would have been possible, namely a railway tunnel.

2. Transnational pollution

Airborne pollution can travel long distances, several hundreds of kilometres, from the source of emission to the final deposition. This is true particularly for sulphur and nitrogen, but also for ammonia, which all contribute to acidification. Due to the prevailing western winds, Norway and Sweden are net importers of pollution, whereas Denmark, Finland, the Baltic states and Poland are net exporters of pollution (cf. Tables 51 and 52). However, most of the exchange of pollution involves areas other than Scandinavia and the Baltic region. About 10% of depositions in Scandinavia originate in the Baltic region, and an even smaller share of depositions in the Baltic region originates from emissions in Scandinavia. Finland, Norway and Sweden import a small amount of pollution from the Baltic region, but Denmark is a net exporter to the Baltic states and to Poland.

Nuclear pollution is a potential cross-frontier threat. Due to the prevailing western winds, accidents in Western European nuclear power plants, including the Barsebäck plant in Sweden situated 20 km from the city centre of Copenhagen, could have serious effects in the Nordic countries. Taking the different degrees of risk into account the more important sources of cross-frontier effects might be other more remote plants in Russia, in Central and Eastern Europe, and the Ignalina plant in Lithuania.

Concerning solid, hazardous waste the Nordic countries are probably net exporters to Russia, the Baltic states and Eastern and Central Europe, but reliable data are not available.

Table 51. Emissions and depositions per capita of sulphur, nitrogen, and ammonia in the Scandinavian and Baltic region, 1990

kg per capita	Sulphur SO ₂		Nitrogen NO _x		Ammonia NH _x	
	emission	deposition	emission	deposition	emission	deposition
Sweden	26.1	28.9	8.6	13.9	7.3	9.3
Finland	57.0	37.6	61.7	14.2	10.5	10.6
Denmark	46.7	12.2	50.6	5.5	16.6	7.3
Estonia	167.5	..	66.3
Latvia	44.4	..	47.0
Lithuania	58.1	..	45.1
Baltic states	75.4	25.4	50.0	8.4	20.0	11.0
Poland	99.4	32.4	35.1	6.5	10.5	7.3

Note: Data refer to 1990 which was the last year of normal production before the economic transition and depression. In the following years emissions in the Baltic states and Poland have decreased by 30-50% (cf. Table 54).

Source: Halsnæs and Sørensen, 1993, pp. 31, 37-9

Table 52. Atmospheric transport of sulphur, nitrogen, and ammonia between Scandinavia, the Baltic region, and other areas, 1990

Total emissions in ktons from		Depositions in			Total emissions
		Scandinavia	Baltic states and Poland	Other areas	
Scandinavia	SO ₂	140	16	677	833
	NO _x	51	13	820	884
	NH _x	109	7	117	233
Baltic states and Poland	SO ₂	67	713	3643	4423
	NO _x	28	76	1646	1750
	NH _x	21	241	301	563
Other areas	SO ₂	434	709
	NO _x	221	225
	NH _x	87	120
Total depositions	SO ₂	641	1438
	NO _x	300	314
	NH _x	217	368

Note: Scandinavia includes Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland. The Baltic region includes the Baltic states and Poland.

Source: Halsnæs and Sørensen, 1993, pp. 36-9



Figure 174. Factories, even if they fill restrictive law prescriptions, are not harmless to the environment. Photo: Katarzyna Skalska

Among the first consequences of marketization in Eastern Europe were imports of hazardous waste in Poland and the Soviet Union. After the enforcement of more efficient controls in Poland these exports were diverted towards the Baltic states, Bulgaria, Romania and the former Soviet republics. According to Greenpeace the main offenders of waste dumped such as used tyres, radioactive residues, pesticides and dust from steel mills are Germany, Austria and Sweden.

Most cross-frontier types of pollution contribute to the greenhouse effect. The contribution per capita in Eastern Europe is comparable to the Scandinavian contribution. Using an index for 1987 with the contribution from the USA equal to 100, the following corresponding numbers have been obtained for various countries: GDR 93, Denmark 73, Finland 65, Czechoslovakia 53, Norway 52, Poland 50, Bulgaria 47, Sweden 41, Hungary 31, Romania 30, Yugoslavia 27, Albania 12. However, the relative contribution per unit of GDP produced is much larger in Eastern Europe, as their GDP per capita is only 20-40% of the levels in Western Europe and the USA (World Resources, 1993:346-349; the deviations as compared to Table 53 reflect different methods, as not only carbon dioxide is included, but it also reflects uncertainty of data).

3. Resources, environment and economic growth

In a historical and global perspective the similarities between Eastern and Western Europe figure more prominently than the differences. Long-term growth paths in Eastern Europe and Russia resemble those of Western Europe (cf. Chap. 50). With respect to the consumption of resources Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union did achieve a level which is on a par with that of the rich western economies. In 1989 energy consumption was relatively high, and very high if energy consumption is computed per unit GDP instead of per capita, but consumption of fertilizer and pesticides were closer to the average. The main differences are that they used resources relatively inefficiently, that progress was small from 1973 to 1989, that they polluted more than western countries – approximately as western countries did 20-30 years before – and furthermore that pollution was more concentrated in a few heavily polluted areas. As regards the more global, less visible and more serious types of pollution, for example the emission of greenhouse gases, Eastern Europe and the former USSR did not contribute more than average.

Economic growth, resource consumption and pollution are closely related. The basic pattern in Table 53 is the similarity of performance of eastern and western countries and the difference between rich and poor countries (cf. Aage 1998c:3-15), and the basic driving forces are two basic human values, which have always threatened the environment and mankind itself, namely the desire to live well and the desire to proliferate (cf. Ponting 1991). The main

cultural, political and economic challenges of our time are related to global problems of distribution and global problems of environment and resources. Thus, competition for resources and markets is likely to intensify in the global economic environment, in which the eastern countries in the Baltic region attempt to recover from economic depression and to reach a standard of living comparable to that of the Nordic countries, which for their part strive to improve their production and income levels even further.

Endowments of natural resources differ much between the countries in the Baltic region. The resource base is relatively important for the Nordic economies, where renewable resources include fish stocks, hydroelectric power in Norway and Sweden, and forests in Norway, Sweden and Finland. There are also considerable exhaustible resources including oil in the Norwegian and Danish parts of the North Sea and mineral resources in Sweden. Poland has considerable deposits of coal. In the Baltic countries the main natural resources consist of agricultural lands and fresh water resources, but in addition there are large deposits of oil-shale and some other mineral resources in Estonia, and in all three Baltic countries there are forests, peat and also hydroelectric power resources. The eastern countries of the Baltic region all have larger areas of pristine wilderness than most western European countries.

Recent records of economic growth also differ sharply between countries. From 1989 to 1997 levels of output in the Nordic countries were retained or improved (cf. Table 54), albeit Sweden and Finland both experiencing temporary set-backs with negative growth in the early 1990s. In contrast, in the Baltic countries, GDP declined by 36% in Estonia, 48% in Latvia and 61% in Lithuania, and they have not recovered from the transition crises yet. In Poland GDP declined by only 18%, and in 1999 it was 22% higher than in 1989. Taking initial differences into account this means that the order of magnitude of GDP per capita levels in the eastern countries in the Baltic region are now 20-30% of the Nordic levels (cf. Chap. 49).

Changes in energy consumption and carbon dioxide emissions largely follow the pattern of GDP developments. Levels of energy consumption per unit GDP were high and close to the Soviet average in 1989 in Estonia and Lithuania, which both produced and exported energy made from oil-shale and nuclear power, respectively, but lower in Latvia (cf. Table 53). Air pollution from sulphur oxide and nitrogen oxide emissions has declined in both the Nordic and the Baltic countries, but for widely different reasons. In the Baltic countries the decline is explained by the economic recession, and levels of sulphur oxide pollution per unit GDP is very high, notably in Estonia due to oil-shale use. Lower levels of sulphur oxide pollution in the Nordic countries are the result of environmental policies that started in the 1970s. Concerning the reduction of pollution from fertilizer use in agriculture, the Nordic countries have been less successful.



Figure 175. Improvements in conservation and transmission of energy yield profit, for economy and environment. Photo: Andrzej Szmal

Table 53. Production, consumption of resources, and human development in BSR countries, 1989

	Human Development Index	Population (million)	GDP per capita	Energy consumption per capita	Energy consumption per unit GDP
Sweden	.976	8.5	80.8	70.6	87.4
Germany, Federal Republic	.955	62.0	82.7	56.0	67.7
Finland	.953	5.0	76.6	82.7	108.0
Denmark	.953	5.1	80.9	47.0	58.
Czechoslovakia	.897	15.6	40.1	60.2	150.1
Lithuania	.883	3.7	35.0	50.0	142.9
Estonia	.882	1.6	37.5	57.6	153.6
Latvia	.880	2.7	36.3	33.9	93.3
Poland	.874	37.9	31.1	50.4	162.1
USSR	.873	281.1	32.5	64.3	197.9

Notes and sources: The data are illustrative only, due to data uncertainty, problems of comparability and methodological arbitrariness; thus, there are inconsistencies with data in Chap. 49 due to the same reasons. All data except population and the human development index are expressed relative to the numbers for the USA which are set equal to 100. The Human Development Index refers to 1990, most other data to 1989, but in some cases data from earlier years have been used, notably for countries outside the OECD area.

Human Development Index 1990: The index combines life expectancy at birth, adult literacy, mean years of schooling, and GDP per capita assuming decreasing utility of income as expressed by the Atkinson index. For Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania figures were not available until 1994, and these figures have been used for interpolation, cf. UNDP, 1992:127-129, 1994:129

Table 53. (continued)

	CO ₂ emission per capita	CO ₂ emission per unit GDP	SO ₂ emission per capita	SO ₂ emission per unit GDP	NO _x emission per capita	NO _x emission per unit GDP	Fertilizer use per area unit	Pesticide use per area unit
Sweden	35.3	43.7	22.7	28.1	56.7	70.2	123.1	41.8
Germany, Federal Republic	52.6	63.6	18.3	22.1	40.9	49.5	289.2	182.8
Finland	52.2	68.2	58.7	76.6	71.7	92.8	211.4	46.7
Denmark	46.9	58.0	45.1	55.7	64.6	79.6	256.3	115.3
Czechoslovakia	73.8	184.0	198.4	494.8	86.8	216.5	286.2	146.4
Lithuania	47.2	134.9	69.5	198.6	56.4	161.1	327.0	108.0
Estonia	114.7	305.9	203.4	542.4	84.2	224.5	206.3	64.8
Latvia	24.9	68.6	31.8	87.6	36.4	100.3	256.6	126.0
Poland	49.9	160.5	133.8	430.2	49.7	159.8	249.5	52.7
USSR	68.8	211.7	37.5	115.4	18.3	56.3	122.6	117.1

Population: UNDP, 1992: 98-100

GDP per capita: Aage, 1998c:4

Energy consumption: OECD, 1999a; Aage, 1998c: 6. For energy consumption per unit GDP other studies suggest considerably higher figures for the Baltic countries and the USSR, particularly for Latvia, cf. Aage, 1998c: 145

CO₂ emissions: Aage, 1998c: 7. Net additions to atmospheric concentration of green house gases by carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuels use, cement production, and land use changes; OECD, 1999a.c

SO₂ and NO_x emissions, and fertilizer and pesticide use: OECD, 1999a; Aage, 1998c: 7; Halsnæs and Sørensen, 1993

Currently, growth rates are positive in the Baltic as well as in the Nordic countries, but the conditions for environmental and resource policy differ. The Baltic countries face an enormous dual task of economic and environmental transition, and transition to a market economy is likely to affect the environment in several ways. Production recovery will have immediate negative environmental impacts, but other aspects of transition will also influence environmental policies. Restructuring towards a larger share of services in output tends to reduce energy consumption and pollution; economic accounting under market conditions will improve resource efficiency; privatization of production and resource ownership may change the conditions for environmental policies; and aspirations for EU membership will induce more ambitious policies in order to comply with EU environmental standards.

Table 54. Economic growth, energy consumption, and pollution in Nordic countries, Baltic states and Poland, 1989-1997

index for 1997 with 1989=100	GDP	Energy consump- tion	CO2 emis- sions	SO2 emis- sions	NOx emis- sions	Ferti- lizer use
Finland	106.9	106.7	114.3	41.0	86.4	59.9
Sweden	106.7	109.5	94.6	56.9	80.6	85.1
Denmark	118.1	119.7	121.6	47.2	87.0	68.4
Poland	111.7	87.2	82.0	60.6	78.0	49.0
Estonia	76.3	64.4	55.3	48.7	68.2	10.0
Latvia	56.1	53.7	51.3	76.0	39.8	10.7
Lithuania	62.6	54.0	50.1	29.5	34.3	11.4

Notes: In several cases data are illustrative only, due to data uncertainty, problems of comparability and methodological arbitrariness. Thus, in some cases data refer to 1990 and 1996 or to other years; anthropogenic CO2 emissions often include emissions from energy use only; emissions in Denmark have been almost unchanged since 1980, but in 1989 CO2 emissions were exceptionally low.

Sources: OECD, 1999a; Baltic Environmental Forum, 2000; Aage, 1998c:9

The Baltic states and Poland are actively adopting EU environmental regulations as a sort of anticipatory adaptation, although too slowly to satisfy the EU. This includes the signing of a number of international conventions. Often this means that previously very strict standards – which were not enforced – have been relaxed concurrently with improved enforcement and stronger reliance on economic incentives. The necessary investment costs are huge, estimated by the EU Commission to an order of magnitude of 120 bn EUR (*The Economist*, 11 December 1999, p. 29).

4. International cooperation

International cooperation with the aim of preserving the Baltic Sea was initiated in 1974 when the Helsinki Convention was signed by the countries bordering the sea. It went into force in 1980 with the establishment of HELCOM (The Baltic Marine Environment Protection Commission – the Helsinki Commission), an intergovernmental body with ministerial meetings every four years. In 1992 the HELCOM-PITF (HELCOM Project Implementation Task Force) was set up to oversee the improvement of conditions at 132 environmental hot spots

around the Baltic Sea, and a Comprehensive Programme to Restore the Baltic Sea to a Sound Ecological Balance was presented in April 1992 with total planned costs until 2012 of 10-17 bn EUR. In June 1998, Baltic 21, a joint Agenda 21 document, was endorsed by environment ministers from the Baltic Sea Region.

The environment ministers from countries within the region of the United Nations' Economic Commission for Europe met in Dobřiš at the Environment for Europe meeting in 1991 where a major compilation of environmental data for the region was initiated. At the meeting in Lucerne in 1993 an Environmental Action Programme for Central and Eastern Europe was carried. The programme stresses cost-efficiency, economic incentives and market mechanisms, the combination of environmental and economic benefits – the so-called win-win policy – and international assistance concerning cross-frontier environmental problems. The ministers agreed to a number of specific recommendations at the meeting in Sofia in October 1995, including a “call upon the international financial institutions to provide their most favorable terms and conditions for qualified environmental investments in both public and private sectors”, and a “commitment to phase out, as soon as possible, unsafe nuclear installations, in particular unsafe nuclear reactors”.

A number of international conventions for improving the environment have been signed. All the countries in Eastern Europe have signed the air pollution convention from 1979, the biodiversity convention, and the climate convention signed in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. Only Hungary and Poland participate in these conventions to the same degree as the EU countries, whereas other countries in Eastern Europe, and particularly the Baltic countries, have desisted from the ratification of a number of conventions, including conventions concerning the dumping of waste at sea, protection of the ozone layer, and cross-frontier transport of hazardous waste. These conventions are often worked out in organizations related to the UN, like the UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) and the UNEP (United Nations Environmental Programme).

International financial institutions are increasingly incorporating environmental considerations into their evaluation procedures, and several are operating in the Baltic region. The World Bank (IBRD, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development) includes the IDA (International Development Association) for soft and concessional loans and the IFC (International Finance Corporation) for loans to private firms on market terms.

The EU is involved in a number of institutions. The EIB (European Investment Bank) is an EU institution, and the EU initiated the EBRD (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development) in 1991 with the purpose of supporting reconstruction and marketization in Central and Eastern Europe and in the former Soviet Union. All OECD countries and several other countries are members, but the EU and the EIB together own 57% of the share capital. Technical assistance and increasingly also investment support is provided by the PHARE (Poland and Hungary Assistance to the Reconstruction of the Economy) and TACIS (Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States) programmes. Both programmes allocate only minor amounts for environmental purposes; for the PHARE programme, which is targeted towards Central Europe and the Baltic states, the share decreased from 20% to 5% during 1991-4, and in the TACIS programme the share is even smaller as the environment is not even mentioned as a priority field.

The Nordic countries own the NIB (Nordic Investment Bank), established in 1975, which has provided some loans for environmental activities in the Baltic countries, particularly through the BIP (Baltic Investment Programme), a facility of 30 million ECU during 1992-5 for loans with a full government guarantee to small and medium-sized firms in the Baltic countries on the condition that projects are both economically and environmentally viable, and through the

NEFCO (Nordic Environment Finance Corporation) established in 1990 for environmental investment loans to Central and Eastern Europe. Other Nordic institutions co-operating with NIB include the NDF (Nordic Development Fund) and NOPEF (Nordic Project Export Fund).

An assessment of foreign environmental assistance must take the motivations of donor and recipient countries as its point of departure. On the part of the donor countries one type of motivation is the concern for improving the environment, in the recipient countries, in the donor country itself due to local transboundary effects, and

in a global perspective. Economic interests are another possible motivation. There is an interest in supporting the domestic industry for anti-pollution equipment and the consultancy industry. For the EU there is an interest in upgrading environmental policy in Central and Eastern European countries in order to prevent “environmental dumping” from their export sectors.

The main priority of recipient countries is projects with an economic growth potential, as concern for the environment faded after the collapse of communism concurrently with the deepening of the economic recession. Even if the general political priority of upgrading the environment prevails, it is not evident that additional funds in the Nordic countries for environmental policy should always be allocated to Central and Eastern Europe rather than to domestic uses. Many types of pollution are not more severe in Eastern than in Western Europe. However, it could nevertheless be cost-efficient to invest in Central and Eastern Europe, where pollution is concentrated on particular types and places and therefore it is relatively inexpensive to reduce, for example waste water outlets and sulphur emissions from a limited number of cities and industries. Pollution of the Baltic Sea is partly due to untreated waste water from urban areas and industries in the eastern countries, which can be remedied at fairly low cost compared to pollution of the sea from, for example, Denmark, which is mainly caused by agricultural fertilizer usage.

However, it is also repeatedly stated as a motivation for Danish environmental support to Central and Eastern European countries that cross-frontier pollution from these countries contributes significantly to local environmental problems in Denmark, which is – apart from the potential threat of nuclear contamination – contrary to fact, as Denmark is a net exporter of air pollution and is itself the cause of most of the pollution of the inner Danish waters. The probability that Denmark receives sulphur pollution emitted in Denmark is 50-100 times larger than the probability of receiving pollution emitted in Poland. Therefore, from a narrow Danish point of view, if the aim is to improve the environment in Denmark, available funds are more effectively spent in Denmark rather than in, for example, Poland, because the costs of pollution control are not so much lower in Poland than in Denmark. Similar considerations apply to the other Nordic countries vis-à-vis the Baltic states, as they only import small amounts of pollution, the most significant being imports of sulphur pollution to Finland from Estonia (cf. Aage 1998c:203-228).



Figure 176. Forests in Silesia have been damaged by salt water being pumped out of coal mines. Since the early 1990s, a visible improvement of the environment in the so-called “triangle of death” in Upper Silesia has been noted. Photo: Paweł Migula

5. Environmental policy

Despite the evident differences between the countries in the Baltic region concerning the state of the economy and the environment, there are several similarities and many common problems for environmental and resource policy.

A common task for energy policy is to improve efficiency and to adjust to expected higher costs of energy consumption. This is one among many areas where the eastern countries have had to free themselves from the Soviet legacy, namely to remove subsidies and increase energy prices from the very low Soviet levels to world market prices, and this has been a difficult task with consequences for social policy as well as for business competitiveness. Another common endeavour is to substitute less polluting and possibly renewable resources for oil. The Baltic countries in particular want to reduce their dependency upon Russian oil, but in this as in many other respects economic considerations have taken priority. Nuclear power is important in Sweden and Lithuania and is also used in Finland. Sweden has decided to phase out nuclear power, but the time schedule is still subject to debate. In Lithuania proposals in the early 1990s for closing down the Ignalina nuclear power plant were suspended for economic reasons, and efforts have been concentrated on improving nuclear safety with assistance from international, including Swedish and Danish, experts. Now, the EU requires the Ignalina plant to be closed down by 2005 (*The Economist*, 11 December 1999, p 29).



Figure 177. Although ecologism has influenced the style of life in the Scandinavian countries, it is not too difficult to take pictures like this even there. Photo: Katarzyna Skalska

Resource management is becoming an issue particularly in some of the Nordic countries. In Iceland, overfishing of stocks has occurred recently, and it proved difficult to gain support for the more strict policies now pursued. In the Faeroe Islands, which enjoy home rule within the Danish kingdom, an overfishing crisis caused a collapse of the economy in the early 1990s. Oil resources in the Norwegian and Danish sectors of the North Sea are being depleted at rather fast rates of exploitation because of the temporary increase of world market prices for oil in the 1970s, and the fixed rates persisted in the 1990s despite low oil prices. Utilization of forest resources is regulated by the governments. In Estonia exploitation of oil-shale has been reduced in recent years, and mining of phosphorite for fertilizer was discontinued in 1991, both because of severe environmental impacts.

Environmental policies concerning air pollution in the Nordic countries started in the 1970s, and effects have been considerable in reducing primarily sulphur dioxide emissions, but also other types of emissions including pollution from motor cars and in recent years carbon dioxide emissions. Water pollution originating in agriculture, households and industry has also been reduced, but in Denmark the outcome of an expensive water purification programme has been disappointing mainly because of economic consequences for agriculture. In the Baltic countries and Poland, environmental policies were less strict in the Soviet period, when norms were often stringent but enforcement lenient, and during the transition period economic growth has been an overwhelming concern. But now environmental policies are being initiated. Due to the concentration of pollution to specific areas, environmental improvements can be achieved at relatively low costs.

In all the countries long-term sustainability is the declared ambition of environmental and resource policy, but except for fisheries and forest management policies they are mostly in a research and preparation stage. Research is carried out concerning accounting and substitutability between man-made physical and human capital on the one hand and natural capital on the other hand, and technological development of renewable resources is supported. But the general conclusion is that much remains to be done before sustainability can be achieved.

Despite all the differences concerning initial economic conditions, resource and environmental situations and policy problems, when it comes to the choice of policy instruments there are many similarities and common experiences. In all countries in the region it is acknowledged that governmental regulation of environment and resources is badly needed. Four types of instruments are generally under consideration: administrative regulation, taxation, transferable quotas and permits, and public investment and subsidies. So far, administrative regulation has been used most extensively, but there is a common trend to prefer economic incentives, and they are being increasingly introduced. Transferable catch quotas have been used in the Icelandic fisheries management since the 1980s, and systems of environmental taxation are increasingly used in all the countries, but in many cases, particularly in the eastern countries, rates of taxation are still low. The most elaborate system of taxation seems to be in effect in Sweden (Aage 1998c; Bluffstone 1997; OECD 2001).

Although notably transferable quotas and permits are usually referred to as market-oriented, all four types of instruments are basically incentive mechanisms for centrally decided policies, as total amounts of resource use and pollution are set politically and market allocation is limited to the distribution of the totals between various uses. Differences could easily be overrated. Even administrative regulation becomes a purely economic incentive in terms of fines, if the criminality of offending regulations is ignored by the public. Furthermore, taxation and the use of transferable permits have similar effects in many respects. However, there are several merits related to strong economic incentives and to "the polluter pays principle", including the possibility of providing funding for public environmental investments (OECD 1999b, 2001).

Common to all policy instruments is the serious problem of monitoring and the related problem of communicating environmental policies to the public. In all the countries' schemes for co-operation between government, local governments and organizations are being developed for these purposes. Like monetary policy, environmental policy is an area where politicians may be tempted to disregard long-term costs in the pursuit of short-term gains, and hence there is an argument for delegating environmental decisions to independent bodies as is the case for monetary authorities, in other words to create "environmental boards" in parallel



Figure 178. The northern outskirts of the region are most effectively protected against pollution. Photo: Andrzej Szmal

with the “currency boards” now established in the Baltic countries. An example of this kind of independent body exists in the Scandinavian countries, namely the so-called Water Courts, which are entitled with certain discretionary powers. Thus, the construction of hydropower plants and some other types of constructions including the bridge across the Sound between Sweden and Denmark require permission from the Swedish Water Court (*Vattendomstolen*).

6. Policy debates

In the late 1980s environmental problems came to the fore of public debate, particularly in the Baltic countries. This was a field where public debate was possible, and the green movement played a significant role in the liberation from Soviet rule. However, during the transition the green parties lost momentum, and concurrently with the deepening of the economic recession environmental problems were crowded out from the policy debate by acute economic concerns. This is also reflected in public opinion polls.

In the Nordic countries a public debate on environmental problems has been going on with varying degrees of intensity for three decades, and there are green organizations with large memberships and also some political influence. The two sides in the debate are often environmentalist on the one side and representatives for economic interests such as fisheries or agriculture on the other. A third party is scientists, and a fourth is economists. Although the economists were not very active in fostering the environmental debate, in recent years they have tried hard to convince the public of the merits of economic incentives in environmental policy. Large parts of the green movements have regarded these economic policy instruments as suspect or even unethical in relation to environmental problems. Thus it appears that even economists have a mission to accomplish in promoting the resource and environmental policies required.

52 Labour market policies

Susanne Oxenstierna

1. Introduction

When it became evident in the late 1980s that Soviet-type socialism had failed, there was a fear that mass unemployment would be a major problem these economies would have to face and deal with. It was expected that the structural change induced by the change of demand for products when the economies were liberalised and the old CMEA system broken up would result in large amounts of workers being laid off, and that this process would be aggravated by privatisation, which would induce a rise in productivity and efficiency. Labour hoarding was a salient feature of the Soviet-type economies, which together with the political priorities for military and heavy industry production created artificial “labour shortages” and economic inefficiency. It was believed that the transition to a market system would lead to increased efficiency of the economies and would inevitably create high unemployment and high social costs.

This rather gloomy picture of the prospects of employment and the labour market made the introduction of active labour market policy an important subject for technical assistance to the Eastern European countries, the Baltic States and Russia in the 1990s. Sweden, with its long traditions of labour policies, and the development of the Rehn-Meidner model of active labour market policies in the late 1940s, has had the introduction of modern employment services and active labour market policy as a main priority in its technical assistance to the East bloc since 1992. The World Bank and Germany have played important roles in developing the labour market infrastructure, and several other countries such as Denmark, Ireland, UK, France, and Canada have had major bilateral projects in the area. For the candidate countries, adjustments to EU-standards in the fields of employment legislation, social partnership, vocational training and re-training, the modern “brokerage” service of a public employment service, job creation, and active labour market measures, have been main topics of several bilateral and regional Phare projects and in projects preparing for support from European structural funds.

What results do we see now after a decade of reforms on the labour markets in Eastern Europe, the Baltic States and Russia? Are unemployment rates high? Have active labour market policies played a role in the adjustment of labour markets to the new conditions?

The purpose of this chapter is to trace some of the main trends in these issues and see what the key problems are that need to be addressed in the near future. Since this is part of a text book for an interdisciplinary university course, it starts with a brief presentation of the theoretical framework, which identifies which indicators should be studied and their internal relations, how active labour market policies fit into this model, and then we look at the development of these indicators in some Eastern European countries over the years.

2. Labour market theory

In simple economic theory, the labour market is seen as a market like other markets, with a supply and demand side and a price – the wage or salary – which at a certain level will equalise the quantity of labour demanded and the quantity supplied. When there is an oversupply of labour on the labour market, i.e. the quantity of labour supplied is higher than the quantity of labour demanded, there is *unemployment*. In the simplest theory, a wage level that is too high seems to be an answer to why there is unemployment. However, other factors influence the picture as well so this is not a full answer. Labour is not a good like any other good although traditional market theory may rather be applied to analyse this market. Some important modifications of that theory must however be taken into account to make the analysis appropriate. There are some of the most relevant aspects which must be taken into account.

Labour supply. The labour supply is made up by the employed and the job seekers looking for jobs. When a person works he/she gives up free time to earn money to earn an income to buy goods and services. The choice could also be about allocating your time between free time, market work and work at home, e.g. taking care of your children, cooking and cleaning, repairing your house, or cultivating vegetables. The supply of labour, or *labour supply*, i.e. how much labour in terms of hours and number of people is supplied on the market, thus depends on how you value your free time as opposed to market work and how you value work at home as opposed to market work, apart from the wage or salary you may earn on the market.

In economic statistics, only market work is counted as work, and people are counted as *employed* only if they have official jobs on the market. Home production that is not sold on a market is not counted in the statistics of a country's GDP (Gross Domestic Product) although it might be an important contributor in the creation of national wealth.

Another type of employment, which is also lacking in national statistics, is the work in the “shadow economy” or *unofficial sector*. Basically reference is made here to work that is done without the appropriate taxes being paid (and not to in other ways criminal activities). That is, you work, or provide goods and services, and get your income unofficially so you avoid paying income tax or social tax, or any sales tax, VAT or other direct taxes. Thus, an individual could face the choice of getting an official job in the official economy, or work in the shadow economy not paying taxes, or be engaged in a mixture of these kinds of activities.

A final important factor influencing the choice of the individual of whether to work on the market at all and in that case how much, is what other incomes he/she may have without working. This income may come from another member of the household who works or earns an income that you may use, it could be a capital income or a pension, or allowances and social benefits that you are entitled to, e.g. child allowances, social benefits, and unemployment benefits.

From this very brief summary on how traditional labour market theory explains how much labour in terms of people and hours is supplied on the labour market, we may summarise that:

The theory takes its starting point in the individual's choice between free time and working time. Working time could be done as official market work for a taxable salary, in home production without a salary, and in jobs in the unofficial sector with a non-taxed income.

The choice of the individual on whether to work or not and how many hours/days per year, is influenced by the wage that he/she can earn in an official job, as we would expect from standard economic theory. However, other factors also influence this choice: how free time is valued, how the results of home production in relation to work incomes which gives the opportunity to buy goods and services is valued, and possibilities to work in the unofficial sector.

The choice of the individual is also influenced by the incomes the individual has without working. If these incomes are enough for the person to live on he/she might refrain from working altogether or, if they are increased from an initial low level, work less than previously.

As seen, the theory is based on what individuals think and what their choices are. If there is not an assumption that all individuals are alike (that is called that labour is assumed to be homogenous), this means different individuals will behave differently, and what the exact effects will be can only be verified by empirical analysis.

This framework allows us to analyse, explain and to a certain degree forecast why certain changes occur to labour supply.

Examples. For instance, what happens if the non-work income is increased, e.g. child allowances or pensions are increased? Some people will find that their total income now allows them to work less, or quit the labour market, while others will keep their present work and just enjoy a higher living standard.

Or what happens with labour supply if the income tax on earnings is increased? Well, this change affects people with an official labour income, and we could expect some of them to increase their labour supply, because the net income they get from their work is decreased and if they want to keep their present living standards (i.e. be able to buy the same amount of goods and services as before) they must supply more working hours. Others might find that the net pay-off to official work has gone down to a level where they prefer to spend more time at home because the value of more free time is higher than the marginal income from work or home production becomes more profitable in light of the new tax. Some people might choose to quit their jobs altogether, some might choose to work more on the “black market” instead.

Theory cannot say which of the effects will be largest, that income has become lower, which would induce the individuals to work more (this is called the *income effect*) or that free time or time spent in other activities becomes “cheaper” since the net salary goes down, which would induce the individuals to work less (this is called the *substitution effect*). However, in most text books it is assumed that when we add all individual labour supply curves we have a market labour supply curve which shows a positive relation to the wage level, i.e. the higher the net wage of the workers the more labour is supplied.

Of course, a more sophisticated theoretical and empirical analysis is necessary to give full answers to the questions asked above as well as other questions. This, however, gives a basic framework for reasoning around labour supply.

Labour demand. On the other side of the labour market we have the employers, the firms. In standard economic theory, firms are assumed to be a *profit maximiser*. From this behavioural assumption, it follows that the firms shall employ workers until the value of the marginal increase of revenues which can be obtained by increasing production (called the value *marginal product* of labour) by increasing employment by one person, should be equal to the increase in extra costs, that is the wage cost and other employee-linked costs, caused by employing that worker.




Figure 179. The political transition and its results have changed the structure of economy, the societies and the work morals. Ill.: Małgorzata Sheiki-Bińkowska

This theory also says that the labour demand of firms is downward sloping with regard to wages, i.e. the firms will employ more labour the lower the wage.

Price of labour. The mechanism that is supposed to keep the labour market in equilibrium is a flexible wage. If there is an oversupply of labour, the wage should go down and

if there is overdemand the wage should go up and thereby the quantity of labour demanded and the quantity supplied should be adjusted.

However, modern, Western European, labour markets do not work in this way, particularly not when it comes to wage adjustments downwards. In most countries and professions wages are regulated by contracts or agreements which last for periods of a year, and sudden demand shocks cannot be adjusted by immediate wage cuts. Also wages are largely set by agreements between trade unions and employer organisations and there is a large degree of wage rigidity in the systems, since relative wages between different groups are strongly monitored, and short-term wage adjustments are difficult to achieve in the short run, and therefore the adjustment has to be made in the long term.

From a macro-economic policy perspective, upward adjustments of wages in the case of increases in general demand are problematic because they create inflation. Likewise, downward pressure on wages may create depression since lower wages means lower incomes and lower purchasing power. It is therefore in the interest of policy makers to intervene and help the labour market to adjust. Another strong argument is of course that unemployment is bad because it is a waste of resources and the unemployed individuals have to bear social costs.

The role of active labour market policies. Labour is a *heterogeneous* factor of production, which means that people have different abilities, education, and professions. Firms need different kinds of labour since they produce in different sectors and, within the firms, for different tasks. Thus, one worker might not be a perfect substitute for another, and jobs might not be perfect substitutes for one another. So the “labour market” can be seen as a set of several labour markets for different kinds of workers. There is a market for “highly skilled metal workers”, there is a market for “secretaries”, for “engineers”, etc. When the economy is undergoing structural change, unemployment is often caused by workers being laid off in one sector, while other sectors are expanding. In order to redeploy the laid off workers, they might need retraining to acquire skills needed in the new jobs.

Heterogeneity of labour in terms of skills and education is one important task of active labour market policies. It is to identify the needs for different professions and skills on the expanding part of the labour market, identify the abilities of laid off workers and other job seekers and give them training and retraining so they can find new jobs quickly.

Regional demand and labour policy

Thus differences in the regional demand and supply of labour create several important tasks for active labour market policy, and these tasks are usually performed by a public employment service: to have tight employer contacts to find out what vacancies employers can offer, to provide information to the unemployed about existing vacancies, assist the employers and unemployed job seekers by screening job seekers and assisting them in their job search – a sort of brokerage function. In addition, support for increased labour mobility might be necessary, and this may entail both geographical and professional mobility.

Overdemand, or overheating, on the labour market is bad because labour shortage creates bottlenecks in production and firms cannot expand as they want. Also, this can cause a strong upwards pressure on wages, which may eventually create too high a wage level in the region or the country as a whole as other groups follow with high wage demands, and this can lead to inflation, loss of competitive power and eventually to unemployment.

3. Employment

A main trend in the adjustments in transition economies is a decline in employment, and although economic recovery has come in some countries, the employment level in most countries is still at a lower level than before the beginning of the transition. This has followed from a sharp drop in production during the first years of transition. However, the decline in employment is much less pronounced than that of production, which means that adjustments of employment have been shared by effects other than increases in unemployment.

Table 55. Employment in selected East European countries 1989-2001, thousand people

	1989	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Estonia	837,9	656	646	644	636	610	605	593
Latvia	1 171	1 046	1 018	1 037	1 043	1 038	1 038	1 035
Lithuania	1 545	1 632	1 620	1 571	1 598	1 598	1 518	Na
Poland	17 002	14 735	15 041	15 439	15 425	na	Na	Na
Russia	72 071*	66 441	65 950	64 639	63 642	63 227	64 732	Na

*1992

Sources: Central statistical offices of respective country. Oxenstierna, 1992, p. 228; Gruzevskis, 1999, p. 13; Sztanderska, 1999, p. 11

Several adjustment mechanisms may be traced, which produced this result:

Increased home and agricultural production. In some countries, the decline of employment in industry has been counteracted by a constant rise in employment in agriculture (e.g. Lithuania). Thus, some people have chosen (or been forced to, due to the lack of other opportunities) to go back to cultivate their small plots of land instead of becoming unemployed. Since productivity is usually lower in agriculture than in industry, and the small-scale farming has a very low capital intensity, this is an efficiency loss for the economy.

In other countries (like e.g. Poland) the economic recovery has been largely driven by an expansion of the service sector. Since this sector was underdeveloped compared to Western

European economies during the socialist period, this is seen as a positive development, although productivity in the service sector is difficult to measure.

Increase in the inactive population and decrease of employment rates. Another characteristic is the decrease in employment rates, which reflects a decrease in labour force participation but also that people are rationed on the labour market. Some people prefer and choose to stay outside the labour force because they have other income to live on – the salary of a spouse, social allowance, pensions. However, there might also be the effect of the discouraged worker; this means that people who have lost their job do not see how they could find a new one, and therefore do not actively search for a job. A relatively stronger decrease in female labour force participation rates than male rates is a feature in most countries. This probably reflects that some women choose to stay at home with young children, or that their husbands demand this, but it might also be a reflection of increased difficulties of women in finding jobs in the evolving competitive market economies.

Yet compared to the EU-averages, the East European countries compare well regarding female employment rates. As seen from Table 56, it is the male employment rates in prime working wages that lag behind.

Table 56. Employment rates in EU- and selected candidate countries in Eastern Europe, 2000

Age		EU-15	Estonia	Latvia	Lithuania	Poland	Denmark	Germany	Finland	Sweden
15-24	Men	43.3	31.4	35.2	30.2	26.4	70.3	48.6	47.0	36.6
15-24	Women	36.5	23.2	25.6	23.2	21.9	64.0	43.6	43.8	37.1
25-54	Men	87.1	79.5	75.4	75.1	77.5	88.3	87.4	84.6	84.1
25-54	Women	65.7	74.2	73.0	76.8	64.5	80.4	71.1	77.6	80.9
55-64	Men	47.6	50.2	48.3	52.2	37.4	61.9	46.2	41.8	67.0
55-64	Women	27.7	37.5	25.9	34.5	21.8	46.2	28.7	40.7	61.7
20-64	Men	77.1	72.3	69.0	68.6	67.9	82.4	76.5	75.5	78.2
20-64	Women	57.0	63.2	59.9	64.7	54.5	73.3	60.7	69.0	74.4

Source: Swedish Central Statistical Office, www.scb.se

Work in the informal sector. Work in the informal sector, or “shadow economy”, is another reason for the rise in the number of non-employed and decline in official employment. The informal sector is estimated to a range of 12-40 percent of the GDP in the East European countries. It also seems that many people combine a job in the formal sector with either work in the informal economy or different kinds of home production. Work in the shadow economy and in home production might seem profitable in the short run. However, it can have severe repercussions later in your work life, since no contributions are paid into the social security system. Eligibility to unemployment benefits and pensions are, as a rule, conditioned on that both workers and employers pay contributions.

Continued subsidies to the old sector. Despite the fact that large parts of the production in the post-communist countries was not in demand after the start of transition, these producers got continued subsidies from the state and did not have to adjust their employment. To some extent this was motivated by the fact that employment in an enterprise not only provided the worker with a job, but a lot of social services, such as e.g. housing, child care etc. was linked to the job, making it difficult to lay off workers. The crisis in Russia in 1998, put a hard pressure on the old sector both in the country itself, and in other Eastern European countries, which still exported to Russia. This resulted in decreased subsidies and old com-

panies having to lay off staff and in increased unemployment.

Wage cuts. The fact that the old sector of production did not have to lay off workers at the pace expected before the introduction of market reforms, has been achieved by employees taking considerable real wage cuts. This adjustment has been achieved by the labour force losing real consumer purchasing power as the price level has increased compared to nominal wages in all these economies, and an increasing gap between wages in the old state (and eventually privatised) sector and the new private sector. This also reflects the decline in productivity in the old sector, caused by the fact that employment reductions were not made, and instead “too many” people kept their jobs at declining real wages.

In Russia, the wage cuts have been severe, and during long periods the old industry and the public sector have been unable to meet their payrolls, which has resulted in considerable wage arrears. It appears that payment arrears is a salient feature, typical of countries in the previous Soviet Union, and not such a pronounced problem in the other Eastern European economies.

The degree to which wage reductions have taken place spontaneously, and been used as a conscious means in the adjustments to the new conditions, stand in sharp contrast to developments in Western European labour markets, where economic accommodation in the 1990s has been made through very high unemployment. A part of the answer to why this has been possible is the absence of organised workers and trade unions with wage issues on their agenda, the fact that workers have been tied to their enterprise for other basic needs and social services, and the occurrence of unemployment, combined with weak social safety nets, which has meant strong competition for the existing jobs.

4. Unemployment

Despite these adjustment mechanisms, which have implied that the drop in production has been followed by less fall in employment than could have been expected, unemployment has occurred, and most countries have experienced unemployment rates of 8-15 percent. In some countries, the figure has been around 20 percent, and there are big regional differences within the countries, implying both considerably lower and considerably higher unemployment. This is according to the labour force surveys, which were introduced in all countries. The labour force surveys follow the ILO convention for who is to be considered unemployed: i) during a reference week, he/she neither worked nor was temporarily absent from work; ii) he/she was actively seeking work during the past four weeks; iii) he/she was immediately available to start work within two weeks.

Unemployment was a phenomenon unheard of in the socialist economies, since employment was a right and obligatory for all citizens. Yet, some unemployment existed in the form




Figure 180. Ill.: Małgorzata Sheiki-Bińkowska

of frictional unemployment, since new entrants did not always find jobs immediately after having finished school and there was considerable job turnover and what, by Western definitions, would be considered unemployment in connection with job change.

Table 57. Unemployment rates in selected countries in Eastern Europe 1995-2001, percent

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Estonia	9.7	10	9.7	9.9	12.3	13.7	na
Latvia	Na	19.4	14.8	14	13.5	13.2	13.5
Lithuania	Na	8.1	6.3	7.5	8.1	11.1	13.2
Poland*	14.9	13.2	10.5	10.4	na	13.7	15.6
Russia	9.5	na	11.8	13.3	12.9	na	na

*Registered unemployment. The other countries' figures are Labour force survey data.

Source: Central statistical offices of the respective countries; Sztanderska, 1999; Huitfeldt 2001

Still, with underdeveloped social safety nets to take care of the unemployed, unemployment was a scary phenomenon in the start of the transition. Employment legislation had to be reformed to encompass how to regulate the rights of the unemployed people and how to provide income compensation in connection with unemployment spells. Most countries introduced an unemployment insurance system at the beginning of the 1990s. Replacement rates have, as a rule, been very low. Poland has been an exception, and had quite a generous system, which has also been reflected in that registered unemployment has been higher than unemployment reported in the labour force surveys.

5. Labour Market Policies

All Eastern European countries introduced public employment services (PES), which are responsible for giving people the status of unemployed, which in turn gives the right to unemployment benefits. It was also understood that PES had to fulfil the function of brokers between employers and job seekers and that active measures such as vocational counselling and retraining, public works etc would be needed to help laid off workers on the new labour market.

A developed public employment service is an important part in the adjustment to EU-conditions of the candidate countries. Programmes for promoting national infrastructure and providing conditions for the four “pillars” in employment policies – employability, adaptability, entrepreneurship and equal opportunities – are funded by Phare, and there are projects preparing the countries for assistance from the EU Social & Structural Funds. Therefore, these countries have generally more developed labour policies than e.g. Russia. There are, however, big differences between countries and regions, e.g. Lithuania has a very developed employment service in comparison to its Baltic neighbours, and some regions in Russia have well-developed employment services, usually they are then supported by the



Figure 181. Marketplace in St Petersburg. Photo: Alfred F. Majewicz

regional authorities and foreign assistance projects, since the concepts of active labour market policy at the federal level are not very advanced.

The PES work with the unemployed who are registered with them and this might be quite different numbers from those considered unemployed, according to the labour force surveys which use the ILO's definition of unemployment. In some countries, the figures for registered unemployment are just a third or half of what is presented in Table 57. The difference is due to the fact that employment legislation gives the status of unemployed to people not answering to the ILO criteria. It depends on what the generosity of the unemployment benefit system is, and that all those who are unemployed according to the labour force surveys do not register with the PES for different reasons.

The resources given to labour market policy vary with the political commitment to these issues and so does the proportion between passive and active labour policy, and how much investment PES is given to develop their services to a European level.

In all Phare countries, EU projects have supported the reform of the vocational training system in order for these educational and training systems to better answer to the present labour market demand for skills. This is the basis for continuing training and retraining also of unemployed adults, and important for developing training as an active labour market measure. Vocational training projects, and the ongoing educational reform in Russia that encompasses the reform of professional training, and the fact that several regional labour services in Russia already use competitive bidding systems for purchasing training for their unemployed has helped in developing the vocational training sector and creating a market for training organisers in Russia as well.

6. Conclusions

The adjustments of labour markets in Eastern Europe have been characterised by a decline in employment, but this has not only resulted in sharp increases of unemployment. Other effects have occurred due to the fact that adjustments have been achieved not only by laying off workers. At the beginning of the transition, unemployment increased only slowly, because workers were not laid off from the unprofitable old sector, but kept at low wages. Also, some parts of the population have chosen to leave the labour force. Some of these work in agriculture on their own plots in small-scale farming. Others work in the unofficial economy, which means they are economically active but this is not registered. This has potential negative effects on their social protection later, since no contributions are paid to the social security system, and unemployment benefits and pensions are often conditional upon contributions having been paid both by the employer and the employee.

Reduction in real wages has been a way of labour market adjustment, which is characteristic of Eastern Europe and was not highly expected in Western Europe, where labour markets are strongly regulated and there are strong trade unions that make it difficult to achieve labour market adjustment through wage adjustments, and instead unemployment rates increased substantially in the 1990s. However, this has also created poverty, and many people need to work on several jobs to survive.

Yet, even with these effects, which have dampened the increase of unemployment, unemployment exists and is an issue for policy makers. Employment services have been created in all the countries and there are both systems for passive and active labour policies. In most countries, however, the part of the unemployed that the employment service serves is quite

small. This is because legislation in most of countries has definitions of unemployed that differ from the ILO definition used in the labour force surveys, which allow for international comparisons of unemployment rates. Also, the degree of assistance that may be given is sometimes very marginal, so the unemployed do not turn to the employment offices.

A problem in all countries is the limited means for labour market polices, and there is a tendency to stress passive labour market polices over active ones. In many countries labour polices are more a part of social policies than a part of economic policies, which might both be due to political conviction – those who want jobs find them whatever the economic situation, and those who cannot find a job should just have income support at the minimum subsistence level. Probably, the role of active labour market policy will increase in economies which will experience growth during the next years, since the cost of having idle resources then increases and it becomes evident that unemployment supported only by income subsidies, and a decreasing labour force through people leaving the official employment sphere, will benefit neither economic development, nor the possibility of accession to EU membership.

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THE AUTHORS

Introduction – How to study a region

Lars Rydén, Prof., Uppsala University, Uppsala (The Baltic Sea region and the relevance of regional approaches and chapter 46)

Witold Maciejewski, Prof., Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań (On the emergence of the Baltic Sea region and the reading of the book)

Section I

Kristian Gerner, Prof., Uppsala University (editor and author of chapters 1-6)

Alena Korshuk, Assoc. Prof., Belarusian State University, Minsk (case chapter 1)

Ilja Solomeshch, Assoc. Prof., Petrozavodsk State University (case chapter 2)

Section II

Folke Bohlin, Prof., Lund University (case chapter 3, p. 7 and 10)

Michał Buchowski, Prof., Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań and of Central European Studies, European University-Viadrina, Frankfurt an der Oder (chapter 8)

Helen Krag, Prof., Copenhagen University (p. 10.6)

Jan Ling, Prof., University of Göteborg (case chapter 3)

Witold Maciejewski, Prof., Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań (Introduction)

Kazimierz Musiał, Ph D, University of Gdansk (chapter 14)

Thorleif Pettersson, Prof., Uppsala University (chapter 12)

Bernard Piotrowski, Prof., Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań (chapter 13)

Lennart Tegborg, Assoc. Prof., Uppsala University (chapter 11)

Charles Westin, Prof., Stockholm University (chapters 9 and 10)

Andrzej Wozniński, , PhD, University of Gdańsk (case chapter 4)

Section III

Éva Ágnes Csató, Assoc. Prof., Uppsala University (case chapter 6)

Sven Gustavsson, Prof., Uppsala University (chapters 15 – 18)

Alena Korshuk, Assoc. Prof., Belarusian State University, Minsk (case chapter 1)

Henryk Jankowski, Prof., Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań (Sample of a manuscript of the Karaim Bible)

Witold Maciejewski, Prof., Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań (Introduction and Note on communicative communities)

Birger Winsa, Ass. Prof., Stockholm University (Note on the youngest language of the Baltic region)

Section IV

Hans Aage, Prof., University of Roskilde (chapter 25)

Jan Assarson, (Jan Teorell), Researcher, Uppsala University (co-editor of chapters 19 – 23)

Sten Berglund, Prof., Åbo Academy/Wasa (p. 22.2)

Li Bennich-Björkman, Assoc. Prof., Uppsala University (Introduction, chapter 27 and case chapter 7)

Jan-Åke Dellenbrandt, Assoc. Prof., Umeå University (p. 19.3 and 22.4)

Gunilla Edelstam, Assoc. Prof., Södertörn University College, Stockholm (chapter 24)

Sverker Gustavsson, Prof., Uppsala University (p. 21.1 and box on EU)

Axel Hadenius, Prof., Uppsala University (co-editor of chapters 19 – 23)

Per-Eric Högberg, Researcher, Uppsala University (p. 20.2 and 22.5)

Priit Järve, Dr, Estonian Academy of Science (Note on Citizenship and suffrage in Estonia)

Michele Micheletti, Assoc. Prof., Stockholm University (p. 22.1 and 22.3)

Jaako Nousiainen, Prof., Turku University (Note on Finnish Presidency)

Paweł Swianiewicz, Dr, Warsaw University (p. 21.2 – 3)

Halina Zboroń, Dr, Poznań School of Economics (chapter 26)

Section V

Hans Ingvar Roth, Ph D, Uppsala University (chapters 31 and 32)

Harald Runblom, Prof., Uppsala University (Introduction, chapters 28 – 30 and note on the Åland Islands)

Charles Westin, Prof., Stockholm University (p. 28.2)

Section VI

Katarina Engberg, Prof., Ministry of Defence, Sweden (co-author of chapter 38)

Björn Hagelin, Assoc. Prof., Uppsala University (chapter 37)

Lena Jonson, Ph D, The Swedish Institute of International Affairs (p. 34.5)

Michael Karlsson, Ph D, Södertörn University College, Stockholm (case chapter 8)

Claes Levinsson, Researcher, Uppsala University (co-author of updated versions of chapters 33 – 39)

Erik Melander, Researcher, Uppsala University (chapter 35)

Kjell-Åke Nordquist, Ph D, Uppsala University (chapter 36, co-author of chapters 33 and 34)

Peter Wallensteen, Prof., Uppsala University (Introduction, chapters 38 and 39. co-author of chapters 33 and 34)

Section VII

Eva Ericsson, Assoc. Prof., Lund University (chapter 44)

Sture Korpi, Director General, National Board of Institutional Care (chapter 46)

Witold Maciejewski, Prof., Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań (case chapter 10)

Andrey Manakov, Assoc. Prof., Pskov Pedagogical Institute (contributions to chapter 40)

Ingegerd Municio-Larsson, Assoc. Prof., Södertörn University College, Stockholm (chapter 42)

Gaiane Safarova, Ph.D, Researcher, St Petersburg Institute for Economics and Mathematics/Russian Academy of Sciences (chapter 41)

Vera Segraeus, Adjunct Professor, National Board of Institutional Care (chapter 46)

Dominika Skrzypek, M. A., Researcher, Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań (note on the flying university)

Marina Thorborg, Assoc. Prof., Södertörn University College, Stockholm (Introduction, chapters 40, 43, 45 and supplement on education)

Section VIII

Hans Aage, Prof., University of Roskilde (Introduction, chapters 47, 51 and 52)

Camilla Jensen, Ass. Prof., Odense University (co-author of chapter 49)

Klaus Meyer, Prof., Copenhagen Business School and Visiting Scholar, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (co-author of chapter 49)

Niels Mygind, Assoc. Prof., Director at Center of East European Studies, Copenhagen (chapter 48)

Susanne Oxenstierna, Project leader/Senior Lecturer, Stockholm University (chapter 53)

Alari Purju, Prof., Tallinn Technical University (chapter 50)

Cover p. 4

Douglas Harrison, M. A., Editing Adviser, Aberfoyle, Scotland

Maps and illustrations

Karin Hallgren (Uppsala)

Ulf Zander (Lund)

Rafał Przebitkowski (Poznań)

Małgorzata Sheiki-Bińkowska (Katowice)

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
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The Atlas of the BSR

Figure 182. *Carta marina* by Olavus Magnus, published 1539 in Venedig. III.: Uppsala University Library



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
Baltic Region – Physical features



The main regions in Europe



The main transborder regions in the BSR




Environmental pollution




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
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Precipitation



Climatic Regions (after Köppen)



Political Borders



Gross Domestic Product



Population



Corruption



Economics




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
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Main Conflicts



The World Human Development





This book about the peoples and societies of the Baltic Sea Region comprises some 60 essays and articles by 55 authors from numerous academic institutions around the Baltic Sea. The different chapters cover a wide range of subjects from politics and analyses of social and economic conditions to essays on history, art, culture, geography and the environment of the region.

The book is ideal for anyone who wants to acquire an in-depth understanding of the key issues facing the region today. It is the long, hard look at culture and history of the Baltic Sea Region in this book that shows that it is a region with an intensive mesh of historical and cultural exchange. Use this book as a reference and a guide to the Baltic Sea Region.